Panos Kouvelis
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Panos Kouvelis has a total of 56 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Danko Turcic
A. Gary Anderson Graduate School of Management, University of California Riverside, Riverside, California 92507
8 shared publications Ling Dong
Olin Business School, Washington University
4 shared publications- Sammi Yu Tang
Department of Management, Miami Herbert Business School University of Miami Coral Gables Florida USA
4 shared publications - Yixuan Xiao
Carson College of Business Washington State University Pullman Washington USA
4 shared publications - Guang Xiao
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
3 shared publications - Lingxiu Dong
Olin Business School, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO, USA
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 1 November 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
- Vol. 74 (6) , 3421-3441
Prophet Inequalities for a New Class of Overbooking Problems in Container Shipping
A New Class of Overbooking Problems in Container Shipping Industry Container carriers lose billions of dollars each year when shippers reserve slots but fail to show up with the corresponding cargo. This paper studies an online booking problem under a deposit-based mechanism designed to better align incentives and mitigate the costs of overbooking. The authors derive near-optimal online policies for two demand settings: one in which shippers’ no-show behavior is coupled through a spot market, and another in which no-shows are independent. In the coupled setting, a randomized threshold policy guarantees at least 81.9% of clairvoyant profit. In the independent setting, a simple greedy policy is shown to be asymptotically 0.5-optimal as the number of slots tends to infinity. Extensive simulations further demonstrate strong and robust practical performance.
- 1 November 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
- Vol. 74 (6) , 3421-3441
Prophet Inequalities for a New Class of Overbooking Problems in Container Shipping
A New Class of Overbooking Problems in Container Shipping Industry Container carriers lose billions of dollars each year when shippers reserve slots but fail to show up with the corresponding cargo. This paper studies an online booking problem under a deposit-based mechanism designed to better align incentives and mitigate the costs of overbooking. The authors derive near-optimal online policies for two demand settings: one in which shippers’ no-show behavior is coupled through a spot market, and another in which no-shows are independent. In the coupled setting, a randomized threshold policy guarantees at least 81.9% of clairvoyant profit. In the independent setting, a simple greedy policy is shown to be asymptotically 0.5-optimal as the number of slots tends to infinity. Extensive simulations further demonstrate strong and robust practical performance.
- 22 December 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 35 (6) , 2395-2416
Pricing Strategies for Processing Intermediaries in Agri-chains with Side Markets: Paradox of Ex-Post Pricing Flexibility
We study an agricultural supply chain in an emerging economy, where farmers make land allocation decisions among alternative crops and have the option to sell their harvest either in a side market or directly to a processing plant, and where a government-mandated minimum price guarantee (MPG) is in place. Our study examines a range of pricing strategies that the processing plant can employ to favor a protected crop and the utilization of the processing plant. We begin by considering the Benchmark strategy, in which the plant strictly adheres to the MPG. Subsequently, we investigate two distinct pricing strategies: The Ex-ante strategy, in which the plant commits to an optimal predetermined final price at the start of the growing season; and the Responsive strategy, in which the optimal final price is determined at the end of the season after yield and side-market uncertainties have been resolved. Additionally, we propose the Hybrid strategy, which integrates both ex-ante pricing as a preseason commitment and ex-post price adjustments in response to realized uncertainties. We develop two-stage stochastic program models to analyze the farmer allocation and plant pricing decisions. Among other results, our study suggests that the ex-post pricing flexibility inherent in the Responsive approach may leave the plant worse off, even though price adjustments are plant-profit optimizing. We refer to this phenomenon as the ex-post pricing flexibility paradox. Due to this phenomenon, the Hybrid strategy, while consistently outperforming the Responsive approach, does not always dominate the Ex-ante approach. We propose execution variants of the Hybrid strategy that can guarantee outperformance on the Ex-ante benchmark. In long-term repeated interactions between the plant and farmers, the Hybrid strategy with historically credible probabilistic after-harvest price adjustments, proves effective. For short-term practices, defining a contingency region of relevant outcomes (e.g., yield realizations, side-market attractiveness, and processing margins) that triggers after-harvest price adjustments enables the Hybrid strategy to outperform. These findings urge caution when the plant considers adjusting after-harvest prices, and highlight the importance of building long-term and stable relationships in agri-chains for effective execution of pricing strategies that align incentives and optimize profits for all involved parties.
- 22 December 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 35 (6) , 2395-2416
Pricing Strategies for Processing Intermediaries in Agri-chains with Side Markets: Paradox of Ex-Post Pricing Flexibility
We study an agricultural supply chain in an emerging economy, where farmers make land allocation decisions among alternative crops and have the option to sell their harvest either in a side market or directly to a processing plant, and where a government-mandated minimum price guarantee (MPG) is in place. Our study examines a range of pricing strategies that the processing plant can employ to favor a protected crop and the utilization of the processing plant. We begin by considering the Benchmark strategy, in which the plant strictly adheres to the MPG. Subsequently, we investigate two distinct pricing strategies: The Ex-ante strategy, in which the plant commits to an optimal predetermined final price at the start of the growing season; and the Responsive strategy, in which the optimal final price is determined at the end of the season after yield and side-market uncertainties have been resolved. Additionally, we propose the Hybrid strategy, which integrates both ex-ante pricing as a preseason commitment and ex-post price adjustments in response to realized uncertainties. We develop two-stage stochastic program models to analyze the farmer allocation and plant pricing decisions. Among other results, our study suggests that the ex-post pricing flexibility inherent in the Responsive approach may leave the plant worse off, even though price adjustments are plant-profit optimizing. We refer to this phenomenon as the ex-post pricing flexibility paradox. Due to this phenomenon, the Hybrid strategy, while consistently outperforming the Responsive approach, does not always dominate the Ex-ante approach. We propose execution variants of the Hybrid strategy that can guarantee outperformance on the Ex-ante benchmark. In long-term repeated interactions between the plant and farmers, the Hybrid strategy with historically credible probabilistic after-harvest price adjustments, proves effective. For short-term practices, defining a contingency region of relevant outcomes (e.g., yield realizations, side-market attractiveness, and processing margins) that triggers after-harvest price adjustments enables the Hybrid strategy to outperform. These findings urge caution when the plant considers adjusting after-harvest prices, and highlight the importance of building long-term and stable relationships in agri-chains for effective execution of pricing strategies that align incentives and optimize profits for all involved parties.
- 1 July 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 27 (4) , 1164-1182
Flexibility Value of Reshoring Capacity Under Policy Uncertainty and Domestic Competition
Problem definition: Companies operating global supply chains face growing policy uncertainties that affect the costs of importing raw materials (RM) and finished goods (FG) from low-cost to developed countries, as well as the relative profitability of production in different countries. This has prompted the need for diversified global supply chains often involving the addition of onshore production alongside existing offshore facilities. Motivated by recent developments in the U.S. clean energy sector, this paper adopts a game-theoretic model to analyze a global firm’s reshoring capacity decision and output quantity competition with a domestic manufacturer under policy uncertainty. We examine the effects of these policies on operational decisions and profitability for both firms. Methodology/results: We show that the impact of FG tariffs depends on two opposite effects: an output quantity effect that leads to reduction of reshoring investment as the expected unit cost in serving the market increases and an overflow demand effect that encourages more reshoring investment to minimize the overflow of unsatisfied production to offshore locations. RM tariffs do not affect overflow production, and the output quantity effect will always dampen reshoring investment. Because consumer tax credits directly influence market demand, when firms’ output decisions are made after demand and therefore policy realization, the output quantity effect is absent. The overflow demand effect and stimulated higher demand will incentivize higher reshoring investment. Furthermore, we show that higher tariffs hurt the global firm’s profit as tariffs increase its average output cost, whereas tax credits can benefit the firm. Although both policies are intended to protect domestic firms, they may negatively affect their profit when the global firm’s reshoring capacity is high, intensifying competition between them. Finally, the existence of domestic competition will reduce reshoring investment when domestic manufacturing is efficient. However, when global firms have significant cost advantage, the presence of domestic competition may encourage aggressive reshoring investment. Managerial implications: For global firms, investing in reshoring capacity creates a “real option” in production allocation in serving the market, and the provided operational flexibility enhances competitiveness in an uncertain environment. For policymakers, it is crucial to carefully consider the tariff level, which stage of a supply chain to execute trade restrictions on, and tax credit amounts to be used. Very high tariffs on moderate size markets may have unexpected effect on reshoring. Trade and industrial policies should be carefully analyzed for their effectiveness, accounting for cost disadvantages of domestic competitors and market demand strength. Funding: X. Tan was supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities [Grant JKN02242202]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0387 .
- 1 July 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 27 (4) , 1164-1182
Flexibility Value of Reshoring Capacity Under Policy Uncertainty and Domestic Competition
Problem definition: Companies operating global supply chains face growing policy uncertainties that affect the costs of importing raw materials (RM) and finished goods (FG) from low-cost to developed countries, as well as the relative profitability of production in different countries. This has prompted the need for diversified global supply chains often involving the addition of onshore production alongside existing offshore facilities. Motivated by recent developments in the U.S. clean energy sector, this paper adopts a game-theoretic model to analyze a global firm’s reshoring capacity decision and output quantity competition with a domestic manufacturer under policy uncertainty. We examine the effects of these policies on operational decisions and profitability for both firms. Methodology/results: We show that the impact of FG tariffs depends on two opposite effects: an output quantity effect that leads to reduction of reshoring investment as the expected unit cost in serving the market increases and an overflow demand effect that encourages more reshoring investment to minimize the overflow of unsatisfied production to offshore locations. RM tariffs do not affect overflow production, and the output quantity effect will always dampen reshoring investment. Because consumer tax credits directly influence market demand, when firms’ output decisions are made after demand and therefore policy realization, the output quantity effect is absent. The overflow demand effect and stimulated higher demand will incentivize higher reshoring investment. Furthermore, we show that higher tariffs hurt the global firm’s profit as tariffs increase its average output cost, whereas tax credits can benefit the firm. Although both policies are intended to protect domestic firms, they may negatively affect their profit when the global firm’s reshoring capacity is high, intensifying competition between them. Finally, the existence of domestic competition will reduce reshoring investment when domestic manufacturing is efficient. However, when global firms have significant cost advantage, the presence of domestic competition may encourage aggressive reshoring investment. Managerial implications: For global firms, investing in reshoring capacity creates a “real option” in production allocation in serving the market, and the provided operational flexibility enhances competitiveness in an uncertain environment. For policymakers, it is crucial to carefully consider the tariff level, which stage of a supply chain to execute trade restrictions on, and tax credit amounts to be used. Very high tariffs on moderate size markets may have unexpected effect on reshoring. Trade and industrial policies should be carefully analyzed for their effectiveness, accounting for cost disadvantages of domestic competitors and market demand strength. Funding: X. Tan was supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities [Grant JKN02242202]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0387 .
- 1 June 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 70 (6) , 3664-3683
Automotive Procurement Under Opaque Prices: Theory with Evidence from the BMW Supply Chain
Several features of automotive procurement distinguish it from the prototypical supply chain in the academic literature: pass-through pricing that reimburses suppliers for raw material costs, market frictions that prohibit cost transparency and imbue suppliers with pricing power, and contractual commitments that span multiple production periods. In this context, we formalize a procurement model by considering an automaker that buys components from an upstream supplier to assemble cars over several production periods in an environment where period demands and raw material costs are both stochastic. Our paper clarifies how information asymmetry and market factors that amplify or weaken this asymmetry affect the firms’ procurement protocol preferences. Then, using proprietary contract and supplier data from BMW, we empirically validate this model and show that it reflects BMW’s reality: the factors that should theoretically go into automotive procurement decisions do so. Our analysis also reveals that existing contracting protocols in this context are not optimal for procurement under asymmetric information, and so we propose an alternative contracting method. We calibrate our model and estimate an automaker’s performance improvement from this optimal contract over the status quo. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4880 .
- 1 June 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 70 (6) , 3664-3683
Automotive Procurement Under Opaque Prices: Theory with Evidence from the BMW Supply Chain
Several features of automotive procurement distinguish it from the prototypical supply chain in the academic literature: pass-through pricing that reimburses suppliers for raw material costs, market frictions that prohibit cost transparency and imbue suppliers with pricing power, and contractual commitments that span multiple production periods. In this context, we formalize a procurement model by considering an automaker that buys components from an upstream supplier to assemble cars over several production periods in an environment where period demands and raw material costs are both stochastic. Our paper clarifies how information asymmetry and market factors that amplify or weaken this asymmetry affect the firms’ procurement protocol preferences. Then, using proprietary contract and supplier data from BMW, we empirically validate this model and show that it reflects BMW’s reality: the factors that should theoretically go into automotive procurement decisions do so. Our analysis also reveals that existing contracting protocols in this context are not optimal for procurement under asymmetric information, and so we propose an alternative contracting method. We calibrate our model and estimate an automaker’s performance improvement from this optimal contract over the status quo. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4880 .
- 1 March 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 26 (2) , 664-680
Agricultural Supply Chains in Emerging Markets: Competition and Cooperation Under Correlated Yields
Problem definition: We model the development of effective agricultural supply chains (agri-chains) in emerging economies for better utilization of land and intermediate processing resources for harvested export-oriented goods. We study decisions made by farmers, intermediate processors, and government officials in agri-chains. The structure and management of supply chains and government minimum guaranteed prices to farmers affect the performance of these chains and are in the domain of our study. Methodology/results: We develop models of agricultural supply chains in which yields are correlated across regions, and farmers sell to competing capacitated processors. The models have two types of fundamental decisions: determining how much land to allocate for planting before the start of a growing season and, determining the prices offered by competing processors that purchase the harvest. We develop analytical results and algorithmic approaches for finding resulting equilibria that depend on the nature of decision making and on the structure of yield uncertainty. In particular, for all-or-nothing yields, we characterize the ranges of minimum guaranteed prices that lead to farmers’ no-production, under-production, full-production and over-production equilibria. Analytical results supported by numerical experiments allow us to conclude that appropriately setting minimum price guarantees, with the exact definition of such ranges dependent on agri-chain characteristics, can lead to first-best supply chain solutions. Managerial implications: The analysis also suggests that some farmer co-operation in land allocation or regional integration of farmer-processing assets, together with moderate minimum guaranteed prices, might be implementable pathways for achieving agri-chain efficiency in emerging economies. In an interesting result, farmlands with yields of positive correlation tend to inhibit over-production, whereas those with negative correlations tend to induce over-production. Supplemental Material: The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.0076 .
- 1 March 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 26 (2) , 664-680
Agricultural Supply Chains in Emerging Markets: Competition and Cooperation Under Correlated Yields
Problem definition: We model the development of effective agricultural supply chains (agri-chains) in emerging economies for better utilization of land and intermediate processing resources for harvested export-oriented goods. We study decisions made by farmers, intermediate processors, and government officials in agri-chains. The structure and management of supply chains and government minimum guaranteed prices to farmers affect the performance of these chains and are in the domain of our study. Methodology/results: We develop models of agricultural supply chains in which yields are correlated across regions, and farmers sell to competing capacitated processors. The models have two types of fundamental decisions: determining how much land to allocate for planting before the start of a growing season and, determining the prices offered by competing processors that purchase the harvest. We develop analytical results and algorithmic approaches for finding resulting equilibria that depend on the nature of decision making and on the structure of yield uncertainty. In particular, for all-or-nothing yields, we characterize the ranges of minimum guaranteed prices that lead to farmers’ no-production, under-production, full-production and over-production equilibria. Analytical results supported by numerical experiments allow us to conclude that appropriately setting minimum price guarantees, with the exact definition of such ranges dependent on agri-chain characteristics, can lead to first-best supply chain solutions. Managerial implications: The analysis also suggests that some farmer co-operation in land allocation or regional integration of farmer-processing assets, together with moderate minimum guaranteed prices, might be implementable pathways for achieving agri-chain efficiency in emerging economies. In an interesting result, farmlands with yields of positive correlation tend to inhibit over-production, whereas those with negative correlations tend to induce over-production. Supplemental Material: The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.0076 .
- 1 November 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 32 (11) , 3717-3735
Managing material shortages in project supply chains: Inventories, time buffers, and supplier flexibility
We consider a two‐stage project supply chain with a downstream project firm producing an engineer‐to‐order (ETO) complex product or a make‐to‐order (MTO), low‐volume, customized industrial product as a project, and an upstream contract supplier supplying a key material to the project. The project faces two uncertainties: project activity time uncertainty and material consumption uncertainty, which may be positively or negatively correlated. In anticipation of these uncertainties, the project firm has to carefully decide its promised project due date to its project customer, against which harsh penalties will be assessed, and his material order quantity to commit to the contract supplier in advance. In most practical settings, project firms order from contracted suppliers via a flexible wholesale price contract consisting of a discounted advance order price and a risk‐premium adjusted expedite order price. The discounted advance order price encourages the project firm to take more inventory risk in the supply chain, and the expedite order price incentivizes the supplier to bear more inventory risk by carrying safety stock in excess of the project firm's advance material order. We formulate an optimization model that solves the project firm's project due date and material order problem, which takes into account the supplier's strategic reaction to the project firm's material order under the flexible wholesale price contract. We show that for MTO projects, risk‐sharing with suppliers on project materials is less important to the project firm, with the project firm assuming ownership of all material inventory in the channel and setting a deliberate project due date being the key. On the other hand, for ETO projects, risk‐sharing with contracted suppliers assumes critical importance. Project firms managing ETO projects should fully exploit the flexibility in the material supply contract to optimally drive the supplier's safety stock level and set the project due date reflecting the shared risk in the supply chain.
- 1 November 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 32 (11) , 3717-3735
Managing material shortages in project supply chains: Inventories, time buffers, and supplier flexibility
We consider a two‐stage project supply chain with a downstream project firm producing an engineer‐to‐order (ETO) complex product or a make‐to‐order (MTO), low‐volume, customized industrial product as a project, and an upstream contract supplier supplying a key material to the project. The project faces two uncertainties: project activity time uncertainty and material consumption uncertainty, which may be positively or negatively correlated. In anticipation of these uncertainties, the project firm has to carefully decide its promised project due date to its project customer, against which harsh penalties will be assessed, and his material order quantity to commit to the contract supplier in advance. In most practical settings, project firms order from contracted suppliers via a flexible wholesale price contract consisting of a discounted advance order price and a risk‐premium adjusted expedite order price. The discounted advance order price encourages the project firm to take more inventory risk in the supply chain, and the expedite order price incentivizes the supplier to bear more inventory risk by carrying safety stock in excess of the project firm's advance material order. We formulate an optimization model that solves the project firm's project due date and material order problem, which takes into account the supplier's strategic reaction to the project firm's material order under the flexible wholesale price contract. We show that for MTO projects, risk‐sharing with suppliers on project materials is less important to the project firm, with the project firm assuming ownership of all material inventory in the channel and setting a deliberate project due date being the key. On the other hand, for ETO projects, risk‐sharing with contracted suppliers assumes critical importance. Project firms managing ETO projects should fully exploit the flexibility in the material supply contract to optimally drive the supplier's safety stock level and set the project due date reflecting the shared risk in the supply chain.
- 1 September 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 25 (5) , 1711-1729
Managing Operations of a Hog Farm Facing Volatile Markets: Inventory and Selling Strategies
Problem definition: We study a dynamic finishing-stage planning problem of a pork producer who at the beginning of each week gets to see how many market-ready hogs she has available for sale and the current market prices. Then, she must decide which hogs to sell to a meatpacker and on the open market and which hogs to hold until the following week. The farmer is contracted to deliver a fixed quantity of hogs to the meatpacker each week priced according to a contractually predetermined market index. If the farmer underdelivers to the meatpacker, she pays a contractually predetermined unit penalty also linked to a market index. Biosecurity protocols prevent the farmer from buying hogs on the open market and selling them to the meatpacker. The farmer can, however, use the open market to sell hogs for prevailing market prices. Methodology/Results: We treat the problem as a dynamic, multiitem, nonstationary inventory problem with multiple sources of uncertainty. The optimal policy is a threshold policy with multiple price-dependent thresholds. The computational complexity required to evaluate the thresholds is the biggest impediment to using the optimal policy as a decision-support tool. So, we utilize an approximate dynamic programming approach that exploits the optimal policy structure and produces a sharp heuristic that is easy to implement. Managerial implications: Numerical experiments calibrated to a pork producer’s data reveal that the optimal policy with the heuristically estimated thresholds substantially improves the existing practice (around 25% on average). The success of the proposed model is attributed to recognizing the value of holding underweight hogs and effectively hedging supply uncertainty and future prices—an insight missed in the planning actions of the current practice.Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.1216 .
- 1 September 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 25 (5) , 1711-1729
Managing Operations of a Hog Farm Facing Volatile Markets: Inventory and Selling Strategies
Problem definition: We study a dynamic finishing-stage planning problem of a pork producer who at the beginning of each week gets to see how many market-ready hogs she has available for sale and the current market prices. Then, she must decide which hogs to sell to a meatpacker and on the open market and which hogs to hold until the following week. The farmer is contracted to deliver a fixed quantity of hogs to the meatpacker each week priced according to a contractually predetermined market index. If the farmer underdelivers to the meatpacker, she pays a contractually predetermined unit penalty also linked to a market index. Biosecurity protocols prevent the farmer from buying hogs on the open market and selling them to the meatpacker. The farmer can, however, use the open market to sell hogs for prevailing market prices. Methodology/Results: We treat the problem as a dynamic, multiitem, nonstationary inventory problem with multiple sources of uncertainty. The optimal policy is a threshold policy with multiple price-dependent thresholds. The computational complexity required to evaluate the thresholds is the biggest impediment to using the optimal policy as a decision-support tool. So, we utilize an approximate dynamic programming approach that exploits the optimal policy structure and produces a sharp heuristic that is easy to implement. Managerial implications: Numerical experiments calibrated to a pork producer’s data reveal that the optimal policy with the heuristically estimated thresholds substantially improves the existing practice (around 25% on average). The success of the proposed model is attributed to recognizing the value of holding underweight hogs and effectively hedging supply uncertainty and future prices—an insight missed in the planning actions of the current practice.Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.1216 .
- 29 August 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 25 (6) , 2074-2084
Supply Chain Finance Redefined: A Supply Chain-Centric Viewpoint of Working Capital, Hedging, and Risk Management
Problem definition: The narrow definition of supply chain finance (SCF) as a financing scheme for accounts receivables fails to capture the knowledge creation of MSOM research scholars of the last 25 years who labored in the area under this label. A redefined definition of the research-and-application field, under the acronym integrated SCF (iSCF), better reflects the interplay of operational, financial, and risk management decisions our scholars and practitioners care about. The foundational knowledge of this field is ready to come into the classroom and elevate SCF courses from the typical “accounting and finance for supply chain managers” content to a supply-chain-centric viewpoint of important decisions in working capital management, effective cash-flow hedging, and integrated risk management of global supply chain risks. We outline the main research themes behind the iSCF research, and teaching, field; highlight concepts ready for the classroom; and pose some open research questions pointing to the future promise of the field. Methodology/results: Forum paper. MSOM Fellow opinion on topic of supply chain finance and risk management based on his published research. Managerial implications: A supply-chain-centric view on state-of-the-art practices for improved working capital, hedging, and risk management in global supply chains (integrated supply chain finance).
- 29 August 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 25 (6) , 2074-2084
Supply Chain Finance Redefined: A Supply Chain-Centric Viewpoint of Working Capital, Hedging, and Risk Management
Problem definition: The narrow definition of supply chain finance (SCF) as a financing scheme for accounts receivables fails to capture the knowledge creation of MSOM research scholars of the last 25 years who labored in the area under this label. A redefined definition of the research-and-application field, under the acronym integrated SCF (iSCF), better reflects the interplay of operational, financial, and risk management decisions our scholars and practitioners care about. The foundational knowledge of this field is ready to come into the classroom and elevate SCF courses from the typical “accounting and finance for supply chain managers” content to a supply-chain-centric viewpoint of important decisions in working capital management, effective cash-flow hedging, and integrated risk management of global supply chain risks. We outline the main research themes behind the iSCF research, and teaching, field; highlight concepts ready for the classroom; and pose some open research questions pointing to the future promise of the field. Methodology/results: Forum paper. MSOM Fellow opinion on topic of supply chain finance and risk management based on his published research. Managerial implications: A supply-chain-centric view on state-of-the-art practices for improved working capital, hedging, and risk management in global supply chains (integrated supply chain finance).
- 1 June 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 32 (6) , 1830-1845
Long‐term service agreement in electricity supply chain with renewable energy penetration
We study a long‐term service agreement (LTSA) between an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) of a conventional power generator and a utility firm in the electricity supply chain. The OEM offers the LTSA to the utility firm, which specifies the service fee and the maintenance interval. The utility firm dynamically chooses among different resources (conventional, renewable, or emergency) to meet energy demand. An LTSA contracts on a generator's long‐term production schedule (i.e., the usage time and number of starts). We first characterize that the conventional generator's optimal operating mode (i.e., on or off) follows a two‐threshold policy, which shows a hysteresis phenomenon. Then, the optimal production from different resources can be obtained by minimizing the utility firm's cost of the current period. We prove that the OEM's optimal LTSA design on the maintenance interval and service fee can be solved sequentially, and capture the trade‐off between the service margin and the usage of conventional generator. Our numerical results show that the utility firm starts the conventional generator less often as the maintenance service fee of a start increases and the minimum conventional output decreases. The OEM has incentives to reduce the minimum output to make the conventional generator more flexible, but such improvement may not benefit the utility firm. Finally, increasing renewable penetration leads to more frequent cycling of the conventional generator and less conventional output. With more renewable generation and less conventional and emergency generation, higher renewable penetration reduces the utility firm's cost, the OEM's profit, and the total emission.
- 1 June 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 32 (6) , 1830-1845
Long‐term service agreement in electricity supply chain with renewable energy penetration
We study a long‐term service agreement (LTSA) between an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) of a conventional power generator and a utility firm in the electricity supply chain. The OEM offers the LTSA to the utility firm, which specifies the service fee and the maintenance interval. The utility firm dynamically chooses among different resources (conventional, renewable, or emergency) to meet energy demand. An LTSA contracts on a generator's long‐term production schedule (i.e., the usage time and number of starts). We first characterize that the conventional generator's optimal operating mode (i.e., on or off) follows a two‐threshold policy, which shows a hysteresis phenomenon. Then, the optimal production from different resources can be obtained by minimizing the utility firm's cost of the current period. We prove that the OEM's optimal LTSA design on the maintenance interval and service fee can be solved sequentially, and capture the trade‐off between the service margin and the usage of conventional generator. Our numerical results show that the utility firm starts the conventional generator less often as the maintenance service fee of a start increases and the minimum conventional output decreases. The OEM has incentives to reduce the minimum output to make the conventional generator more flexible, but such improvement may not benefit the utility firm. Finally, increasing renewable penetration leads to more frequent cycling of the conventional generator and less conventional output. With more renewable generation and less conventional and emergency generation, higher renewable penetration reduces the utility firm's cost, the OEM's profit, and the total emission.
- 1 March 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 25 (2) , 668-685
Quality Signaling Through Crowdfunding Pricing
Problem definition: This paper studies an entrepreneur’s pricing strategy in a reward-based crowdfunding campaign under asymmetric product quality information. We propose two signaling mechanisms and investigate how entrepreneurs can leverage their pricing strategy to signal a high-quality project. Academic/practical relevance: This problem is relevant to practice, as asymmetric quality information is a significant concern in reward-based crowdfunding. High-quality entrepreneurs seek credible mechanisms to signal the quality of projects to customers. Methodology: We develop a stylized game-theoretic signaling model with funding and regular selling periods that captures asymmetric quality information between an entrepreneur and customers. Results: We propose a new theory on quality signaling in crowdfunding. We show that contingent access to the regular selling market after running a successful crowdfunding campaign allows high-quality entrepreneurs to signal their quality through low funding prices (one-price signaling). A high-quality entrepreneur can increase his funding price and still signal his high-quality level if he commits to the future regular selling price (two-price signaling). We show that the distinct feature of crowdfunding, that is, the probabilistic nature of crowdfunding, plays different roles in one- and two-price signaling. It is the driving force for the separating equilibrium in one-price signaling, and in two-price signaling, it affects how the entrepreneur should manipulate his funding and regular selling prices to reduce signaling cost. Managerial implications: Entrepreneurs should be mindful of pricing in funding and regular selling periods because it could play an essential role in signaling quality information. Our findings suggest practical tools for quality signaling in crowdfunding. We also investigate when price commitment is the most beneficial for a high-quality entrepreneur, looking for potential signaling mechanisms. Funding: W. Zhou acknowledges financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 72192823 and Grant 71821002]. Supplemental Material: The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.1177 .
- 1 March 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 25 (2) , 668-685
Quality Signaling Through Crowdfunding Pricing
Problem definition: This paper studies an entrepreneur’s pricing strategy in a reward-based crowdfunding campaign under asymmetric product quality information. We propose two signaling mechanisms and investigate how entrepreneurs can leverage their pricing strategy to signal a high-quality project. Academic/practical relevance: This problem is relevant to practice, as asymmetric quality information is a significant concern in reward-based crowdfunding. High-quality entrepreneurs seek credible mechanisms to signal the quality of projects to customers. Methodology: We develop a stylized game-theoretic signaling model with funding and regular selling periods that captures asymmetric quality information between an entrepreneur and customers. Results: We propose a new theory on quality signaling in crowdfunding. We show that contingent access to the regular selling market after running a successful crowdfunding campaign allows high-quality entrepreneurs to signal their quality through low funding prices (one-price signaling). A high-quality entrepreneur can increase his funding price and still signal his high-quality level if he commits to the future regular selling price (two-price signaling). We show that the distinct feature of crowdfunding, that is, the probabilistic nature of crowdfunding, plays different roles in one- and two-price signaling. It is the driving force for the separating equilibrium in one-price signaling, and in two-price signaling, it affects how the entrepreneur should manipulate his funding and regular selling prices to reduce signaling cost. Managerial implications: Entrepreneurs should be mindful of pricing in funding and regular selling periods because it could play an essential role in signaling quality information. Our findings suggest practical tools for quality signaling in crowdfunding. We also investigate when price commitment is the most beneficial for a high-quality entrepreneur, looking for potential signaling mechanisms. Funding: W. Zhou acknowledges financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 72192823 and Grant 71821002]. Supplemental Material: The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.1177 .