Elselijn Kingma
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Elselijn Kingma has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Ank de Jonge
Amsterdam University Medical Centre (UMC), Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Department of Midwifery Science, AVAG, The Amsterdam Reproduction & Development research institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
2 shared publicationsCorine Verhoeven
Amsterdam University Medical Centre (UMC), Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Department of Midwifery Science, AVAG, Amsterdam Public Health research institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
2 shared publications- Marit Sophia Gerardina van der Pijl
Amsterdam University Medical Centre (UMC), Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Department of Midwifery Science, AVAG, Amsterdam Public Health research institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
2 shared publications Martine Hollander
Amalia Children’s Hospital, Department of Obstetrics, Radboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
2 shared publicationsMary Margaret McCabe
Department of Philosophy King's College London London UK
2 shared publicationsAnna Madeley
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 45-68
Disease as Scientific and as Value-Laden Concept
- 19 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-24
Disease as Scientific and as Value-Laden Concept
- Open Access
- 29 November 2024
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
- Vol. 51 (9)
Ethics round table: choice and autonomy in obstetrics
Decisions about how and where they deliver their baby are extremely important to pregnant women. There are very strong ethical norms that women’s autonomy should be respected, and that plans around birth should be personalised. However, there appear to be profound challenges in practice to respecting women’s choices in pregnancy and labour. Choices carry risks and consequences—to the woman and her child; also potentially to her caregivers and to other women.What does it mean for women’s autonomy to be respected in obstetrics? How should health professionals respond to refusals of treatment or requests for care outside normal guidelines? What are the ethical limits to autonomy? In this clinical ethics round table, service users, midwives, obstetricians, philosophers and ethicists respond to two hypothetical cases drawn from real-life scenarios.
- 29 November 2024
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
- Vol. 51 (9)
Open AccessEthics round table: choice and autonomy in obstetrics
Decisions about how and where they deliver their baby are extremely important to pregnant women. There are very strong ethical norms that women’s autonomy should be respected, and that plans around birth should be personalised. However, there appear to be profound challenges in practice to respecting women’s choices in pregnancy and labour. Choices carry risks and consequences—to the woman and her child; also potentially to her caregivers and to other women.What does it mean for women’s autonomy to be respected in obstetrics? How should health professionals respond to refusals of treatment or requests for care outside normal guidelines? What are the ethical limits to autonomy? In this clinical ethics round table, service users, midwives, obstetricians, philosophers and ethicists respond to two hypothetical cases drawn from real-life scenarios.
- 30 August 2023
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
- Vol. 49 (9) , 632-633
Consent and episiotomies: do not let the perfect be the enemy of the good
- 30 August 2023
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
- Vol. 49 (9) , 632-633
Consent and episiotomies: do not let the perfect be the enemy of the good
- 2 May 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 23 (5) , 85-87
Artificial Placenta – Imminent Ethical Considerations for Research Trials and Clinical Translation
De Bie et al. (2023) propose an organizing framework for different stages of human gestational development from conception to the viable premature. They also identify ethical considerations and con...
- 2 May 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 23 (5) , 85-87
Artificial Placenta – Imminent Ethical Considerations for Research Trials and Clinical Translation
De Bie et al. (2023) propose an organizing framework for different stages of human gestational development from conception to the viable premature. They also identify ethical considerations and con...
- Open Access
- 30 January 2023
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
- Vol. 49 (9) , 611-617
The ethics of consent during labour and birth: episiotomies
Unconsented episiotomies and other procedures during labour are commonly reported by women in several countries, and often highlighted in birth activism. Yet, forced caesarean sections aside, the ethics of consent during labour has received little attention. Focusing on episiotomies, this paper addresses whether and how consent in labour should be obtained. We briefly review the rationale for informed consent, distinguishing its intrinsic and instrumental relevance for respecting autonomy. We also emphasise two non-explicit ways of giving consent: implied and opt-out consent. We then discuss challenges and opportunities for obtaining consent in labour and birth, given its unique position in medicine.We argue that consent for procedures in labour is always necessary, but this consent does not always have to be fully informed or explicit. We recommend an individualised approach where the antenatal period is used to exchange information and explore values and preferences with respect to the relevant procedures. Explicit consent should always be sought at the point of intervening, unless women antenatally insist otherwise. We caution against implied consent. However, if a woman does not give a conclusive response during labour and the stakes are high, care providers can move to clearly communicated opt-out consent. Our discussion is focused on episiotomies, but also provides a useful starting point for addressing the ethics of consent for other procedures during labour, as well as general time-critical medical procedures.
- 30 January 2023
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
- Vol. 49 (9) , 611-617
Open AccessThe ethics of consent during labour and birth: episiotomies
Unconsented episiotomies and other procedures during labour are commonly reported by women in several countries, and often highlighted in birth activism. Yet, forced caesarean sections aside, the ethics of consent during labour has received little attention. Focusing on episiotomies, this paper addresses whether and how consent in labour should be obtained. We briefly review the rationale for informed consent, distinguishing its intrinsic and instrumental relevance for respecting autonomy. We also emphasise two non-explicit ways of giving consent: implied and opt-out consent. We then discuss challenges and opportunities for obtaining consent in labour and birth, given its unique position in medicine.We argue that consent for procedures in labour is always necessary, but this consent does not always have to be fully informed or explicit. We recommend an individualised approach where the antenatal period is used to exchange information and explore values and preferences with respect to the relevant procedures. Explicit consent should always be sought at the point of intervening, unless women antenatally insist otherwise. We caution against implied consent. However, if a woman does not give a conclusive response during labour and the stakes are high, care providers can move to clearly communicated opt-out consent. Our discussion is focused on episiotomies, but also provides a useful starting point for addressing the ethics of consent for other procedures during labour, as well as general time-critical medical procedures.
- Open Access
Harming one to benefit another: The paradox of autonomy and consent in maternity care
This paper critically analyses ‘the paradox of autonomy and consent in maternity care’. It argues that maternity care has certain features that increase the need for explicit attention to, and respect for, both autonomy and rigorous informed consent processes. And, moreover, that the resulting need is considerably greater than in almost all other areas of medicine. These features are as follows: (1) maternity care involves particularly socially sensitive body parts that are regularly implicated in consent‐centred procedures, as well as in unconsented interventions, in ordinary, non‐medical life; and (2) much of maternity care (especially intervening in childbirth) is medically unique, in that it harms one patient (the mother) not primarily for the promotion of her own health but for the benefit of another (the baby). The apt comparison, within medicine, is therefore with non‐therapeutic research and transplantation medicine—both of which have elevated consent requirements characterized by very rigorous consent processes. At the same time—and this delivers the titular paradox—the importance of autonomy and consent in maternity care is at particular risk of being denied or disregarded. Jointly, these considerations make a very strong case for change: attention to and respect for autonomy and consent should be (1) core values; (2) key points of practical attention in the years ahead; and (3) central quality indicators in maternity care.
Open AccessHarming one to benefit another: The paradox of autonomy and consent in maternity care
This paper critically analyses ‘the paradox of autonomy and consent in maternity care’. It argues that maternity care has certain features that increase the need for explicit attention to, and respect for, both autonomy and rigorous informed consent processes. And, moreover, that the resulting need is considerably greater than in almost all other areas of medicine. These features are as follows: (1) maternity care involves particularly socially sensitive body parts that are regularly implicated in consent‐centred procedures, as well as in unconsented interventions, in ordinary, non‐medical life; and (2) much of maternity care (especially intervening in childbirth) is medically unique, in that it harms one patient (the mother) not primarily for the promotion of her own health but for the benefit of another (the baby). The apt comparison, within medicine, is therefore with non‐therapeutic research and transplantation medicine—both of which have elevated consent requirements characterized by very rigorous consent processes. At the same time—and this delivers the titular paradox—the importance of autonomy and consent in maternity care is at particular risk of being denied or disregarded. Jointly, these considerations make a very strong case for change: attention to and respect for autonomy and consent should be (1) core values; (2) key points of practical attention in the years ahead; and (3) central quality indicators in maternity care.
- 8 September 2020
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
- Vol. 47 (5) , 355-356
In defence of gestatelings: response to Colgrove
Ectogestation—that is, ‘artificial’ or extramammalian pregnancy—may soon be within technological reach. This confronts us with questions about the correct moral and legal attitude towards the subjects of this technology, which are called ‘gestatelings’. Colgrove argues that gestatelings are a kind of newborn, and consequently should have the same moral and legal protections as newborns. This paper responds that both claims are unsupported by his arguments, which equivocate on two understandings of the term ‘newborn’. Questions about the appropriate moral and legal status of gestatelings are therefore (once again, and correctly) left unanswered, but in the course of attempting to answer them, we are well advised to continue using the term gestateling.
- 8 September 2020
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
- Vol. 47 (5) , 355-356
In defence of gestatelings: response to Colgrove
Ectogestation—that is, ‘artificial’ or extramammalian pregnancy—may soon be within technological reach. This confronts us with questions about the correct moral and legal attitude towards the subjects of this technology, which are called ‘gestatelings’. Colgrove argues that gestatelings are a kind of newborn, and consequently should have the same moral and legal protections as newborns. This paper responds that both claims are unsupported by his arguments, which equivocate on two understandings of the term ‘newborn’. Questions about the appropriate moral and legal status of gestatelings are therefore (once again, and correctly) left unanswered, but in the course of attempting to answer them, we are well advised to continue using the term gestateling.
- 22 June 2020
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
- Vol. 47 (4) , 280-286
Parental obligation and compelled caesarean section: careful analogies and reliable reasoning about individual cases
Whether it is morally permissible to compel women to undergo a caesarean section is a topic of longstanding debate. Despite plenty of arguments against the moral permissibility of a forced caesarean section, the question keeps cropping up. This paper seeks to scrutinise a particular moral argument in favour of compulsion: the appeal to parental obligation. We present what we take to be a distillation of the basic form of this argument. We then argue that, in the absence of an exhaustive theory of parental obligation, the question of whether a labouring woman is morally obliged to undergo emergency surgery—and especially the further question of it is morally permissible for third parties to compel this—cannot be answered via ready-made theory. We propose that the most viable option for settling both questions is by analogy. We follow earlier writers in presenting an analogous case—that of fathers being compelled to undergo non-consensual invasive surgery to save their children—but expand the analogy by considering objections that appeal to the ownership of the fetus. We offer two lines of response: (1) the parthood view of pregnancy and (2) chimaera dad. We argue that it is clear in the analogous case that compulsion cannot be justified. We also offer this analogy as a useful tool for assessing whether mothers have a moral duty to undergo caesarean sections, both in general and in particular cases, even if such a duty is insufficient to warrant compulsion.
- 22 June 2020
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
- Vol. 47 (4) , 280-286
Parental obligation and compelled caesarean section: careful analogies and reliable reasoning about individual cases
Whether it is morally permissible to compel women to undergo a caesarean section is a topic of longstanding debate. Despite plenty of arguments against the moral permissibility of a forced caesarean section, the question keeps cropping up. This paper seeks to scrutinise a particular moral argument in favour of compulsion: the appeal to parental obligation. We present what we take to be a distillation of the basic form of this argument. We then argue that, in the absence of an exhaustive theory of parental obligation, the question of whether a labouring woman is morally obliged to undergo emergency surgery—and especially the further question of it is morally permissible for third parties to compel this—cannot be answered via ready-made theory. We propose that the most viable option for settling both questions is by analogy. We follow earlier writers in presenting an analogous case—that of fathers being compelled to undergo non-consensual invasive surgery to save their children—but expand the analogy by considering objections that appeal to the ownership of the fetus. We offer two lines of response: (1) the parthood view of pregnancy and (2) chimaera dad. We argue that it is clear in the analogous case that compulsion cannot be justified. We also offer this analogy as a useful tool for assessing whether mothers have a moral duty to undergo caesarean sections, both in general and in particular cases, even if such a duty is insufficient to warrant compulsion.
- 21 May 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine
- Vol. 45 (3) , 371-386
Nine Months
When did we begin to exist? Barry Smith and Berit Brogaard argue that a new human organism comes into existence neither earlier nor later than the moment of gastrulation: 16 days after conception. Several critics have responded that the onset of the organism must happen earlier; closer to conception. This article makes a radically different claim: if we accept Smith and Brogaard’s ontological commitments, then human organisms start, on average, roughly nine months after conception. The main point of contention is whether the fetus is or is not part of the maternal organism. Smith and Brogaard argue that it is not; I demonstrate that it is. This claim in combination with Smith and Brogaard’s own criteria commits to the view that human organisms begin, precisely, at birth.
- 21 May 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine
- Vol. 45 (3) , 371-386
Nine Months
When did we begin to exist? Barry Smith and Berit Brogaard argue that a new human organism comes into existence neither earlier nor later than the moment of gastrulation: 16 days after conception. Several critics have responded that the onset of the organism must happen earlier; closer to conception. This article makes a radically different claim: if we accept Smith and Brogaard’s ontological commitments, then human organisms start, on average, roughly nine months after conception. The main point of contention is whether the fetus is or is not part of the maternal organism. Smith and Brogaard argue that it is not; I demonstrate that it is. This claim in combination with Smith and Brogaard’s own criteria commits to the view that human organisms begin, precisely, at birth.