Roman Inderst
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Roman Inderst has a total of 36 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Stefan Thomas
Eberhard Karls Univ Tubingen, Fac Law, Private Law Commercial Law Competit Law & Insuran, Tubingen, Germany
4 shared publications - Greg Shaffer
University of Rochester, Rochester, New York 14627
2 shared publications - Marco Ottaviani
Bocconi University - Department of Economics
2 shared publications - Martin Obradovits
Department of Economics University of Innsbruck Innsbruck Austria
2 shared publications - Achim Wambach
28345 ZEW – Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung ZEW – Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung L7, 1 Mannheim Germany
1 shared publication Adrian Fritzsche
Department of Finance, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main 60323, Germany
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 September 2025
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik
- Vol. 26 (3) , 272-289
Industriepolitik in Europa
Zusammenfassung: Die Industriepolitik rückt zunehmend in den Fokus der deutschen und der europäischen Wirtschaftspolitik. In diesem Beitrag entwickeln Hanna Hottenrott, Roman Inderst, Eckhard Janeba, Klaus Schmidt, Achim Wambach und Christine Zulehner eine Systematik industriepolitischer Eingriffe und zeigen, dass industriepolitische Maßnahmen zur Förderung von Innovation, Klimaschutz, Versorgungssicherheit oder Verteidigungsbereitschaft begründet sein können. Gleichzeitig sind die Gefahren der Industriepolitik wie Wettbewerbsverzerrungen, Subventionswettläufen und Staatsversagen ernst zu nehmen. Das Autorenteam plädiert daher für eine wettbewerbskonforme Industriepolitik, die auf europäischer Ebene koordiniert wird, marktkonform ausgestaltet ist und sich auf klar begrenzte Ziele wie die Stärkung von Resilienz und Sicherheit sowie die Anpassung an den Strukturwandel konzentriert. Der Beitrag ist eine gekürzte Fassung des Gutachtens des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats beim Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie unter demselben Titel, veröffentlicht am 26. August 2025.
- 1 September 2025
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik
- Vol. 26 (3) , 272-289
Open AccessIndustriepolitik in Europa
Zusammenfassung: Die Industriepolitik rückt zunehmend in den Fokus der deutschen und der europäischen Wirtschaftspolitik. In diesem Beitrag entwickeln Hanna Hottenrott, Roman Inderst, Eckhard Janeba, Klaus Schmidt, Achim Wambach und Christine Zulehner eine Systematik industriepolitischer Eingriffe und zeigen, dass industriepolitische Maßnahmen zur Förderung von Innovation, Klimaschutz, Versorgungssicherheit oder Verteidigungsbereitschaft begründet sein können. Gleichzeitig sind die Gefahren der Industriepolitik wie Wettbewerbsverzerrungen, Subventionswettläufen und Staatsversagen ernst zu nehmen. Das Autorenteam plädiert daher für eine wettbewerbskonforme Industriepolitik, die auf europäischer Ebene koordiniert wird, marktkonform ausgestaltet ist und sich auf klar begrenzte Ziele wie die Stärkung von Resilienz und Sicherheit sowie die Anpassung an den Strukturwandel konzentriert. Der Beitrag ist eine gekürzte Fassung des Gutachtens des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats beim Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie unter demselben Titel, veröffentlicht am 26. August 2025.
- 1 July 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 71 (7) , 6184-6203
Bundling and Line Extensions in Distribution Channels
We show how manufacturers can benefit from contracts that incentivize retailers to purchase multiple products from the same manufacturer. We isolate two effects: first, under standard contractual inefficiencies, which give rise to double marginalization, such contracts can increase channel profits (the “improved contractual efficiency” effect); second, when a weaker product is tied to a particularly strong “must-stock” product, such contracts can also reduce a retailer’s position and shift rent to the manufacturer (the “increased rent extraction” effect). To harness these effects, we show that it can even be profitable for the manufacturer to introduce a weak product that ultimately has the effect of foreclosing a rival’s more efficient substitute. Nevertheless, unless the tying product is sufficiently strong, the overall effect on welfare can still be positive, providing manufacturers with an efficiency rationale to use against common concerns held by antitrust agencies about such practices. This paper was accepted by Dmitri Kuksov, marketing.
- 1 July 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 71 (7) , 6184-6203
Bundling and Line Extensions in Distribution Channels
We show how manufacturers can benefit from contracts that incentivize retailers to purchase multiple products from the same manufacturer. We isolate two effects: first, under standard contractual inefficiencies, which give rise to double marginalization, such contracts can increase channel profits (the “improved contractual efficiency” effect); second, when a weaker product is tied to a particularly strong “must-stock” product, such contracts can also reduce a retailer’s position and shift rent to the manufacturer (the “increased rent extraction” effect). To harness these effects, we show that it can even be profitable for the manufacturer to introduce a weak product that ultimately has the effect of foreclosing a rival’s more efficient substitute. Nevertheless, unless the tying product is sufficiently strong, the overall effect on welfare can still be positive, providing manufacturers with an efficiency rationale to use against common concerns held by antitrust agencies about such practices. This paper was accepted by Dmitri Kuksov, marketing.
- Open Access
- 10 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Quantitative Marketing and Economics
- Vol. 23 (2) , 265-289
CPG consumption in times of recession: novel evidence from matched administrative data
We utilize a novel dataset that merges household administrative income and socio-demographic information from tax records with scanner data on CPG consumption. Our analysis reveals significant variation in household per-capita expenditures. However, we find only a modest economic relationship between CPG spending and income, even amidst substantial within-household income fluctuations during the Dutch "double-dip recession" from 2011 to 2018. This relationship remains small for households with low income and low liquidity and holds across both food and non-food expenditures.
- 10 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Quantitative Marketing and Economics
- Vol. 23 (2) , 265-289
Open AccessCPG consumption in times of recession: novel evidence from matched administrative data
We utilize a novel dataset that merges household administrative income and socio-demographic information from tax records with scanner data on CPG consumption. Our analysis reveals significant variation in household per-capita expenditures. However, we find only a modest economic relationship between CPG spending and income, even amidst substantial within-household income fluctuations during the Dutch "double-dip recession" from 2011 to 2018. This relationship remains small for households with low income and low liquidity and holds across both food and non-food expenditures.
- 14 July 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Competition Law & Economics
- Vol. 20 (3) , 228-245
Estimation of (Consumer) Sustainability Benefits from Horizontal Agreements: A Quasi Ex Post Analysis
The European Commission’s new horizontal guidelines create scope for sustainability agreements and, to calculate efficiencies, suggest the estimation of consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for so-called “nonuse value.” We contrast estimates obtained from a hypothetical choice experiment conducted for the Netherlands’ competition authority (the “Chicken of Tomorrow” case) with estimates based on homescan data documenting consumers’ real choices between more or less animal-friendly meat, ensuring that the respective alternatives are made highly comparable. Still, the estimated WTP for the animal-friendly alternative is several times higher in the choice experiment. Given observed prices and the WTP estimated in the choice experiment, the animal-friendly alternative should have already crowded out the conventional variant. We use our findings to inform about several pitfalls both when using experimental data and when using data from true purchases.
- 14 July 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Competition Law & Economics
- Vol. 20 (3) , 228-245
Estimation of (Consumer) Sustainability Benefits from Horizontal Agreements: A Quasi Ex Post Analysis
The European Commission’s new horizontal guidelines create scope for sustainability agreements and, to calculate efficiencies, suggest the estimation of consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for so-called “nonuse value.” We contrast estimates obtained from a hypothetical choice experiment conducted for the Netherlands’ competition authority (the “Chicken of Tomorrow” case) with estimates based on homescan data documenting consumers’ real choices between more or less animal-friendly meat, ensuring that the respective alternatives are made highly comparable. Still, the estimated WTP for the animal-friendly alternative is several times higher in the choice experiment. Given observed prices and the WTP estimated in the choice experiment, the animal-friendly alternative should have already crowded out the conventional variant. We use our findings to inform about several pitfalls both when using experimental data and when using data from true purchases.
- 1 February 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 70 (2) , 1301-1314
When Liability Is Not Enough: Regulating Bonus Payments in Markets with Advice
- 1 February 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 70 (2) , 1301-1314
When Liability Is Not Enough: Regulating Bonus Payments in Markets with Advice
- Open Access
- 27 November 2023
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 71 (4) , 1038-1071
Firm Competition and Cooperation with Norm‐Based Preferences for Sustainability
- 27 November 2023
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 71 (4) , 1038-1071
Open AccessFirm Competition and Cooperation with Norm‐Based Preferences for Sustainability
- Open Access
- 25 June 2023
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 33 (1) , 53-77
Price promotions as a threat to brands
Manufacturers frequently resist heavy discounting of their products by retailers. Since low prices should increase demand and manufacturers could simply refuse to fund deep price promotions, such resistance is puzzling at first sight. We develop a model in which price promotions cause shoppers to evaluate the relative importance of quality and price against a market‐wide reference point. With deep discounting, consumers perceive quality differences as less pronounced, eroding brand value and the bargaining position of brand manufacturers. This reduces their profits and may even lead to a delisting of their products. By linking price promotions to increased one‐stop shopping and more intense retail competition, our theory also offers an explanation for the rise of store brands.
- 25 June 2023
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 33 (1) , 53-77
Open AccessPrice promotions as a threat to brands
Manufacturers frequently resist heavy discounting of their products by retailers. Since low prices should increase demand and manufacturers could simply refuse to fund deep price promotions, such resistance is puzzling at first sight. We develop a model in which price promotions cause shoppers to evaluate the relative importance of quality and price against a market‐wide reference point. With deep discounting, consumers perceive quality differences as less pronounced, eroding brand value and the bargaining position of brand manufacturers. This reduces their profits and may even lead to a delisting of their products. By linking price promotions to increased one‐stop shopping and more intense retail competition, our theory also offers an explanation for the rise of store brands.
- Open Access
- 20 May 2022
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Wirtschaftsdienst
- Vol. 102 (5) , 338-340
Nachhaltigkeit und Wettbewerbsrecht
Sustainability goals are frequently achieved through cooperation between companies. However, this is often inadmissible under current competition law. So far, the competition authorities have had to limit their assessment of cooperations and mergers to the effects in the relevant market. The EU Commission has now explicitly taken up the issue of sustainability in the draft Horizontal Guidelines. It introduces exemptable cooperation on “sustainability cooperation”. Thus, the exchange of information on sustainable suppliers will be permissible, as will a joint campaign to promote sustainability awareness. The article discusses the possibilities and problems arising from this.
- 20 May 2022
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Wirtschaftsdienst
- Vol. 102 (5) , 338-340
Open AccessNachhaltigkeit und Wettbewerbsrecht
Sustainability goals are frequently achieved through cooperation between companies. However, this is often inadmissible under current competition law. So far, the competition authorities have had to limit their assessment of cooperations and mergers to the effects in the relevant market. The EU Commission has now explicitly taken up the issue of sustainability in the draft Horizontal Guidelines. It introduces exemptable cooperation on “sustainability cooperation”. Thus, the exchange of information on sustainable suppliers will be permissible, as will a joint campaign to promote sustainability awareness. The article discusses the possibilities and problems arising from this.
- 1 May 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Marketing Science
- Vol. 41 (3) , 637-656
Measuring Income and Wealth Effects on Private-Label Demand with Matched Administrative Data
Merging administrative income data with homescan data and taking a panel perspective, we show that private label consumption is only weakly associated with changes in income.
- 1 May 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Marketing Science
- Vol. 41 (3) , 637-656
Measuring Income and Wealth Effects on Private-Label Demand with Matched Administrative Data
Merging administrative income data with homescan data and taking a panel perspective, we show that private label consumption is only weakly associated with changes in income.
- 22 April 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice
- Vol. 13 (8) , 571-577
Sustainability Agreements in the European Commission’s Draft Horizontal Guidelines
The European Commission has recently published its Draft Horizontal Guidelines (DHG). 1 A major novelty is the recognition of ‘sustainability agreements’ as a new category 2 (Chapter 9). This did not come as a surprise given the Commission’s own initiatives over the last 2 years 3 and as various countries and national competition agencies have already taken steps towards a greater recognition of sustainability concerns in the enforcement of their antitrust laws. 4 The OECD hosts a discussion on green innovation and competition in its 2022 Open Day and has dedicated a specific panel to this end in December 2021. 5 In this contribution, we first briefly review the Commission’s draft (Section II). The DHG enlarge the scope for the consideration of sustainability benefits through generating a safe harbour for particular types of sustainability agreements, such as those that concern internal corporate conduct, providing conditions under which ‘sustainability standard agreements’ may be exempted from an effects analysis, recognising that even certain severe restrictions such as in the context of joint production and supply may not be considered as ‘by object’ 6 and extending the scope of potentially relevant benefits that may be considered under an effects analysis. Many of these provisions should now give firms sufficient scope and certainty to pursue sustainability agreements. And they should also foster the application of new instruments borrowed, amongst others, from environmental and resource economics. The DHG thus provide an important step forward.
- 22 April 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of European Competition Law & Practice
- Vol. 13 (8) , 571-577
Sustainability Agreements in the European Commission’s Draft Horizontal Guidelines
The European Commission has recently published its Draft Horizontal Guidelines (DHG). 1 A major novelty is the recognition of ‘sustainability agreements’ as a new category 2 (Chapter 9). This did not come as a surprise given the Commission’s own initiatives over the last 2 years 3 and as various countries and national competition agencies have already taken steps towards a greater recognition of sustainability concerns in the enforcement of their antitrust laws. 4 The OECD hosts a discussion on green innovation and competition in its 2022 Open Day and has dedicated a specific panel to this end in December 2021. 5 In this contribution, we first briefly review the Commission’s draft (Section II). The DHG enlarge the scope for the consideration of sustainability benefits through generating a safe harbour for particular types of sustainability agreements, such as those that concern internal corporate conduct, providing conditions under which ‘sustainability standard agreements’ may be exempted from an effects analysis, recognising that even certain severe restrictions such as in the context of joint production and supply may not be considered as ‘by object’ 6 and extending the scope of potentially relevant benefits that may be considered under an effects analysis. Many of these provisions should now give firms sufficient scope and certainty to pursue sustainability agreements. And they should also foster the application of new instruments borrowed, amongst others, from environmental and resource economics. The DHG thus provide an important step forward.