JPJeffrey Pittman

Jeffrey Pittman

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Jeffrey Pittman has a total of 35 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Private Firm Disclosures and Public Firms' Debt Choice

    by Fengqin Chen, Jeffrey Pittman, Walid Saffar

    Analyzing a cross-country sample, we provide evidence implying that private firm disclosure transparency narrows information asymmetry, which, in turn, lowers public firms' reliance on bank debt. Channel tests help substantiate that private firm disclosure elicits this positive externality, evident in lower monitoring demand, lower borrowing costs, and higher credit rating quality. Cross-sectional results suggest that the impact of private firm transparency is larger when public firms suffer worse information opacity, private firm disclosures are more important to their public peers, and bond markets are more developed. In relying on the staggered implementation of electronic business registers as a plausibly exogenous shock and a simulated disclosure scope as the instrumental variable, we continue to find that private firm disclosures reduce public firms' bank debt reliance, helping to alleviate endogeneity threats. Data Availability Statement: The data used in this study are obtained from publicly available sources identified in the paper. JEL Classifications: G32; G21; M41.

  • Do Financial Statement Auditors Respond to Shifts in Corporate Tax Enforcement? Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design and Field Research

    by Travis Chow, Jeffrey Pittman, Muzhi Wang, Zitian Wang, Le Zhao

    SUMMARY: We examine whether external auditor behavior is sensitive to shifts in corporate tax enforcement. Using a regression discontinuity design that exploits a Chinese tax reform that assigns companies to two enforcement regimes based on registration dates, we find that auditors exert less effort—evident in lower audit fees—when clients are monitored by the more stringent tax authority, although their financial reporting quality improves, evident in a lower incidence of accounting and tax-related restatements. We also document that clients undergoing stricter tax enforcement have shorter audit report lags and are assigned less experienced partners. Collectively, the results are consistent with clients responding to tougher tax enforcement by improving compliance, which, in turn, reduces perceived audit risk and enables auditors to perform their work more efficiently. Surveys of auditors corroborate these inferences. Our evidence implies that tougher tax enforcement engenders a positive externality by improving audit efficiency without sacrificing reporting quality. Data Availability: The data used in this study are available from the sources cited in the manuscript. JEL Classifications: H25; H26; M42.

  • Open Access

    The Importance of Conscientiousness to Audit Quality: Engagement Partner Graduate Thesis Typos and Audit Adjustments

    by Xianjie He, Jeffrey Pittman, Shuwei Sun, Zili Zhuang

    Relying on the frequency of typos in engagement partners’ graduate theses to measure their conscientiousness, we find that more conscientious partners conduct higher-quality audits, evident in that they are more likely to require an audit adjustment. Our core results hold for both upward and downward adjustments, implying that being conscientious is not equivalent to being overly conservative. Consistent with DeAngelo’s (1981) theory, cross-sectional evidence suggests that the role that partner conscientiousness plays in audit quality comes through both the auditor competence and independence channels. Additionally, we find that the frequency of partner thesis typos is negatively associated with auditor effort. Collectively, our evidence implies that engagement partner conscientiousness plays a major role in shaping audit outcomes. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M42.


  • The Cost of Investor Protection: Bank Loan Contracting During SEC Investigations

    by Yangyang Chen, Emmanuel Ofosu, Jeffrey Pittman

    In examining the loan contracting implications of SEC investigations, we document that banks charge higher loan spreads when borrowers are under investigation, with the rise in interest rates varying predictably with lender characteristics. Further, our evidence implies that the debt pricing impact of SEC investigations is amplified for borrowers suffering worse credit quality and information asymmetry as well as those relying more on bank loans. These findings suggest that banks perceive increased risk for borrowers under SEC scrutiny while also leveraging their knowledge of the investigations to extract rents. Supplemental analyses reveal tighter nonspread loan terms and a higher likelihood of amending existing loan contracts during SEC investigations. Additionally, the tightening of loan terms reverses for investigations that conclude without enforcement actions. Overall, our research identifies an economic cost of SEC investigations and alerts regulators to these costs when deciding whether to launch an investigation. Data Availability: All data used are available from the sources indicated in the paper. JEL Classifications: M41; D82; G21; K22.


  • Experience Is Wealth: Does Work Experience in Other Professions Matter to Mutual Fund Managers’ Portfolio Decisions?

    by Yangyang Chen, Jun Huang, Ting Li, Jeffrey Pittman

    We document that, among stocks held in mutual fund portfolios, fund managers tend to invest more heavily in firms for which they have prior professional experience in the form of working for sell-side analysts, audit firms, and underwriters in capacities where they could learn about companies that may belong to their portfolios when they later become fund managers. Cross-sectional results reveal that the impact of this professional experience intensifies when the work experience is less distant and lasts for longer, when the firm suffers more severe agency problems and worse information asymmetry, and when the fund manager has more power. Additionally, we observe that fund managers trade on stocks of firms for which they have relevant professional experience prior to upcoming earnings news, and this trading activity leads to superior returns to their funds. Finally, we document empirical patterns consistent with both knowledge acquisition and professional connections from prior work experience contributing to our evidence.

  • The Importance of Business Development Incentives to Audit Partners: Evidence from the Propensity to Issue Modified Opinions to Group-Affiliated Audit Clients

    by Simon Yu Kit Fung, Like Jiang, Jeffrey Pittman, Zhifeng Yang

    SUMMARY: We analyze a unique incentive motivating audit partners to pursue new revenue streams from potential audit clients related to incumbent clients. In auditing clients belonging to business groups, a partner who issues a modified audit opinion (MAO) to a group-affiliated client risks losing not only that client but also the opportunity to extend their audit services to other member companies. We document that partners are less likely to render MAOs to group-affiliated clients when other group members are large relative to the partners’ client portfolio, and this relation intensifies when the incumbent group-affiliated clients themselves are economically less important. We also find that partners who issue MAOs to group-affiliated clients underperform in attracting new clients from the same business group. Further, investors perceive that audit quality is higher in these partners’ non-group-affiliated clients, reflecting that reputation protection forces discipline partners to resist the temptation to issue unwarranted clean opinions. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M42.

  • Penny Wise and Pound Foolish: Does Striving to Meet Earnings Expectations by Manipulating Real Activities Trigger Product Recalls?

    by Yangyang Chen, Lijun Ma, Jeffrey Pittman, Xin Yang

    We examine whether managers’ activities in striving to reach earnings targets through real earnings manipulation affect their firms’ product recalls. Our evidence implies that firms suspected of manipulating real activities in trying to meet earnings benchmarks exhibit a higher likelihood and frequency of product recalls. In cross-sectional results consistent with expectations, we find that the impact of exploiting real activities to attain earnings benchmarks on product recalls intensifies for firms whose managers have stronger incentives to manage earnings and subsides for firms subject to greater customer power and firms with more growth opportunities. Additional analysis shows that lowering product quality to meet or beat earnings expectations undermines firms’ future performance. This paper was accepted by Ranjani Krishnan, accounting. Funding: Y. Chen acknowledges the General Research Fund of the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong [Project 15504219] for financial support. L. Ma acknowledges financial support from the Ministry of Education Project of Humanities and Social Sciences [Project 22YJC630099] and the Young Scholars Grant Program of the University of International Business and Economics [Project 20YQ06]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.04035 .


  • Open Access

    A Tale of Two Intermediaries: Investment Banker-Auditor Social Ties and IPO Quality

    by Xianjie He, Jeffrey Pittman, Shuwei Sun, Donghui Wu

    SUMMARY: Firms undertaking an initial public offering (IPO) appoint investment bankers and auditors to certify information disclosed to investors. We find that social connections significantly increase the likelihood that the bankers and auditors become involved in the same IPO deal. Although some theory and evidence suggests that information transferred via social networks may enhance economic agents’ performance, other research implies that such links may admit bias into auditor judgment or impair their independence. Empirically, we find that IPO firms report higher discretionary accruals when bankers and auditors are socially connected. We also document that banker-auditor social ties are associated with lower earnings credibility and worse post-IPO performance. However, auditors benefit from social connections with bankers by attracting higher fee premiums and securing more future IPO audit businesses.


  • Open Access

    Does Investment Bankers’ Prior Experience in Public Accounting Reduce Earnings Management in IPO Firms?

    by Xianjie He, Jeffrey Pittman, Sarah E. Stein, Huifang Yin

    SUMMARY: We examine whether firms undertaking an initial public offering (IPO) exhibit less earnings management when individual investment bankers have prior experience in public accounting. Although auditors are primarily responsible for providing external monitoring of the financial reporting process, individual bankers also have strong incentives to improve accounting quality in firms going public. We predict a negative relation between public accounting experience and IPO firms’ earnings management because working in public practice fosters individual bankers’ accounting expertise and conservative personalities. In exploiting unique disclosures of investment bankers’ identities and characteristics in China, our analysis indicates that bankers with early-career public accounting experience constrain IPO firms’ accrual-based earnings management. Consistent with expectations, we find that this evidence is more pronounced if the accounting firm that employed the future investment banker is larger, is permitted to audit listed companies, and was previously subject to a regulatory sanction. Data Availability: Most data are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper. Hand-collected data from the Securities Association of China (SAC) can be made available upon request. JEL Classifications: G24; M41; M42.