DCDane M. Christensen

Dane M. Christensen

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Dane M. Christensen has a total of 35 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Location, Location, Location: Senate Trading and Seat Proximity

    by Dane M. Christensen, Hengda Jin, Beverly R. Walther, Laura A. Wellman

    Using the distance between two Senators' desks to capture the proclivity to share information, we find that when two Senators sit closer together in the Senate Chamber, they are more likely to trade stocks in the same industry and earn larger returns, especially when they belong to the same political party. This association varies with Senators' information sources and power, and the scrutiny they face. We perform multiple identification tests to support our inference that Senators share private trading information gleaned from their positions in Congress. Moreover, we provide the first evidence on the career benefits associated with sharing information.

  • Open Access

    Location, Location, Location: Senate Trading and Seat Proximity

    by Dane M. Christensen, Hengda Jin, Beverly R. Walther, Laura A. Wellman

    Using the distance between two Senators’ desks to capture the proclivity to share information, we find that when two Senators sit closer together in the Senate Chamber, they are more likely to trade stocks in the same industry and earn larger returns, especially when they belong to the same political party. This association varies with Senators’ information sources and power and the scrutiny they face. We perform multiple identification tests to support our inference that Senators share private trading information gleaned from their positions in Congress. Moreover, we provide the first evidence on the career benefits associated with sharing information.

  • Do Boards Reward and Punish CEOs Based on Employee Satisfaction Ratings?

    by Khaled Abdulsalam, Dane M. Christensen, Scott D. Graffin, John Li

    We investigate whether boards of directors reward and punish chief executive officers (CEOs) based on employee satisfaction ratings. Using data from Glassdoor, we find that CEOs tend to receive larger bonuses when employee satisfaction ratings increase. Similarly, we find a higher rate of CEO dismissal when employees become less satisfied. Further, we investigate three factors that may amplify the role of employee satisfaction ratings in CEO evaluations: the importance of employees to financial performance, the board’s commitment to stakeholders, and the need to preserve firm reputation. We find some evidence that each of these three factors strengthens the relationship between employee satisfaction ratings and CEO evaluations. Finally, we exploit the staggered timing of first-time reviews on Glassdoor and use a difference-in-differences design to strengthen our inferences. Collectively, these findings suggest that boards’ evaluations of CEO compensation and retention incorporate employee satisfaction ratings.


  • Open Access

    Corporate Political Activism and Information Transfers

    by Dane M. Christensen, Hengda Jin, Joshua A. Lee, Suhas A. Sridharan, Laura A. Wellman

    Prior research suggests that (1) politically active firms have an information advantage over firms that do not engage in the political process but also that (2) politically active firms are more likely to disclose policy-related information. We examine whether there are externalities associated with the processing of political information by politically active firms. We study this question in the setting of intraindustry information transfers around earnings announcements. Measuring firms’ political activism using campaign contributions, we find stronger intraindustry information transfers from politically active firms to their industry peers. These information transfers are stronger when there is more discussion during conference calls of political topics that have industry- or market-wide implications. Similarly, these information transfers are also stronger when there is greater political uncertainty. Our paper highlights an important information externality related to politically active firms’ disclosures and improves our understanding of how politically active firms affect their industries’ information environment. Data Availability: The data used in this study are publicly available from the sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: D72; M41; M48.


  • Externalities of Financial Statement Fraud on the Incoming Accounting Labor Force

    by Robert R. Carnes, Dane M. Christensen, Paul E. Madsen

    Financial statement fraud generates many negative effects, including reducing people's willingness to participate in the stock market. If it also stigmatizes accounting, it may similarly adversely affect the quantity and quality of workers willing to become accountants, thereby potentially creating negative effects for years to come. We examine the impact of fraud on the labor force entering the accounting profession, which is a key input into the production of accounting information (i.e., the output). Using data describing millions of college students across the United States, we find incoming students are actually more likely to major in accounting when local frauds occur during their formative years. These students are also more likely to have attributes desired by the accounting profession (e.g., high academic aptitude) and are more likely to subsequently serve in public accounting and become Certified Public Accountants. In the context of other fields (i.e., all college majors), we find that fraud similarly spurs interest in other business disciplines, but not in majors outside of business schools. Those attracted to other business disciplines, however, generally possess different traits. Specifically, students entering accounting are distinctively more likely to exhibit values espoused by the accounting profession, including a predisposition to public service and less commercial orientation. Thus, nonpecuniary motives appear to uniquely drive accounting student enrollment following fraud. Collectively, our findings suggest that, while fraud is unmistakably bad, it appears to have the positive unintended consequence of attracting labor into business disciplines and, in accounting, increasing the prevalence of desirable traits among entrants.


  • Open Access

    Externalities of Financial Statement Fraud on the Incoming Accounting Labor Force

    by Robert R. Carnes, Dane M. Christensen, Paul E. Madsen

    Financial statement fraud generates many negative effects, including reducing people’s willingness to participate in the stock market. If it also stigmatizes accounting, it may similarly adversely affect the quantity and quality of workers willing to become accountants, thereby potentially creating negative effects for years to come. We examine the impact of fraud on the labor force entering the accounting profession, which is a key input into the production of accounting information (i.e., the output). Using data describing millions of college students across the U.S., we find incoming students are actually more likely to major in accounting when local frauds occur during their formative years. These students are also more likely to have attributes desired by the accounting profession (e.g., high academic aptitude) and are more likely to subsequently serve in public accounting and become CPAs. In the context of other fields (i.e., all college majors), we find that fraud similarly spurs interest in other business disciplines, but not in majors outside of business schools. Those attracted to other business disciplines, however, generally possess different traits. Specifically, students entering accounting are distinctively more likely to exhibit values espoused by the accounting profession, including a predisposition to public service and less commercial orientation. Thus, non-pecuniary motives appear to uniquely drive accounting student enrollment following fraud. Collectively, our findings suggest that, while fraud is unmistakably bad, it appears to have the positive unintended consequence of attracting labor into business disciplines and, in accounting, increasing the prevalence of desirable traits among entrants.

  • Hedging on the Hill: Does Political Hedging Reduce Firm Risk?

    by Dane M. Christensen, Hengda Jin, Suhas A. Sridharan, Laura A. Wellman

    We examine whether firms’ political hedging activities are effective at mitigating political risk. Focusing on the risk induced by partisan politics, we measure political hedging as the degree to which firms’ political connections are balanced across Republican and Democratic candidates. We find that greater political hedging is associated with reduced stock return volatility, particularly during periods of higher policy uncertainty. Similarly, greater political hedging is associated with reduced crash risk, investment volatility, and earnings volatility. Moreover, the reduction in earnings volatility appears to relate to both a firm’s taxes and its operating activities, as we find that greater political hedging is associated with reduced cash effective tax rate volatility and pretax income volatility. We further find investors are better able to anticipate future earnings for firms that engage in political hedging, suggesting that political hedging helps improve firms’ information environments. Lastly, we perform an event study using President Obama’s Clean Power Plan. We find that on the days this policy proposal was debated in Congress, energy and utility firms experienced heightened intraday return volatility (relative to other firms and nonevent days). However, this heightened volatility is mitigated for energy and utility firms that are more politically hedged. Overall, we conclude that political hedging is an effective risk management tool that helps mitigate firm risk. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.


  • Political information flow and management guidance

    by Dane M. Christensen, Arthur Morris, Beverly R. Walther, Laura A. Wellman


  • How do most low ETR firms avoid paying taxes?

    by Dane M. Christensen, David G. Kenchington, Rick C. Laux

    Evidence suggests a large proportion of profitable U.S. firms have low effective tax rates (i.e., an ETR between 0 and 10%). Despite widespread interest in how firms avoid paying taxes, we do not know how most firms attain low ETRs and whether they are primarily benefiting from benign or aggressive tax positions. Using a research design that explicitly examines low ETR firms, we predict and find that the majority are primarily benefiting from a benign tax position: large net operating loss carryforwards (NOLs). We also find that large NOLs allow firms to persistently retain low ETRs year after year. In contrast, we find that multinationals and tax haven firms, which should have more opportunities for aggressive tax planning, have a lower probability of attaining a low ETR (relative to domestic and non-tax haven firms). Collectively, these findings suggest that the typical low ETR firm does not incur significant tax risk. Consistent with this, we find that low ETR firms accrue unrecognized tax benefits at a similar rate as firms that pay the statutory tax rate and do not experience higher future tax rate volatility. Overall, the results shed light on the profile of the average low ETR firm and provide evidence that the majority are utilizing large NOLs rather than aggressive tax planning.


  • Top Cited Papers

    Why is Corporate Virtue in the Eye of The Beholder? The Case of ESG Ratings

    by Dane M. Christensen, George Serafeim, Anywhere Sikochi

    Despite the rising use of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) ratings, there is substantial disagreement across rating agencies regarding what rating to give to individual firms. As what drives this disagreement is unclear, we examine whether a firm's ESG disclosure helps explain some of this disagreement. We predict and find that greater ESG disclosure actually leads to greater ESG rating disagreement. These findings hold using firm fixed effects and using a difference-in-differences design with mandatory ESG disclosure shocks. We also find that raters disagree more about ESG outcome metrics than input metrics (policies), and that disclosure appears to amplify disagreement more for outcomes. Last, we examine consequences of ESG disagreement and find that greater ESG disagreement is associated with higher return volatility, larger absolute price movements, and a lower likelihood of issuing external financing. Overall, our findings highlight that ESG disclosure generally exacerbates ESG rating disagreement rather than resolves it. Data Availability: The data used in this study are publicly available from the sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G24; M14; M41; Q56.