Eva Erman
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Eva Erman has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Niklas Möller
Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
12 shared publications Niklas Möller
Stockholms Universitet, Stockholm, Sweden
6 shared publications- Markus Furendal
Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
4 shared publications Markus Furendal
Stockholm University
2 shared publicationsJonathan W. Kuyper
School of History, Anthropology, Philosophy and Politics, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UK
1 shared publication- Naima Chahboun
Stockholm University, Sweden
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 23 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Res Publica
- p. 1-19
Why Feasibility Need Not and Should Not be Moralized
The literature on feasibility in political philosophy has been dominated by non-moralized accounts, but also moralized variants have been defended. Recently, however, it has been argued that unless reduced to mere possibility, also allegedly non-moralized accounts are in fact moralized, and therefore cannot do the theoretical work assigned to them. In this paper, we reject that conclusion. Whether moralization is understood in the commonsensical sense—according to which an instantiation of the concept itself provides a moral reason—or in the weaker sense of value-ladenness—according to which correct application depends on background evaluative judgments—the concept of feasibility does not collapse into moralization. The paper furthermore argues that feasibility should not be moralized, since doing so obscures the distinct role of feasibility in practical deliberation. A non-moralized concept of feasibility preserves the difference between what is infeasible and what is merely costly, demanding, or morally unattractive, and thereby retains its value as an analytical and practical tool in political philosophy.
- 23 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Res Publica
- p. 1-19
Open AccessWhy Feasibility Need Not and Should Not be Moralized
The literature on feasibility in political philosophy has been dominated by non-moralized accounts, but also moralized variants have been defended. Recently, however, it has been argued that unless reduced to mere possibility, also allegedly non-moralized accounts are in fact moralized, and therefore cannot do the theoretical work assigned to them. In this paper, we reject that conclusion. Whether moralization is understood in the commonsensical sense—according to which an instantiation of the concept itself provides a moral reason—or in the weaker sense of value-ladenness—according to which correct application depends on background evaluative judgments—the concept of feasibility does not collapse into moralization. The paper furthermore argues that feasibility should not be moralized, since doing so obscures the distinct role of feasibility in practical deliberation. A non-moralized concept of feasibility preserves the difference between what is infeasible and what is merely costly, demanding, or morally unattractive, and thereby retains its value as an analytical and practical tool in political philosophy.
- Open Access
- 17 July 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Studies Review
Climate mitigation: Just, legitimate and hence politically feasible?
An emerging consensus among social scientists holds that climate mitigation policies should be just and legitimate, not only because justice and legitimacy are valuable moral ends but because they are vital to policies’ political feasibility. Yet, the view that justice and legitimacy enable political feasibility in climate mitigation stands in sharp contrast to the mainstream view within normative political theory, where political feasibility is usually treated as a constraint on the realization of values such as justice and legitimacy. This paper explains how these conflicting perspectives arise and offers a multifaceted account of the relation between moral values and political feasibility in climate mitigation. By analyzing three conceptual distinctions – normative versus sociological, transcendental versus comparative, and wide-scope versus narrow-scope approaches to justice/legitimacy – we show how justice/legitimacy tends to enable political feasibility under the latter understandings (sociological, comparative, and narrow-scope) but constrain it under the former (normative, transcendental, and wide-scope). This clarification dissolves the apparent disciplinary contradiction and reveals the conditions under which values central to climate mitigation align with or limit political feasibility.
- 17 July 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Studies Review
Open AccessClimate mitigation: Just, legitimate and hence politically feasible?
An emerging consensus among social scientists holds that climate mitigation policies should be just and legitimate, not only because justice and legitimacy are valuable moral ends but because they are vital to policies’ political feasibility. Yet, the view that justice and legitimacy enable political feasibility in climate mitigation stands in sharp contrast to the mainstream view within normative political theory, where political feasibility is usually treated as a constraint on the realization of values such as justice and legitimacy. This paper explains how these conflicting perspectives arise and offers a multifaceted account of the relation between moral values and political feasibility in climate mitigation. By analyzing three conceptual distinctions – normative versus sociological, transcendental versus comparative, and wide-scope versus narrow-scope approaches to justice/legitimacy – we show how justice/legitimacy tends to enable political feasibility under the latter understandings (sociological, comparative, and narrow-scope) but constrain it under the former (normative, transcendental, and wide-scope). This clarification dissolves the apparent disciplinary contradiction and reveals the conditions under which values central to climate mitigation align with or limit political feasibility.
- 9 June 2026
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 46-60
Global governance of artificial intelligence and the question of political legitimacy
The rapid rise of artificial intelligence poses urgent challenges for global governance, yet discussions have emphasised ethical principles while largely neglecting the question of political legitimacy. This chapter addresses this gap by examining the concept of global political legitimacy and applying it to the global governance of artificial intelligence (AI). It explores three core questions: What should be legitimately controlled? Who should have a say? And how should legitimate global AI governance come about? The analysis highlights how concentrated control by powerful states and corporations risks exacerbating inequalities and entrenching global hierarchies, underscoring the need for inclusive structures that enable those affected by AI to influence its regulation. By distinguishing between normative and sociological legitimacy, developing the concept of a ‘chain of legitimacy’, and evaluating soft- versus hard-law approaches, the chapter argues that robust legal frameworks are essential for ensuring both effective and politically legitimate global AI governance.
- 9 June 2026
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 46-60
Global governance of artificial intelligence and the question of political legitimacy
The rapid rise of artificial intelligence poses urgent challenges for global governance, yet discussions have emphasised ethical principles while largely neglecting the question of political legitimacy. This chapter addresses this gap by examining the concept of global political legitimacy and applying it to the global governance of artificial intelligence (AI). It explores three core questions: What should be legitimately controlled? Who should have a say? And how should legitimate global AI governance come about? The analysis highlights how concentrated control by powerful states and corporations risks exacerbating inequalities and entrenching global hierarchies, underscoring the need for inclusive structures that enable those affected by AI to influence its regulation. By distinguishing between normative and sociological legitimacy, developing the concept of a ‘chain of legitimacy’, and evaluating soft- versus hard-law approaches, the chapter argues that robust legal frameworks are essential for ensuring both effective and politically legitimate global AI governance.
- Open Access
- 18 June 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy
- p. 1-26
The democratic role of non-state actors in the global governance of artificial intelligence
- 18 June 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy
- p. 1-26
Open AccessThe democratic role of non-state actors in the global governance of artificial intelligence
- Open Access
- 6 January 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy & Technology
- Vol. 38 (1) , 1-9
Algorithmic Fairness and Feasibility
The “impossibility results” in algorithmic fairness suggest that a predictive model cannot fully meet two common fairness criteria – sufficiency and separation – except under extraordinary circumstances. These findings have sparked a discussion on fairness in algorithms, prompting debates over whether predictive models can avoid unfair discrimination based on protected attributes, such as ethnicity or gender. As shown by Otto Sahlgren, however, the discussion of the impossibility results would gain from importing some of the tools developed in the philosophical literature on feasibility. Utilizing these tools, Sahlgren sketches a cautiously optimistic view of how algorithmic fairness can be made feasible in restricted local decision-making. While we think it is a welcome move to inject the literature on feasibility into the debate on algorithmic fairness, Sahlgren says very little about what are the general gains of bringing in feasibility considerations in theorizing algorithmic fairness. How, more precisely, does it help us make assessments about fairness in algorithmic decision-making? This is what is addressed in this Reply. More specifically, our two-fold argument is that feasibility plays an important but limited role for algorithmic fairness. We end by offering a sketch of a framework, which may be useful for theorizing feasibility in algorithmic fairness.
- 6 January 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy & Technology
- Vol. 38 (1) , 1-9
Open AccessAlgorithmic Fairness and Feasibility
The “impossibility results” in algorithmic fairness suggest that a predictive model cannot fully meet two common fairness criteria – sufficiency and separation – except under extraordinary circumstances. These findings have sparked a discussion on fairness in algorithms, prompting debates over whether predictive models can avoid unfair discrimination based on protected attributes, such as ethnicity or gender. As shown by Otto Sahlgren, however, the discussion of the impossibility results would gain from importing some of the tools developed in the philosophical literature on feasibility. Utilizing these tools, Sahlgren sketches a cautiously optimistic view of how algorithmic fairness can be made feasible in restricted local decision-making. While we think it is a welcome move to inject the literature on feasibility into the debate on algorithmic fairness, Sahlgren says very little about what are the general gains of bringing in feasibility considerations in theorizing algorithmic fairness. How, more precisely, does it help us make assessments about fairness in algorithmic decision-making? This is what is addressed in this Reply. More specifically, our two-fold argument is that feasibility plays an important but limited role for algorithmic fairness. We end by offering a sketch of a framework, which may be useful for theorizing feasibility in algorithmic fairness.
- Open Access
- 6 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Res Publica
- Vol. 32 (1) , 45-63
Why Normative Behaviourism Does Not Improve Political Realism
Focusing on ‘real actions’ of ‘real people’, normative behaviourism turns facts about observable patterns of behaviour into grounds for specific normative political principles. For this reason, this way of doing normative political theory has strong political realist credentials, given its methods, values and ambitions. In fact, according to its supporters, normative behaviourism is an improvement of political realism since it solves two problems that allegedly face many realists, namely, the ‘legitimacy problem’, i.e., how we should distinguish genuine acceptance of a political system from false acceptance, and ‘the institutional problem’, i.e., how we should translate political principles into viable political institutions. In this paper, we make two claims. First, normative behaviourism does not solve the legitimacy problem encountered by realists, because its solution rests on a flawed distinction between foundational principles and ‘principles that matter’, together with a problematic use of a Humean internal reasons approach. Second, normative behaviourism does not solve the institutional problem encountered by realists, because its solution is in fact much more unfeasible than realist prescriptions, since feasibility is interpreted as mere possibility. We wind up our analysis by showing that normative behaviourism encounters new problems that realist approaches typically do not face.
- 6 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Res Publica
- Vol. 32 (1) , 45-63
Open AccessWhy Normative Behaviourism Does Not Improve Political Realism
Focusing on ‘real actions’ of ‘real people’, normative behaviourism turns facts about observable patterns of behaviour into grounds for specific normative political principles. For this reason, this way of doing normative political theory has strong political realist credentials, given its methods, values and ambitions. In fact, according to its supporters, normative behaviourism is an improvement of political realism since it solves two problems that allegedly face many realists, namely, the ‘legitimacy problem’, i.e., how we should distinguish genuine acceptance of a political system from false acceptance, and ‘the institutional problem’, i.e., how we should translate political principles into viable political institutions. In this paper, we make two claims. First, normative behaviourism does not solve the legitimacy problem encountered by realists, because its solution rests on a flawed distinction between foundational principles and ‘principles that matter’, together with a problematic use of a Humean internal reasons approach. Second, normative behaviourism does not solve the institutional problem encountered by realists, because its solution is in fact much more unfeasible than realist prescriptions, since feasibility is interpreted as mere possibility. We wind up our analysis by showing that normative behaviourism encounters new problems that realist approaches typically do not face.
- Open Access
- 30 July 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Studies Review
- Vol. 23 (1) , 352-371
The Importance and Limitation of Epistemic Norms in Political Theory
One recent debate in political theory centers on the question of whether there is a distinctively political normativity. According to an influential view, there is a distinctive set of norms that applies specifically to political actions and decisions, which are not grounded in moral normativity. On one version of this non-moral view, political theory is grounded in epistemic normativity (and thus epistemic norms). Theorists identifying as “radical realists” insist that political theorists do not need any moral normativity (and thus moral norms), because epistemic normativity may provide action-guidance for political theory. In this article, we take our point of departure in a critical analysis of this epistemic version of the non-moral view, with the overall aim of analyzing the importance and limitation of epistemic norms in political theory. We argue that epistemic norms are necessary—since a political theory should not rely on empirical falsities—but not sufficient for a successful account in the political domain. Two claims are made: moral norms are essential in the process of political theorizing, both in the form of pre-epistemic norms and in the form of post-epistemic norms. More specifically, we contend, first, that we need moral norms to identify and justify which practices to study when conducting political theorizing, and second, that we need moral norms to tell us how to act in light of our investigation of warranted and unwarranted beliefs.
- 30 July 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Studies Review
- Vol. 23 (1) , 352-371
Open AccessThe Importance and Limitation of Epistemic Norms in Political Theory
One recent debate in political theory centers on the question of whether there is a distinctively political normativity. According to an influential view, there is a distinctive set of norms that applies specifically to political actions and decisions, which are not grounded in moral normativity. On one version of this non-moral view, political theory is grounded in epistemic normativity (and thus epistemic norms). Theorists identifying as “radical realists” insist that political theorists do not need any moral normativity (and thus moral norms), because epistemic normativity may provide action-guidance for political theory. In this article, we take our point of departure in a critical analysis of this epistemic version of the non-moral view, with the overall aim of analyzing the importance and limitation of epistemic norms in political theory. We argue that epistemic norms are necessary—since a political theory should not rely on empirical falsities—but not sufficient for a successful account in the political domain. Two claims are made: moral norms are essential in the process of political theorizing, both in the form of pre-epistemic norms and in the form of post-epistemic norms. More specifically, we contend, first, that we need moral norms to identify and justify which practices to study when conducting political theorizing, and second, that we need moral norms to tell us how to act in light of our investigation of warranted and unwarranted beliefs.
- Open Access
- 2 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
- Vol. 44 (1) , 27-38
The Role of Moral Norms in Political Theory
In the recent debate on political normativity in political philosophy, two positions have emerged among so-called political realists. On the first ‘non-moral’ view, political normativity is understood as orthogonal to moral normativity. On the second ‘filter view’, moral norms and prescriptions may be ‘filtered through’ the realities of politics such that they are altered by politics’ constitutive features. While the former has been severely criticized, the latter has remained underdeveloped and vague. To take the debate on political normativity forward, the aim in this paper is to explore what it could reasonably mean to claim that moral norms are filtered through politics and are aligned with its constitutive features. More specifically, we explore the role of moral norms in political theory. We take our starting-point in Larmore’s work and make two claims. First, we argue against Larmore’s claim – following political realists – that because political philosophy is concerned with the regulation of basic institutions and legal-political orders, it should primarily focus on political legitimacy rather than justice and always focus on legitimacy before justice. In our view, nothing in the constitutive features of politics supports such a conclusion. Second, we argue that any reasonable political theory relies on at least one moral premise, constituted by foundational principles (or values), which are independent of a society or polity. These are more basic than political principles in the sense that they put up the normative boundary conditions for such principles.
- 2 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
- Vol. 44 (1) , 27-38
Open AccessThe Role of Moral Norms in Political Theory
In the recent debate on political normativity in political philosophy, two positions have emerged among so-called political realists. On the first ‘non-moral’ view, political normativity is understood as orthogonal to moral normativity. On the second ‘filter view’, moral norms and prescriptions may be ‘filtered through’ the realities of politics such that they are altered by politics’ constitutive features. While the former has been severely criticized, the latter has remained underdeveloped and vague. To take the debate on political normativity forward, the aim in this paper is to explore what it could reasonably mean to claim that moral norms are filtered through politics and are aligned with its constitutive features. More specifically, we explore the role of moral norms in political theory. We take our starting-point in Larmore’s work and make two claims. First, we argue against Larmore’s claim – following political realists – that because political philosophy is concerned with the regulation of basic institutions and legal-political orders, it should primarily focus on political legitimacy rather than justice and always focus on legitimacy before justice. In our view, nothing in the constitutive features of politics supports such a conclusion. Second, we argue that any reasonable political theory relies on at least one moral premise, constituted by foundational principles (or values), which are independent of a society or polity. These are more basic than political principles in the sense that they put up the normative boundary conditions for such principles.
- 8 March 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Machine Intelligence
- Vol. 6 (3) , 246-248
The democratization of global AI governance and the role of tech companies
- 8 March 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Machine Intelligence
- Vol. 6 (3) , 246-248
The democratization of global AI governance and the role of tech companies
- Open Access
- 2 February 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Studies Review
- Vol. 21 (3) , 454-461
Does Normative Behaviourism Offer an Alternative Methodology in Political Theory?
A central distinction for Jonathan Floyd is that between the traditional method of pursuing political theory conducted by mainstream theorists, which he calls ‘mentalism’, and his suggested method, so-called ‘normative behaviourism’. While the former relies on patterns of thought (e.g. intuitions, value commitments, principles or considered judgements) to justify normative theories, the latter instead relies on patterns of behaviour. Floyd argues that normative behaviourism offers an alternative methodology to mainstream mentalism, a new – and better – way of doing political philosophy. Our aim in this article is to reject this claim: normative behaviourism does not offer an alternative methodology in political theory. First, we show that normative behaviourism, contrary to Floyd’s claim, is as dependent on value premises as mainstream, ‘mentalist’ political theory. Second, we illustrate the structural similarities between normative behaviourism and mainstream political theory from a methodological standpoint by comparing the former with an influential normative theory, namely, utilitarianism.
- 2 February 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Studies Review
- Vol. 21 (3) , 454-461
Open AccessDoes Normative Behaviourism Offer an Alternative Methodology in Political Theory?
A central distinction for Jonathan Floyd is that between the traditional method of pursuing political theory conducted by mainstream theorists, which he calls ‘mentalism’, and his suggested method, so-called ‘normative behaviourism’. While the former relies on patterns of thought (e.g. intuitions, value commitments, principles or considered judgements) to justify normative theories, the latter instead relies on patterns of behaviour. Floyd argues that normative behaviourism offers an alternative methodology to mainstream mentalism, a new – and better – way of doing political philosophy. Our aim in this article is to reject this claim: normative behaviourism does not offer an alternative methodology in political theory. First, we show that normative behaviourism, contrary to Floyd’s claim, is as dependent on value premises as mainstream, ‘mentalist’ political theory. Second, we illustrate the structural similarities between normative behaviourism and mainstream political theory from a methodological standpoint by comparing the former with an influential normative theory, namely, utilitarianism.