Jose Manuel Paz Y Miio
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Jose Manuel Paz Y Miio has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Gustavo Torrens
4 shared publications- Filomena Garcia
Indiana University; ISEG - Technical University of Lisbon; UECE - Research Unit in Economics and Complexity
2 shared publications Sebastian Galiani
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 9 April 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 234
Geopolitics and international trade infrastructure deterrence
- 9 April 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 234
Geopolitics and international trade infrastructure deterrence
- Open Access
- 1 July 2021
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Geopolitics and International Trade Infrastructure
We develop a simple (incumbent versus entrant) strategic deterrence model to study the economic and geopolitical interactions underlying international trade-related infrastructure projects such as the Panama Canal. We study the incentives for global geopolitical players to support allied satellite countries where these projects are or could potentially be built. We show that even if no effective competitor emerges, the appearance of a geopolitical challenger capable of credibly supporting the entrant has a pro-competition economic effect which benefits consumers all over the world. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
- 1 July 2021
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessGeopolitics and International Trade Infrastructure
We develop a simple (incumbent versus entrant) strategic deterrence model to study the economic and geopolitical interactions underlying international trade-related infrastructure projects such as the Panama Canal. We study the incentives for global geopolitical players to support allied satellite countries where these projects are or could potentially be built. We show that even if no effective competitor emerges, the appearance of a geopolitical challenger capable of credibly supporting the entrant has a pro-competition economic effect which benefits consumers all over the world. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
- Open Access
- 25 October 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Collusion, Mergers and Antitrust Policy
This paper develops a model that formalizes several connections between mergers, collusion and antitrust policy. In equilibrium, firms may merge to make collusion sustainable when it cannot be sustained with the original set of firms. A rise in the probability of detecting and prosecuting collusion could induce a wave of mergers, so firms can sustain collusion again. Indeed, mergers could fully neutralize the pro-competitive effect of an improvement in collusion detection and prosecution. From a normative perspective, we show that merger policy is crucial when cost synergies are small (or nonexistent) and the competition authority can only deter collusion by restricting mergers. Finally, we highlight that mergers could be more harmful (less beneficial) than expected if the impact that mergers have on the competition regime is properly considered, which suggests a formal definition for the notions of unilateral and coordinated effects associated with mergers.
- 25 October 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCollusion, Mergers and Antitrust Policy
This paper develops a model that formalizes several connections between mergers, collusion and antitrust policy. In equilibrium, firms may merge to make collusion sustainable when it cannot be sustained with the original set of firms. A rise in the probability of detecting and prosecuting collusion could induce a wave of mergers, so firms can sustain collusion again. Indeed, mergers could fully neutralize the pro-competitive effect of an improvement in collusion detection and prosecution. From a normative perspective, we show that merger policy is crucial when cost synergies are small (or nonexistent) and the competition authority can only deter collusion by restricting mergers. Finally, we highlight that mergers could be more harmful (less beneficial) than expected if the impact that mergers have on the competition regime is properly considered, which suggests a formal definition for the notions of unilateral and coordinated effects associated with mergers.
- Open Access
- 29 March 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Of Course Collusion Should Be Prosecuted. But Maybe... Or (the Case for International Antitrust Agreements)
We study the incentives of competition authorities to prosecute collusive practices of domestic and foreign firms. For that purpose, we develop a model of multi-market contact between two firms that can engage in collusion in two countries. In each country, there is a competition authority with a mandate to maximize national welfare. Each competition authority decides its prosecution policy at the beginning of time and commits to it. In equilibrium, the ownership distribution of the firms (domestic versus foreign) affects prosecution policies. The country that does not own the firms prosecutes them as soon as information of collusion becomes available. On the contrary, the country that owns the firms has an incentive to protect their profits in foreign markets delaying prosecution. This strategic delay is valuable because it contains the information spreading that could trigger prosecution in the foreign country. Prosecution delays, however, are not optimal from the point of view of global welfare, something that could be solved through the integration of the competition authorities. The country of origin of the firms would nevertheless oppose integration. Finally, in a multi-industry setting, both countries delay prosecuting domestic firms, which again is not optimal from the point of view of global welfare. Moreover, in a multi-industry setting, both countries can be better off under integration.
- 29 March 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessOf Course Collusion Should Be Prosecuted. But Maybe... Or (the Case for International Antitrust Agreements)
We study the incentives of competition authorities to prosecute collusive practices of domestic and foreign firms. For that purpose, we develop a model of multi-market contact between two firms that can engage in collusion in two countries. In each country, there is a competition authority with a mandate to maximize national welfare. Each competition authority decides its prosecution policy at the beginning of time and commits to it. In equilibrium, the ownership distribution of the firms (domestic versus foreign) affects prosecution policies. The country that does not own the firms prosecutes them as soon as information of collusion becomes available. On the contrary, the country that owns the firms has an incentive to protect their profits in foreign markets delaying prosecution. This strategic delay is valuable because it contains the information spreading that could trigger prosecution in the foreign country. Prosecution delays, however, are not optimal from the point of view of global welfare, something that could be solved through the integration of the competition authorities. The country of origin of the firms would nevertheless oppose integration. Finally, in a multi-industry setting, both countries delay prosecuting domestic firms, which again is not optimal from the point of view of global welfare. Moreover, in a multi-industry setting, both countries can be better off under integration.