Elena Inarra
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Elena Inarra has a total of 37 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Annick Laruelle
Department of Economic Analysis (ANEKO), University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU), Bilbao, Spain
3 shared publications A. Saracho
2 shared publicationsC. Larrea
2 shared publications- C. Larrea
Univ Basque Country UPV EHU, BRiDGE, Dept Econ Aplicada 4, Leioa, Spain
2 shared publications - Elena Molis
Department of Economics, University of Granada, Granada, Spain
2 shared publications F. Grafe
Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico, University of the Basque Country, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, E-48015 Bilbao, Spain ES
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Effects of heterogeneity on cancer: a game theory perspective
In this study, we explore interactions between cancer cells by using the hawk-dove game. We analyze the heterogeneity of tumors by considering games with populations composed of 2 or 3 types of cells. We determine what strategies are evolutionarily stable in the 2-type and 3-type population games and the corresponding expected payoffs. Our results show that the payoff of the best-off cell in the 2-type population game is higher than that of the best-off cell in the 3-type population game. Translating these mathematical findings to the field of oncology suggests that a branching-type tumor pursues a less aggressive course than a punctuated-type one. Some histological and genomic data of clear cell renal cell carcinomas are consistent with these results.
Open AccessEffects of heterogeneity on cancer: a game theory perspective
In this study, we explore interactions between cancer cells by using the hawk-dove game. We analyze the heterogeneity of tumors by considering games with populations composed of 2 or 3 types of cells. We determine what strategies are evolutionarily stable in the 2-type and 3-type population games and the corresponding expected payoffs. Our results show that the payoff of the best-off cell in the 2-type population game is higher than that of the best-off cell in the 3-type population game. Translating these mathematical findings to the field of oncology suggests that a branching-type tumor pursues a less aggressive course than a punctuated-type one. Some histological and genomic data of clear cell renal cell carcinomas are consistent with these results.
- Open Access
- 18 February 2020
- Published by CAIRN.INFO in Revue économique
- Vol. 71 (2) , 225-266
The Nucleolus, the Kernel, and the Bargaining Set: An Update
One of the many important contributions in David Schmeidler’s distinguished career was the introduction of the nucleolus. This paper is an update on the nucleolus and its two related supersolutions, i.e., the kernel and the bargaining set. JEL Codes: C71, C72.
- 18 February 2020
- Published by CAIRN.INFO in Revue économique
- Vol. 71 (2) , 225-266
Open AccessThe Nucleolus, the Kernel, and the Bargaining Set: An Update
One of the many important contributions in David Schmeidler’s distinguished career was the introduction of the nucleolus. This paper is an update on the nucleolus and its two related supersolutions, i.e., the kernel and the bargaining set. JEL Codes: C71, C72.
- 1 January 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 79, 74-82
A new solution concept for the roommate problem: -stable matchings- 1 January 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 79, 74-82
A new solution concept for the roommate problem: -stable matchings- 1 February 2015
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Psychology
- Vol. 64-65, 58-65
Games with perception
- 1 February 2015
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Psychology
- Vol. 64-65, 58-65
Games with perception
- 1 October 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 125 (1) , 70-73
The von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets for the mixed extension of games- 1 October 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 125 (1) , 70-73
The von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets for the mixed extension of games- 30 September 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 81, 165-178
Absorbing sets in roommate problems
- 30 September 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 81, 165-178
Absorbing sets in roommate problems
- 1 July 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Vol. 305, 110-117
Artificial distinction and real discrimination
- 1 July 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Vol. 305, 110-117
Artificial distinction and real discrimination
- 1 March 2010
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 46 (2) , 141-147
Deriving Nash equilibria as the supercore for a relational system
- 1 March 2010
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 46 (2) , 141-147
Deriving Nash equilibria as the supercore for a relational system
- 24 September 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Economic Design
- Vol. 13 (4) , 361-376
A noncooperative view on two airport cost sharing rules
- 24 September 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Economic Design
- Vol. 13 (4) , 361-376
A noncooperative view on two airport cost sharing rules
- 1 May 2008
- Published by University of Wisconsin Press in Land Economics
- Vol. 84 (2) , 327-339
Restoring a Fish Stock: A Dynamic Bankruptcy Problem
Total Allowable Catch (TAC)-regulating schemes have been introduced in most fisheries. TAC distribution following the Proportional Rule, based on historical catches, implies that harvesters or vessel groups that have captured more in the past and contributed to overfishing are getting larger quotas than groups that have contributed less to overfishing. In contrast to this rule, a more egalitarian rule, the Constrained Equal Award Rule, is proposed for distributing the TAC. Contingent upon the fishing techniques used by the harvesters, it is demonstrated how the fish-stock recovery period, harvest, and profitability may vary according to these two rules. (JEL Q22, C70)
- 1 May 2008
- Published by University of Wisconsin Press in Land Economics
- Vol. 84 (2) , 327-339
Restoring a Fish Stock: A Dynamic Bankruptcy Problem
Total Allowable Catch (TAC)-regulating schemes have been introduced in most fisheries. TAC distribution following the Proportional Rule, based on historical catches, implies that harvesters or vessel groups that have captured more in the past and contributed to overfishing are getting larger quotas than groups that have contributed less to overfishing. In contrast to this rule, a more egalitarian rule, the Constrained Equal Award Rule, is proposed for distributing the TAC. Contingent upon the fishing techniques used by the harvesters, it is demonstrated how the fish-stock recovery period, harvest, and profitability may vary according to these two rules. (JEL Q22, C70)