Anton Peez
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Anton Peez has a total of 517 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Lisbeth Zimmermann
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Germany
7 shared publications Antonio Arcudi
6 shared publications- Felix S. Bethke
Goethe University Frankfurt & Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) Research Center Normative Orders Frankfurt am Main
6 shared publications - Max Lesch
Peace Research Institute Frankfurt , Germany
6 shared publications - Nicole Deitelhoff
Str. 2 | D-60323 Frankfurt
6 shared publications - Hana Attia
German Institute for Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, Germany
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 October 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Assessing the Trust Crisis in European Security: A New Approach to Measuring Unthinking Trust
Trust between the United States and its European allies appears to be in crisis, but our knowledge of the exact extent and consequences of this crisis is limited. To address this knowledge gap, we propose a novel approach for measuring deep, unthinking trust in public opinion. We conceptualize unthinking trust as the unquestioned expectation that others will reciprocate cooperation. We qualitatively capture this expectation through open-ended responses in a survey, which we then systematically code, creating a quantitative measure of unthinking trust. We apply our approach to study how recent breaches of trust affect unthinking trust among the German public in two key NATO allies, the UK and the US. Our findings show that a vignette reminding German respondents of Brexit and its aftermath significantly reduces unthinking trust in the UK. A comparable vignette reminding respondents of recent US behavior toward its European allies does not measurably affect unthinking trust in the US, presumably due to salience effects. Furthermore, we find that the Brexit treatment significantly affects respondents’ policy preferences, making them more wary of multilateral security cooperation and, surprisingly, of a national strengthening of defense. A mediation analysis shows that the mechanism of unthinking trust contributes to these effects.
- 14 October 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessAssessing the Trust Crisis in European Security: A New Approach to Measuring Unthinking Trust
Trust between the United States and its European allies appears to be in crisis, but our knowledge of the exact extent and consequences of this crisis is limited. To address this knowledge gap, we propose a novel approach for measuring deep, unthinking trust in public opinion. We conceptualize unthinking trust as the unquestioned expectation that others will reciprocate cooperation. We qualitatively capture this expectation through open-ended responses in a survey, which we then systematically code, creating a quantitative measure of unthinking trust. We apply our approach to study how recent breaches of trust affect unthinking trust among the German public in two key NATO allies, the UK and the US. Our findings show that a vignette reminding German respondents of Brexit and its aftermath significantly reduces unthinking trust in the UK. A comparable vignette reminding respondents of recent US behavior toward its European allies does not measurably affect unthinking trust in the US, presumably due to salience effects. Furthermore, we find that the Brexit treatment significantly affects respondents’ policy preferences, making them more wary of multilateral security cooperation and, surprisingly, of a national strengthening of defense. A mediation analysis shows that the mechanism of unthinking trust contributes to these effects.
- Open Access
- 21 September 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Peace Research
How citizens update their preferences on foreign policy: experimental evidence on Western sanctions
This study examines how citizens update their foreign policy preferences, focusing on the role of policy effectiveness in shaping support for economic sanctions. Economic sanctions often require sustained public support, which depends on perceptions of effectiveness. Using a two-stage experimental design, we investigate how individuals' preferences evolve when presented with information about effectiveness. We examine this updating behavior in “ordinary” times and in times of real-world foreign policy crisis. The study covers three major sanctioning countries—the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States—and four hypothetical scenarios. Our results suggest that citizens indeed update their preferences: effectiveness causes a moderate increase in support, while ineffectiveness causes a significant drop, showing clear negativity bias. For the U.S. sample, we repeated the experiment across four survey waves collected before and after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a major real-world foreign policy crisis. We find that responsiveness to effectiveness information remained remarkably stable. This demonstrates that citizens update their policy preferences based on instrumental reasoning, showing great consistency across countries, scenarios, and even in times of crisis.
- 21 September 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Peace Research
Open AccessHow citizens update their preferences on foreign policy: experimental evidence on Western sanctions
This study examines how citizens update their foreign policy preferences, focusing on the role of policy effectiveness in shaping support for economic sanctions. Economic sanctions often require sustained public support, which depends on perceptions of effectiveness. Using a two-stage experimental design, we investigate how individuals' preferences evolve when presented with information about effectiveness. We examine this updating behavior in “ordinary” times and in times of real-world foreign policy crisis. The study covers three major sanctioning countries—the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States—and four hypothetical scenarios. Our results suggest that citizens indeed update their preferences: effectiveness causes a moderate increase in support, while ineffectiveness causes a significant drop, showing clear negativity bias. For the U.S. sample, we repeated the experiment across four survey waves collected before and after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a major real-world foreign policy crisis. We find that responsiveness to effectiveness information remained remarkably stable. This demonstrates that citizens update their policy preferences based on instrumental reasoning, showing great consistency across countries, scenarios, and even in times of crisis.
- Open Access
- 15 September 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
The Growing Transatlantic Sanctions Divide
Multilateral cooperation on sanctions is a key determinant of their success, yet transatlantic collaboration on sanctions is steeply declining. This transatlantic sanctions divide is a symptom of increasingly divergent US and EU foreign policies. Sanctions are likewise best terminated multilaterally to effectively wield them as leverage. Here too, trustful US-EU collaboration is increasingly difficult to imagine. Nonetheless, strong public support for sanctioning Russia in both the EU and US offers a basis for continuing forceful Western sanctions as Russia escalates its war of aggression against Ukraine.
- 15 September 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessThe Growing Transatlantic Sanctions Divide
Multilateral cooperation on sanctions is a key determinant of their success, yet transatlantic collaboration on sanctions is steeply declining. This transatlantic sanctions divide is a symptom of increasingly divergent US and EU foreign policies. Sanctions are likewise best terminated multilaterally to effectively wield them as leverage. Here too, trustful US-EU collaboration is increasingly difficult to imagine. Nonetheless, strong public support for sanctioning Russia in both the EU and US offers a basis for continuing forceful Western sanctions as Russia escalates its war of aggression against Ukraine.
- Open Access
- 27 August 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Elite-Public Gaps on Salient Foreign Policy Issues: Experimental Evidence from the 2022/23 US Sanctions on Russia
Do citizens and political elites in Western democracies hold different views on foreign policy? ‘Elite-public gaps’ raise questions about whether elites represent public preferences and how much discretion they exercise. Research suggests that although gaps exist, they are significantly driven by ‘mundane’ compositional differences. We examine these gaps during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. We ran a paired experiment with US executive staffers (n = 253) and the US public (n = 1,002), asking whether respondents support increasing sanctions on Russia. We randomize information on real public polling highly supportive of sanctions. The public was less supportive than executive staffers at baseline, but more responsive to public opinion. Gaps shrink after accounting for basic sociodemographics. This extends research on elite-public gaps to cover salient real-world events.
- 27 August 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessElite-Public Gaps on Salient Foreign Policy Issues: Experimental Evidence from the 2022/23 US Sanctions on Russia
Do citizens and political elites in Western democracies hold different views on foreign policy? ‘Elite-public gaps’ raise questions about whether elites represent public preferences and how much discretion they exercise. Research suggests that although gaps exist, they are significantly driven by ‘mundane’ compositional differences. We examine these gaps during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. We ran a paired experiment with US executive staffers (n = 253) and the US public (n = 1,002), asking whether respondents support increasing sanctions on Russia. We randomize information on real public polling highly supportive of sanctions. The public was less supportive than executive staffers at baseline, but more responsive to public opinion. Gaps shrink after accounting for basic sociodemographics. This extends research on elite-public gaps to cover salient real-world events.
- Open Access
- 20 July 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Conflict Management and Peace Science
Public opinion on sanctions compliance and evasion: Experimental evidence from the 2022–23 Russia sanctions
How does the public assess corporate behavior regarding economic sanctions? Private companies play a critical role in making sanctions work—circumventing, complying, or limiting their business beyond what is legally required. We theorize that stigma and information cues make citizens likely to support domestic firms withdrawing from a foreign market and disapprove of companies continuing business. We ran two pre-registered survey experiments about the 2022 Russia sanctions in Germany. Germans disapprove of firms remaining, even when not violating sanctions regulations. Firms continuing legal business cannot justify their actions in a way that mitigates negative public perception. Three replications establish generalizability.
- 20 July 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Conflict Management and Peace Science
Open AccessPublic opinion on sanctions compliance and evasion: Experimental evidence from the 2022–23 Russia sanctions
How does the public assess corporate behavior regarding economic sanctions? Private companies play a critical role in making sanctions work—circumventing, complying, or limiting their business beyond what is legally required. We theorize that stigma and information cues make citizens likely to support domestic firms withdrawing from a foreign market and disapprove of companies continuing business. We ran two pre-registered survey experiments about the 2022 Russia sanctions in Germany. Germans disapprove of firms remaining, even when not violating sanctions regulations. Firms continuing legal business cannot justify their actions in a way that mitigates negative public perception. Three replications establish generalizability.
- Open Access
- 23 May 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Who Changes Their Mind After Dramatic Diplomatic Events? Public Opinion and the Trump/Zelenskyy Oval Office Meeting
How do ordinary citizens react to dramatic diplomatic events? We propose public reactions to such dramatic global events are initially significantly driven by ‘bottom up’ dynamics rooted in personality traits and emotion. Over time, these personality-driven effects diminish, and ‘top down’ elite cues and strategic calculus persist as drivers. We examine the unexpected, dramatic 28 February 2025 Oval Office confrontation between US president Donald Trump and Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy and its effects on German public support for arming Ukraine. We consider this a ‘hard’ test, as Ukraine policy has been one of the foremost policy issues in Germany for years, with strongly entrenched partisan positions. We use detailed two-wave panel data collected before and after the confrontation (N = 7,768 respondents in a rolling cross-section). Across estimation strategies, we find that the confrontation indeed caused a swift increase in mean support for arms deliveries to Ukraine (+0.22–0.27 SD). We show that this effect persisted for at least four weeks with no clear signs of diminishing. We find an ‘empathy effect,’ with respondents with higher levels of agreeableness reacting more strongly. This conditional effect receded over time, suggesting that ‘bottom up’ (personality-driven) and ‘top down’ (elite cueing) dynamics may unfold differently over time following extreme events. This provides empirical evidence for individual-level traits as important drivers not only of baseline foreign policy preferences, but also of changes in preferences. The study gives us a more dynamic understanding of how personality – especially agreeableness – drives individual responses to dramatic global events.
- 23 May 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessWho Changes Their Mind After Dramatic Diplomatic Events? Public Opinion and the Trump/Zelenskyy Oval Office Meeting
How do ordinary citizens react to dramatic diplomatic events? We propose public reactions to such dramatic global events are initially significantly driven by ‘bottom up’ dynamics rooted in personality traits and emotion. Over time, these personality-driven effects diminish, and ‘top down’ elite cues and strategic calculus persist as drivers. We examine the unexpected, dramatic 28 February 2025 Oval Office confrontation between US president Donald Trump and Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy and its effects on German public support for arming Ukraine. We consider this a ‘hard’ test, as Ukraine policy has been one of the foremost policy issues in Germany for years, with strongly entrenched partisan positions. We use detailed two-wave panel data collected before and after the confrontation (N = 7,768 respondents in a rolling cross-section). Across estimation strategies, we find that the confrontation indeed caused a swift increase in mean support for arms deliveries to Ukraine (+0.22–0.27 SD). We show that this effect persisted for at least four weeks with no clear signs of diminishing. We find an ‘empathy effect,’ with respondents with higher levels of agreeableness reacting more strongly. This conditional effect receded over time, suggesting that ‘bottom up’ (personality-driven) and ‘top down’ (elite cueing) dynamics may unfold differently over time following extreme events. This provides empirical evidence for individual-level traits as important drivers not only of baseline foreign policy preferences, but also of changes in preferences. The study gives us a more dynamic understanding of how personality – especially agreeableness – drives individual responses to dramatic global events.
- Open Access
- 18 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in The Review of International Organizations
Using LLMs for measurement in diplomatic speeches: The evolving politics of UN sanctions in Security Council debates
UN sanctions are an important tool for maintaining international peace and have shaped the global security order since the end of the Cold War. However, given contemporary UN Security Council (UNSC) dynamics, new sanctions regimes have become rare, and policymakers are pessimistic about the future of the tool. We evaluate this pessimism by offering a long-term perspective, analyzing all UNSC members’ positions on UN-mandated and unilateral sanctions from 1992 to 2023, introducing the UNSC Sanctions Stance Dataset. We examine 5,984 sanctions-related Council speeches using a large language model for measurement, and validate this procedure with hand coding, descriptive analyses, and expert interviews. Our description of the construction process and guidance on using LLMs for measurement serve as a template for creating LLM-coded and manually and substantively verified datasets from IO speech data. The analysis focuses on Russia, China, and the Global South, and traces their positions in detail. We find that Russia turned from limited support of UN sanctions in the 2000s to total opposition in the mid-2010s, while China has persistently been opposed, offering at most begrudging tolerance. The P3 (France, UK, US) have consistently been supportive. Meanwhile, states from the Global South hold a distinct intermediate position, opposing unilateral sanctions while cautiously but consistently supporting UN-mandated sanctions. This finding cuts against an assumption of Global South opposition to sanctions in general.
- 18 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in The Review of International Organizations
Open AccessUsing LLMs for measurement in diplomatic speeches: The evolving politics of UN sanctions in Security Council debates
UN sanctions are an important tool for maintaining international peace and have shaped the global security order since the end of the Cold War. However, given contemporary UN Security Council (UNSC) dynamics, new sanctions regimes have become rare, and policymakers are pessimistic about the future of the tool. We evaluate this pessimism by offering a long-term perspective, analyzing all UNSC members’ positions on UN-mandated and unilateral sanctions from 1992 to 2023, introducing the UNSC Sanctions Stance Dataset. We examine 5,984 sanctions-related Council speeches using a large language model for measurement, and validate this procedure with hand coding, descriptive analyses, and expert interviews. Our description of the construction process and guidance on using LLMs for measurement serve as a template for creating LLM-coded and manually and substantively verified datasets from IO speech data. The analysis focuses on Russia, China, and the Global South, and traces their positions in detail. We find that Russia turned from limited support of UN sanctions in the 2000s to total opposition in the mid-2010s, while China has persistently been opposed, offering at most begrudging tolerance. The P3 (France, UK, US) have consistently been supportive. Meanwhile, states from the Global South hold a distinct intermediate position, opposing unilateral sanctions while cautiously but consistently supporting UN-mandated sanctions. This finding cuts against an assumption of Global South opposition to sanctions in general.
- Open Access
- 18 May 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Using LLMs for Measurement in Diplomatic Speeches: The Evolving Politics of UN Sanctions in Security Council Debates
UN sanctions are an important tool for maintaining international peace and have shaped the global security order since the end of the Cold War. However, given contemporary UN Security Council (UNSC) dynamics, new sanctions regimes have become rare, and policymakers are pessimistic about the future of the tool. We evaluate this pessimism by offering a long-term perspective, analyzing all UNSC members’ positions on UN-mandated and unilateral sanctions from 1992–2023, introducing the UNSC Sanctions Stance Dataset. We examine 5,984 sanctions-related Council speeches using a large language model for measurement, and validate this procedure with hand coding, descriptive analyses, and expert interviews. Our description of the construction process and guidance on using LLMs for measurement serve as a template for creating LLM-coded and manually and substantively verified datasets from IO speech data. The analysis focuses on Russia, China, and the Global South, and traces their positions in detail. We find that Russia turned from limited support of UN sanctions in the 2000s to total opposition in the mid-2010s, while China has persistently been opposed, offering at most begrudging tolerance. The P3 (France, UK, US) have consistently been supportive. Meanwhile, states from the Global South hold a distinct intermediate position, opposing unilateral sanctions while cautiously but consistently supporting UN-mandated sanctions. This finding cuts against an assumption of Global South opposition to sanctions in general.
- 18 May 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessUsing LLMs for Measurement in Diplomatic Speeches: The Evolving Politics of UN Sanctions in Security Council Debates
UN sanctions are an important tool for maintaining international peace and have shaped the global security order since the end of the Cold War. However, given contemporary UN Security Council (UNSC) dynamics, new sanctions regimes have become rare, and policymakers are pessimistic about the future of the tool. We evaluate this pessimism by offering a long-term perspective, analyzing all UNSC members’ positions on UN-mandated and unilateral sanctions from 1992–2023, introducing the UNSC Sanctions Stance Dataset. We examine 5,984 sanctions-related Council speeches using a large language model for measurement, and validate this procedure with hand coding, descriptive analyses, and expert interviews. Our description of the construction process and guidance on using LLMs for measurement serve as a template for creating LLM-coded and manually and substantively verified datasets from IO speech data. The analysis focuses on Russia, China, and the Global South, and traces their positions in detail. We find that Russia turned from limited support of UN sanctions in the 2000s to total opposition in the mid-2010s, while China has persistently been opposed, offering at most begrudging tolerance. The P3 (France, UK, US) have consistently been supportive. Meanwhile, states from the Global South hold a distinct intermediate position, opposing unilateral sanctions while cautiously but consistently supporting UN-mandated sanctions. This finding cuts against an assumption of Global South opposition to sanctions in general.
- Open Access
- 31 March 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in MetaArXiv
Investigating the analytical robustness of the social and behavioural sciences
The same dataset can be analysed in different justifiable ways to answer the same research question, potentially challenging the robustness of empirical science1–3. In this crowd initiative, we investigated the degree to which research findings in the social and behavioural sciences are contingent on analysts’ choices. We examined a stratified random sample of 100 studies published between 2009 and 2018, where for one claim per study, at least five re-analysts independently re-analysed the original data. The statistical appropriateness of the re-analyses was assessed in peer evaluations, and the robustness indicators were inspected along a range of research characteristics and study designs. We found that 34% of the independent re-analyses yielded the same result (within a tolerance region of +/- 0.05 Cohen’s d) as the original report; with a four times broader tolerance region, this indicator rose to 57%. Regarding the conclusions drawn, 74% of analyses were reported to arrive at the same conclusion as in the original investigation; 24% to no effects/inconclusive result, and 2% to the opposite effect as in the original investigation. This exploratory study suggests that the common single-path analyses in social and behavioural research should not simply be assumed to be robust to alternative analyses4. Therefore, we recommend the development and use of practices to explore and communicate this neglected source of uncertainty.
- 31 March 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in MetaArXiv
Open AccessInvestigating the analytical robustness of the social and behavioural sciences
The same dataset can be analysed in different justifiable ways to answer the same research question, potentially challenging the robustness of empirical science1–3. In this crowd initiative, we investigated the degree to which research findings in the social and behavioural sciences are contingent on analysts’ choices. We examined a stratified random sample of 100 studies published between 2009 and 2018, where for one claim per study, at least five re-analysts independently re-analysed the original data. The statistical appropriateness of the re-analyses was assessed in peer evaluations, and the robustness indicators were inspected along a range of research characteristics and study designs. We found that 34% of the independent re-analyses yielded the same result (within a tolerance region of +/- 0.05 Cohen’s d) as the original report; with a four times broader tolerance region, this indicator rose to 57%. Regarding the conclusions drawn, 74% of analyses were reported to arrive at the same conclusion as in the original investigation; 24% to no effects/inconclusive result, and 2% to the opposite effect as in the original investigation. This exploratory study suggests that the common single-path analyses in social and behavioural research should not simply be assumed to be robust to alternative analyses4. Therefore, we recommend the development and use of practices to explore and communicate this neglected source of uncertainty.
- Open Access
- 4 December 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- Vol. 14 (4) , 1-19
Re-examining the effects of Western sanctions on democracy and human rights in the 21 st century
Do economic sanctions negatively affect democracy and human rights in targeted countries? Although often intended to improve these outcomes, their record of doing so has historically been mixed at best. Most canonical studies cover the 1980s–1990s, but sanctions practice has since undergone major innovations following debates on humanitarian harm. Given this move toward ‘targeted’ sanctions, it stands to reason that sanctions may today be achieving their intended purposes. I take up policy and methodological innovations to re-examine the effects of Western sanctions seeking to improve democracy and human rights from 1990 to 2021. I find that negative effects persist, offering an important update to the empirical literature. Beyond this contribution, I present a template for replicating and extending country-year research in international relations (IR).
- 4 December 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- Vol. 14 (4) , 1-19
Open AccessRe-examining the effects of Western sanctions on democracy and human rights in the 21 st century
Do economic sanctions negatively affect democracy and human rights in targeted countries? Although often intended to improve these outcomes, their record of doing so has historically been mixed at best. Most canonical studies cover the 1980s–1990s, but sanctions practice has since undergone major innovations following debates on humanitarian harm. Given this move toward ‘targeted’ sanctions, it stands to reason that sanctions may today be achieving their intended purposes. I take up policy and methodological innovations to re-examine the effects of Western sanctions seeking to improve democracy and human rights from 1990 to 2021. I find that negative effects persist, offering an important update to the empirical literature. Beyond this contribution, I present a template for replicating and extending country-year research in international relations (IR).