Filomena Garcia
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Filomena Garcia has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Jean J. Gabszewicz
4 shared publicationsGustavo Torrens
Department of Economics Indiana University Bloomington Indiana
3 shared publications- Joana Resende
University of Porto
2 shared publications - Jose Manuel Paz Y Miio
Indiana University Bloomington
2 shared publications - Malgorzata Knauff
Warsaw School of Economics
2 shared publications Paolo Colla
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 14 November 2023
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 25 (6) , 1229-1250
First‐best health policy in vaccine markets with health and network externalities
This paper considers an oligopolistic market for a vaccine, characterized by negative network effects, which stem from the free‐riding behavior of individuals engaged in a vaccination game. Vaccine markets often suffer from three imperfections: high concentration, network effects, and a health externality (contagion). The first conclusion of the paper is that the negative network externality is important as a market distortion, as it may lead to significant welfare losses. The second and main part of the paper develops a two‐part per‐unit subsidy scheme that a social planner could use to target both consumers and producers of vaccines. The scope of such a subsidy scheme to induce the firms to produce the first‐best output without network effects (which is the most ambitious first‐best target) is investigated. In many cases, while the first‐best is attainable, it requires negative prices for vaccines, which amounts to rewarding consumers to induce them to vaccinate.
- 14 November 2023
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 25 (6) , 1229-1250
First‐best health policy in vaccine markets with health and network externalities
This paper considers an oligopolistic market for a vaccine, characterized by negative network effects, which stem from the free‐riding behavior of individuals engaged in a vaccination game. Vaccine markets often suffer from three imperfections: high concentration, network effects, and a health externality (contagion). The first conclusion of the paper is that the negative network externality is important as a market distortion, as it may lead to significant welfare losses. The second and main part of the paper develops a two‐part per‐unit subsidy scheme that a social planner could use to target both consumers and producers of vaccines. The scope of such a subsidy scheme to induce the firms to produce the first‐best output without network effects (which is the most ambitious first‐best target) is investigated. In many cases, while the first‐best is attainable, it requires negative prices for vaccines, which amounts to rewarding consumers to induce them to vaccinate.
- Open Access
- 11 April 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- p. 1-39
Wealth inequality, systemic financial fragility and government intervention
Does wealth inequality make financial crises more likely? If so, how can a government intervene, and how does this affect the distribution of resources in the economy? To answer these questions, we study a banking model where strategic complementarities among wealth-heterogeneous depositors trigger systemic self-fulfilling runs. In equilibrium, higher wealth inequality increases directly the incentives to run of the poor, and indirectly those of the rich via higher bank liquidity insurance, thus increasing the probability of a systemic self-fulfilling run overall. A government intervention on illiquid but solvent banks redistributes resources towards the poor and makes systemic self-fulfilling runs less likely.
- 11 April 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- p. 1-39
Open AccessWealth inequality, systemic financial fragility and government intervention
Does wealth inequality make financial crises more likely? If so, how can a government intervene, and how does this affect the distribution of resources in the economy? To answer these questions, we study a banking model where strategic complementarities among wealth-heterogeneous depositors trigger systemic self-fulfilling runs. In equilibrium, higher wealth inequality increases directly the incentives to run of the poor, and indirectly those of the rich via higher bank liquidity insurance, thus increasing the probability of a systemic self-fulfilling run overall. A government intervention on illiquid but solvent banks redistributes resources towards the poor and makes systemic self-fulfilling runs less likely.
- 8 June 2020
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 22 (6) , 2051-2081
The merger paradox, collusion, and competition policy
This paper develops a model that formalizes several connections between mergers, collusion, and competition policy. In equilibrium, firms may merge to make collusion sustainable when it cannot be sustained with the original set of firms. A rise in the probability of detecting and prosecuting collusion could induce a wave of mergers, so firms can sustain collusion again. Indeed, mergers could fully neutralize the procompetitive effect of an improvement in collusion detection and prosecution. From a normative perspective, we show that merger policy is crucial when cost synergies are small (or nonexistent) and the competition authority can only deter collusion by restricting mergers. Finally, we highlight that mergers could be more harmful (less beneficial) than expected if the impact that mergers have on the competition regime is properly considered, which suggests a decomposition of the welfare impact of mergers into unilateral and coordinated effects.
- 8 June 2020
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 22 (6) , 2051-2081
The merger paradox, collusion, and competition policy
This paper develops a model that formalizes several connections between mergers, collusion, and competition policy. In equilibrium, firms may merge to make collusion sustainable when it cannot be sustained with the original set of firms. A rise in the probability of detecting and prosecuting collusion could induce a wave of mergers, so firms can sustain collusion again. Indeed, mergers could fully neutralize the procompetitive effect of an improvement in collusion detection and prosecution. From a normative perspective, we show that merger policy is crucial when cost synergies are small (or nonexistent) and the competition authority can only deter collusion by restricting mergers. Finally, we highlight that mergers could be more harmful (less beneficial) than expected if the impact that mergers have on the competition regime is properly considered, which suggests a decomposition of the welfare impact of mergers into unilateral and coordinated effects.
- Open Access
- 25 October 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Collusion, Mergers and Antitrust Policy
This paper develops a model that formalizes several connections between mergers, collusion and antitrust policy. In equilibrium, firms may merge to make collusion sustainable when it cannot be sustained with the original set of firms. A rise in the probability of detecting and prosecuting collusion could induce a wave of mergers, so firms can sustain collusion again. Indeed, mergers could fully neutralize the pro-competitive effect of an improvement in collusion detection and prosecution. From a normative perspective, we show that merger policy is crucial when cost synergies are small (or nonexistent) and the competition authority can only deter collusion by restricting mergers. Finally, we highlight that mergers could be more harmful (less beneficial) than expected if the impact that mergers have on the competition regime is properly considered, which suggests a formal definition for the notions of unilateral and coordinated effects associated with mergers.
- 25 October 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCollusion, Mergers and Antitrust Policy
This paper develops a model that formalizes several connections between mergers, collusion and antitrust policy. In equilibrium, firms may merge to make collusion sustainable when it cannot be sustained with the original set of firms. A rise in the probability of detecting and prosecuting collusion could induce a wave of mergers, so firms can sustain collusion again. Indeed, mergers could fully neutralize the pro-competitive effect of an improvement in collusion detection and prosecution. From a normative perspective, we show that merger policy is crucial when cost synergies are small (or nonexistent) and the competition authority can only deter collusion by restricting mergers. Finally, we highlight that mergers could be more harmful (less beneficial) than expected if the impact that mergers have on the competition regime is properly considered, which suggests a formal definition for the notions of unilateral and coordinated effects associated with mergers.
- 19 May 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 66 (3) , 681-705
Price competition with differentiated goods and incomplete product awareness
- 19 May 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 66 (3) , 681-705
Price competition with differentiated goods and incomplete product awareness
- Open Access
- 29 March 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Of Course Collusion Should Be Prosecuted. But Maybe... Or (the Case for International Antitrust Agreements)
We study the incentives of competition authorities to prosecute collusive practices of domestic and foreign firms. For that purpose, we develop a model of multi-market contact between two firms that can engage in collusion in two countries. In each country, there is a competition authority with a mandate to maximize national welfare. Each competition authority decides its prosecution policy at the beginning of time and commits to it. In equilibrium, the ownership distribution of the firms (domestic versus foreign) affects prosecution policies. The country that does not own the firms prosecutes them as soon as information of collusion becomes available. On the contrary, the country that owns the firms has an incentive to protect their profits in foreign markets delaying prosecution. This strategic delay is valuable because it contains the information spreading that could trigger prosecution in the foreign country. Prosecution delays, however, are not optimal from the point of view of global welfare, something that could be solved through the integration of the competition authorities. The country of origin of the firms would nevertheless oppose integration. Finally, in a multi-industry setting, both countries delay prosecuting domestic firms, which again is not optimal from the point of view of global welfare. Moreover, in a multi-industry setting, both countries can be better off under integration.
- 29 March 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessOf Course Collusion Should Be Prosecuted. But Maybe... Or (the Case for International Antitrust Agreements)
We study the incentives of competition authorities to prosecute collusive practices of domestic and foreign firms. For that purpose, we develop a model of multi-market contact between two firms that can engage in collusion in two countries. In each country, there is a competition authority with a mandate to maximize national welfare. Each competition authority decides its prosecution policy at the beginning of time and commits to it. In equilibrium, the ownership distribution of the firms (domestic versus foreign) affects prosecution policies. The country that does not own the firms prosecutes them as soon as information of collusion becomes available. On the contrary, the country that owns the firms has an incentive to protect their profits in foreign markets delaying prosecution. This strategic delay is valuable because it contains the information spreading that could trigger prosecution in the foreign country. Prosecution delays, however, are not optimal from the point of view of global welfare, something that could be solved through the integration of the competition authorities. The country of origin of the firms would nevertheless oppose integration. Finally, in a multi-industry setting, both countries delay prosecuting domestic firms, which again is not optimal from the point of view of global welfare. Moreover, in a multi-industry setting, both countries can be better off under integration.
- 1 April 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 141, 107-111
Technology adoption: Hysteresis and absence of lock-in
- 1 April 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 141, 107-111
Technology adoption: Hysteresis and absence of lock-in
- Open Access
- 1 January 2016
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Journal of Dynamics and Games
- Vol. 3 (2) , 153-167
Conformity-based behavior and the dynamics of price competition: A new rationale for fashion shifts
This paper deals with dynamic price competition in markets in which the perception of consumers regarding the value of goods depends on the choices of other consumers in the market. In particular, we consider the case in which consumers exhibit conformist preferences, which leads them to imitate their peers. In the context of a finite horizon model, we show that conformity-based behavior creates new channels of dynamic interaction between firms, changing the nature of price competition. We focus on the case of high network effects for which we obtain V-shaped equilibrium price paths and oscillating trajectories of market shares. We provide also a new rationale for the inversion of fashion trends.
- 1 January 2016
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Journal of Dynamics and Games
- Vol. 3 (2) , 153-167
Open AccessConformity-based behavior and the dynamics of price competition: A new rationale for fashion shifts
This paper deals with dynamic price competition in markets in which the perception of consumers regarding the value of goods depends on the choices of other consumers in the market. In particular, we consider the case in which consumers exhibit conformist preferences, which leads them to imitate their peers. In the context of a finite horizon model, we show that conformity-based behavior creates new channels of dynamic interaction between firms, changing the nature of price competition. We focus on the case of high network effects for which we obtain V-shaped equilibrium price paths and oscillating trajectories of market shares. We provide also a new rationale for the inversion of fashion trends.
- 14 December 2015
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 25 (3) , 720-749
Revealing Incentives for Compatibility Provision in Vertically Differentiated Network Industries
We determine the incentives for compatibility provision of firms that produce network goods with different intrinsic qualities when firms do not have veto power over compatibility. When network effects are strong, there are multiple equilibria in pricing and consumer decisions. We show that in some equilibria, it is the high‐quality firm that invests in compatibility, whereas in others, the low‐quality firm triggers compatibility. The socially optimal compatibility degree is zero, except under very strong network effects, where one of the equilibria has all consumers buying the low‐quality good. In this case, a partial degree of compatibility is optimal.
- 14 December 2015
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 25 (3) , 720-749
Revealing Incentives for Compatibility Provision in Vertically Differentiated Network Industries
We determine the incentives for compatibility provision of firms that produce network goods with different intrinsic qualities when firms do not have veto power over compatibility. When network effects are strong, there are multiple equilibria in pricing and consumer decisions. We show that in some equilibria, it is the high‐quality firm that invests in compatibility, whereas in others, the low‐quality firm triggers compatibility. The socially optimal compatibility degree is zero, except under very strong network effects, where one of the equilibria has all consumers buying the low‐quality good. In this case, a partial degree of compatibility is optimal.
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 13 (1) , 381-414
When Should a Monopolist Improve Quality in a Network Industry?
This article identifies the necessary and sufficient conditions under which a monopolist, producing a network good, benefits from introducing a higher quality in the market. It is shown that, if the network externality is higher than the intrinsic quality differential, quality improvement is not optimal. Also, we obtain that, for low levels of the network effect, the monopolist prefers not to cover the market, whereas for higher levels, optimal prices are such that all consumers buy one of the two qualities. Finally, there is an introductory price strategy which is optimal for the good that benefits from network externalities.
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 13 (1) , 381-414
When Should a Monopolist Improve Quality in a Network Industry?
This article identifies the necessary and sufficient conditions under which a monopolist, producing a network good, benefits from introducing a higher quality in the market. It is shown that, if the network externality is higher than the intrinsic quality differential, quality improvement is not optimal. Also, we obtain that, for low levels of the network effect, the monopolist prefers not to cover the market, whereas for higher levels, optimal prices are such that all consumers buy one of the two qualities. Finally, there is an introductory price strategy which is optimal for the good that benefits from network externalities.