Linda Thunström

A common assumption of models of decision making under risk is that people choose the level of risk they deem optimal for themselves. We, however, provide novel evidence that people systematically choose risk levels that they report as unsatisfactory. Data from three surveys show that around 50 percent of participants report dissatisfaction with the level of risk they take in life overall, and that a large majority of participants are dissatisfied with their risk taking in at least some subdomain of life. Significantly, for most (although not all) domains, far more of those who express dissatisfaction with their risk taking believe they take insufficient as opposed to excessive risks. Probing mechanisms, we find that internal factors (e.g., emotions) are more important determinants of unsatisfactory risk taking than external factors (e.g., constraints). Our findings suggest that choices under risk, like choices across time, may be explained by dual process theories that incorporate both deliberation and emotions. We also find a strong negative correlation between dissatisfaction with risk taking and life satisfaction. While our data do not enable us to establish causality, this finding provides suggestive evidence that dissatisfaction with risk taking may be consequential for subjective well-being.

The social cost of greenhouse gases is important in many regulatory impact analyses. However, calculations of the social cost of greenhouse gases are highly complex and periodically revisited. We offer seven recommendations to improve current estimates. These include recommendations to use both country-level and global measures of the social cost of greenhouse gases, to use country-specific values for monetizing climate damages, to represent uncertainties by reporting distributions instead of using only central values, and to conduct a temporal distributional analysis that shows the magnitudes of climate damages across generations. We also provide recommendations for the discount rates that should be used when estimating the social cost of greenhouse gases, and the appropriate discount rates for regulatory impact analyses that include the social cost of greenhouse gases.

Mandatory surveillance testing programs are popular policies aimed to control SARS-CoV-2 and may be considered for future epidemics. However, if people believe that testing lowers their risk of infection, such policies could increase risky behavior and may even cause increased pathogen spread. Using data from two US universities, we find that frequent mandatory testing is associated with greater participation in events linked to COVID-19 spread. Women seem to be driving this association, and mediation analyses suggest this is partly due to women’s higher perception of COVID-related health risks. Our results show the potential for adverse effects from epidemic control policies, both on average and across population subgroups. Undertaking mitigation measures to reduce such unintended consequences may therefore be important.

Praying for others in the wake of a disasters is a common interpersonal and public response to tragedy in the United States. But these gestures are controversial. In a survey experiment, we elicit how people value receiving a prayer from a Christian stranger in support of a recent hardship and examine factors that affect the value of the prayer. We find that people who positively value receiving the prayer do so primarily because they believe it provides emotional support and will be answered by God. Many also value the prayer because they believe it will improve their health and wealth, although empirical support of such effects is lacking. People who negatively value receiving the prayer do so primarily because they believe praying is a waste of time. The negative value is particularly large if people are offended by religion. Finally, the hardship experienced by the prayer recipient matters to the intensity by which recipients like or dislike the gesture, suggesting the benefit of prayers varies not only across people, but also across contexts.

The rapid development of COVID-19 vaccines is a tremendous scientific response to the current global pandemic. However, vaccines per se do not save lives and restart economies. Their success depends on the number of people getting vaccinated. We used a survey experiment to examine the impact on vaccine intentions of a variety of public health messages identified as particularly promising: three messages that emphasize different benefits from the vaccines (personal health, the health of others, and the recovery of local and national economies) and one message that emphasizes vaccine safety. Because people will likely be exposed to multiple messages in the real world, we also examined the effect of these messages in combination. Based on a nationally quota representative sample of 3,048 adults in the United States, our findings suggest that several forms of public messages can increase vaccine intentions, but messaging that emphasizes personal health benefits had the largest impact.

The scientific community has come together in a mass mobilization to combat the public health risks of COVID-19, including efforts to develop a vaccine. However, the success of any vaccine depends on the share of the population that gets vaccinated. We designed a survey experiment in which a nationally representative sample of 3,133 adults in the USA stated their intentions to vaccinate themselves and their children for COVID-19. The factors that we varied across treatments were: the stated severity and infectiousness of COVID-19 and the stated source of the risk information (White House or the Centers for Disease Control). We find that 20% of people in the USA intend to decline the vaccine. We find no statistically significant effect on vaccine intentions from the severity of COVID-19. In contrast, we find that the degree of infectiousness of the coronavirus influences vaccine intentions and that inconsistent risk messages from public health experts and elected officials may reduce vaccine uptake. However, the most important determinants of COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy seem to be distrust of the vaccine safety (including uncertainty due to vaccine novelty), as well as general vaccine avoidance, as implied by not having had a flu shot in the last two years.

Trust, a cornerstone of economic development, is promoted within religions. In a randomized controlled trial, we examine how trust and trustworthiness vary across religions (Christianity and Islam), religiosity, and atheists/agnostics in the United States. Three novel findings emerge. First, Christians are trusted more than Muslims and nonbelievers, which is due to a Christian ingroup bias––Christians trust Christians more than they trust Muslims and nonbelievers, while Muslims and nonbelievers trust all groups the same. Second, religiosity matters to trust. Religious people trust those of higher religiosity more, but only if they are of the same religion. In contrast, nonbelievers trust people of higher religiosity less. Third, trustworthiness among nonbelievers is somewhat lower than that of the religious, especially toward Christians. We speculate that the lower reciprocity originates in the prejudice toward nonbelievers. Our results may help explain discrimination against Muslims and nonbelievers, given that discrimination often originates in distrust.