Laura A. Wellman
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Laura A. Wellman has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Dane M. Christensen
Lundquist College of Business, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon 97403
3 shared publications - Hengda Jin
Texas A&M University
2 shared publications - Suhas A. Sridharan
Emory University
2 shared publications - A. Nicole Skinner
University of Colorado Boulder
1 shared publication - Andrea Pawliczek
University of Colorado Boulder
1 shared publication - Arthur Morris
The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 14 March 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 60 (6) , 2879-2920
Political Activism and Market Power
We document an increase in market power for politically active firms during times of heightened policy uncertainty, when their information and influence advantage is greater. The effect is long-lasting and stronger for large politically active firms. We show that relatively large investments during high uncertainty periods serve as a potential mechanism for gains in market power. Industries populated with politically active firms experience lower business dynamism and import penetration, consistent with active firms leveraging investment timing to restrict competition. Results suggest that political activism is a likely contributing factor to the dominance of large firms over the last two decades.
- 14 March 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 60 (6) , 2879-2920
Political Activism and Market Power
We document an increase in market power for politically active firms during times of heightened policy uncertainty, when their information and influence advantage is greater. The effect is long-lasting and stronger for large politically active firms. We show that relatively large investments during high uncertainty periods serve as a potential mechanism for gains in market power. Industries populated with politically active firms experience lower business dynamism and import penetration, consistent with active firms leveraging investment timing to restrict competition. Results suggest that political activism is a likely contributing factor to the dominance of large firms over the last two decades.
- Open Access
- 22 April 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 99 (3) , 87-113
Corporate Political Activism and Information Transfers
Prior research suggests that (1) politically active firms have an information advantage over firms that do not engage in the political process but also that (2) politically active firms are more likely to disclose policy-related information. We examine whether there are externalities associated with the processing of political information by politically active firms. We study this question in the setting of intraindustry information transfers around earnings announcements. Measuring firms’ political activism using campaign contributions, we find stronger intraindustry information transfers from politically active firms to their industry peers. These information transfers are stronger when there is more discussion during conference calls of political topics that have industry- or market-wide implications. Similarly, these information transfers are also stronger when there is greater political uncertainty. Our paper highlights an important information externality related to politically active firms’ disclosures and improves our understanding of how politically active firms affect their industries’ information environment. Data Availability: The data used in this study are publicly available from the sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: D72; M41; M48.
- 22 April 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 99 (3) , 87-113
Open AccessCorporate Political Activism and Information Transfers
Prior research suggests that (1) politically active firms have an information advantage over firms that do not engage in the political process but also that (2) politically active firms are more likely to disclose policy-related information. We examine whether there are externalities associated with the processing of political information by politically active firms. We study this question in the setting of intraindustry information transfers around earnings announcements. Measuring firms’ political activism using campaign contributions, we find stronger intraindustry information transfers from politically active firms to their industry peers. These information transfers are stronger when there is more discussion during conference calls of political topics that have industry- or market-wide implications. Similarly, these information transfers are also stronger when there is greater political uncertainty. Our paper highlights an important information externality related to politically active firms’ disclosures and improves our understanding of how politically active firms affect their industries’ information environment. Data Availability: The data used in this study are publicly available from the sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: D72; M41; M48.
- 1 June 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (6) , 4356-4379
Hedging on the Hill: Does Political Hedging Reduce Firm Risk?
We examine whether firms’ political hedging activities are effective at mitigating political risk. Focusing on the risk induced by partisan politics, we measure political hedging as the degree to which firms’ political connections are balanced across Republican and Democratic candidates. We find that greater political hedging is associated with reduced stock return volatility, particularly during periods of higher policy uncertainty. Similarly, greater political hedging is associated with reduced crash risk, investment volatility, and earnings volatility. Moreover, the reduction in earnings volatility appears to relate to both a firm’s taxes and its operating activities, as we find that greater political hedging is associated with reduced cash effective tax rate volatility and pretax income volatility. We further find investors are better able to anticipate future earnings for firms that engage in political hedging, suggesting that political hedging helps improve firms’ information environments. Lastly, we perform an event study using President Obama’s Clean Power Plan. We find that on the days this policy proposal was debated in Congress, energy and utility firms experienced heightened intraday return volatility (relative to other firms and nonevent days). However, this heightened volatility is mitigated for energy and utility firms that are more politically hedged. Overall, we conclude that political hedging is an effective risk management tool that helps mitigate firm risk. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.
- 1 June 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (6) , 4356-4379
Hedging on the Hill: Does Political Hedging Reduce Firm Risk?
We examine whether firms’ political hedging activities are effective at mitigating political risk. Focusing on the risk induced by partisan politics, we measure political hedging as the degree to which firms’ political connections are balanced across Republican and Democratic candidates. We find that greater political hedging is associated with reduced stock return volatility, particularly during periods of higher policy uncertainty. Similarly, greater political hedging is associated with reduced crash risk, investment volatility, and earnings volatility. Moreover, the reduction in earnings volatility appears to relate to both a firm’s taxes and its operating activities, as we find that greater political hedging is associated with reduced cash effective tax rate volatility and pretax income volatility. We further find investors are better able to anticipate future earnings for firms that engage in political hedging, suggesting that political hedging helps improve firms’ information environments. Lastly, we perform an event study using President Obama’s Clean Power Plan. We find that on the days this policy proposal was debated in Congress, energy and utility firms experienced heightened intraday return volatility (relative to other firms and nonevent days). However, this heightened volatility is mitigated for energy and utility firms that are more politically hedged. Overall, we conclude that political hedging is an effective risk management tool that helps mitigate firm risk. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.
- 7 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 28 (3) , 1466-1499
Political information flow and management guidance
- 7 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 28 (3) , 1466-1499
Political information flow and management guidance
- Open Access
- 27 August 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 26 (3) , 1088-1136
A new take on voice: the influence of BlackRock’s ‘Dear CEO’ letters
We examine whether broad-based public engagement by institutional investors influences the behavior of portfolio firms. We investigate this question in the context of BlackRock’s annual Dear CEO letter, which in recent years has called for portfolio firms to acknowledge and quantify the impact of environmental and regulatory factors on their firms. We find that portfolio firms’ disclosures during the post-letter period reflect topics similar to those discussed in the letters, controlling for a variety of firm and disclosure characteristics and the occurrence of private engagements. Moreover, BlackRock appears to value these additional disclosures, as it more often votes with management on shareholder proposals during subsequent annual shareholder meetings. Finally, motivated by BlackRock’s attempts to mobilize firms toward its specific policy recommendations, we also provide some evidence that firms’ lobbying efforts during the post-letter period become more aligned with the issues highlighted in the letter, especially when firms’ share BlackRock’s policy preferences ex ante. Taken together, our evidence suggests that portfolio firms are responsive to BlackRock’s public engagement efforts.
- 27 August 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 26 (3) , 1088-1136
Open AccessA new take on voice: the influence of BlackRock’s ‘Dear CEO’ letters
We examine whether broad-based public engagement by institutional investors influences the behavior of portfolio firms. We investigate this question in the context of BlackRock’s annual Dear CEO letter, which in recent years has called for portfolio firms to acknowledge and quantify the impact of environmental and regulatory factors on their firms. We find that portfolio firms’ disclosures during the post-letter period reflect topics similar to those discussed in the letters, controlling for a variety of firm and disclosure characteristics and the occurrence of private engagements. Moreover, BlackRock appears to value these additional disclosures, as it more often votes with management on shareholder proposals during subsequent annual shareholder meetings. Finally, motivated by BlackRock’s attempts to mobilize firms toward its specific policy recommendations, we also provide some evidence that firms’ lobbying efforts during the post-letter period become more aligned with the issues highlighted in the letter, especially when firms’ share BlackRock’s policy preferences ex ante. Taken together, our evidence suggests that portfolio firms are responsive to BlackRock’s public engagement efforts.