Peter Norman Sørensen
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Peter Norman Sørensen has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Marco Ottaviani
Bocconi University - Department of Economics
15 shared publications Alfredo Di Tillio
4 shared publicationsJesper Pedersen
3 shared publicationsLones Smith
University of Wisconsin
3 shared publicationsRasmus Fatum
3 shared publicationsMarco Ottaviani
Department of Economics and IGIER, Bocconi University
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Information Comparison of Order Statistics, with Applications to Auctions and Voting
We compare the informativeness of order statistics in a sample of conditionally independent draws from a distribution F(x|θ) as the sample size n increases. The k-th highest of n + 1 draws is more accurate than the k-th highest of n if and only if the cumulative reverse hazard log F(x|θ) is log-supermodular. Symmetrically, the k-th lowest is more accurate if and only if the cumulative hazardlog(1-F(x|θ)) is log-supermodular. Reversals are exceptional, occurring only for experiments that are, up to increasing transformations, exponential location experiments. In large samples, middle order statistics are asymptotically fully informative, while bounded lower and upper ranks require unbounded informativeness tail conditions. When full learning fails, bounded ranks converge to location experiments, and more central ranks are Blackwell more informative. Extending the analysis from scalar order statistics to blocks of selected data, we obtain multidimensional comparisons under log-supermodularity of hazard rates. The results unify and extend information-aggregation results in auctions and provide a new order-statistic approach to strategic voting.
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessInformation Comparison of Order Statistics, with Applications to Auctions and Voting
We compare the informativeness of order statistics in a sample of conditionally independent draws from a distribution F(x|θ) as the sample size n increases. The k-th highest of n + 1 draws is more accurate than the k-th highest of n if and only if the cumulative reverse hazard log F(x|θ) is log-supermodular. Symmetrically, the k-th lowest is more accurate if and only if the cumulative hazardlog(1-F(x|θ)) is log-supermodular. Reversals are exceptional, occurring only for experiments that are, up to increasing transformations, exponential location experiments. In large samples, middle order statistics are asymptotically fully informative, while bounded lower and upper ranks require unbounded informativeness tail conditions. When full learning fails, bounded ranks converge to location experiments, and more central ranks are Blackwell more informative. Extending the analysis from scalar order statistics to blocks of selected data, we obtain multidimensional comparisons under log-supermodularity of hazard rates. The results unify and extend information-aggregation results in auctions and provide a new order-statistic approach to strategic voting.
- Open Access
- 28 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Information Comparison of Order Statistics, with Applications to Auctions and Voting
We compare the informativeness of order statistics in a sample of conditionally independent draws from a distribution F(x|θ) as the sample size n increases. The k-th highest of n + 1 draws is more accurate than the k-th highest of n if and only if the cumulative reverse hazard - log F(x|θ) is log-supermodular. Symmetrically, the k-th lowest is more accurate if and only if the cumulative hazard - log(1-F(x|θ)) is log-supermodular. Reversals are exceptional, occurring only for experiments that are, up to increasing transformations, exponential location experiments. In large samples, middle order statistics are asymptotically fully informative, while bounded lower and upper ranks require unbounded informativeness tail conditions. When full learning fails, bounded ranks converge to location experiments, and more central ranks are Blackwell more informative. Extending the analysis from scalar order statistics to blocks of selected data, we obtain multidimensional comparisons under log-supermodularity of hazard rates. The results unify and extend information-aggregation results in auctions and provide a new order-statistic approach to strategic voting.
- 28 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessInformation Comparison of Order Statistics, with Applications to Auctions and Voting
We compare the informativeness of order statistics in a sample of conditionally independent draws from a distribution F(x|θ) as the sample size n increases. The k-th highest of n + 1 draws is more accurate than the k-th highest of n if and only if the cumulative reverse hazard - log F(x|θ) is log-supermodular. Symmetrically, the k-th lowest is more accurate if and only if the cumulative hazard - log(1-F(x|θ)) is log-supermodular. Reversals are exceptional, occurring only for experiments that are, up to increasing transformations, exponential location experiments. In large samples, middle order statistics are asymptotically fully informative, while bounded lower and upper ranks require unbounded informativeness tail conditions. When full learning fails, bounded ranks converge to location experiments, and more central ranks are Blackwell more informative. Extending the analysis from scalar order statistics to blocks of selected data, we obtain multidimensional comparisons under log-supermodularity of hazard rates. The results unify and extend information-aggregation results in auctions and provide a new order-statistic approach to strategic voting.
- 25 February 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Review of Economic Studies
- Vol. 88 (5) , 2527-2554
Informational Herding, Optimal Experimentation, and Contrarianism
In the standard herding model, privately informed individuals sequentially see prior actions and then act. An identical action herd eventually starts and public beliefs tend to “cascade sets” where social learning stops. What behaviour is socially efficient when actions ignore informational externalities? We characterize the outcome that maximizes the discounted sum of utilities. Our four key findings are: (1) cascade sets shrink but do not vanish, and herding should occur but less readily as greater weight is attached to posterity. (2) An optimal mechanism rewards individuals mimicked by their successor. (3) Cascades cannot start after period one under a signal log-concavity condition. (4) Given this condition, efficient behaviour is contrarian, leaning against the myopically more popular actions in every period. We make two technical contributions: as value functions with learning are not smooth, we use monotone comparative statics under uncertainty to deduce optimal dynamic behaviour. We also adapt dynamic pivot mechanisms to Bayesian learning.
- 25 February 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Review of Economic Studies
- Vol. 88 (5) , 2527-2554
Informational Herding, Optimal Experimentation, and Contrarianism
In the standard herding model, privately informed individuals sequentially see prior actions and then act. An identical action herd eventually starts and public beliefs tend to “cascade sets” where social learning stops. What behaviour is socially efficient when actions ignore informational externalities? We characterize the outcome that maximizes the discounted sum of utilities. Our four key findings are: (1) cascade sets shrink but do not vanish, and herding should occur but less readily as greater weight is attached to posterity. (2) An optimal mechanism rewards individuals mimicked by their successor. (3) Cascades cannot start after period one under a signal log-concavity condition. (4) Given this condition, efficient behaviour is contrarian, leaning against the myopically more popular actions in every period. We make two technical contributions: as value functions with learning are not smooth, we use monotone comparative statics under uncertainty to deduce optimal dynamic behaviour. We also adapt dynamic pivot mechanisms to Bayesian learning.
- 1 January 2021
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 89 (2) , 911-953
Strategic Sample Selection
Are the highest sample realizations selected from a larger presample more or less informative than the same amount of random data? Developing multivariate accuracy for interval dominance ordered preferences, we show that sample selection always benefits (or always harms) a decision maker if the reverse hazard rate of the data distribution is log‐supermodular (or log‐submodular), as in location experiments with normal noise. We find nonpathological conditions under which the information contained in the winning bids of a symmetric auction decreases in the number of bidders. Exploiting extreme value theory, we quantify the limit amount of information revealed when the presample size (number of bidders) goes to infinity. In a model of equilibrium persuasion with costly information, we derive implications for the optimal design of selected experiments when selection is made by an examinee, a biased researcher, or contending sides with the peremptory challenge right to eliminate a number of jurors.
- 1 January 2021
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 89 (2) , 911-953
Strategic Sample Selection
Are the highest sample realizations selected from a larger presample more or less informative than the same amount of random data? Developing multivariate accuracy for interval dominance ordered preferences, we show that sample selection always benefits (or always harms) a decision maker if the reverse hazard rate of the data distribution is log‐supermodular (or log‐submodular), as in location experiments with normal noise. We find nonpathological conditions under which the information contained in the winning bids of a symmetric auction decreases in the number of bidders. Exploiting extreme value theory, we quantify the limit amount of information revealed when the presample size (number of bidders) goes to infinity. In a model of equilibrium persuasion with costly information, we derive implications for the optimal design of selected experiments when selection is made by an examinee, a biased researcher, or contending sides with the peremptory challenge right to eliminate a number of jurors.
- 1 October 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 127 (605) , F266-F304
Persuasion Bias in Science: Can Economics Help?
- 1 October 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 127 (605) , F266-F304
Persuasion Bias in Science: Can Economics Help?
- 1 January 2015
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 105 (1) , 01-34
Price Reaction to Information with Heterogeneous Beliefs and Wealth Effects: Underreaction, Momentum, and Reversal
This paper analyzes how asset prices in a binary market react to information when traders have heterogeneous prior beliefs. We show that the competitive equilibrium price underreacts to information when there is a bound to the amount of money traders are allowed to invest. Underreaction is more pronounced when prior beliefs are more heterogeneous. Even in the absence of exogenous bounds on the amount that traders can invest, prices underreact to information provided that traders become less risk averse as their wealth increases. In a dynamic setting, underreaction results in initial momentum and then reversal in the long run. (JEL D83, D84, G11, G12, G14)
- 1 January 2015
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 105 (1) , 01-34
Price Reaction to Information with Heterogeneous Beliefs and Wealth Effects: Underreaction, Momentum, and Reversal
This paper analyzes how asset prices in a binary market react to information when traders have heterogeneous prior beliefs. We show that the competitive equilibrium price underreacts to information when there is a bound to the amount of money traders are allowed to invest. Underreaction is more pronounced when prior beliefs are more heterogeneous. Even in the absence of exogenous bounds on the amount that traders can invest, prices underreact to information provided that traders become less risk averse as their wealth increases. In a dynamic setting, underreaction results in initial momentum and then reversal in the long run. (JEL D83, D84, G11, G12, G14)
- Open Access
- 1 May 2014
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 34, 66-74
Accept or reject? An organizational perspective
- 1 May 2014
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 34, 66-74
Open AccessAccept or reject? An organizational perspective
- Open Access
- 1 March 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of International Money and Finance
- Vol. 33, 103-117
The intraday effects of central bank intervention on exchange rate spreads
- 1 March 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of International Money and Finance
- Vol. 33, 103-117
Open AccessThe intraday effects of central bank intervention on exchange rate spreads
- 30 July 2011
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 97-104
Giffen Demand for Several Goods