STSammi Yu Tang

Sammi Yu Tang

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Sammi Yu Tang has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Incentive contract design for supplier reliability: The role of asymmetric information on reliability level and improvement costs

    by Yutian Li, Sammi Y. Tang

    We study a supply chain subject to supply disruptions, where the supplier can exert costly effort to mitigate the impact of disruptions and improve reliability. The supplier's current reliability level and the cost of improving reliability can each be high or low and are privately known only to the supplier. We investigate which type of information—the reliability level or the improvement cost—is more valuable to a buyer who designs incentive contracts to induce the desired supplier effort. We develop a framework to compare expected profits based on two partial asymmetric information settings: in each, the buyer observes one type of information while having only incomplete information about the other. Our analysis reveals that when product value is relatively high, information about the supplier's initial reliability is more valuable, as ensuring production success is critical for high‐value products. However, when product value is moderate and the supplier has high improvement potential, the buyer is more sensitive to whether the supplier can cost‐effectively enhance its reliability, making improvement cost information more valuable. We extend the base model to incorporate partial disruptions and continuous effort choices by the supplier, and find that our key insights remain robust. Our results offer practical guidance for firms on where to focus their efforts in acquiring accurate information about suppliers' production processes and reliability improvement capabilities.


  • Flexibility Value of Reshoring Capacity Under Policy Uncertainty and Domestic Competition

    by Panos Kouvelis, Xiao Tan, Sammi Y. Tang

    Problem definition: Companies operating global supply chains face growing policy uncertainties that affect the costs of importing raw materials (RM) and finished goods (FG) from low-cost to developed countries, as well as the relative profitability of production in different countries. This has prompted the need for diversified global supply chains often involving the addition of onshore production alongside existing offshore facilities. Motivated by recent developments in the U.S. clean energy sector, this paper adopts a game-theoretic model to analyze a global firm’s reshoring capacity decision and output quantity competition with a domestic manufacturer under policy uncertainty. We examine the effects of these policies on operational decisions and profitability for both firms. Methodology/results: We show that the impact of FG tariffs depends on two opposite effects: an output quantity effect that leads to reduction of reshoring investment as the expected unit cost in serving the market increases and an overflow demand effect that encourages more reshoring investment to minimize the overflow of unsatisfied production to offshore locations. RM tariffs do not affect overflow production, and the output quantity effect will always dampen reshoring investment. Because consumer tax credits directly influence market demand, when firms’ output decisions are made after demand and therefore policy realization, the output quantity effect is absent. The overflow demand effect and stimulated higher demand will incentivize higher reshoring investment. Furthermore, we show that higher tariffs hurt the global firm’s profit as tariffs increase its average output cost, whereas tax credits can benefit the firm. Although both policies are intended to protect domestic firms, they may negatively affect their profit when the global firm’s reshoring capacity is high, intensifying competition between them. Finally, the existence of domestic competition will reduce reshoring investment when domestic manufacturing is efficient. However, when global firms have significant cost advantage, the presence of domestic competition may encourage aggressive reshoring investment. Managerial implications: For global firms, investing in reshoring capacity creates a “real option” in production allocation in serving the market, and the provided operational flexibility enhances competitiveness in an uncertain environment. For policymakers, it is crucial to carefully consider the tariff level, which stage of a supply chain to execute trade restrictions on, and tax credit amounts to be used. Very high tariffs on moderate size markets may have unexpected effect on reshoring. Trade and industrial policies should be carefully analyzed for their effectiveness, accounting for cost disadvantages of domestic competitors and market demand strength. Funding: X. Tan was supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities [Grant JKN02242202]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0387 .


  • Open Access

    Incentive Contract Design for Supplier Reliability: The Role of Asymmetric Information on Reliability Level and Improvement Costs

    by Yutian Li, Sammi Tang

    We study a supply chain subject to supply disruptions, where the supplier can exert costly effort to mitigate the impact of disruptions and improve reliability. The supplier's current reliability level and the cost of improving reliability can each be high or low and are privately known only to the supplier. We investigate which type of information-the reliability level or the improvement cost-is more valuable to a buyer who designs incentive contracts to induce the desired supplier effort. We develop a framework to compare expected profits based on two partial asymmetric information settings: in each, the buyer observes one type of information while having only incomplete information about the other. Our analysis reveals that when product value is relatively high, information about the supplier's initial reliability is more valuable, as ensuring production success is critical for high-value products. However, when product value is moderate and the supplier has high improvement potential, the buyer is more sensitive to whether the supplier can cost-effectively enhance its reliability, making improvement cost information more valuable. We extend the base model to incorporate partial disruptions and continuous effort choices by the supplier, and find that our key insights remain robust. Our results offer practical guidance for firms on where to focus their efforts in acquiring accurate information about suppliers' production processes and reliability improvement capabilities.

  • Effect of Guided Delegation and Information Proximity on Multitier Responsible Sourcing

    by Sammi Y. Tang, Jing-Sheng Song

    Problem definition: Guided delegation, a practice in which companies provide guidelines when delegating supplier management to tier 1 firms, is a common practice in managing complex supply chains. We study the benefits and risks of this approach in a three-tier supply chain setting consisting of a buying firm, a tier 1 contract manufacturer, and tier 2 suppliers, where responsibility risk stems from the tier 2 suppliers. We analyze the buyer’s profit and the supply chain’s responsibility risk under a guided-delegation model, in which the buyer specifies an authorized tier 2 supplier for the tier 1 manufacturer as a guideline and may audit the tier 1 firm for compliance. We compare this model with a full-delegation model, in which the buyer fully delegates tier 2 supplier selection to the tier 1 firm. Methodology/results: We formulate a Stackelberg game for the buyer’s contract design problem. We show that guided delegation does not always yield its expected results of lower supply chain risk and greater buyer profit. In instances where compliance auditing is financially more attractive to the buyer than paying a premium for tier 1’s responsible sourcing, guided delegation can result in higher profit but increased risk because compliance auditing cannot completely eliminate the risk. Additionally, when tier 1 anticipates buyer audits and demands higher wholesale prices to offset potential penalties, guided delegation may lead to decreased risk but lower profit for the buyer. Our analysis shows that delegating audit responsibilities to tier 1 often does not improve the buyer’s profit, and in situations where it does, it invariably raises the supply chain risk. Managerial implications: Our research identifies the potential downsides of guided delegation, offering insight for external stakeholders on where to focus efforts to avoid these pitfalls. It suggests that the intended benefits of guided delegation can only be realized when paired with compliance auditing. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2020.0446 .


  • Individualized No‐Show Predictions: Effect on Clinic Overbooking and Appointment Reminders

    by Yutian Li, Sammi Yu Tang, Joseph Johnson, David A. Lubarsky

    Patient no‐shows and late cancellations lead to clinic inefficiency, high clinic costs and low patient satisfaction. The two main strategies clinics employed to alleviate the adverse effects of no‐shows are overbooking and patient appointment reminders. Developing effective overbooking schedules depends on accurately predicting each patient’s no‐show probability, while developing effective reminder systems requires a patient‐level estimate of communication sensitivity. Current methods of estimating no‐show probabilities do not produce such patient‐level predictions. To remedy this, we develop a Bayesian nested logit model which utilizes appointment confirmation data and estimates individual‐level coefficients for patient‐specific predictors. A log‐likelihood comparison of model fit on 12 months of appointment data shows that the Bayesian model outperforms the standard logit model by about 30% improvement in model fit. Additionally, our Bayesian model allows categorization of patients based on their appointment confirmation behavior. Finally, using patient‐specific no‐show probabilities as an input to a simulated appointment scheduler we find that the Bayesian model improves clinic profit over the standard logit model. The benefit comes mainly from waiting cost reduction when no‐show probability is low and from physician overtime and idle time cost reduction when no‐show probability is high. Our study has two managerial implications. First, the Bayesian method allows customizing appointment reminder effort based on patient’s confirmation behavior. Second, the Bayesian method also allows improved overbooking scheduling especially in clinics that experience large patient throughput.


  • Soft Order Commitment in Supply Chains: Role of Penalties and Rationing Rules

    by Zhili Tian, Sammi Yu Tang, Panos (Panos) Kouvelis

    In some industries (e.g., semiconductors, electronics, and agribusiness), buyers place noncommitted orders (called soft orders) to manufacturers in an effort to guide the manufacturer's production decisions. After the buyers know their own demand, they place purchase orders (called firm orders). These orders are often placed very close to the production start time or even after the production start time so that it is not possible for the manufacturer to revise its production schedule. The discrepancies between the soft order and the firm order often result in high excess inventories at the manufacturer. Without any commitment related to the soft orders by the buyers and the production by the manufacturer, the soft orders are often not effective. We hence propose a penalty contract, through which the buyers pay a penalty for canceling some portion of their soft orders. This contract can perfectly coordinate the decentralized supply chain of one manufacturer and multiple buyers and can lead to Pareto improvement in profits relative to the wholesale price contract for all firms in the supply chain. Our results indicate that it is more likely for the contract to achieve coordination and Pareto improvement when the manufacturer allocates the supply in proportion to the firm orders than when it allocates the supply according to the soft orders. We also illustrate the contract by using the data from a leading manufacturer in the industry.


  • Production Chain Disruptions: Inventory, Preparedness, and Insurance

    by Lingxiu Dong, Sammi Yu Tang, Brian Tomlin

    Disruptions that temporarily interrupt production pose a significant risk for manufacturing firms. To manage this risk, firms can purchase interruption insurance and/or deploy operational measures such as storing inventory or taking preparedness actions that reduce the expected interruption length. In this study, we explore inventory, preparedness, and insurance in a two‐stage production chain that can experience disruptions at either the upstream or downstream stage. We analytically characterize an inventory‐only model and a preparedness‐only model in which the firm uses either inventory or preparedness effort to manage disruption risk, and a joint model in which the firm deploys both operational measures. We identify the relationships between the two operational measures within a stage and across the two stages. We also examine how insurance affects a firm's optimal deployment of and preference between the two operational measures. In addition to providing insights into the interaction of these three risk management measures, our results provide insights into the production chain design. For example, the firm can reduce its disruption risk management cost by allocating more production activity downstream (when possible) and this risk management benefit can, at times, outweigh the possible production cost increase associated with allocating more production downstream.


  • Pay‐Back‐Revenue‐Sharing Contract in Coordinating Supply Chains with Random Yield

    by Sammi Y. Tang, Panos Kouvelis

    We consider coordination issues in supply chains where supplier's production process is subject to random yield losses. For a simple supply chain with a single supplier and retailer facing deterministic demand, a pay back contract which has the retailer paying a discount price for the supplier's excess units can provide the right incentive for the supplier to increase his production size and achieve coordination. Building upon this result, we consider coordination issues for two other supply chains: one with competing retailers, the other with stochastic demand. When retailers compete for both demand and supply, they tend to over‐order. We show that a combination of a pay back and revenue sharing mechanism can coordinate the supply chain, with the pay back mechanism correcting the supplier's under‐producing problem and the revenue sharing mechanism correcting the retailers' over‐ordering problem. When demand is stochastic, we consider a modified pay‐back‐revenue‐sharing contract under which the retailer agrees to not only purchase the supplier's excess output (beyond the retailer's order), but also share with the supplier a portion of the revenue made from the sales of the excess output. We show that this contract, by giving the supplier additional incentives in the form of revenue share, can achieve coordination.


  • Managing Disruptions in Decentralized Supply Chains with Endogenous Supply Process Reliability

    by Sammi Y. Tang, Haresh Gurnani, Diwakar Gupta

    Supply disruptions are all too common in supply chains. To mitigate delivery risk, buyers may either source from multiple suppliers or offer incentives to their preferred supplier to improve its process reliability. These incentives can be either direct (investment subsidy) or indirect (inflated order quantity). In this study, we present a series of models to highlight buyers’ and suppliers’ optimal parameter choices. Our base‐case model has deterministic buyer demand and two possibilities for the supplier yield outcomes: all‐or‐nothing supply or partial disruption. For the all‐or‐nothing model, we show that the buyer prefers to only use the subsidy option, which obviates the need to inflate order quantity. However, in the partial disruption model, both incentives—subsidy and order inflation—may be used at the same time. Although single sourcing provides greater indirect incentive to the selected supplier because that avoids order splitting, we show that the buyer may prefer the diversification strategy under certain circumstances. We also quantify the amount by which the wholesale price needs to be discounted (if at all) to ensure that dual sourcing strategy dominates sole sourcing. Finally, we extend the model to the case of stochastic demand. Structural properties of ordering/subsidy decisions are derived for the all‐or‐nothing model, and in contrast to the deterministic demand case, we establish that the buyer may increase use of subsidy and order quantity at the same time.


  • On Optimal Expediting Policy for Supply Systems with Uncertain Lead‐Times

    by Panos Kouvelis, Sammi Y. Tang

    We examine the role of expediting in dealing with lead‐time uncertainties associated with global supply chains of “functional products” (high volume, low demand uncertainty goods). In our developed stylized model, a retailer sources from a supplier with uncertain lead‐time to meet his stable and known demand, and the supply lead‐time is composed of two random duration stages. At the completion time of the first stage, the retailer has the option to expedite a portion of the replenishment order via an alternative faster supply mode. We characterize the optimal expediting policy in terms of if and how much of the order to expedite and explore comparative statics on the optimal policy to better understand the effects of changes in the cost parameters and lead‐time properties. We also study how the expediting option affects the retailer's decisions on the replenishment order (time and size of order placement). We observe that with the expediting option the retailer places larger orders closer to the start of the selling season, thus having this option serve as a substitute for the safety lead‐time and allowing him to take increased advantages of economies of scale. Finally we extend the basic model by looking at correlated lead‐time stages and more than two random lead‐time stages.