José Luis Luján
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
José Luis Luján has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Oliver Todt
Department for Philosophy, University of the Balearic Islands, Palma, Spain
20 shared publications Oliver Todt
Department of Philosophy, University of the Balearic Islands (UIB), Carretera de Valldemossa, Km. 7,5, 07071, Palma de Mallorca, Spain
5 shared publications- Juan Bautista Bengoetxea
Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
3 shared publications - Luis Moreno
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas
3 shared publications - Carolina Moreno-Castro
Universitat de València
2 shared publications - Roberto López-Mas
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy and Letters, University of the Balearic Islands, Palma de Mallorca, Spain
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 2 June 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Risk Research
- p. 1-14
Methodological tensions in risk assessment and benefit assessment: a classification
- 2 June 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Risk Research
- p. 1-14
Methodological tensions in risk assessment and benefit assessment: a classification
- Open Access
- 15 March 2024
- Published by Organizacion de Estados Iberoamericanos in Revista Iberoamericana de Ciencia Tecnología y Sociedad
- Vol. 19 (55) , 85-106
PRESENTACIÓN: Maneras de hacer ciencia
Este monográfico explora la cuestión de si es posible que, por influencia de valores epistémicos o no epistémicos, pueda existir más de un tipo de ciencia. Como se verá en el conjunto de trabajos que constituyen el monográfico, este problema se puede abordar de maneras muy distintas y las respuestas son múltiples. Se trata de una cuestión muy amplia que aquí no es posible abarcar. Aun así, es importante abordar este tema, ya que subyace a muchos planteamientos relacionados con el conocimiento científico y sus aplicaciones, y rara vez se trata de forma directa.
- 15 March 2024
- Published by Organizacion de Estados Iberoamericanos in Revista Iberoamericana de Ciencia Tecnología y Sociedad
- Vol. 19 (55) , 85-106
Open AccessPRESENTACIÓN: Maneras de hacer ciencia
Este monográfico explora la cuestión de si es posible que, por influencia de valores epistémicos o no epistémicos, pueda existir más de un tipo de ciencia. Como se verá en el conjunto de trabajos que constituyen el monográfico, este problema se puede abordar de maneras muy distintas y las respuestas son múltiples. Se trata de una cuestión muy amplia que aquí no es posible abarcar. Aun así, es importante abordar este tema, ya que subyace a muchos planteamientos relacionados con el conocimiento científico y sus aplicaciones, y rara vez se trata de forma directa.
- 22 November 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Science and Public Policy
- Vol. 51 (3) , 352-359
Comparing regulatory options: the role of epistemic policies and pragmatic consequences
The controversies surrounding the regulation of technology depend, among other factors, on the diversity of the regulatory objectives prioritized by the distinct social actors. These differences may also lead to controversies in the realm of regulatory science: controversies between distinct epistemic policies. As controversies are partly the result of prioritizing different objectives, comparing alternative regulatory options is a seemingly impossible endeavour. In this paper, we offer a partial solution to this problem by proposing a means of comparing different regulatory options. This proposal makes it possible to analyse and assess the different options and facilitates the adoption of compromises between the various parties to the controversy, even if it is unable to eliminate the differences in the prioritization of objectives. The case study we have used to illustrate the main ideas of this paper is the controversy surrounding the regulation of health claims in the European Union.
- 22 November 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Science and Public Policy
- Vol. 51 (3) , 352-359
Comparing regulatory options: the role of epistemic policies and pragmatic consequences
The controversies surrounding the regulation of technology depend, among other factors, on the diversity of the regulatory objectives prioritized by the distinct social actors. These differences may also lead to controversies in the realm of regulatory science: controversies between distinct epistemic policies. As controversies are partly the result of prioritizing different objectives, comparing alternative regulatory options is a seemingly impossible endeavour. In this paper, we offer a partial solution to this problem by proposing a means of comparing different regulatory options. This proposal makes it possible to analyse and assess the different options and facilitates the adoption of compromises between the various parties to the controversy, even if it is unable to eliminate the differences in the prioritization of objectives. The case study we have used to illustrate the main ideas of this paper is the controversy surrounding the regulation of health claims in the European Union.
- Open Access
- 20 June 2023
- Published by Wiley in Politics & Policy
- Vol. 51 (4) , 524-537
Evidence‐based policies: Lessons from regulatory science
In this article, various examples of controversies in regulatory science are analyzed concerning chemical and pharmaceutical products and functional foods. In these controversies, it is possible to show the relationship between epistemic policies and regulatory objectives (decision‐making objectives). From an analysis of this relationship, four points must be noted that can be extrapolated to current evidence‐based policy proposals: (1) The regulatory objectives determine the evidence hierarchies. (2) Evidence hierarchies determine the appropriate scientific methodology and, by extension, the scientific knowledge that will be generated. (3) The use of scientific knowledge in the formulation of public policies is an example of extrapolation, and such cases should be viewed as hypotheses whose testing requires evidence from different lines of research. (4) The suitability of a particular evidentiary hierarchy depends on what is at stake; that is, on an assessment of the gains and losses to which the policy or regulation based on such an evidentiary requirement may lead.Related Articles: Nunes Silva, Carlos. 2012. “Policy and Evidence in a Partisan Age: The Great Disconnect—By Paul Gary Wyckoff.” Politics & Policy 40(3): 541–43. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2012.00363.x.Sinclair, Thomas A. P. 2006. “Previewing Policy Sciences: Multiple Lenses and Segmented Visions.” Politics & Policy 34(3): 481–504. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2006.00025.x.Smith‐Walter, Aaron, Holly L. Peterson, Michael D. Jones, and Ashley Nicole Reynolds Marshall. 2016. “Gun Stories: How Evidence Shapes Firearm Policy in the United States.” Politics & Policy 44(6): 1053–88. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12187.Lemire, Sebastian, Laura R. Peck and Allan Porowski. 2023. “The Evolution of Systematic Evidence Reviews: Past and Future Developments and Their Implications For Policy Analysis.” Politics & Policy 00(0): 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12532.
- 20 June 2023
- Published by Wiley in Politics & Policy
- Vol. 51 (4) , 524-537
Open AccessEvidence‐based policies: Lessons from regulatory science
In this article, various examples of controversies in regulatory science are analyzed concerning chemical and pharmaceutical products and functional foods. In these controversies, it is possible to show the relationship between epistemic policies and regulatory objectives (decision‐making objectives). From an analysis of this relationship, four points must be noted that can be extrapolated to current evidence‐based policy proposals: (1) The regulatory objectives determine the evidence hierarchies. (2) Evidence hierarchies determine the appropriate scientific methodology and, by extension, the scientific knowledge that will be generated. (3) The use of scientific knowledge in the formulation of public policies is an example of extrapolation, and such cases should be viewed as hypotheses whose testing requires evidence from different lines of research. (4) The suitability of a particular evidentiary hierarchy depends on what is at stake; that is, on an assessment of the gains and losses to which the policy or regulation based on such an evidentiary requirement may lead.Related Articles: Nunes Silva, Carlos. 2012. “Policy and Evidence in a Partisan Age: The Great Disconnect—By Paul Gary Wyckoff.” Politics & Policy 40(3): 541–43. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2012.00363.x.Sinclair, Thomas A. P. 2006. “Previewing Policy Sciences: Multiple Lenses and Segmented Visions.” Politics & Policy 34(3): 481–504. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2006.00025.x.Smith‐Walter, Aaron, Holly L. Peterson, Michael D. Jones, and Ashley Nicole Reynolds Marshall. 2016. “Gun Stories: How Evidence Shapes Firearm Policy in the United States.” Politics & Policy 44(6): 1053–88. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12187.Lemire, Sebastian, Laura R. Peck and Allan Porowski. 2023. “The Evolution of Systematic Evidence Reviews: Past and Future Developments and Their Implications For Policy Analysis.” Politics & Policy 00(0): 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12532.
- 9 July 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in Science, Technology, & Human Values
- Vol. 47 (5) , 1086-1108
Rationality in Context: Regulatory Science and the Best Scientific Method
Is there such a thing as a “best scientific methodology” in regulatory (decision-oriented) science? By examining cases from varying regulatory processes, we argue that there is no best scientific method for generating decision-relevant data. In addition, in regulatory science, the most suitable methodologies often differ from what is considered best practice in knowledge-oriented (academic) science. In data generation for regulatory purposes, we are faced with a wide spectrum of preferred methodologies as well as controversy as to methodological choice. What goes by the most adequate scientific method can and will—justifiably and rationally—vary significantly according to context and use. In order to make this argument, we analyze four case studies, two from risk assessment and two from benefit assessment. Our analysis shows that it is the noncognitive objectives of a particular regulatory process that determine what counts as the most appropriate scientific method. We use the concept of bounded rationality to indicate that those methodological choices, despite being context-dependent, can be interpreted as rational.
- 9 July 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in Science, Technology, & Human Values
- Vol. 47 (5) , 1086-1108
Rationality in Context: Regulatory Science and the Best Scientific Method
Is there such a thing as a “best scientific methodology” in regulatory (decision-oriented) science? By examining cases from varying regulatory processes, we argue that there is no best scientific method for generating decision-relevant data. In addition, in regulatory science, the most suitable methodologies often differ from what is considered best practice in knowledge-oriented (academic) science. In data generation for regulatory purposes, we are faced with a wide spectrum of preferred methodologies as well as controversy as to methodological choice. What goes by the most adequate scientific method can and will—justifiably and rationally—vary significantly according to context and use. In order to make this argument, we analyze four case studies, two from risk assessment and two from benefit assessment. Our analysis shows that it is the noncognitive objectives of a particular regulatory process that determine what counts as the most appropriate scientific method. We use the concept of bounded rationality to indicate that those methodological choices, despite being context-dependent, can be interpreted as rational.
- 5 July 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Food Sciences and Nutrition
- Vol. 73 (2) , 149-153
The essentiality of nutrients: a challenge to methodological monism in the scientific substantiation of health claims
This paper analyzes the way in which the EFSA has addressed the limitations that the essentiality of nutrients presents to the requirement of obtaining evidence from RCTs for the scientific substantiation of health claims. By redefining the requirements to affirm causality in the case of essentiality of nutrients, the EFSA has constrained the debate on the relevance of different methodologies in the field of nutrition research. However, avoiding this methodological debate does not settle the controversy as to whether the EFSA's evidentiary hierarchy is the best for both investigating causal relationships in nutrition and for achieving social objectives such as fostering innovation and public health.
- 5 July 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Food Sciences and Nutrition
- Vol. 73 (2) , 149-153
The essentiality of nutrients: a challenge to methodological monism in the scientific substantiation of health claims
This paper analyzes the way in which the EFSA has addressed the limitations that the essentiality of nutrients presents to the requirement of obtaining evidence from RCTs for the scientific substantiation of health claims. By redefining the requirements to affirm causality in the case of essentiality of nutrients, the EFSA has constrained the debate on the relevance of different methodologies in the field of nutrition research. However, avoiding this methodological debate does not settle the controversy as to whether the EFSA's evidentiary hierarchy is the best for both investigating causal relationships in nutrition and for achieving social objectives such as fostering innovation and public health.
- 13 January 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 11 (1) , 1-19
Evidence based methodology: a naturalistic analysis of epistemic policies in regulatory science
- 13 January 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 11 (1) , 1-19
Evidence based methodology: a naturalistic analysis of epistemic policies in regulatory science
- 1 April 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 80, 82-89
Standards of evidence and causality in regulatory science: Risk and benefit assessment
- 1 April 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 80, 82-89
Standards of evidence and causality in regulatory science: Risk and benefit assessment
- 26 January 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 59-72
Regulatory Science: Between Technology and Society
- 26 January 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 59-72
Regulatory Science: Between Technology and Society
- 5 January 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in EMBO Reports
- Vol. 19 (2) , 194-196
The dilemmas of science for policy
Regulatory decision‐making often faces the question of what is an appropriate level of evidence. For instance, which approach is better suited to regulate potentially toxic chemicals: obtaining the best—most complete, most accurate, and so on—information that science is able to produce on each individual compound or relying on more basic knowledge to quickly assess a wide range of compounds? The first one would appear as the obvious answer, but, given the time and resource constraints under which regulators often operate, it may not be the most efficient one. Gathering the most complete and accurate scientific information means that regulatory agencies would be able to deal with only a limited number of substances. In contrast, by limiting the required evidence, they might be able to regulate many more substances albeit at the risk of sometimes making wrong decisions. > The key issue is how to establish the appropriate level of evidence for regulatory purposes and to choose the scientific methodologies best suited for generating this evidence. This is a typical dilemma faced by regulatory agencies in many areas, and the example above is the cause of ongoing controversy among regulators, manufacturers, environmentalists, and public health advocacy groups. The key issue is how to establish the appropriate level of evidence for regulatory purposes and to choose the scientific methodologies best suited for generating this evidence. Another example shows how the same dilemma befalls the field of benefit assessment. Many foods with health claims assert that certain ingredients will confer health benefits for consumers, beyond the nutritional characteristics. Again, what is the appropriate regulatory strategy: to analyze the product in question using the most accurate and complete scientific methodologies at hand, even if that means that only a small number of products will achieve authorization? Or recurring to basic or incomplete scientific information, to …
- 5 January 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in EMBO Reports
- Vol. 19 (2) , 194-196
The dilemmas of science for policy
Regulatory decision‐making often faces the question of what is an appropriate level of evidence. For instance, which approach is better suited to regulate potentially toxic chemicals: obtaining the best—most complete, most accurate, and so on—information that science is able to produce on each individual compound or relying on more basic knowledge to quickly assess a wide range of compounds? The first one would appear as the obvious answer, but, given the time and resource constraints under which regulators often operate, it may not be the most efficient one. Gathering the most complete and accurate scientific information means that regulatory agencies would be able to deal with only a limited number of substances. In contrast, by limiting the required evidence, they might be able to regulate many more substances albeit at the risk of sometimes making wrong decisions. > The key issue is how to establish the appropriate level of evidence for regulatory purposes and to choose the scientific methodologies best suited for generating this evidence. This is a typical dilemma faced by regulatory agencies in many areas, and the example above is the cause of ongoing controversy among regulators, manufacturers, environmentalists, and public health advocacy groups. The key issue is how to establish the appropriate level of evidence for regulatory purposes and to choose the scientific methodologies best suited for generating this evidence. Another example shows how the same dilemma befalls the field of benefit assessment. Many foods with health claims assert that certain ingredients will confer health benefits for consumers, beyond the nutritional characteristics. Again, what is the appropriate regulatory strategy: to analyze the product in question using the most accurate and complete scientific methodologies at hand, even if that means that only a small number of products will achieve authorization? Or recurring to basic or incomplete scientific information, to …