Abstract
The likely large-scale deployment of autonomous vehicle (AV) technology in the near future has the potential to fundamentally change the transportation landscape. Due to the high cost of AV hardware, the most likely path to widespread AV use is via platforms that can sustain high utilization, such as ride-hailing and delivery services. In this paper, we consider four potential operational models to commercialize AVs, which we model as a supply chain game between a platform, an AV supplier, and human drivers that join as individual contractors (ICs). Our operational models include (1) an open platform that outsources the high capital burden of AVs by allowing the AV supplier and human drivers to bring their own vehicles into the system, (2) an AV-only platform that is operated independently by the AV supplier, (3) a platform that sources AVs from the supplier through leasing contracts, and (4) an integrated supply chain in which the same entity operates the platform and supplies the AVs. We use (4) as a benchmark to measure the performances of the other models. We find that apart from operational model (2), all deployment models are subject to a risk of AV underutilization due to the need to maintain the ICs' utilization sufficiently high to ensure ICs remain engaged. In the non-integrated models, this risk can propagate backwards in the supply chain and thereby negatively affect its efficiency. In particular, as a result of AV underutilization, the supply chain profit of an open platform model can be arbitrarily smaller than the integrated benchmark. AV underutilization also arises in the presence of leasing contracts and leads to significant supply chain misalignment. The results demonstrate that the platform's optimal dispatch decision, via AV underutilization, may lead to market failures. In light of these market failures we explore potential contracting solutions through usage commitments. We find that when the platform can contractually commit to an AV utilization level under each demand realization in each scenario, the supply chain can be fully aligned. Moreover, even when demand is not fully contractible, well-designed dispatch commitments can still significantly increase the open platform efficiency. As a proof of concept, we show a guarantee of the following flavor for a simple prioritization contract: either the supply chain profit under the contract is at least half of that of an integrated supply chain or the supply chain can achieve half the profit of an integrated supply chain even without a contract. Despite the inability to fully align the supply chain, this contract demonstrates the value of supply chain contracts when compared to the potentially unbounded efficiency loss in the absence of a contract. In particular, with usage commitments, an open platform exhibits stronger theoretical guarantees and superior numerical performances compared to the other operational models considered in the paper, such as AV leasing or AV-only platforms.