Naima Chahboun
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Naima Chahboun has a total of 1 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Eva Erman
Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 17 July 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Studies Review
Climate mitigation: Just, legitimate and hence politically feasible?
An emerging consensus among social scientists holds that climate mitigation policies should be just and legitimate, not only because justice and legitimacy are valuable moral ends but because they are vital to policies’ political feasibility. Yet, the view that justice and legitimacy enable political feasibility in climate mitigation stands in sharp contrast to the mainstream view within normative political theory, where political feasibility is usually treated as a constraint on the realization of values such as justice and legitimacy. This paper explains how these conflicting perspectives arise and offers a multifaceted account of the relation between moral values and political feasibility in climate mitigation. By analyzing three conceptual distinctions – normative versus sociological, transcendental versus comparative, and wide-scope versus narrow-scope approaches to justice/legitimacy – we show how justice/legitimacy tends to enable political feasibility under the latter understandings (sociological, comparative, and narrow-scope) but constrain it under the former (normative, transcendental, and wide-scope). This clarification dissolves the apparent disciplinary contradiction and reveals the conditions under which values central to climate mitigation align with or limit political feasibility.
- 17 July 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Studies Review
Open AccessClimate mitigation: Just, legitimate and hence politically feasible?
An emerging consensus among social scientists holds that climate mitigation policies should be just and legitimate, not only because justice and legitimacy are valuable moral ends but because they are vital to policies’ political feasibility. Yet, the view that justice and legitimacy enable political feasibility in climate mitigation stands in sharp contrast to the mainstream view within normative political theory, where political feasibility is usually treated as a constraint on the realization of values such as justice and legitimacy. This paper explains how these conflicting perspectives arise and offers a multifaceted account of the relation between moral values and political feasibility in climate mitigation. By analyzing three conceptual distinctions – normative versus sociological, transcendental versus comparative, and wide-scope versus narrow-scope approaches to justice/legitimacy – we show how justice/legitimacy tends to enable political feasibility under the latter understandings (sociological, comparative, and narrow-scope) but constrain it under the former (normative, transcendental, and wide-scope). This clarification dissolves the apparent disciplinary contradiction and reveals the conditions under which values central to climate mitigation align with or limit political feasibility.
- Open Access
- 24 August 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy
- p. 1-22
Perverse incentives, justice, and domination: slack-taking as Chicken game
- 24 August 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy
- p. 1-22
Open AccessPerverse incentives, justice, and domination: slack-taking as Chicken game
- Open Access
- 12 April 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Studies Review
- Vol. 23 (4) , 1028-1043
Louder Than Words? Why Political Ethnography Cannot Fix the Flaws of Normative Behaviorism
This article engages with Jonathan Floyd’s normative behaviorism, and Simon Stevens’ recent criticism of this approach. Its objectives are two: First, the article challenges normative behaviorism’s reliance on crime and insurrection rates as measures of political discontent. I raise three distinct objections against using crime and insurrection rates for this purpose, and argue that these undermine normative behaviorism’s justificatory strategy. Second, the article rebuts Stevens’ suggestion that the flaws of normative behaviorism can be fixed by adding political ethnography to the picture. Rather than remedying the flaws, I argue that supplementing normative behaviorism with an ethnographic sensibility will deprive it of the very features that rendered it attractive in the first place. I conclude that if fixing the flaws of normative behaviorism requires us to transform it beyond recognition, we should rather reject it in the first place.
- 12 April 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Studies Review
- Vol. 23 (4) , 1028-1043
Open AccessLouder Than Words? Why Political Ethnography Cannot Fix the Flaws of Normative Behaviorism
This article engages with Jonathan Floyd’s normative behaviorism, and Simon Stevens’ recent criticism of this approach. Its objectives are two: First, the article challenges normative behaviorism’s reliance on crime and insurrection rates as measures of political discontent. I raise three distinct objections against using crime and insurrection rates for this purpose, and argue that these undermine normative behaviorism’s justificatory strategy. Second, the article rebuts Stevens’ suggestion that the flaws of normative behaviorism can be fixed by adding political ethnography to the picture. Rather than remedying the flaws, I argue that supplementing normative behaviorism with an ethnographic sensibility will deprive it of the very features that rendered it attractive in the first place. I conclude that if fixing the flaws of normative behaviorism requires us to transform it beyond recognition, we should rather reject it in the first place.
- Open Access
- 2 February 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy
- p. 1-22
The limits of nonideal duties: a partial vindication of fair shares
- 2 February 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy
- p. 1-22
Open AccessThe limits of nonideal duties: a partial vindication of fair shares
- Open Access
- 29 May 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Politics, Philosophy & Economics
- Vol. 23 (1) , 47-66
The moral benefits of coercion: A defense of ideal statism
This paper contributes to recent discussions on ideal anarchism vs. ideal statism. I argue, contra ideal anarchists, that coercive state institutions would be justified even in a society populated by morally perfect individuals. My defense of ideal statism is novel in that it highlights the moral benefits of state coercion. Rather than the practical effects on individual compliance or the distributive outcomes that follow therefrom, coercive state institutions are justified through the moral benefits they provide. The state is morally beneficial because it a) lessens the demands on the will that fall on agents under ideal anarchism, and b) counters the structural domination that follows from differences in natural endowments. By shifting the focus of the debate from feasibility to desirability, the paper exposes the flaws of ideal anarchism and provides new insights into the moral value of the state.
- 29 May 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Politics, Philosophy & Economics
- Vol. 23 (1) , 47-66
Open AccessThe moral benefits of coercion: A defense of ideal statism
This paper contributes to recent discussions on ideal anarchism vs. ideal statism. I argue, contra ideal anarchists, that coercive state institutions would be justified even in a society populated by morally perfect individuals. My defense of ideal statism is novel in that it highlights the moral benefits of state coercion. Rather than the practical effects on individual compliance or the distributive outcomes that follow therefrom, coercive state institutions are justified through the moral benefits they provide. The state is morally beneficial because it a) lessens the demands on the will that fall on agents under ideal anarchism, and b) counters the structural domination that follows from differences in natural endowments. By shifting the focus of the debate from feasibility to desirability, the paper exposes the flaws of ideal anarchism and provides new insights into the moral value of the state.
- Open Access
- 17 October 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Res Publica
- Vol. 23 (4) , 431-452
Three Feasibility Constraints on the Concept of Justice
- 17 October 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Res Publica
- Vol. 23 (4) , 431-452
Open AccessThree Feasibility Constraints on the Concept of Justice
- 1 December 2014
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Journal of Political Theory
- Vol. 14 (2) , 229-245
Nonideal theory and compliance—A clarification
This paper examines the various ways in which nonideal theory responds to noncompliance with ideal principles of justice. Taking Rawls’ definition of nonideal theory as my point of departure, I propose an understanding of this concept as comprising two subparts: Complementary nonideal theory responds to deliberate and avoidable noncompliance and consists mainly of theories of civil disobedience, rebellion, and retribution. Substitutive nonideal theory responds to nondeliberate and unavoidable noncompliance and consists mainly of theories of transition and caretaking. I further argue that a special case of substitutive nonideal theory may arise when noncompliance is a result of a lack of motivation among citizens. This situation, I suggest, calls for nonideal theorizing (1) when our aim is to evaluate the political actions undertaken by specific members of a society (in particular the ruling elite) whose set of feasible options is constrained as a result of others’ lack of motivation and (2) when a situation of mutually reinforcing distrust and noncooperation—sometimes called a “social trap”—constrains the feasible option set of the entire population. The main advantage of the twofold conceptualization of nonideal theory is that it bridges the theoretical gap between actor-oriented and situation-based accounts of justice: It allows us to preserve the term ideal justice for justice under minimal feasibility constraints, while recognizing that a situation where all agents comply with their duties must in some sense be characterized as just.
- 1 December 2014
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Journal of Political Theory
- Vol. 14 (2) , 229-245
Nonideal theory and compliance—A clarification
This paper examines the various ways in which nonideal theory responds to noncompliance with ideal principles of justice. Taking Rawls’ definition of nonideal theory as my point of departure, I propose an understanding of this concept as comprising two subparts: Complementary nonideal theory responds to deliberate and avoidable noncompliance and consists mainly of theories of civil disobedience, rebellion, and retribution. Substitutive nonideal theory responds to nondeliberate and unavoidable noncompliance and consists mainly of theories of transition and caretaking. I further argue that a special case of substitutive nonideal theory may arise when noncompliance is a result of a lack of motivation among citizens. This situation, I suggest, calls for nonideal theorizing (1) when our aim is to evaluate the political actions undertaken by specific members of a society (in particular the ruling elite) whose set of feasible options is constrained as a result of others’ lack of motivation and (2) when a situation of mutually reinforcing distrust and noncooperation—sometimes called a “social trap”—constrains the feasible option set of the entire population. The main advantage of the twofold conceptualization of nonideal theory is that it bridges the theoretical gap between actor-oriented and situation-based accounts of justice: It allows us to preserve the term ideal justice for justice under minimal feasibility constraints, while recognizing that a situation where all agents comply with their duties must in some sense be characterized as just.