Zsolt Darvas
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Zsolt Darvas has a total of 29 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Zoltán Schepp
5 shared publications- Guntram B. Wolff
Bruegel, Brussels, Belgium
3 shared publications - Marie-Sophie Lappe
Bruegel, Brussels , Belgium
3 shared publications - Alexandre Mendonça2 shared publications
Bo Sangers
2 shared publicationsGyorgy Szapary
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
More flexible European Union spending needs stronger parliamentary scrutiny
Proposed changes to the EU budget and how it is approved go too far in marginalising the European Parliament; this shortcoming should be corrected
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
More flexible European Union spending needs stronger parliamentary scrutiny
Proposed changes to the EU budget and how it is approved go too far in marginalising the European Parliament; this shortcoming should be corrected
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Hungary’s path to the euro: five tests for a sustainable adoption strategy
The Hungarian government elected in April 2026 supports euro adoption and aims to meet the adoption conditions around 2030. For adoption to happen, certain criteria must be met, but these can mask fiscal weakness, credit booms and competitiveness losses that become harder to correct without national monetary and exchange-rate policies. We propose five domestic readiness tests for the Hungarian government to consider in its euro-adoption strategy. These would help assess whether Hungary’s institutions, policies, productive capacity, shock absorbers and proposed forint-euro exchange rate will be sufficiently ready for it to prosper within the euro area, while identifying the necessary reforms and sequence. In a context of a budget deficit near 7.5 percent of GDP, high debt-service costs, weak productivity and price and credit distortions, institutional repair and fiscal consolidation should come first. Consolidation should redirect resources from poorly targeted subsidies, low-return investment and politically directed support towards health, education, research and infrastructure. Price and credit distortions should be phased out or retargeted, monetary transmission restored and wage growth aligned with productivity. Entry into the Exchange Rate Mechanism should wait until the fiscal and inflation paths are credible. The central exchange rate should be consistent with long-term competitiveness and robust against major shocks. A strong exchange rate should not be used to meet the inflation criterion. The adjustment will take several years. Alongside these reforms, euro adoption could strengthen credibility, investment and income convergence. Premature entry would risk weak growth, renewed inflation and a painful adjustment inside the currency union.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Hungary’s path to the euro: five tests for a sustainable adoption strategy
The Hungarian government elected in April 2026 supports euro adoption and aims to meet the adoption conditions around 2030. For adoption to happen, certain criteria must be met, but these can mask fiscal weakness, credit booms and competitiveness losses that become harder to correct without national monetary and exchange-rate policies. We propose five domestic readiness tests for the Hungarian government to consider in its euro-adoption strategy. These would help assess whether Hungary’s institutions, policies, productive capacity, shock absorbers and proposed forint-euro exchange rate will be sufficiently ready for it to prosper within the euro area, while identifying the necessary reforms and sequence. In a context of a budget deficit near 7.5 percent of GDP, high debt-service costs, weak productivity and price and credit distortions, institutional repair and fiscal consolidation should come first. Consolidation should redirect resources from poorly targeted subsidies, low-return investment and politically directed support towards health, education, research and infrastructure. Price and credit distortions should be phased out or retargeted, monetary transmission restored and wage growth aligned with productivity. Entry into the Exchange Rate Mechanism should wait until the fiscal and inflation paths are credible. The central exchange rate should be consistent with long-term competitiveness and robust against major shocks. A strong exchange rate should not be used to meet the inflation criterion. The adjustment will take several years. Alongside these reforms, euro adoption could strengthen credibility, investment and income convergence. Premature entry would risk weak growth, renewed inflation and a painful adjustment inside the currency union.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
The Danes, the Dutch, the Swedes and the feasibility of walking away from pay-as-you-go pensions
This paper examines whether the pension systems of Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden outperform predominantly pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems, and whether their development provides a replicable reform path for other European Union countries. We find that Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden have developed multi-pillar systems combining public pensions with large, prefunded components. These systems deliver comparatively high final-wage replacement rates and low old-age poverty, while limiting long-term fiscal pressures and supporting higher national savings, deeper capital markets and the supply of long-term risk capital. The experience of these three countries demonstrates that a substantial shift towards prefunded, predominantly defined-contribution pensions need not undermine retirement income security and can strengthen long-term fiscal sustainability. However, other EU countries will struggle to replicate the historical transitions seen in Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden. In the three countries, prefunded pension assets accumulated gradually over decades, supported by favourable demographic and economic conditions and strong social-partner institutions. EU countries now facing rapidly ageing populations and strained PAYG systems no longer have such favourable time or circumstances. Rather than replicating this historical transition, countries with sufficiently sound fiscal positions could accelerate the shift towards prefunding, including through public debt-financed initial contributions to individual pension accounts of 20 percent to 25 percent of GDP. Such a kickstart would rapidly build meaningful pension assets, change savings incentives and help develop the institutional capacity required for sustainable prefunded pension systems.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
The Danes, the Dutch, the Swedes and the feasibility of walking away from pay-as-you-go pensions
This paper examines whether the pension systems of Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden outperform predominantly pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems, and whether their development provides a replicable reform path for other European Union countries. We find that Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden have developed multi-pillar systems combining public pensions with large, prefunded components. These systems deliver comparatively high final-wage replacement rates and low old-age poverty, while limiting long-term fiscal pressures and supporting higher national savings, deeper capital markets and the supply of long-term risk capital. The experience of these three countries demonstrates that a substantial shift towards prefunded, predominantly defined-contribution pensions need not undermine retirement income security and can strengthen long-term fiscal sustainability. However, other EU countries will struggle to replicate the historical transitions seen in Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden. In the three countries, prefunded pension assets accumulated gradually over decades, supported by favourable demographic and economic conditions and strong social-partner institutions. EU countries now facing rapidly ageing populations and strained PAYG systems no longer have such favourable time or circumstances. Rather than replicating this historical transition, countries with sufficiently sound fiscal positions could accelerate the shift towards prefunding, including through public debt-financed initial contributions to individual pension accounts of 20 percent to 25 percent of GDP. Such a kickstart would rapidly build meaningful pension assets, change savings incentives and help develop the institutional capacity required for sustainable prefunded pension systems.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
An assessment of the 2028-2034 EU budget’s contribution to closing Europe’s investment gap
Europe must invest substantially more in the green and digital transitions, innovation and international climate finance. This additional investment should be shared between the private sector, national budgets and the European Union budget. We estimate that the part of the investment gap best financed through the EU budget, because it relates to European public goods (EPGs), amounts to about 0.9 percent of EU gross national income (GNI) annually. We assess the potential of the European Commission’s proposed 2028-2034 EU budget to close this gap. Because, under the proposal, EU countries would have flexibility in allocating funds, and the effectiveness of the budget’s financial instruments to mobilise private investment is uncertain, we develop three scenarios: (1) countries maintain current spending patterns; (2) all available funds are directed to the EPG gap; and (3) funds are allocated to the overall investment gap, regardless of whether investment qualifies as EPGs. We find that the proposed budget would close only around 12 percent of the EPG gap in scenario (1) and 22 percent in scenario (2). In scenario (3), it could cover only four to eight percent of the total additional investment needs. Closing the entire EPG gap would require an EU budget that is 0.6 percent of GNI larger than proposed. EU countries should prioritise investments that advance Europe’s long-term objectives rather than preserve current spending patterns. Financial instruments cannot substitute for direct public investment. Research, climate mitigation and cross-border infrastructure require sustained public funding. Better data, especially on defence, is also needed to assess EU-level investment needs.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
An assessment of the 2028-2034 EU budget’s contribution to closing Europe’s investment gap
Europe must invest substantially more in the green and digital transitions, innovation and international climate finance. This additional investment should be shared between the private sector, national budgets and the European Union budget. We estimate that the part of the investment gap best financed through the EU budget, because it relates to European public goods (EPGs), amounts to about 0.9 percent of EU gross national income (GNI) annually. We assess the potential of the European Commission’s proposed 2028-2034 EU budget to close this gap. Because, under the proposal, EU countries would have flexibility in allocating funds, and the effectiveness of the budget’s financial instruments to mobilise private investment is uncertain, we develop three scenarios: (1) countries maintain current spending patterns; (2) all available funds are directed to the EPG gap; and (3) funds are allocated to the overall investment gap, regardless of whether investment qualifies as EPGs. We find that the proposed budget would close only around 12 percent of the EPG gap in scenario (1) and 22 percent in scenario (2). In scenario (3), it could cover only four to eight percent of the total additional investment needs. Closing the entire EPG gap would require an EU budget that is 0.6 percent of GNI larger than proposed. EU countries should prioritise investments that advance Europe’s long-term objectives rather than preserve current spending patterns. Financial instruments cannot substitute for direct public investment. Research, climate mitigation and cross-border infrastructure require sustained public funding. Better data, especially on defence, is also needed to assess EU-level investment needs.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Hungary has room to streamline public spending without hurting growth
Cutting some state operating and economic spending to the average of its regional peers could save Hungary more than four percent of GDP
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Hungary has room to streamline public spending without hurting growth
Cutting some state operating and economic spending to the average of its regional peers could save Hungary more than four percent of GDP
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Financing the EU budget: an assessment of five proposals for new resources
New EU ‘own resources’ for 2028–34 would reshuffle who pays, their value should be judged by their backing for EU priorities and public goods
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Financing the EU budget: an assessment of five proposals for new resources
New EU ‘own resources’ for 2028–34 would reshuffle who pays, their value should be judged by their backing for EU priorities and public goods
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
The European Union’s external imbalances: Past, future, and policy
Europe’s rising external surplus now rivals China’s, reflecting weak investment and growing surpluses, pointing to a need for pro-investment reforms
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
The European Union’s external imbalances: Past, future, and policy
Europe’s rising external surplus now rivals China’s, reflecting weak investment and growing surpluses, pointing to a need for pro-investment reforms
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
National plans, regional voices: cohesion policy in the next European Union budget
NRPPs could raise the EU added value of the 2028–34 budget, but reform conditions and decision-making must better reflect regional needs
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
National plans, regional voices: cohesion policy in the next European Union budget
NRPPs could raise the EU added value of the 2028–34 budget, but reform conditions and decision-making must better reflect regional needs
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
European and Chinese exports kept growing despite the 2025 Trump trade shock
Diversification has kept global trade strong, despite Trump’s tariffs and accelerated US-China decoupling.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
European and Chinese exports kept growing despite the 2025 Trump trade shock
Diversification has kept global trade strong, despite Trump’s tariffs and accelerated US-China decoupling.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Bruegel
- Vol. 2025 (1)
What will it take to stabilise debt in advanced countries?
This paper analyses the prospects for debt stabilisation in the EU countries, the UK, and the United States, using two methodologies. First, by estimating the level of the structural primary balance that is required to asymptotically stabilise the debt ratio with 70 percent probability, and assessing the plausibility of reaching this level over the medium term using both historical benchmarks and stochastic forecasts centred on IMF projections. Second, by estimating ‘fiscal reaction functions’ that measure the reaction of the primary balance to the debt level. We find that (1) debt-stabilising primary balances are generally within historical precedent – well below 3 percent of GDP; (2) the fiscal adjustment required to reach debt-stabilising primary balances is very high in several countries – specifically, the United States, France, the UK, Slovakia, Poland and Romania, which must increase their primary fiscal balances by over 5 percentage points of GDP; (3) the feedback coefficient from debt to the primary balance remains positive in all countries, but has significantly declined since the global financial crisis, and is not significantly different from zero in most countries. Our main conclusion is that public debt in the countries in our sample remains sustainable in the sense that the fiscal adjustment required to stabilise the debt is feasible, but that undertaking this adjustment will require a larger and/or more protracted fiscal effort than has been both typical for most advanced countries and is currently expected by the IMF. In the meantime, countries with large adjustment needs could be vulnerable to shifts in market sentiment.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Bruegel
- Vol. 2025 (1)
What will it take to stabilise debt in advanced countries?
This paper analyses the prospects for debt stabilisation in the EU countries, the UK, and the United States, using two methodologies. First, by estimating the level of the structural primary balance that is required to asymptotically stabilise the debt ratio with 70 percent probability, and assessing the plausibility of reaching this level over the medium term using both historical benchmarks and stochastic forecasts centred on IMF projections. Second, by estimating ‘fiscal reaction functions’ that measure the reaction of the primary balance to the debt level. We find that (1) debt-stabilising primary balances are generally within historical precedent – well below 3 percent of GDP; (2) the fiscal adjustment required to reach debt-stabilising primary balances is very high in several countries – specifically, the United States, France, the UK, Slovakia, Poland and Romania, which must increase their primary fiscal balances by over 5 percentage points of GDP; (3) the feedback coefficient from debt to the primary balance remains positive in all countries, but has significantly declined since the global financial crisis, and is not significantly different from zero in most countries. Our main conclusion is that public debt in the countries in our sample remains sustainable in the sense that the fiscal adjustment required to stabilise the debt is feasible, but that undertaking this adjustment will require a larger and/or more protracted fiscal effort than has been both typical for most advanced countries and is currently expected by the IMF. In the meantime, countries with large adjustment needs could be vulnerable to shifts in market sentiment.