Yao-Yu Wang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Yao-Yu Wang has a total of 34 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Feng Tao
Soochow University
4 shared publications Jian-Cai Wang
4 shared publications- Jian-Cai Wang
School of Management Beijing Institute of Technology Beijing People's Republic of China
4 shared publications Feng Tao
3 shared publications- Fujun Lai
Research Center for Smarter Supply Chain, Business School, Soochow University, Suzhou, China
3 shared publications - Jian-Cai Wang
School of Management and Economics Beijing Institute of Technology Beijing P.R. China
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 17 April 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 35 (11) , 3979-3996
When does skewness matter in robust inventory management?
We investigate the impact of skewed demand on robust inventory management. Including skewness in calculations leads to cubic constraints that prevent a standard two-stage method from deriving an explicit and tractable objective function. To overcome this roadblock, we propose a joint optimization method to directly derive the robust solution in a closed form. The joint optimization method is widely applicable to various robust inventory models with different ambiguity sets. The notable advantage is that we can obtain the final solution without deriving the objective function, so many tedious intermediate steps are circumvented. We conduct numerical experiments on industry data to demonstrate that our moment-based policies deliver more consistent performance than divergence-based policies. After obtaining various closed-form solutions, we demonstrate that including skewness in the model improves the profit generated by the robust optimal order quantity if either demand is bounded or the cost-to-price ratio is low, even though the sample moments used may not equal the population moments. Furthermore, under these conditions in which skewness should be included in the calculations, the firm’s expected profit, under the most unfavorable distribution, increases with variance but decreases with skewness. This result stands in contrast to findings in the economics and finance literature, where distributional ambiguity is not considered.
- 17 April 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 35 (11) , 3979-3996
Open AccessWhen does skewness matter in robust inventory management?
We investigate the impact of skewed demand on robust inventory management. Including skewness in calculations leads to cubic constraints that prevent a standard two-stage method from deriving an explicit and tractable objective function. To overcome this roadblock, we propose a joint optimization method to directly derive the robust solution in a closed form. The joint optimization method is widely applicable to various robust inventory models with different ambiguity sets. The notable advantage is that we can obtain the final solution without deriving the objective function, so many tedious intermediate steps are circumvented. We conduct numerical experiments on industry data to demonstrate that our moment-based policies deliver more consistent performance than divergence-based policies. After obtaining various closed-form solutions, we demonstrate that including skewness in the model improves the profit generated by the robust optimal order quantity if either demand is bounded or the cost-to-price ratio is low, even though the sample moments used may not equal the population moments. Furthermore, under these conditions in which skewness should be included in the calculations, the firm’s expected profit, under the most unfavorable distribution, increases with variance but decreases with skewness. This result stands in contrast to findings in the economics and finance literature, where distributional ambiguity is not considered.
- 14 December 2025
- Published by Wiley in International Transactions in Operational Research
- Vol. 33 (5) , 2977-3012
Service strategy of a sharing platform in a supply chain under information asymmetry
Sharing platforms can operate in a B2C (business‐to‐customer) mode, a C2C (customer‐to‐customer) mode, or a hybrid. The choice of sharing mode not only influences downstream customers but also has consequences for upstream product manufacturers. Additionally, the sharing platform's ability to gather user and provider data creates information advantages over manufacturers. Motivated by this, we consider a supply chain where a manufacturer can sell products to a sharing platform, where the latter holds private information about the proportion of renters. A type‐dependent screening model is developed to study the sharing platform's service strategy and the manufacturer's contract design. Our findings indicate that, under information symmetry, when the cannibalization effect from B2C intensifies (i.e., the renter proportion and service fee are high), expanding the customer base or raising the service fee can harm the sharing platform. However, when this effect is weak, adopting a hybrid mode allows the sharing platform to benefit from broader market coverage and a higher fee. Under information asymmetry, the sharing platform is classified as either H ‐type or L ‐type based on its private information. When the level of information uncertainty is high, the manufacturer may shut down the inefficient L ‐type sharing platform. Alternatively, if the manufacturer does not shut down the L ‐type sharing platform, when the service fee is low, both types adopt the hybrid mode, and the manufacturer suffers as the sharing platform receives more commission income from the C2C mode. Interestingly, the sharing platform's profit may be non‐monotonic in the level of information uncertainty.
- 14 December 2025
- Published by Wiley in International Transactions in Operational Research
- Vol. 33 (5) , 2977-3012
Service strategy of a sharing platform in a supply chain under information asymmetry
Sharing platforms can operate in a B2C (business‐to‐customer) mode, a C2C (customer‐to‐customer) mode, or a hybrid. The choice of sharing mode not only influences downstream customers but also has consequences for upstream product manufacturers. Additionally, the sharing platform's ability to gather user and provider data creates information advantages over manufacturers. Motivated by this, we consider a supply chain where a manufacturer can sell products to a sharing platform, where the latter holds private information about the proportion of renters. A type‐dependent screening model is developed to study the sharing platform's service strategy and the manufacturer's contract design. Our findings indicate that, under information symmetry, when the cannibalization effect from B2C intensifies (i.e., the renter proportion and service fee are high), expanding the customer base or raising the service fee can harm the sharing platform. However, when this effect is weak, adopting a hybrid mode allows the sharing platform to benefit from broader market coverage and a higher fee. Under information asymmetry, the sharing platform is classified as either H ‐type or L ‐type based on its private information. When the level of information uncertainty is high, the manufacturer may shut down the inefficient L ‐type sharing platform. Alternatively, if the manufacturer does not shut down the L ‐type sharing platform, when the service fee is low, both types adopt the hybrid mode, and the manufacturer suffers as the sharing platform receives more commission income from the C2C mode. Interestingly, the sharing platform's profit may be non‐monotonic in the level of information uncertainty.
- 3 November 2025
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Internet Research
- Vol. 36 (2) , 572-594
How gamification goes wrong: understanding the maladaptive goal orientation in gamified learning systems
Purpose: Gamification is a valuable educational tool. However, research indicates that while gamified learning systems cater to users' gaming motivations, they may induce maladaptive usage. Integrating the gamification affordances-psychological outcomes-behavioral outcomes paradigm and goal orientation theory, this study examines maladaptive goal orientation processes and their unintended psychological and behavioral impacts. Design/methodology/approach: We tested the model through a scenario-based approach in the context of Duolingo, which is a leading and highly influential mobile language learning application. Data from 100 forum users who discussed score-boosting strategies were collected via online questionnaires and analyzed with structural equation modeling. Findings: Gamification affordances include instruction design (i.e. instant individualistic feedback and instant competitive feedback) and interface design (i.e. multisensory interaction). Results reveal that, compared to instant individualistic feedback, instant competitive feedback is more likely to foster maladaptive psychological outcomes, namely, competence feeling and focused attention on game goals. Multisensory interaction shows no significant effect on competence feeling, whereas it exerts a significant impact on focused attention on game goals. Competence feeling, rather than focused attention on game goals, contributes to maladaptive behaviors within the gamified system. Originality/value: This study is among the first to highlight maladaptive goal orientation in gamified learning. It distinguishes types of instant feedback and their effects, emphasizes the role of multisensory interaction and reveals how game objectives may override educational goals. The findings extend gamification theory and provide practical insights for designing learning systems that mitigate maladaptive outcomes.
- 3 November 2025
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Internet Research
- Vol. 36 (2) , 572-594
How gamification goes wrong: understanding the maladaptive goal orientation in gamified learning systems
Purpose: Gamification is a valuable educational tool. However, research indicates that while gamified learning systems cater to users' gaming motivations, they may induce maladaptive usage. Integrating the gamification affordances-psychological outcomes-behavioral outcomes paradigm and goal orientation theory, this study examines maladaptive goal orientation processes and their unintended psychological and behavioral impacts. Design/methodology/approach: We tested the model through a scenario-based approach in the context of Duolingo, which is a leading and highly influential mobile language learning application. Data from 100 forum users who discussed score-boosting strategies were collected via online questionnaires and analyzed with structural equation modeling. Findings: Gamification affordances include instruction design (i.e. instant individualistic feedback and instant competitive feedback) and interface design (i.e. multisensory interaction). Results reveal that, compared to instant individualistic feedback, instant competitive feedback is more likely to foster maladaptive psychological outcomes, namely, competence feeling and focused attention on game goals. Multisensory interaction shows no significant effect on competence feeling, whereas it exerts a significant impact on focused attention on game goals. Competence feeling, rather than focused attention on game goals, contributes to maladaptive behaviors within the gamified system. Originality/value: This study is among the first to highlight maladaptive goal orientation in gamified learning. It distinguishes types of instant feedback and their effects, emphasizes the role of multisensory interaction and reveals how game objectives may override educational goals. The findings extend gamification theory and provide practical insights for designing learning systems that mitigate maladaptive outcomes.
- 7 April 2025
- Published by World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd in Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research
Does a Manufacturer Benefit from Selling to a Better-Forecasting Retailer in a Supply Chain with Responsive Pricing?
Given that firms may have to make stocking decisions before learning real demand due to long production lead times but can adjust retail prices rapidly in response to realized demand, this paper considers a supply chain with responsive pricing, in which a manufacturer sells a product to a newsvendor-type retailer and the latter possesses imperfect forecasting capability about market demand (i.e., can observe an imperfect private demand signal). We analyze the effects of demand uncertainty and forecasting capability on pricing and stocking decisions, and further examine whether the manufacturer benefits from a retailer with strong forecasting capability. We show that, when demand uncertainty is high, the manufacturer chooses a retailer with worst or best forecasting capability, and the retailer makes a stocking decision such that there will exist leftovers with the realized demand being low (i.e., overstocking) or orders nothing. Differently, under moderate demand uncertainty, the manufacturer chooses a retailer with intermediate forecasting capability and the high-demand-signal retailer makes an overstocking decision, while the low-demand-signal retailer always sells all stocked products (i.e., understocking). When demand uncertainty is low, the manufacturer does not care about the retailer’s forecasting capability. We also find that, the improvement in forecasting capability does not always benefit the retailer when the demand uncertainty is moderate. Finally, we discuss the impacts of production cost and demand signal acquisition cost on the manufacturer’s preference.
- 7 April 2025
- Published by World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd in Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research
Does a Manufacturer Benefit from Selling to a Better-Forecasting Retailer in a Supply Chain with Responsive Pricing?
Given that firms may have to make stocking decisions before learning real demand due to long production lead times but can adjust retail prices rapidly in response to realized demand, this paper considers a supply chain with responsive pricing, in which a manufacturer sells a product to a newsvendor-type retailer and the latter possesses imperfect forecasting capability about market demand (i.e., can observe an imperfect private demand signal). We analyze the effects of demand uncertainty and forecasting capability on pricing and stocking decisions, and further examine whether the manufacturer benefits from a retailer with strong forecasting capability. We show that, when demand uncertainty is high, the manufacturer chooses a retailer with worst or best forecasting capability, and the retailer makes a stocking decision such that there will exist leftovers with the realized demand being low (i.e., overstocking) or orders nothing. Differently, under moderate demand uncertainty, the manufacturer chooses a retailer with intermediate forecasting capability and the high-demand-signal retailer makes an overstocking decision, while the low-demand-signal retailer always sells all stocked products (i.e., understocking). When demand uncertainty is low, the manufacturer does not care about the retailer’s forecasting capability. We also find that, the improvement in forecasting capability does not always benefit the retailer when the demand uncertainty is moderate. Finally, we discuss the impacts of production cost and demand signal acquisition cost on the manufacturer’s preference.
- 3 July 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Industrial Engineering
- Vol. 194
Pricing and blockchain adoption for competitive sellers on an e-commerce platform with different contracts
- 3 July 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Industrial Engineering
- Vol. 194
Pricing and blockchain adoption for competitive sellers on an e-commerce platform with different contracts
- 25 December 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management
- Vol. 71 (00189391) , 9661-9678
Strategic Choice of Commission Formats in a Supply Chain With a Platform and Competing Manufacturers
Recently, an increasing number of platforms have begun to serve as marketplaces, which allow upstream manufacturers to directly connect with consumers. In this prevalent selling mode, a platform commonly charges manufacturers commissions through the revenue-sharing format or fixed-rent format. By building game-theoretical models, this study investigates the performance differences between the two commission formats and explores the optimal commission strategy of the platform facing competing manufacturers. Our results show that compared to the fixed-rent format, the revenue-sharing format, which leads to lower required per-unit commissions, lower prices, and higher demand, can weaken the platform's dominance. In addition, the competition between upstream manufacturers plays a critical role in the choice of the commission format by the platform. Specifically, when the competition intensity is low, as the commission rate increases, the platform's preference evolves from a pure fixed-rent strategy to a hybrid strategy and then to a pure revenue-sharing strategy. As upstream competition intensifies, the platform's preference for the revenue-sharing format begins to wane. That is, when the competition intensity is moderate, a hybrid strategy is preferred by the platform even if the commission rate is sufficiently high. Moreover, when upstream competition is fierce, the platform should adopt the pure fixed-rent strategy, regardless of the commission rate. Furthermore, we also find that the dominant strategy of both manufacturers is to adopt the revenue-sharing format. However, neither of them can achieve the highest profit in the equilibrium outcome. If a manufacturer wants to win the competition, she must make efforts to induce her competitor to adopt the fixed-rent format while maintaining her own dominant commission choice.
- 25 December 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management
- Vol. 71 (00189391) , 9661-9678
Strategic Choice of Commission Formats in a Supply Chain With a Platform and Competing Manufacturers
Recently, an increasing number of platforms have begun to serve as marketplaces, which allow upstream manufacturers to directly connect with consumers. In this prevalent selling mode, a platform commonly charges manufacturers commissions through the revenue-sharing format or fixed-rent format. By building game-theoretical models, this study investigates the performance differences between the two commission formats and explores the optimal commission strategy of the platform facing competing manufacturers. Our results show that compared to the fixed-rent format, the revenue-sharing format, which leads to lower required per-unit commissions, lower prices, and higher demand, can weaken the platform's dominance. In addition, the competition between upstream manufacturers plays a critical role in the choice of the commission format by the platform. Specifically, when the competition intensity is low, as the commission rate increases, the platform's preference evolves from a pure fixed-rent strategy to a hybrid strategy and then to a pure revenue-sharing strategy. As upstream competition intensifies, the platform's preference for the revenue-sharing format begins to wane. That is, when the competition intensity is moderate, a hybrid strategy is preferred by the platform even if the commission rate is sufficiently high. Moreover, when upstream competition is fierce, the platform should adopt the pure fixed-rent strategy, regardless of the commission rate. Furthermore, we also find that the dominant strategy of both manufacturers is to adopt the revenue-sharing format. However, neither of them can achieve the highest profit in the equilibrium outcome. If a manufacturer wants to win the competition, she must make efforts to induce her competitor to adopt the fixed-rent format while maintaining her own dominant commission choice.
- 11 February 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Industrial Engineering
- Vol. 177
Equilibrium analysis of transaction modes and recycling channels in a closed-loop supply chain with an online platform
- 11 February 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Industrial Engineering
- Vol. 177
Equilibrium analysis of transaction modes and recycling channels in a closed-loop supply chain with an online platform
- 24 March 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Production Research
- Vol. 61 (11) , 3670-3684
Impact of blockchain technology on the optimal pricing and quality decisions of platform supply chains
We investigate how blockchain technology influences optimal pricing and quality decisions under two different supply chain structures. In both cases, the supplier is the leader and plays a Stackelberg game with downstream platform(s). Specifically, the supplier determines the wholesale prices and quality levels of the products, and the platform(s) decides the selling prices. Based on our analysis, we find that when consumer acceptance of blockchain is low, among the two products in the single platform, the products with blockchain technology have not only a high quality but also a low price. However, in the case of the two competitive platforms, although blockchain will also enable the platform that uses this technology to provide products with a high quality and low price, its advantages are not obvious. Nevertheless, in comparing the two cases, when consumer acceptance is high, the two competing platforms tend to provide products with a high quality and low price, regardless of whether or not the products use blockchain technology. Our conclusions reveal that although blockchain will benefit a supplier and consumers, in some cases, the supplier will have an incentive to decrease the quality level of the products with blockchain technology, which will eventually negatively affect consumers.
- 24 March 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Production Research
- Vol. 61 (11) , 3670-3684
Impact of blockchain technology on the optimal pricing and quality decisions of platform supply chains
We investigate how blockchain technology influences optimal pricing and quality decisions under two different supply chain structures. In both cases, the supplier is the leader and plays a Stackelberg game with downstream platform(s). Specifically, the supplier determines the wholesale prices and quality levels of the products, and the platform(s) decides the selling prices. Based on our analysis, we find that when consumer acceptance of blockchain is low, among the two products in the single platform, the products with blockchain technology have not only a high quality but also a low price. However, in the case of the two competitive platforms, although blockchain will also enable the platform that uses this technology to provide products with a high quality and low price, its advantages are not obvious. Nevertheless, in comparing the two cases, when consumer acceptance is high, the two competing platforms tend to provide products with a high quality and low price, regardless of whether or not the products use blockchain technology. Our conclusions reveal that although blockchain will benefit a supplier and consumers, in some cases, the supplier will have an incentive to decrease the quality level of the products with blockchain technology, which will eventually negatively affect consumers.
- 17 February 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 309 (2) , 641-661
Contract strategies in competitive supply chains subject to inventory inaccuracy
- 17 February 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 309 (2) , 641-661
Contract strategies in competitive supply chains subject to inventory inaccuracy