Jason F. Shogren

We use experimental data from bilateral and trilateral prisoner’s dilemma games to test whether the sequence in which negotiations occur affects efficiency. Although both the game types have statistically similar mean efficiency, the interaction between game type and order of play (i.e., sequence) is significant. Groups that play bilateral rounds first achieve higher efficiency in subsequent trilateral rounds. Simpler negotiations serve as a learning platform for more complex multilateral settings.

We explore how a contest designer can use a combined two fee-shifting reimbursement system with a classic contingency fee to reduce unnecessary effort, maximize expected payoffs of players, and raise effort levels of the delegates to their highest level.

Herein, we further examine how we can value nonmarket goods and services by considering the costs associated with environmental conflicts. Focusing on two American rules—the asymmetric reimbursement system and the contingent fee contract—we develop a strategic game-theoretic model in which a citizens group engages a delegate through a contingent fee compensation contract, while a polluter engages a delegate through an hourly fee compensation contract. If the citizens group prevails, the polluter is obligated to contribute a portion of the contingent fee. Solving for the subgame perfect equilibrium, two results emerge. First, the 4x-rule can be maintained through the adjustment of the asymmetric reimbursement system. Second, the asymmetric reimbursement system can serve both as a supplementary method to measure nonmarket valuation and to reduce the rent dissipation resulting from environmental conflicts under general circumstances.

The social cost of greenhouse gases is important in many regulatory impact analyses. However, calculations of the social cost of greenhouse gases are highly complex and periodically revisited. We offer seven recommendations to improve current estimates. These include recommendations to use both country-level and global measures of the social cost of greenhouse gases, to use country-specific values for monetizing climate damages, to represent uncertainties by reporting distributions instead of using only central values, and to conduct a temporal distributional analysis that shows the magnitudes of climate damages across generations. We also provide recommendations for the discount rates that should be used when estimating the social cost of greenhouse gases, and the appropriate discount rates for regulatory impact analyses that include the social cost of greenhouse gases.