Rachel Katharine Sterken
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Rachel Katharine Sterken has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Anne Bosse
Department of Philosophy University of Hong Kong Pok Fu Lam Hong Kong
1 shared publication David Liebesman
Department of Philosophy and School of Languages, Linguistics, Literatures, and Cultures University of Calgary Calgary Alberta Canada
1 shared publication- David Plunkett
Dartmouth College
1 shared publication - Eleonore Neufeld
Department of Philosophy University of Massachusetts Amherst Amherst Massachusetts USA
1 shared publication Eliot Michaelson
Department of Philosophy, King's College London, London, UK
1 shared publication- Eliot Michaelson
King's College London
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Wiley in WIREs Cognitive Science
- Vol. 16 (1) , e70000
Giving Generic Language Another Thought
According to an influential research program in cognitive science, philosophy, and linguistics, there is a deep, special connection between generics and pernicious aspects of social cognition, such as stereotyping. Specifically, generics are thought to exacerbate our propensity to essentialize, lead us to overgeneralize based on scarce evidence and to other epistemically dubious patterns of inference. Recently, however, several studies have put empirical and theoretical pressure on some of the main tenets of this research program. The goal of this paper is to bring these results together in a comprehensive narrative and systematically evaluate their impact on the hypothesis that generics have a uniquely problematic effect on our social and cognitive capacities.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Wiley in WIREs Cognitive Science
- Vol. 16 (1) , e70000
Giving Generic Language Another Thought
According to an influential research program in cognitive science, philosophy, and linguistics, there is a deep, special connection between generics and pernicious aspects of social cognition, such as stereotyping. Specifically, generics are thought to exacerbate our propensity to essentialize, lead us to overgeneralize based on scarce evidence and to other epistemically dubious patterns of inference. Recently, however, several studies have put empirical and theoretical pressure on some of the main tenets of this research program. The goal of this paper is to bring these results together in a comprehensive narrative and systematically evaluate their impact on the hypothesis that generics have a uniquely problematic effect on our social and cognitive capacities.
- 30 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 201 (2) , 1-46
Generics and metalinguistic negotiation
- 30 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 201 (2) , 1-46
Generics and metalinguistic negotiation
- Open Access
- 19 June 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 91-107
Manipulative machines
The aim of this chapter is to explore various ways of thinking about the concept of manipulation in order to capture both current and potentially future instances of machine manipulation, manipulation on the part of everything from the Facebook advertising algorithm to super-intelligent AGI. Three views are considered: a conservative one, which slightly tweaks extant influence-based theories of manipulation; a dismissive view according to which it doesn’t matter much if machines are literally manipulative, provided we can classify them as so doing to make sense of our interactions with them; and an ameliorative analysis, according to which we should change our concept of manipulation better to make sense of machine manipulation. We tentatively favor the latter.
- 19 June 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 91-107
Open AccessManipulative machines
The aim of this chapter is to explore various ways of thinking about the concept of manipulation in order to capture both current and potentially future instances of machine manipulation, manipulation on the part of everything from the Facebook advertising algorithm to super-intelligent AGI. Three views are considered: a conservative one, which slightly tweaks extant influence-based theories of manipulation; a dismissive view according to which it doesn’t matter much if machines are literally manipulative, provided we can classify them as so doing to make sense of our interactions with them; and an ameliorative analysis, according to which we should change our concept of manipulation better to make sense of machine manipulation. We tentatively favor the latter.
- Open Access
- 17 June 2021
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy Compass
- Vol. 16 (7) , e12754
Generics and the metaphysics of kinds
Recent years have seen renewed interest in the semantics of generics. And a relatively mainstream view in this work is that the semantics of generics must appeal to kinds. But what are kinds? Can we learn anything about their nature by looking at how semantic theories of generics appeal to them? In this article, we overview recent work on the semantics of generics and consider their consequences for our understanding of the metaphysics of kinds.
- 17 June 2021
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy Compass
- Vol. 16 (7) , e12754
Open AccessGenerics and the metaphysics of kinds
Recent years have seen renewed interest in the semantics of generics. And a relatively mainstream view in this work is that the semantics of generics must appeal to kinds. But what are kinds? Can we learn anything about their nature by looking at how semantic theories of generics appeal to them? In this article, we overview recent work on the semantics of generics and consider their consequences for our understanding of the metaphysics of kinds.
- 27 November 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 65 (4) , 471-487
Why we should keep talking about fake news
In response to Habgood-Coote (2019. “Stop Talking about Fake News!” Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (9–10): 1033–1065.) and a growing number of scholars who argue that academics and journalists should stop talking about fake news and abandon the term, we argue that the reasons which have been offered for eschewing the term 'fake news' are not sufficient to justify such abandonment. Prima facie, then, we take ourselves and others to be justified in continuing to talk about fake news.
- 27 November 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 65 (4) , 471-487
Why we should keep talking about fake news
In response to Habgood-Coote (2019. “Stop Talking about Fake News!” Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (9–10): 1033–1065.) and a growing number of scholars who argue that academics and journalists should stop talking about fake news and abandon the term, we argue that the reasons which have been offered for eschewing the term 'fake news' are not sufficient to justify such abandonment. Prima facie, then, we take ourselves and others to be justified in continuing to talk about fake news.
- 4 August 2017
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy Compass
- Vol. 12 (8)
The meaning of generics
This article discusses recent theories of the meaning of generics. The discussion is centred on how the theories differ in their approach to addressing the primary difficulty in providing a theory of generic meaning: The notoriously complex ways in which the truth conditions of generics seem to vary. In addition, the article summarizes considerations for and against each theory.
- 4 August 2017
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy Compass
- Vol. 12 (8)
The meaning of generics
This article discusses recent theories of the meaning of generics. The discussion is centred on how the theories differ in their approach to addressing the primary difficulty in providing a theory of generic meaning: The notoriously complex ways in which the truth conditions of generics seem to vary. In addition, the article summarizes considerations for and against each theory.
- 3 November 2016
- Published by Wiley in Mind & Language
- Vol. 31 (5) , 503-529
Generics, Covert Structure and Logical Form
The standard view amongst philosophers of language and linguists is that the logical form of generics is quantificational and contains a covert, unpronounced quantifier expression Gen. Recently, some theorists have begun to question the standard view and rekindle the competing proposal, that generics are a species of kind‐predication. These theorists offer some forceful objections to the standard view, and new strategies for dealing with the abundance of linguistic evidence in favour of the standard view. I respond to these objections and show that their strategies fail. I offer a novel argument in favour of the standard view that I call the binder argument. The upshot of this argument is that if one rejects the existence of Gen, then one is committed to rejecting the existence of covert structure in general (including domain variables and implicit argument places).
- 3 November 2016
- Published by Wiley in Mind & Language
- Vol. 31 (5) , 503-529
Generics, Covert Structure and Logical Form
The standard view amongst philosophers of language and linguists is that the logical form of generics is quantificational and contains a covert, unpronounced quantifier expression Gen. Recently, some theorists have begun to question the standard view and rekindle the competing proposal, that generics are a species of kind‐predication. These theorists offer some forceful objections to the standard view, and new strategies for dealing with the abundance of linguistic evidence in favour of the standard view. I respond to these objections and show that their strategies fail. I offer a novel argument in favour of the standard view that I call the binder argument. The upshot of this argument is that if one rejects the existence of Gen, then one is committed to rejecting the existence of covert structure in general (including domain variables and implicit argument places).
- 28 December 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 172 (9) , 2493-2512
Leslie on generics
- 28 December 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 172 (9) , 2493-2512
Leslie on generics