Charlene Tan

This paper proposes a dao‐centric orientation of sustainability education to combat the climate emergency. Drawing on the Daoist text Liezi 列子, it is argued that dao‐centrism comprises two salient characteristics. First, dao‐centrism is embodied in ‘common Way‐making’ ( gongdao 公道) that denotes a non‐possessive and non‐exploitative view of nature. Secondly, dao‐centrism is facilitated by ‘effortless acting’ ( wuwei 無為) which is manifested in the love of and friendship with nature. A dao‐centric orientation of sustainability education challenges anthropocentricism that typically instrumentalises nature and regards only humans as deserving of moral considerations. This article also proposes place‐based education that revolves around ‘person‐in‐environment’ and situates learning in actual settings. Far from perceiving nature as weak, dependent and passive, a dao‐centric foundation of sustainability education foregrounds nature's strength, power and dynamic interactions with humans. By highlighting Daoist perspectives, this study extends the existing scholarship on the pivotal role of education to address the climate crisis and ecological damage.

Background: Beauchamp and Childress’ principle of respect for autonomy has been criticised by scholars for privileging individualism due to its Anglo-American (‘Western’) origin and orientation. Consequently, researchers in clinical ethics need to consider alternative normative models and culturally diverse approaches to autonomy. Aim: Guided by philosophical inquiry, this paper seeks to re-envision the concept of autonomy in biomedical contexts by focusing on the contributions of Confucian perspectives to its understanding and application in clinical contexts. Methods: The research methodology is philosophical inquiry based on a textual analysis of the Analects (Lunyu), which records the teachings and conduct of Confucius. The research methodology of philosophical inquiry comprises philosophical retrieval and philosophical reconstruction. Philosophical retrieval aims to review, shed light on, and analyse key concepts, theories, and presuppositions with respect to one or more classical texts. Philosophical reconstruction, on the other hand, is geared towards applying ancient intellectual ideas and practices to contemporary issues and challenges. Results: The textual analysis of the Analects reveals that Confucius’ notion of autonomy is relational, embodied, and authentic. Rather than ‘self-rule’, Confucius’ interpretation of autonomy advocates ‘selves-rule’ by harmonising interdependence, mind-body integration, and moral self-cultivation. What makes Confucius’ relational autonomy unique is its emphasis on morality, particularly the all-encompassing virtue of ren (an achieved state of humanity). Conclusion: A major implication of Confucian ideas in clinical settings is the need to respect and consider the consent of patients as well as that of their family members based on the value of ren (an achieved state of humanity). Confronted with complex ethical dilemmas, especially in clinical scenarios, medical professionals need to recognise that the autonomy of an individual is intrinsically tied to that of their family and inseparable from pre-existing ethical commitments. In other words, medical professionals should be mindful of the relational, embodied, and authentic aspects of autonomy by giving balanced recognition to both patient autonomy and shared decision-making, which contributes to the realisation of ren. Confucian bioethics converges with Christian bioethics by underscoring the relational dimension of autonomy, especially in settings involving family, healthcare professionals, and the patient.

Submitted: 6 February 2025 Accepted: 14 May 2025 Published online: 7 October, TAPS 2025, 10(4), 94-96 https://doi.org/10.29060/TAPS.2025-10-4/II3664 Charlene Tan1 & Ruth Neo2 1College of Arts, Humanities and Languages, Life University, Cambodia; 2UNSW Medicine & Health, University of New South Wales, Australia I. INTRODUCTION This article proposes a Chinese philosophical approach to well-being for medical education […]

A survey of the existing literature shows that there is limited philosophical inquiry into the construct of well-being, particularly from East Asian spiritual traditions. This article reconceptualises well-being by critiquing the prevailing constructs of well-being, and proposing an alternative formulation from Confucian philosophy. I argue that the dominant categorisation of well-being into hedonic and eudaimonic has engendered two major weaknesses. First, the emphasis on positive emotions in hedonic well-being privileges individualism and self-interest, catalysed by the positive psychology movement. Secondly, there is a lack of clarity on the role of emotions and the place of virtues in self-actualisation for eudaimonic well-being. I then sketch a Confucian interpretation of well-being by drawing on Mencius’ spiritual ideal of joy. My argument is that Mencian well-being revolves around virtue-directed joy, which is experienced through the extension of innate moral feelings. Instead of an artificial dichotomy of well-being into hedonic and eudaimonic well-being, Mencius harmonises both by acknowledging both positive emotions and self-actualisation. Confucian spiritual perspectives extend the existing scholarship by providing an original interpretation of well-being that foregrounds the primary role of emotions in character development. Confucian spiritual perspectives extend the existing scholarship on well-being by foregrounding collective well-being, and highlighting the contribution of emotional experience to the cultivation of ethical character.

This article explores the concept of nature connectedness with reference to the Yijing (The Classic of Changes). Following an interpretation of the neo-Confucian thinker Zhu Xi, the article argues that oneness with the natural world refers to the moral unity between humans and Heaven. This unity is reflected in the correspondence between the natural order (tianli) of Heaven and the moral order (daoli) for humanity. Humans attain moral order by cultivating their moral nature through gewu (investigation of things), where one makes sense of and appreciates how oneself, other people, situations, and natural phenomena fit together harmoniously. This has implications for education, and the article recommends two strategies for schools: promoting mindful reflection and personal journalling for students. The article also identifies and responds to two major critiques of the Confucian ideas set out here: the problem of an idealized nature, and the rationale for moral self-cultivation.

This article illustrates the contribution of Chinese philosophy to the field of medical humanities by focussing on the ideas and conduct of Confucius. Drawing on a Chinese philosophical classic, the Analects (Lunyu), this study proposes a Confucian reinterpretation of Beauchamp and Childress’ principle of respect for autonomy in medical ethics. The paper begins by critiquing Beauchamp and Childress’ three conditions of autonomous action, namely intentionality, understanding, and the absence of controlling influences that determine one’s action. It is contended that the three conditions over-emphasise rationality and overlook the role of emotions and morality in autonomy. The second part of the article proposes a Confucian reformulation of the three conditions that is derived from the concepts of xin (heart-mind) and li (normative behaviour). The modified conditions are moral intentionality, the integration of understanding and emotions, and the absence of controlling influences that determine one’s action and underlying values, beliefs, attitudes, feelings and predispositions. From a Confucian perspective, Beauchamp and Childress’ positive obligation for the principle of respect for autonomy requires medical professionals to render empathetic treatment towards patients. By challenging and reconstructing major theories and assumptions in medical ethics, this paper demonstrates the saliency of non-Western philosophical traditions in medical humanities.