Feng Tao
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Feng Tao has a total of 27 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Kin Keung Lai
International Business School, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi’an 710119, China
5 shared publications - Tijun Fan
School of Business, East China University of Science and Technology, Shanghai, China
5 shared publications Kin Keung Lai
4 shared publications- Yao-Yu Wang
Research Center for Smarter Supply Chain, Business School, Soochow University, Suzhou, China
4 shared publications Junsong Bian
Department of Supply Chain Management and Information Systems, Rennes School of Business, Rennes, France
2 shared publicationsTijun Fan
Department of Management Science and Engineering, East China University of Science and Technology, Xuhui, Shanghai, People’s Republic of China
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 12 November 2026
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
Skewness and robust pricing mechanisms
- 12 November 2026
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
Open AccessSkewness and robust pricing mechanisms
- 22 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Production Economics
- Vol. 301
Impact of return shipping insurance in live-streaming retailing
- 22 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Production Economics
- Vol. 301
Impact of return shipping insurance in live-streaming retailing
- Open Access
- 17 April 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 35 (11) , 3979-3996
When does skewness matter in robust inventory management?
We investigate the impact of skewed demand on robust inventory management. Including skewness in calculations leads to cubic constraints that prevent a standard two-stage method from deriving an explicit and tractable objective function. To overcome this roadblock, we propose a joint optimization method to directly derive the robust solution in a closed form. The joint optimization method is widely applicable to various robust inventory models with different ambiguity sets. The notable advantage is that we can obtain the final solution without deriving the objective function, so many tedious intermediate steps are circumvented. We conduct numerical experiments on industry data to demonstrate that our moment-based policies deliver more consistent performance than divergence-based policies. After obtaining various closed-form solutions, we demonstrate that including skewness in the model improves the profit generated by the robust optimal order quantity if either demand is bounded or the cost-to-price ratio is low, even though the sample moments used may not equal the population moments. Furthermore, under these conditions in which skewness should be included in the calculations, the firm’s expected profit, under the most unfavorable distribution, increases with variance but decreases with skewness. This result stands in contrast to findings in the economics and finance literature, where distributional ambiguity is not considered.
- 17 April 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 35 (11) , 3979-3996
Open AccessWhen does skewness matter in robust inventory management?
We investigate the impact of skewed demand on robust inventory management. Including skewness in calculations leads to cubic constraints that prevent a standard two-stage method from deriving an explicit and tractable objective function. To overcome this roadblock, we propose a joint optimization method to directly derive the robust solution in a closed form. The joint optimization method is widely applicable to various robust inventory models with different ambiguity sets. The notable advantage is that we can obtain the final solution without deriving the objective function, so many tedious intermediate steps are circumvented. We conduct numerical experiments on industry data to demonstrate that our moment-based policies deliver more consistent performance than divergence-based policies. After obtaining various closed-form solutions, we demonstrate that including skewness in the model improves the profit generated by the robust optimal order quantity if either demand is bounded or the cost-to-price ratio is low, even though the sample moments used may not equal the population moments. Furthermore, under these conditions in which skewness should be included in the calculations, the firm’s expected profit, under the most unfavorable distribution, increases with variance but decreases with skewness. This result stands in contrast to findings in the economics and finance literature, where distributional ambiguity is not considered.
- 2 August 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Cleaner Production
- Vol. 522
How do banks set carbon pledge interest rates while considering government carbon quota policies?
- 2 August 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Cleaner Production
- Vol. 522
How do banks set carbon pledge interest rates while considering government carbon quota policies?
- 29 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 364 (2) , 1-31
Corporate donation strategies considering remanufacturing subsidies and consumer heterogeneity
- 29 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 364 (2) , 1-31
Corporate donation strategies considering remanufacturing subsidies and consumer heterogeneity
- 19 August 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Logistics Research and Applications
- Vol. 27 (2) , 326-345
Agency selling or reselling? Channel selection of green products with consumer environmental awareness
Motivated by the growing consumer interest in new energy vehicles, this paper studies a manufacturer's pricing and channel selection issues when selling green products to environmentally conscious consumers. Three channel structures are examined: (1) a single agency selling channel, (2) a single reselling channel, and (3) dual channels of agency selling and reselling. Agency selling refers to the case in which the manufacturer directly sells products to consumers on the platform by paying a fixed fee. Reselling refers to when the manufacturer wholesales products to the platform, which is then responsible for selling to end consumers. We find that an increase in consumers' green awareness has a positive impact on green technology levels, retail prices, and the profits of the manufacturer, platform, and retailer. When consumers' green awareness and the revenue-sharing rate are relatively low, the manufacturer will choose the single reselling channel, which is beneficial for both the manufacturer and retailer. When consumers' green awareness is moderate, the manufacturer will choose the hybrid channel in which the manufacturer and platform will reach a win-win situation. When consumers' green awareness is high, the dual channel is simultaneously beneficial for the manufacturer, platform, and retailer, which reveals that Pareto optimisation occurs.
- 19 August 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Logistics Research and Applications
- Vol. 27 (2) , 326-345
Agency selling or reselling? Channel selection of green products with consumer environmental awareness
Motivated by the growing consumer interest in new energy vehicles, this paper studies a manufacturer's pricing and channel selection issues when selling green products to environmentally conscious consumers. Three channel structures are examined: (1) a single agency selling channel, (2) a single reselling channel, and (3) dual channels of agency selling and reselling. Agency selling refers to the case in which the manufacturer directly sells products to consumers on the platform by paying a fixed fee. Reselling refers to when the manufacturer wholesales products to the platform, which is then responsible for selling to end consumers. We find that an increase in consumers' green awareness has a positive impact on green technology levels, retail prices, and the profits of the manufacturer, platform, and retailer. When consumers' green awareness and the revenue-sharing rate are relatively low, the manufacturer will choose the single reselling channel, which is beneficial for both the manufacturer and retailer. When consumers' green awareness is moderate, the manufacturer will choose the hybrid channel in which the manufacturer and platform will reach a win-win situation. When consumers' green awareness is high, the dual channel is simultaneously beneficial for the manufacturer, platform, and retailer, which reveals that Pareto optimisation occurs.
- 18 September 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 81-85
Bank Credit Versus Trade Credit: The Preferences of Financial Formats for Supply Chain Members
- 18 September 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 81-85
Bank Credit Versus Trade Credit: The Preferences of Financial Formats for Supply Chain Members
- 1 March 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Industrial Engineering
- Vol. 141
Contract preference for the dominant supplier subject to inventory inaccuracy
- 1 March 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Industrial Engineering
- Vol. 141
Contract preference for the dominant supplier subject to inventory inaccuracy
- Open Access
- 1 January 2020
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization
- Vol. 16 (1) , 289-307
Pricing and modularity decisions under competition
This paper considers price and modularity of competition between two firms with deterministic demand, in which demand is dependent on both the prices and the modularity levels determined by two firms. Bertrand competition and Stackelberg competition are formulated to derive the equilibrium solutions analytically. Because of the complexity, an intensive numerical study is conducted to investigate the impact of the sensitive parameters on equilibrium prices and modularity levels, as well as optimal profits of the two firms. An important and interesting finding is that optimal profits of the two firms under both types of competition are decreasing with the modularity cost when the price and modularity sensitivities are low, where both firms are worse-off due to decrease of the modularity levels; but they are increasing when the price and modularity sensitivities are high, where both firms are better-off at the expense of modular design. Our research reveals that Stackelberg game improves the modularity levels in most of the cases, though both firms perform better in Bertrand competition in these cases when jointly deciding the prices and modularity levels in the two firms.
- 1 January 2020
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization
- Vol. 16 (1) , 289-307
Open AccessPricing and modularity decisions under competition
This paper considers price and modularity of competition between two firms with deterministic demand, in which demand is dependent on both the prices and the modularity levels determined by two firms. Bertrand competition and Stackelberg competition are formulated to derive the equilibrium solutions analytically. Because of the complexity, an intensive numerical study is conducted to investigate the impact of the sensitive parameters on equilibrium prices and modularity levels, as well as optimal profits of the two firms. An important and interesting finding is that optimal profits of the two firms under both types of competition are decreasing with the modularity cost when the price and modularity sensitivities are low, where both firms are worse-off due to decrease of the modularity levels; but they are increasing when the price and modularity sensitivities are high, where both firms are better-off at the expense of modular design. Our research reveals that Stackelberg game improves the modularity levels in most of the cases, though both firms perform better in Bertrand competition in these cases when jointly deciding the prices and modularity levels in the two firms.
- 20 February 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Production Research
- Vol. 57 (9) , 2695-2714
Joint pricing and inventory strategies in a supply chain subject to inventory inaccuracy
This paper focuses on pricing strategies, inventory policies for a supply chain when Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology is adopted to cope with inventory inaccuracy. The supply chain consists of one supplier and one retailer, in which the RFID tag price is shared between the supplier and the retailer. We present and compare the performance differences between a wholesale price contract and a consignment contract when the retailer is the Stackelberg leader and the supplier is the follower. Based on the optimal pricing and inventory decisions, an interesting observation of contract selection is that there are two critical values of inventory available rate such that when the inventory availability is less than the lower value, both the supplier and the retailer prefer a consignment contract; when the inventory availability is greater than the upper value, a wholesale price contract is their best choice; when the inventory availability is between the two values, the supplier prefers a wholesale price contract and the retailer prefers a consignment contract. Additionally, there exist threshold values of RFID tag price and sharing rate to determine the contract preference for the retailer. Furthermore, the profits of both the supplier and the retailer are independent of the RFID tag price sharing rate in a wholesale price contract, and the supplier has the incentive to invest in RFID tag cost in a consignment contract.
- 20 February 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Production Research
- Vol. 57 (9) , 2695-2714
Joint pricing and inventory strategies in a supply chain subject to inventory inaccuracy
This paper focuses on pricing strategies, inventory policies for a supply chain when Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology is adopted to cope with inventory inaccuracy. The supply chain consists of one supplier and one retailer, in which the RFID tag price is shared between the supplier and the retailer. We present and compare the performance differences between a wholesale price contract and a consignment contract when the retailer is the Stackelberg leader and the supplier is the follower. Based on the optimal pricing and inventory decisions, an interesting observation of contract selection is that there are two critical values of inventory available rate such that when the inventory availability is less than the lower value, both the supplier and the retailer prefer a consignment contract; when the inventory availability is greater than the upper value, a wholesale price contract is their best choice; when the inventory availability is between the two values, the supplier prefers a wholesale price contract and the retailer prefers a consignment contract. Additionally, there exist threshold values of RFID tag price and sharing rate to determine the contract preference for the retailer. Furthermore, the profits of both the supplier and the retailer are independent of the RFID tag price sharing rate in a wholesale price contract, and the supplier has the incentive to invest in RFID tag cost in a consignment contract.