Marco Ottaviani
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Marco Ottaviani has a total of 73 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Peter Norman Sørensen
University of Copenhagen
15 shared publications Roman Inderst
Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt and Imperial College London
7 shared publications- Albert Banal-Estañol
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona School of Management, Barcelona School of Economics, and City St George’s, University of London
3 shared publications Alfredo Di Tillio
3 shared publicationsAlbert Banal-Estañol
Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Department of Economics and Business (DEB); City University London - Department of Economics
2 shared publications- Christian Decker
Department of Economics, University of Zurich
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Information Comparison of Order Statistics, with Applications to Auctions and Voting
We compare the informativeness of order statistics in a sample of conditionally independent draws from a distribution F(x|θ) as the sample size n increases. The k-th highest of n + 1 draws is more accurate than the k-th highest of n if and only if the cumulative reverse hazard log F(x|θ) is log-supermodular. Symmetrically, the k-th lowest is more accurate if and only if the cumulative hazardlog(1-F(x|θ)) is log-supermodular. Reversals are exceptional, occurring only for experiments that are, up to increasing transformations, exponential location experiments. In large samples, middle order statistics are asymptotically fully informative, while bounded lower and upper ranks require unbounded informativeness tail conditions. When full learning fails, bounded ranks converge to location experiments, and more central ranks are Blackwell more informative. Extending the analysis from scalar order statistics to blocks of selected data, we obtain multidimensional comparisons under log-supermodularity of hazard rates. The results unify and extend information-aggregation results in auctions and provide a new order-statistic approach to strategic voting.
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessInformation Comparison of Order Statistics, with Applications to Auctions and Voting
We compare the informativeness of order statistics in a sample of conditionally independent draws from a distribution F(x|θ) as the sample size n increases. The k-th highest of n + 1 draws is more accurate than the k-th highest of n if and only if the cumulative reverse hazard log F(x|θ) is log-supermodular. Symmetrically, the k-th lowest is more accurate if and only if the cumulative hazardlog(1-F(x|θ)) is log-supermodular. Reversals are exceptional, occurring only for experiments that are, up to increasing transformations, exponential location experiments. In large samples, middle order statistics are asymptotically fully informative, while bounded lower and upper ranks require unbounded informativeness tail conditions. When full learning fails, bounded ranks converge to location experiments, and more central ranks are Blackwell more informative. Extending the analysis from scalar order statistics to blocks of selected data, we obtain multidimensional comparisons under log-supermodularity of hazard rates. The results unify and extend information-aggregation results in auctions and provide a new order-statistic approach to strategic voting.
- Open Access
- 28 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Information Comparison of Order Statistics, with Applications to Auctions and Voting
We compare the informativeness of order statistics in a sample of conditionally independent draws from a distribution F(x|θ) as the sample size n increases. The k-th highest of n + 1 draws is more accurate than the k-th highest of n if and only if the cumulative reverse hazard - log F(x|θ) is log-supermodular. Symmetrically, the k-th lowest is more accurate if and only if the cumulative hazard - log(1-F(x|θ)) is log-supermodular. Reversals are exceptional, occurring only for experiments that are, up to increasing transformations, exponential location experiments. In large samples, middle order statistics are asymptotically fully informative, while bounded lower and upper ranks require unbounded informativeness tail conditions. When full learning fails, bounded ranks converge to location experiments, and more central ranks are Blackwell more informative. Extending the analysis from scalar order statistics to blocks of selected data, we obtain multidimensional comparisons under log-supermodularity of hazard rates. The results unify and extend information-aggregation results in auctions and provide a new order-statistic approach to strategic voting.
- 28 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessInformation Comparison of Order Statistics, with Applications to Auctions and Voting
We compare the informativeness of order statistics in a sample of conditionally independent draws from a distribution F(x|θ) as the sample size n increases. The k-th highest of n + 1 draws is more accurate than the k-th highest of n if and only if the cumulative reverse hazard - log F(x|θ) is log-supermodular. Symmetrically, the k-th lowest is more accurate if and only if the cumulative hazard - log(1-F(x|θ)) is log-supermodular. Reversals are exceptional, occurring only for experiments that are, up to increasing transformations, exponential location experiments. In large samples, middle order statistics are asymptotically fully informative, while bounded lower and upper ranks require unbounded informativeness tail conditions. When full learning fails, bounded ranks converge to location experiments, and more central ranks are Blackwell more informative. Extending the analysis from scalar order statistics to blocks of selected data, we obtain multidimensional comparisons under log-supermodularity of hazard rates. The results unify and extend information-aggregation results in auctions and provide a new order-statistic approach to strategic voting.
- Open Access
Designing Scientific Grants
This paper overviews the economics of scientific grants, focusing on the interplay between the inherent uncertainty in research, researchers' incentives, and grant design. Grants differ from traditional market systems and other science and innovation policy tools, such as prizes and patents. We outline the main economic forces specific to science, noting the limited attention given to grant funding in the economics literature. Using tools from information economics, we identify key incentive problems at various stages of the grant funding process and offer guidance for effective grant design. In the allocation stage, funders aim to select the highest-merit applications while minimizing evaluation costs. The selection rule, in turn, impacts researchers' incentives to apply and invest in their proposals. In the grant management stage, funders monitor researchers to ensure efficient use of funds. We discuss the advantages and potential pitfalls of (partial) lotteries and emphasize the effectiveness of staged grant design in promoting a productive use of grants. Beyond these broadly applicable insights, our overview highlights the need for further research on grantmaking. Understudied areas include, at the micro level, the interplay of different grant funding stages, and at the macro level, the interaction of grants with other instruments in the market for science.
Open AccessDesigning Scientific Grants
This paper overviews the economics of scientific grants, focusing on the interplay between the inherent uncertainty in research, researchers' incentives, and grant design. Grants differ from traditional market systems and other science and innovation policy tools, such as prizes and patents. We outline the main economic forces specific to science, noting the limited attention given to grant funding in the economics literature. Using tools from information economics, we identify key incentive problems at various stages of the grant funding process and offer guidance for effective grant design. In the allocation stage, funders aim to select the highest-merit applications while minimizing evaluation costs. The selection rule, in turn, impacts researchers' incentives to apply and invest in their proposals. In the grant management stage, funders monitor researchers to ensure efficient use of funds. We discuss the advantages and potential pitfalls of (partial) lotteries and emphasize the effectiveness of staged grant design in promoting a productive use of grants. Beyond these broadly applicable insights, our overview highlights the need for further research on grantmaking. Understudied areas include, at the micro level, the interplay of different grant funding stages, and at the macro level, the interaction of grants with other instruments in the market for science.
- 1 February 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 70 (2) , 1301-1314
When Liability Is Not Enough: Regulating Bonus Payments in Markets with Advice
- 1 February 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 70 (2) , 1301-1314
When Liability Is Not Enough: Regulating Bonus Payments in Markets with Advice
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Designing Scientific Grants
This paper overviews the economics of scientific grants, focusing on the interplay between the inherent uncertainty in research, researchers' incentives, and grant design. Grants differ from traditional market systems and other science and innovation policy tools, such as prizes and patents. We outline the main economic forces specific to science, noting the limited attention given to grant funding in the economics literature. Using tools from information economics, we identify key incentive problems at various stages of the grant funding process and offer guidance for effective grant design.In the allocation stage, funders aim to select the highest-merit applications while minimizing evaluation costs. The selection rule, in turn, impacts researchers' incentives to apply and invest in their proposals. In the grant management stage, funders monitor researchers to ensure efficient use of funds. We discuss the advantages and potential pitfalls of (partial) lotteries and emphasize the effectiveness of staged grant design in promoting a productive use of grants.Beyond these broadly applicable insights, our overview highlights the need for further research on grantmaking. Understudied areas include, at the micro level, the interplay of different grant funding stages, and at the macro level, the interaction of grants with other instruments in the market for science. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessDesigning Scientific Grants
This paper overviews the economics of scientific grants, focusing on the interplay between the inherent uncertainty in research, researchers' incentives, and grant design. Grants differ from traditional market systems and other science and innovation policy tools, such as prizes and patents. We outline the main economic forces specific to science, noting the limited attention given to grant funding in the economics literature. Using tools from information economics, we identify key incentive problems at various stages of the grant funding process and offer guidance for effective grant design.In the allocation stage, funders aim to select the highest-merit applications while minimizing evaluation costs. The selection rule, in turn, impacts researchers' incentives to apply and invest in their proposals. In the grant management stage, funders monitor researchers to ensure efficient use of funds. We discuss the advantages and potential pitfalls of (partial) lotteries and emphasize the effectiveness of staged grant design in promoting a productive use of grants.Beyond these broadly applicable insights, our overview highlights the need for further research on grantmaking. Understudied areas include, at the micro level, the interplay of different grant funding stages, and at the macro level, the interaction of grants with other instruments in the market for science. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
- 18 September 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 139 (2) , 1255-1319
Grantmaking, Grading on a Curve, and the Paradox of Relative Evaluation in Nonmarkets
The article develops a model of nonmarket allocation of resources such as the awarding of grants to meritorious projects, honors to outstanding students, or journal slots to quality publications. On the supply side, the available budget of grants is awarded to applicants who are evaluated most favorably according to the noisy information available to reviewers. On the demand side, stronger candidates are more likely to obtain grants and thus self-select into applying, given that applications are costly. We establish that if evaluation is perfect, grading on a curve inefficiently discourages even the very best candidates from applying. More generally, when the budget is insufficient to award grants to all applicants, the equilibrium unravels if information is symmetric enough—the paradox of relative evaluation. Leveraging a technique based on the quantile function pioneered by Lehmann, we characterize a broad set of nonmarket allocation rules under which an increase in evaluation noise in a field (or course) raises equilibrium applications in that field, and reduces applications in all other fields. We empirically confirm these comparative statics by exploiting a change in the rule for apportioning the total budget to applications in different fields at the European Research Council, showing that a 1 standard deviation increase in own evaluation noise leads to a 0.4 standard deviation increase in the number of applications and budget share. Moreover, we derive insights for the design of evaluation institutions, particularly regarding the endogenous choice of noise by fields or courses and the optimal aggregation of fields into panels.
- 18 September 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 139 (2) , 1255-1319
Grantmaking, Grading on a Curve, and the Paradox of Relative Evaluation in Nonmarkets
The article develops a model of nonmarket allocation of resources such as the awarding of grants to meritorious projects, honors to outstanding students, or journal slots to quality publications. On the supply side, the available budget of grants is awarded to applicants who are evaluated most favorably according to the noisy information available to reviewers. On the demand side, stronger candidates are more likely to obtain grants and thus self-select into applying, given that applications are costly. We establish that if evaluation is perfect, grading on a curve inefficiently discourages even the very best candidates from applying. More generally, when the budget is insufficient to award grants to all applicants, the equilibrium unravels if information is symmetric enough—the paradox of relative evaluation. Leveraging a technique based on the quantile function pioneered by Lehmann, we characterize a broad set of nonmarket allocation rules under which an increase in evaluation noise in a field (or course) raises equilibrium applications in that field, and reduces applications in all other fields. We empirically confirm these comparative statics by exploiting a change in the rule for apportioning the total budget to applications in different fields at the European Research Council, showing that a 1 standard deviation increase in own evaluation noise leads to a 0.4 standard deviation increase in the number of applications and budget share. Moreover, we derive insights for the design of evaluation institutions, particularly regarding the endogenous choice of noise by fields or courses and the optimal aggregation of fields into panels.
- 1 September 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 69 (9) , 5112-5127
Looking into Crystal Balls: A Laboratory Experiment on Reputational Cheap Talk
We experimentally study information transmission by experts motivated by their reputation for being well-informed. In our game of reputational cheap talk, a reporter privately observes information about a state of the world and sends a message to an evaluator; the evaluator uses the message and the realized state of the world to assess the reporter’s informativeness. We manipulate the key driver of misreporting incentives: the uncertainty about the phenomenon to forecast. We highlight three findings. First, misreporting information is pervasive even when truthful information transmission can be an equilibrium strategy. Second, consistent with the theory, reporters are more likely to transmit information truthfully when there is more uncertainty on the state. Third, evaluators have difficulty learning reporters’ strategies and, contrary to the theory, assessments react more strongly to message accuracy when reporters are more likely to misreport. In a simpler environment with computerized evaluators, reporters learn to best reply to evaluators’ behavior and, when the state is highly uncertain and evaluators are credulous, to transmit information truthfully. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: Financial support from the H2020 European Research Council [Grant 295835 (EVALIDEA)] is gratefully acknowledged. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4629 .
- 1 September 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 69 (9) , 5112-5127
Looking into Crystal Balls: A Laboratory Experiment on Reputational Cheap Talk
We experimentally study information transmission by experts motivated by their reputation for being well-informed. In our game of reputational cheap talk, a reporter privately observes information about a state of the world and sends a message to an evaluator; the evaluator uses the message and the realized state of the world to assess the reporter’s informativeness. We manipulate the key driver of misreporting incentives: the uncertainty about the phenomenon to forecast. We highlight three findings. First, misreporting information is pervasive even when truthful information transmission can be an equilibrium strategy. Second, consistent with the theory, reporters are more likely to transmit information truthfully when there is more uncertainty on the state. Third, evaluators have difficulty learning reporters’ strategies and, contrary to the theory, assessments react more strongly to message accuracy when reporters are more likely to misreport. In a simpler environment with computerized evaluators, reporters learn to best reply to evaluators’ behavior and, when the state is highly uncertain and evaluators are credulous, to transmit information truthfully. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: Financial support from the H2020 European Research Council [Grant 295835 (EVALIDEA)] is gratefully acknowledged. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4629 .
- Open Access
Preregistration and Credibility of Clinical Trials *
Preregistration at public research registries is considered a promising solution to the credibility crisis in science, but empirical evidence of its actual benefit is limited. Guaranteeing research integrity is especially vital in clinical research, where human lives are at stake and investigators might suffer from financial pressure. This paper analyzes the distribution of p-values from pre-approval drug trials reported to ClinicalTrials.gov , the largest registry for research studies in human volunteers, conditional on the preregistration status. The z-score density of non-preregistered trials displays a significant upward discontinuity at the salient 5% threshold for statistical significance, indicative of p-hacking or selective reporting. The density of preregistered trials appears smooth at this threshold. With caliper tests, we establish that these differences between preregistered and non-preregistered trials are robust when conditioning on sponsor fixed effects and other design features commonly indicative of research integrity, such as blinding and data monitoring committees. Our results suggest that preregistration is a credible signal for the integrity of clinical trials, as far as it can be assessed with the currently available methods to detect p-hacking.
Open AccessPreregistration and Credibility of Clinical Trials *
Preregistration at public research registries is considered a promising solution to the credibility crisis in science, but empirical evidence of its actual benefit is limited. Guaranteeing research integrity is especially vital in clinical research, where human lives are at stake and investigators might suffer from financial pressure. This paper analyzes the distribution of p-values from pre-approval drug trials reported to ClinicalTrials.gov , the largest registry for research studies in human volunteers, conditional on the preregistration status. The z-score density of non-preregistered trials displays a significant upward discontinuity at the salient 5% threshold for statistical significance, indicative of p-hacking or selective reporting. The density of preregistered trials appears smooth at this threshold. With caliper tests, we establish that these differences between preregistered and non-preregistered trials are robust when conditioning on sponsor fixed effects and other design features commonly indicative of research integrity, such as blinding and data monitoring committees. Our results suggest that preregistration is a credible signal for the integrity of clinical trials, as far as it can be assessed with the currently available methods to detect p-hacking.
- 9 January 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Vol. 40 (3) , 597-624
Approval regulation and learning, with application to timing of merger control
This article analyzes the optimal combination of ex ante and ex post regulation of an activity in a two-period model. Additional information about the sign and extent of the externality associated with the activity becomes available only once a private party undertakes the activity, but undoing the activity at that stage is costly. We characterize when the regulator should commit not to reevaluate the activity ex post. The case for ex post regulation is strengthened if the private party can signal its private information about the consequences of the activity, but it is weakened if the cost of undoing the activity can be manipulated.
- 9 January 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Vol. 40 (3) , 597-624
Approval regulation and learning, with application to timing of merger control
This article analyzes the optimal combination of ex ante and ex post regulation of an activity in a two-period model. Additional information about the sign and extent of the externality associated with the activity becomes available only once a private party undertakes the activity, but undoing the activity at that stage is costly. We characterize when the regulator should commit not to reevaluate the activity ex post. The case for ex post regulation is strengthened if the private party can signal its private information about the consequences of the activity, but it is weakened if the cost of undoing the activity can be manipulated.
- 1 July 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (7) , 5330-5347
Regulation with Experimentation: Ex Ante Approval, Ex Post Withdrawal, and Liability
We analyze the optimal mix of ex ante experimentation and ex post learning for the dynamic adoption of activities with uncertain payoffs in a two-phase model of information diffusion. In a first preintroduction phase, costly experimentation is undertaken to decide whether to adopt an activity or abandon experimentation. In a second stage following adoption, learning can continue possibly at a different pace while the activity remains in place; the withdrawal option is exercised following the accumulation of sufficiently bad news. We compare from a law and economics perspective the performance of three regulatory frameworks commonly adopted to govern private experimentation and adoption incentives: liability, withdrawal, and authorization regulation. Liability should be preempted to avoid chilling of activities that generate large positive externalities consistent with the preemption doctrine. Liability should be used to discourage excessive experimentation for activities that generate small positive externalities. Authorization regulation should be lenient whenever it is used consistent with the organization of regulation in a number of areas, ranging from product safety to antitrust. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.
- 1 July 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (7) , 5330-5347
Regulation with Experimentation: Ex Ante Approval, Ex Post Withdrawal, and Liability
We analyze the optimal mix of ex ante experimentation and ex post learning for the dynamic adoption of activities with uncertain payoffs in a two-phase model of information diffusion. In a first preintroduction phase, costly experimentation is undertaken to decide whether to adopt an activity or abandon experimentation. In a second stage following adoption, learning can continue possibly at a different pace while the activity remains in place; the withdrawal option is exercised following the accumulation of sufficiently bad news. We compare from a law and economics perspective the performance of three regulatory frameworks commonly adopted to govern private experimentation and adoption incentives: liability, withdrawal, and authorization regulation. Liability should be preempted to avoid chilling of activities that generate large positive externalities consistent with the preemption doctrine. Liability should be used to discourage excessive experimentation for activities that generate small positive externalities. Authorization regulation should be lenient whenever it is used consistent with the organization of regulation in a number of areas, ranging from product safety to antitrust. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.