The Nucleolus, the Kernel, and the Bargaining Set: An Update
Open Access
- 18 February 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by CAIRN.INFO in Revue économique
- Vol. 71 (2) , 225-266
Abstract
One of the many important contributions in David Schmeidler’s distinguished career was the introduction of the nucleolus. This paper is an update on the nucleolus and its two related supersolutions, i.e., the kernel and the bargaining set. JEL Codes: C71, C72.Keywords
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