Guntram B. Wolff
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Guntram B. Wolff has a total of 83 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Simone Tagliapietra
Bruegel, Brussels, Belgium
5 shared publications - Javier Ospital4 shared publications
- Juan Mejino-López
Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB) and Bruegel
4 shared publications Maria Demertzis
Bruegel, Rue de la Charité 33, 1210 Saint-Josse-ten-Noode, Belgium
3 shared publications- Zsolt Darvas
Bruegel, Brussels, Belgium
3 shared publications - Alexandr Burilkov
Leuphana University of Lüneburg (Germany)
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 23 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Getting Serious about European Defence Integration: The European Defence Community Precedent
Europe stands at a crossroads. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, mounting instability in the Middle East and North Africa, and the uncertain future of the transatlantic alliance have laid bare the vulnerabilities in Europe’s defence architecture. At the same time, Europe’s reliance on the United States is increasingly untenable—a reality underscored by fluctuating U.S. commitments under a second Trump Presidency. With security threats escalating and European autonomy at stake, the time for rethinking the European defence architecture has come.
- 23 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessGetting Serious about European Defence Integration: The European Defence Community Precedent
Europe stands at a crossroads. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, mounting instability in the Middle East and North Africa, and the uncertain future of the transatlantic alliance have laid bare the vulnerabilities in Europe’s defence architecture. At the same time, Europe’s reliance on the United States is increasingly untenable—a reality underscored by fluctuating U.S. commitments under a second Trump Presidency. With security threats escalating and European autonomy at stake, the time for rethinking the European defence architecture has come.
- 30 March 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Defence and Peace Economics
- Vol. 37 (5) , 1-18
Europe’s dependence on US foreign military sales: evidence for policy makers from a new database
1Europe faces a deteriorating threat scenario with an aggressive and increasingly assertive Russia at a moment of a significant disruption in the transatlantic relationship. The state of transatlan...
- 30 March 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Defence and Peace Economics
- Vol. 37 (5) , 1-18
Europe’s dependence on US foreign military sales: evidence for policy makers from a new database
1Europe faces a deteriorating threat scenario with an aggressive and increasingly assertive Russia at a moment of a significant disruption in the transatlantic relationship. The state of transatlan...
- Open Access
- 25 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Who Controls the Defence Industry?
Defence markets exhibit asset specificity and bilateral monopoly with governments as sole customer. Transaction cost economics predicts state ownership or control in such circumstances. We examine what governments actually do. Ownership alone does not determine control. A state with zero equity can have influence through governance provisions and legal tools. Using large language model extraction from annual reports, we compile a dataset on corporate governance and state control for the largest 112 defence companies by revenue in 24 countries. We construct a novel State Influence Index aggregating voting power, voting enhancements, board appointment, and veto rights. State ownership is bimodal: full state ownership at one end, no state ownership at the other. Formal control varies independently. China and Russia combine full ownership with full control. The United States has no ownership and little formal control, relying instead on security agreements, revenue dependence, and personnel interchange. The rest of the distribution is dispersed. Some countries combine minority equity with legal devices that amplify formal control well beyond ownership stakes. Others rely on regulatory mechanisms with little or no formal governance authority. In several cases, states have delegated control to domestic families operating under implicit state leverage. Corporate governance mechanisms matter most when defence entities operate beyond the home state's jurisdiction, where regulatory authority alone does not reach. A complementary State Restraint Index shows that European companies with high state influence also score highly on voluntary self-limitation, consistent with credible commitment to attract private capital. Cross-border cooperation is producing new governance architectures that partition operations across national subsidiaries to reconcile economies of scale with sovereign control. The observed patterns are consistent with basic predictions of transaction cost economics and property rights theory: higher asset specificity and bilateral dependence are associated with stronger state control, though the institutional form varies with legal tradition and political economy.
- 25 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessWho Controls the Defence Industry?
Defence markets exhibit asset specificity and bilateral monopoly with governments as sole customer. Transaction cost economics predicts state ownership or control in such circumstances. We examine what governments actually do. Ownership alone does not determine control. A state with zero equity can have influence through governance provisions and legal tools. Using large language model extraction from annual reports, we compile a dataset on corporate governance and state control for the largest 112 defence companies by revenue in 24 countries. We construct a novel State Influence Index aggregating voting power, voting enhancements, board appointment, and veto rights. State ownership is bimodal: full state ownership at one end, no state ownership at the other. Formal control varies independently. China and Russia combine full ownership with full control. The United States has no ownership and little formal control, relying instead on security agreements, revenue dependence, and personnel interchange. The rest of the distribution is dispersed. Some countries combine minority equity with legal devices that amplify formal control well beyond ownership stakes. Others rely on regulatory mechanisms with little or no formal governance authority. In several cases, states have delegated control to domestic families operating under implicit state leverage. Corporate governance mechanisms matter most when defence entities operate beyond the home state's jurisdiction, where regulatory authority alone does not reach. A complementary State Restraint Index shows that European companies with high state influence also score highly on voluntary self-limitation, consistent with credible commitment to attract private capital. Cross-border cooperation is producing new governance architectures that partition operations across national subsidiaries to reconcile economies of scale with sovereign control. The observed patterns are consistent with basic predictions of transaction cost economics and property rights theory: higher asset specificity and bilateral dependence are associated with stronger state control, though the institutional form varies with legal tradition and political economy.
- 5 March 2026
- Published by Wiley in Global Policy
- Vol. 17 (2) , 423-432
Pivot to Asia, Europe or the Homeland? 18 Years of US Foreign Military Sales
Subsequent US administrations have shifted the focus of US foreign policy over the last decades. A pivot to Asia characterised President Obama's administrations while President Biden focused on Europe. President Trump's second administration emphasises homeland security and the Western hemisphere. Meanwhile, the Middle East continues to be an important focus of US foreign policy. But do these ‘pivots’ result in different weapon export patterns, one of the key resources of US foreign policy? The US defence industrial base produces the most advanced weapons in the world and they are in high demand thanks to their effectiveness. In this paper, we analyse all US foreign military sales notifications since 2008 based on a novel database. Our descriptive evidence does not show a ‘pivot to Asia’ during the Obama presidency while exports to Europe have increased substantially during the Biden presidency and Russia's war against Ukraine. The first Trump administration shows no clear shift towards Asia nor towards the homeland but in the second administration, first evidence suggests that FMS are declining while the US military is substantially increasing its demand from the US defence industrial base—consistent with a shift to the homeland. Three policy implications emerge. First, while strategies set the tone, the United States has historically reacted to actual needs as they emerge, a factor that US defence companies need to consider. Second, from the perspective of recipient countries of weapon sales, US ‘pivots’ need to be taken with a grain of salt. Finally, military planners, especially in Europe, need to prepare for less dependence on the US military industrial base given the general uncertainty and the much more forceful shift in US policy during the current administration compared to previous ‘pivots’.
- 5 March 2026
- Published by Wiley in Global Policy
- Vol. 17 (2) , 423-432
Pivot to Asia, Europe or the Homeland? 18 Years of US Foreign Military Sales
Subsequent US administrations have shifted the focus of US foreign policy over the last decades. A pivot to Asia characterised President Obama's administrations while President Biden focused on Europe. President Trump's second administration emphasises homeland security and the Western hemisphere. Meanwhile, the Middle East continues to be an important focus of US foreign policy. But do these ‘pivots’ result in different weapon export patterns, one of the key resources of US foreign policy? The US defence industrial base produces the most advanced weapons in the world and they are in high demand thanks to their effectiveness. In this paper, we analyse all US foreign military sales notifications since 2008 based on a novel database. Our descriptive evidence does not show a ‘pivot to Asia’ during the Obama presidency while exports to Europe have increased substantially during the Biden presidency and Russia's war against Ukraine. The first Trump administration shows no clear shift towards Asia nor towards the homeland but in the second administration, first evidence suggests that FMS are declining while the US military is substantially increasing its demand from the US defence industrial base—consistent with a shift to the homeland. Three policy implications emerge. First, while strategies set the tone, the United States has historically reacted to actual needs as they emerge, a factor that US defence companies need to consider. Second, from the perspective of recipient countries of weapon sales, US ‘pivots’ need to be taken with a grain of salt. Finally, military planners, especially in Europe, need to prepare for less dependence on the US military industrial base given the general uncertainty and the much more forceful shift in US policy during the current administration compared to previous ‘pivots’.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Europe’s strategic bet on US technology for air superiority is unravelling
Europe’s bet on the US defence industrial base for air defence is fast becoming a major strategic liability in the face of the Russian threat
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Europe’s strategic bet on US technology for air superiority is unravelling
Europe’s bet on the US defence industrial base for air defence is fast becoming a major strategic liability in the face of the Russian threat
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
More flexibility needs greater accountability: defence in the 2028-2034 EU budget
Oversight of defence-related spending in the EU suffers from a number of weaknesses. It is essential that these not be carried over into the 2028-2034
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
More flexibility needs greater accountability: defence in the 2028-2034 EU budget
Oversight of defence-related spending in the EU suffers from a number of weaknesses. It is essential that these not be carried over into the 2028-2034
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Defence innovation and procurement reform: an empirical evaluation of the US Defense Innovation Unit
Battlefields are evolving rapidly, with new technologies reshaping military strategy and tactics. Many of the new technologies originate in firms outside the traditional defence sector, rather than with the existing prime contractors. In the United States, the Department of Defense (DoD) created the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) in 2015 to incentivise commercial tech companies to work on national security challenges. How successful has this new unit been in achieving its mission? We provide the first causal evaluation of the DIU’s effects on defence procurement. Using administrative procurement data and a firm-level panel covering 2017-2025, and employing propensity score matching, additional firm-level covariates and a staggered difference-in-differences design, we find that the DIU has expanded both the extensive and intensive margins of defence contracting. We find not only a significant increase in the likelihood of receiving a DoD contract because of DIU treatment, but also in the size of the contract. Our findings show that defence innovation organisations can broaden and deepen the defence-supplier base. Governments updating their defence acquisition strategies in response to the lessons from recent conflicts can benefit from reforms that facilitate firm entry into procurement, overcoming the transaction cost and information asymmetry problems typical in defence markets.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Defence innovation and procurement reform: an empirical evaluation of the US Defense Innovation Unit
Battlefields are evolving rapidly, with new technologies reshaping military strategy and tactics. Many of the new technologies originate in firms outside the traditional defence sector, rather than with the existing prime contractors. In the United States, the Department of Defense (DoD) created the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) in 2015 to incentivise commercial tech companies to work on national security challenges. How successful has this new unit been in achieving its mission? We provide the first causal evaluation of the DIU’s effects on defence procurement. Using administrative procurement data and a firm-level panel covering 2017-2025, and employing propensity score matching, additional firm-level covariates and a staggered difference-in-differences design, we find that the DIU has expanded both the extensive and intensive margins of defence contracting. We find not only a significant increase in the likelihood of receiving a DoD contract because of DIU treatment, but also in the size of the contract. Our findings show that defence innovation organisations can broaden and deepen the defence-supplier base. Governments updating their defence acquisition strategies in response to the lessons from recent conflicts can benefit from reforms that facilitate firm entry into procurement, overcoming the transaction cost and information asymmetry problems typical in defence markets.
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Geoeconomics Press in Journal of Geoeconomics
- Vol. 1, e2663891
Fit for War by 2030? European Rearmament Efforts Vis-à-Vis Russia
This research article presents new data on military procurement in Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), Poland, and France, and uses these data to analyse procurement patterns, delivery timelines, and force-generation constraints against the background of a deteriorating security situation and rising Russian capabilities. We show that procurement has substantially increased since 2022 with Germany and Poland focusing on land forces, while the UK’s spending is focused on maritime forces. However, we show that procurement needs to accelerate and be frontloaded to be prepared for a possible Russian attack assessed to occur as early as 2030, as delivery delays of three years or more persist. Military strategy and technology are evolving rapidly, particularly with the growing role of unmanned systems, artificial intelligence, and multi-domain integration. Military planners must modernise weapons and strategy while simultaneously scaling existing and effective systems. We show that sustained investment in European technology is essential for modernisation. European weapons tend to be expensive due to low production volumes in a fragmented market, and a focus on cost-effectiveness is vital to ensure the EU’s planned €800 billion defence spending is sufficient and fiscally sustainable.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Geoeconomics Press in Journal of Geoeconomics
- Vol. 1, e2663891
Top Cited PapersFit for War by 2030? European Rearmament Efforts Vis-à-Vis Russia
This research article presents new data on military procurement in Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), Poland, and France, and uses these data to analyse procurement patterns, delivery timelines, and force-generation constraints against the background of a deteriorating security situation and rising Russian capabilities. We show that procurement has substantially increased since 2022 with Germany and Poland focusing on land forces, while the UK’s spending is focused on maritime forces. However, we show that procurement needs to accelerate and be frontloaded to be prepared for a possible Russian attack assessed to occur as early as 2030, as delivery delays of three years or more persist. Military strategy and technology are evolving rapidly, particularly with the growing role of unmanned systems, artificial intelligence, and multi-domain integration. Military planners must modernise weapons and strategy while simultaneously scaling existing and effective systems. We show that sustained investment in European technology is essential for modernisation. European weapons tend to be expensive due to low production volumes in a fragmented market, and a focus on cost-effectiveness is vital to ensure the EU’s planned €800 billion defence spending is sufficient and fiscally sustainable.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Who controls the defence industry?
Defence markets exhibit extreme asset specificity and bilateral monopoly. Transaction-cost economics predicts state ownership or control in such circumstances. This paper examines what governments actually do. Ownership alone does not determine control. A state with zero equity can have influence through governance provisions and legal tools. Using large language model extraction from annual reports, we compile a dataset on corporate governance and state control for the largest 112 defence companies by revenue in 24 countries. We construct a novel state influence index aggregating voting power, voting enhancements, board appointment and veto rights. State ownership is bimodal: full state ownership at one end, no state ownership at the other. Formal control varies independently. China and Russia combine full ownership with full control. The United States has no ownership and little formal control, relying instead on security agreements, revenue dependence and personnel interchange. The rest of the distribution is dispersed. Some countries combine minority equity with legal devices that amplify formal control well beyond ownership stakes. Others rely on regulatory mechanisms with little or no formal governance authority. In several cases, states have delegated control to domestic families operating under implicit state leverage. Corporate governance mechanisms matter most when defence entities operate beyond the home state’s jurisdiction, where regulatory authority alone does not reach. A complementary State Restraint Index shows that European companies with high state influence also score highly on voluntary self-limitation, consistent with credible commitment to attract private capital. Cross-border cooperation is producing new governance architectures that partition operations across national subsidiaries to reconcile economies of scale with sovereign control. The observed patterns are consistent with basic predictions of transaction cost economics and property rights theory: higher asset specificity and bilateral dependence are associated with stronger state control, though the institutional form varies with legal tradition and political economy.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Who controls the defence industry?
Defence markets exhibit extreme asset specificity and bilateral monopoly. Transaction-cost economics predicts state ownership or control in such circumstances. This paper examines what governments actually do. Ownership alone does not determine control. A state with zero equity can have influence through governance provisions and legal tools. Using large language model extraction from annual reports, we compile a dataset on corporate governance and state control for the largest 112 defence companies by revenue in 24 countries. We construct a novel state influence index aggregating voting power, voting enhancements, board appointment and veto rights. State ownership is bimodal: full state ownership at one end, no state ownership at the other. Formal control varies independently. China and Russia combine full ownership with full control. The United States has no ownership and little formal control, relying instead on security agreements, revenue dependence and personnel interchange. The rest of the distribution is dispersed. Some countries combine minority equity with legal devices that amplify formal control well beyond ownership stakes. Others rely on regulatory mechanisms with little or no formal governance authority. In several cases, states have delegated control to domestic families operating under implicit state leverage. Corporate governance mechanisms matter most when defence entities operate beyond the home state’s jurisdiction, where regulatory authority alone does not reach. A complementary State Restraint Index shows that European companies with high state influence also score highly on voluntary self-limitation, consistent with credible commitment to attract private capital. Cross-border cooperation is producing new governance architectures that partition operations across national subsidiaries to reconcile economies of scale with sovereign control. The observed patterns are consistent with basic predictions of transaction cost economics and property rights theory: higher asset specificity and bilateral dependence are associated with stronger state control, though the institutional form varies with legal tradition and political economy.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Could a Hormuz Toll solve the oil crisis and who pays?
With a return to the pre-Iran conflict energy status quo unlikely, a Hormuz toll may be the next best option – but Gulf states would pay the most
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Could a Hormuz Toll solve the oil crisis and who pays?
With a return to the pre-Iran conflict energy status quo unlikely, a Hormuz toll may be the next best option – but Gulf states would pay the most