Randall W. Stone
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Randall W. Stone has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Songying Fang
Department of Political Science, Rice University, United States
2 shared publications - Yu Wang
Fudan Institute for Advanced Study in Social Sciences, Fudan University, Shanghai, China
2 shared publications Jeheung Ryu
University of Rochester
1 shared publication- Kevin A. Clarke
University of Rochester
1 shared publication - Martin C. Steinwand
Department of Government, University of Essex, Colchester, UK
1 shared publication Muhammet A Bas
New York University Abu Dhabi
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 11 September 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 69 (4)
Probabilistic Democracy
Democracy is an important concept that is difficult to measure, and existing measures have well-known weaknesses. We define democracy narrowly, as electoral accountability, and estimate the probability of democracy using a structural model and data from 1945 to 2008. We allow for strategic voting and find evidence that voters are intimidated into supporting authoritarian leaders. Ratification of the Convention Against Torture by the country in question emboldens voters, while ratification by third parties, close relations with the USA and the incumbent’s military experience increase voter intimidation. Our estimated democracy scores are highly correlated with other measures frequently used in political science and come with important advantages, including conceptual clarity, replicability, out-of-sample score prediction, flexibility with respect to the variables and specifications used in the estimation model, estimates of uncertainty, and avoiding potential expert bias.
- 11 September 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 69 (4)
Probabilistic Democracy
Democracy is an important concept that is difficult to measure, and existing measures have well-known weaknesses. We define democracy narrowly, as electoral accountability, and estimate the probability of democracy using a structural model and data from 1945 to 2008. We allow for strategic voting and find evidence that voters are intimidated into supporting authoritarian leaders. Ratification of the Convention Against Torture by the country in question emboldens voters, while ratification by third parties, close relations with the USA and the incumbent’s military experience increase voter intimidation. Our estimated democracy scores are highly correlated with other measures frequently used in political science and come with important advantages, including conceptual clarity, replicability, out-of-sample score prediction, flexibility with respect to the variables and specifications used in the estimation model, estimates of uncertainty, and avoiding potential expert bias.
- 12 September 2024
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 74-84
Rational choice: actors, preferences and power
Debates about the World Bank in political science frequently revolve around the choice of theoretically interesting actors. A review of recent empirical work suggests that the most important principals are the US president and the US Congress. Other countries have much less influence, and while non-governmental actors can play important roles at key junctures, they exercise their influence by lobbying the US Congress. Principal-agent problems in the Bank are addressed by selecting staff who internalize US policy preferences, but they can reemerge when US preferences shift and Bank procedures and incentives fail to adapt.
- 12 September 2024
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 74-84
Rational choice: actors, preferences and power
Debates about the World Bank in political science frequently revolve around the choice of theoretically interesting actors. A review of recent empirical work suggests that the most important principals are the US president and the US Congress. Other countries have much less influence, and while non-governmental actors can play important roles at key junctures, they exercise their influence by lobbying the US Congress. Principal-agent problems in the Bank are addressed by selecting staff who internalize US policy preferences, but they can reemerge when US preferences shift and Bank procedures and incentives fail to adapt.
- 8 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in The Review of International Organizations
- Vol. 19 (1) , 181-184
Christina L. Davis. 2023. Discriminatory Clubs: The Geopolitics of International Organizations. (Princeton: Princeton University Press)
- 8 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in The Review of International Organizations
- Vol. 19 (1) , 181-184
Christina L. Davis. 2023. Discriminatory Clubs: The Geopolitics of International Organizations. (Princeton: Princeton University Press)
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 22 April 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in The Review of International Organizations
- Vol. 18 (1) , 201-225
China visits: a dataset of Chinese leaders’ foreign visits
Leader visits constitute an important signal in international relations. While studies of U.S. diplomacy can all use the same dataset from the Office of the Historian, IR scholars on China must make do with ad hoc datasets and often need to build their own from scratch. We contribute a novel dataset, ChinaVisits, to fill this glaring gap. Our dataset has three major advantages: (1) it covers the period from 1998 onwards so that it is widely applicable to different research agendas; (2) each recorded visit has rich auxiliary information, including its date and duration, and is accompanied by a document from official websites for verification, and the dataset in its entirety is evaluated against existing datasets; (3) it is publicly available and indexed annually with country codes and country names. To facilitate its use, we provide a detailed analysis of the patterns in leader visits.
- 22 April 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in The Review of International Organizations
- Vol. 18 (1) , 201-225
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessChina visits: a dataset of Chinese leaders’ foreign visits
Leader visits constitute an important signal in international relations. While studies of U.S. diplomacy can all use the same dataset from the Office of the Historian, IR scholars on China must make do with ad hoc datasets and often need to build their own from scratch. We contribute a novel dataset, ChinaVisits, to fill this glaring gap. Our dataset has three major advantages: (1) it covers the period from 1998 onwards so that it is widely applicable to different research agendas; (2) each recorded visit has rich auxiliary information, including its date and duration, and is accompanied by a document from official websites for verification, and the dataset in its entirety is evaluated against existing datasets; (3) it is publicly available and indexed annually with country codes and country names. To facilitate its use, we provide a detailed analysis of the patterns in leader visits.
- Top Cited Papers
- 5 August 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 76 (1) , 229-250
Chinese Power and the State-Owned Enterprise
China has become a leading source of outward foreign direct investment (FDI), and the Chinese state exercises a unique degree of influence over its firms. We explore the patterns of political influence over FDI using a comprehensive firm-level data set on Chinese outward FDI from 2000 to 2013. Using six country-level measures of affinity for China, we find that state-owned and globally diversified firms appear to conform most closely to official guidance. Official investment directives and state visits link investments to state policies; Taiwan recognition and Dalai Lama meetings anchor our political interpretations; and UN General Assembly voting and temporary UN Security Council membership suggest that this intervention may be systematic. The results are robust to country, year, and sector fixed effects, and most do not hold for private or small firms. The results suggest that China uses FDI by prominent state-owned enterprises as an instrument to promote its foreign policy.
- 5 August 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 76 (1) , 229-250
Top Cited PapersChinese Power and the State-Owned Enterprise
China has become a leading source of outward foreign direct investment (FDI), and the Chinese state exercises a unique degree of influence over its firms. We explore the patterns of political influence over FDI using a comprehensive firm-level data set on Chinese outward FDI from 2000 to 2013. Using six country-level measures of affinity for China, we find that state-owned and globally diversified firms appear to conform most closely to official guidance. Official investment directives and state visits link investments to state policies; Taiwan recognition and Dalai Lama meetings anchor our political interpretations; and UN General Assembly voting and temporary UN Security Council membership suggest that this intervention may be systematic. The results are robust to country, year, and sector fixed effects, and most do not hold for private or small firms. The results suggest that China uses FDI by prominent state-owned enterprises as an instrument to promote its foreign policy.
- 17 March 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 65 (2) , 375-386
Multinational Banks and IMF Conditionality
We find firm-level evidence that US banks receive preferential treatment in countries under IMF conditionality. We rely on investment location decisions to infer firms’ expectations about future profits and find that US firms are approximately 53 percent more likely to acquire financial firms in countries under financial conditionality. IMF programs without financial conditionality and FDI in other sectors serve as placebo tests. Financial conditionality has weak effects on investment decisions by non-US firms, which implies a political-economy interpretation. Firm-level data indicate that the distinctive behavior of US firms is not due to advantages of scale or to a US-firm fixed effect, but to US influence in the IMF. Firms from other major IMF shareholders benefit as well, but the effects are much weaker. The effects are concentrated in the politically relevant firms that have local affiliates, which is consistent with the interpretation that firms lobby for preferential treatment.
- 17 March 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 65 (2) , 375-386
Multinational Banks and IMF Conditionality
We find firm-level evidence that US banks receive preferential treatment in countries under IMF conditionality. We rely on investment location decisions to infer firms’ expectations about future profits and find that US firms are approximately 53 percent more likely to acquire financial firms in countries under financial conditionality. IMF programs without financial conditionality and FDI in other sectors serve as placebo tests. Financial conditionality has weak effects on investment decisions by non-US firms, which implies a political-economy interpretation. Firm-level data indicate that the distinctive behavior of US firms is not due to advantages of scale or to a US-firm fixed effect, but to US influence in the IMF. Firms from other major IMF shareholders benefit as well, but the effects are much weaker. The effects are concentrated in the politically relevant firms that have local affiliates, which is consistent with the interpretation that firms lobby for preferential treatment.
- 20 February 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in The Review of International Organizations
- Vol. 13 (2) , 273-308
Plaintiffs by proxy: A firm-level approach to WTO dispute resolution
- 20 February 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in The Review of International Organizations
- Vol. 13 (2) , 273-308
Plaintiffs by proxy: A firm-level approach to WTO dispute resolution
- 28 July 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 47 (2) , 329-349
Mixed Signals: IMF Lending and Capital Markets
The effect of new International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending announcements on capital markets depends on the lender’s political motivations. There are conditions under which lending reduces the risk of a deepening crisis and the risk premium demanded by market actors. Yet the political interests that make lenders willing to lend may weaken the credibility of commitments to reform, and the act of accepting an agreement reveals unfavorable information about the state of the borrower’s economy. The net ‘catalytic’ effect on the price of private borrowing depends on whether these effects dominate the beneficial effects of the liquidity the loan provides. Decomposing the contradictory effects of crisis lending provides an explanation for the discrepant empirical findings in the literature about market reactions. This study tests the implications of the theory by examining how sovereign bond yields are affected by IMF program announcements, loan size, the scope of conditions attached to loans and measures of the geopolitical interests of the United States, a key IMF principal.
- 28 July 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 47 (2) , 329-349
Mixed Signals: IMF Lending and Capital Markets
The effect of new International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending announcements on capital markets depends on the lender’s political motivations. There are conditions under which lending reduces the risk of a deepening crisis and the risk premium demanded by market actors. Yet the political interests that make lenders willing to lend may weaken the credibility of commitments to reform, and the act of accepting an agreement reveals unfavorable information about the state of the borrower’s economy. The net ‘catalytic’ effect on the price of private borrowing depends on whether these effects dominate the beneficial effects of the liquidity the loan provides. Decomposing the contradictory effects of crisis lending provides an explanation for the discrepant empirical findings in the literature about market reactions. This study tests the implications of the theory by examining how sovereign bond yields are affected by IMF program announcements, loan size, the scope of conditions attached to loans and measures of the geopolitical interests of the United States, a key IMF principal.
- 21 September 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in The Review of International Organizations
- Vol. 9 (1) , 1-28
Adverse selection and growth under IMF programs
- 21 September 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in The Review of International Organizations
- Vol. 9 (1) , 1-28
Adverse selection and growth under IMF programs