Andrew M. Bauer
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Andrew M. Bauer has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Dan Amiram
Tel Aviv University
2 shared publications- Mary Margaret Frank
University of Virginia - Darden School of Business
2 shared publications - Aleksandra B. Zimmerman
Florida State University
1 shared publication - Daniel P. Lynch
University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, USA
1 shared publication - Darren Henderson
Wilfrid Laurier University
1 shared publication - Jeffrey Pittman
Memorial University of Newfoundland
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 September 2026
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- p. 1-31
Auditor-Employed Tax Experts and Audit Quality
Using PCAOB data, we examine variation in auditor-employed tax experts’ involvement to assist the audit team. Tax expert hours average 5 percent of total audit hours and are positively associated with several proxies for the complexity of tax estimates. Greater tax expert involvement correlates with a higher detection rate of tax-related internal control material weaknesses (ICMWs) and a greater frequency of subsequent tax-related restatements. However, earlier tax expert involvement is associated with fewer ICMWs, although it is not significantly associated with subsequent restatements. Overall, our findings provide new evidence on how the timing and intensity of tax expert involvement relate to audit outcomes. Although involving tax experts is a typical response to auditing complex estimates, their involvement alone does not fully mitigate restatement risk. Importantly, timely coordination between the audit team and tax experts plays a critical role in ensuring high audit quality. Data Availability: Audit engagement data from the PCAOB are proprietary; other data are from public sources. JEL Classifications: M4.
- 1 September 2026
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- p. 1-31
Auditor-Employed Tax Experts and Audit Quality
Using PCAOB data, we examine variation in auditor-employed tax experts’ involvement to assist the audit team. Tax expert hours average 5 percent of total audit hours and are positively associated with several proxies for the complexity of tax estimates. Greater tax expert involvement correlates with a higher detection rate of tax-related internal control material weaknesses (ICMWs) and a greater frequency of subsequent tax-related restatements. However, earlier tax expert involvement is associated with fewer ICMWs, although it is not significantly associated with subsequent restatements. Overall, our findings provide new evidence on how the timing and intensity of tax expert involvement relate to audit outcomes. Although involving tax experts is a typical response to auditing complex estimates, their involvement alone does not fully mitigate restatement risk. Importantly, timely coordination between the audit team and tax experts plays a critical role in ensuring high audit quality. Data Availability: Audit engagement data from the PCAOB are proprietary; other data are from public sources. JEL Classifications: M4.
- 1 August 2025
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Journal of the American Taxation Association
- Vol. 48 (2) , 1-25
A Comparison of Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures of Tax Settlements to Assess Their Favorability
Tax footnotes, particularly disclosures of unrecognized tax benefit (UTB) accruals, contain significant information. To aid large-sample empirical research, and assess reliable measures of the favorability of tax settlements, we compare three potential proxies of footnote information: two derived from quantitative information and one derived from qualitative information. To validate the proxies, we use hand-coded disclosures about the nature of UTB settlements and an empirical model of the revaluation of prior, open tax positions at the time of settlement. We find that the textual analysis method to infer settlement favorability from qualitative text in tax footnotes performs well in both validations. Conversely, the tax rate reconciliation proxy is discriminant only in the first validation, whereas the accrual of interest and penalties proxy relates to settlement favorability only in the second validation. Overall, the qualitative proxy is most reliable and represents a new and useful measure for the empirical tax literature. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: C89; D81; H25; M48.
- 1 August 2025
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Journal of the American Taxation Association
- Vol. 48 (2) , 1-25
A Comparison of Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures of Tax Settlements to Assess Their Favorability
Tax footnotes, particularly disclosures of unrecognized tax benefit (UTB) accruals, contain significant information. To aid large-sample empirical research, and assess reliable measures of the favorability of tax settlements, we compare three potential proxies of footnote information: two derived from quantitative information and one derived from qualitative information. To validate the proxies, we use hand-coded disclosures about the nature of UTB settlements and an empirical model of the revaluation of prior, open tax positions at the time of settlement. We find that the textual analysis method to infer settlement favorability from qualitative text in tax footnotes performs well in both validations. Conversely, the tax rate reconciliation proxy is discriminant only in the first validation, whereas the accrual of interest and penalties proxy relates to settlement favorability only in the second validation. Overall, the qualitative proxy is most reliable and represents a new and useful measure for the empirical tax literature. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: C89; D81; H25; M48.
- 12 October 2020
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 96 (4) , 81-109
The Importance of IRS Enforcement to Stock Price Crash Risk: The Role of CEO Power and Incentives
We analyze whether tough IRS monitoring generates a positive externality by constraining managers' bad news hoarding activities. Supporting this prediction, we find a negative relation between the threat of an IRS audit and stock price crash risk. Our evidence is consistent with recent theory that outside investors learn more about firms when tax enforcement is stricter. Additionally, path analysis suggests that the monitoring channel (direct path) plays a critical role in shaping crash risk relative to information asymmetry channels of tax planning and accruals manipulation (indirect paths). Consistent with other predictions, we find that the monitoring role of IRS audits intensifies when firms experience worse agency conflicts stemming from CEO power and incentives. Collectively, our research implies that external monitoring by tax authorities protects shareholders against managers suppressing negative firm-specific information that engenders stock price crash risk, particularly when CEOs have wider scope and stronger incentives to hoard bad news.
- 12 October 2020
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 96 (4) , 81-109
The Importance of IRS Enforcement to Stock Price Crash Risk: The Role of CEO Power and Incentives
We analyze whether tough IRS monitoring generates a positive externality by constraining managers' bad news hoarding activities. Supporting this prediction, we find a negative relation between the threat of an IRS audit and stock price crash risk. Our evidence is consistent with recent theory that outside investors learn more about firms when tax enforcement is stricter. Additionally, path analysis suggests that the monitoring channel (direct path) plays a critical role in shaping crash risk relative to information asymmetry channels of tax planning and accruals manipulation (indirect paths). Consistent with other predictions, we find that the monitoring role of IRS audits intensifies when firms experience worse agency conflicts stemming from CEO power and incentives. Collectively, our research implies that external monitoring by tax authorities protects shareholders against managers suppressing negative firm-specific information that engenders stock price crash risk, particularly when CEOs have wider scope and stronger incentives to hoard bad news.
- 1 November 2018
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 94 (5) , 27-55
Tax Avoidance at Public Corporations Driven by Shareholder Taxes: Evidence from Changes in Dividend Tax Policy
We exploit changes in a country's integration of corporate and shareholder taxes to identify the effect of investor-level taxes on costly corporate tax avoidance. Specifically, we rely on European countries eliminating imputation systems in different years in response to supranational judicial rulings. These eliminations, which are exogenous to the firm, remove managers' disincentive to engage in tax avoidance if they consider investor-level taxes. Using a difference-in-differences model with fixed effects, we find that the average firm affected by an elimination reduces its cash effective tax rate by 5.5 percent. Placebo tests support that this effect exists only for countries and years for which eliminations occur. Consistent with our cross-sectional predictions, we find that results are stronger for firms with lower growth opportunities, higher dividend payout, lower foreign income, and higher closely held ownership. Further analysis provides evidence consistent with shifting income to foreign countries as one method of tax avoidance. JEL Classifications: G38; G32; G15; H26.
- 1 November 2018
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 94 (5) , 27-55
Tax Avoidance at Public Corporations Driven by Shareholder Taxes: Evidence from Changes in Dividend Tax Policy
We exploit changes in a country's integration of corporate and shareholder taxes to identify the effect of investor-level taxes on costly corporate tax avoidance. Specifically, we rely on European countries eliminating imputation systems in different years in response to supranational judicial rulings. These eliminations, which are exogenous to the firm, remove managers' disincentive to engage in tax avoidance if they consider investor-level taxes. Using a difference-in-differences model with fixed effects, we find that the average firm affected by an elimination reduces its cash effective tax rate by 5.5 percent. Placebo tests support that this effect exists only for countries and years for which eliminations occur. Consistent with our cross-sectional predictions, we find that results are stronger for firms with lower growth opportunities, higher dividend payout, lower foreign income, and higher closely held ownership. Further analysis provides evidence consistent with shifting income to foreign countries as one method of tax avoidance. JEL Classifications: G38; G32; G15; H26.
- 1 September 2017
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 93 (3) , 59-82
Supplier Internal Control Quality and the Duration of Customer-Supplier Relationships
Internal controls influence information quality, thus affecting the ability of supply chain partners, who rely on collaborative systems of information sharing, to reliably contract. Using SOX-related internal control assessments as a proxy for internal control quality and U.S. GAAP-mandated major customer disclosures, we find that supplier internal control quality influences supply chain relationship duration. Specifically, our evidence demonstrates that: (1) poor internal control quality increases the likelihood of subsequent customer-supplier relationship termination; (2) timely control weakness remediation attenuates termination likelihood; and (3) weaknesses affecting customer contracting drive the effect of internal control quality on relationship termination. Our results control for supplier operational quality and performance, and are robust to propensity score matching techniques, controls for reverse causality, and alternative proxies for relationship termination and internal control quality. Overall, our findings are consistent with customers viewing strong supplier controls as important, albeit overlooked, contracting elements with significant implications for supply chain relationships.
- 1 September 2017
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 93 (3) , 59-82
Supplier Internal Control Quality and the Duration of Customer-Supplier Relationships
Internal controls influence information quality, thus affecting the ability of supply chain partners, who rely on collaborative systems of information sharing, to reliably contract. Using SOX-related internal control assessments as a proxy for internal control quality and U.S. GAAP-mandated major customer disclosures, we find that supplier internal control quality influences supply chain relationship duration. Specifically, our evidence demonstrates that: (1) poor internal control quality increases the likelihood of subsequent customer-supplier relationship termination; (2) timely control weakness remediation attenuates termination likelihood; and (3) weaknesses affecting customer contracting drive the effect of internal control quality on relationship termination. Our results control for supplier operational quality and performance, and are robust to propensity score matching techniques, controls for reverse causality, and alternative proxies for relationship termination and internal control quality. Overall, our findings are consistent with customers viewing strong supplier controls as important, albeit overlooked, contracting elements with significant implications for supply chain relationships.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Manager-Shareholder Alignment, Shareholder Dividend Tax Policy, and Corporate Tax Avoidance
We exploit exogenous changes in a country’s shareholder dividend tax policy to quantify the impact shareholder demand has on corporate tax avoidance by managers
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessManager-Shareholder Alignment, Shareholder Dividend Tax Policy, and Corporate Tax Avoidance
We exploit exogenous changes in a country’s shareholder dividend tax policy to quantify the impact shareholder demand has on corporate tax avoidance by managers