Margarida Hermida
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Margarida Hermida has a total of 50 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Aurélia Saraiva
Universidade do Porto
14 shared publications - Cristina Cruz
Universidade do Porto
9 shared publications - Bárbara Cavaleiro
University of Porto, Faculty of Sciences, Biology Department, Rua do Campo Alegre, Edifício FC4, 4169-007 Porto, Portugal
3 shared publications - James Ladyman
Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK
3 shared publications - Lídia Gouveia
Direção de Serviços de Monitorização, Estudos e Investigação do Mar (DSEIMar)
3 shared publications - Nuno Gouveia
Direção Regional de Pescas, Direção de Serviços de Inspeção e Controlo, Edifício da Sociedade Metropolitana de Câmara de Lobos
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 21 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 208 (3) , 121
The freedom to try to do what you want: randomness, organismal agency, and free will
The world is likely to be indeterministic. As a consequence, agents can never definitely settle anything, because there is always a chance that a random event can interfere with their actions. Yet organisms are able to exploit random processes in order to increase the probability of bringing about certain preferred outcomes. This happens at various scales, from subcellular nanomachines to complex nervous systems. I suggest that free will consists in the capacity of cognitively sophisticated biological agents to bias their own behaviours in ways that better align them with their reflectively endorsed preferences. Thus we are neither fully determined by causes outside of our control, nor entirely at the mercy of randomness; rather, we are among the causes of our own behaviour. In an indeterministic universe, we have the freedom to try to do what we want.
- 21 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 208 (3) , 121
Open AccessThe freedom to try to do what you want: randomness, organismal agency, and free will
The world is likely to be indeterministic. As a consequence, agents can never definitely settle anything, because there is always a chance that a random event can interfere with their actions. Yet organisms are able to exploit random processes in order to increase the probability of bringing about certain preferred outcomes. This happens at various scales, from subcellular nanomachines to complex nervous systems. I suggest that free will consists in the capacity of cognitively sophisticated biological agents to bias their own behaviours in ways that better align them with their reflectively endorsed preferences. Thus we are neither fully determined by causes outside of our control, nor entirely at the mercy of randomness; rather, we are among the causes of our own behaviour. In an indeterministic universe, we have the freedom to try to do what we want.
- Open Access
- 7 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 16 (3) , 59
The importance of spatial structure in biology
Living things are highly complex and organised. This is often taken as an objection to reductionism and a point in favour of organicist views, which argue for the central role of the organism in all biological explanations. This paper argues that biological organisation often either is, or depends on, spatial structure, together with interactions among parts of the system understood in physical terms. We take spatial structure to include position, configuration, shape, directionality, and orientation of objects in space. Important features of the spatial structure of living systems include physical boundaries, such as membranes; cellular structure, which includes physical objects spatially arranged in certain ways; directionality and orientation with respect to internal and environmental signals; location, both of organisms in their environments and of components within the organism; and shape, including the shapes of organisms and their components at atomic, mesoscopic, and larger scales. The importance of spatial structure for explanations of the functioning of biological systems corroborates criticisms of genetic and molecular reductionism, but is compatible with physical reduction – the explanation of biological phenomena in physical terms – and part-whole reduction – the explanation of systems in terms of their parts, spatial structure, and interactions with each other and their environment.
- 7 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 16 (3) , 59
Open AccessThe importance of spatial structure in biology
Living things are highly complex and organised. This is often taken as an objection to reductionism and a point in favour of organicist views, which argue for the central role of the organism in all biological explanations. This paper argues that biological organisation often either is, or depends on, spatial structure, together with interactions among parts of the system understood in physical terms. We take spatial structure to include position, configuration, shape, directionality, and orientation of objects in space. Important features of the spatial structure of living systems include physical boundaries, such as membranes; cellular structure, which includes physical objects spatially arranged in certain ways; directionality and orientation with respect to internal and environmental signals; location, both of organisms in their environments and of components within the organism; and shape, including the shapes of organisms and their components at atomic, mesoscopic, and larger scales. The importance of spatial structure for explanations of the functioning of biological systems corroborates criticisms of genetic and molecular reductionism, but is compatible with physical reduction – the explanation of biological phenomena in physical terms – and part-whole reduction – the explanation of systems in terms of their parts, spatial structure, and interactions with each other and their environment.
- Open Access
- 16 June 2026
- Published by MDPI AG in Proceedings
- Vol. 146 (1) , 8
Integrating Otolith Shape and Chemistry for Stock Discrimination of Pagellus bogaraveo in the Northeast Atlantic
Introduction: Fish stock identification and delineation are fundamental requirements for preventing local depletion and promoting the sustainable exploitation of marine resources. The blackspot seabream, Pagellus bogaraveo, is the most commercially valuable sparid species across the Northeast Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea. To effectively discriminate fish stocks, researchers increasingly rely on the use of natural tags, which reflect both environmental and genetic influences, providing critical information regarding fish movements and population structure. Objective: To broaden the understanding of P. bogaraveo stock structure, samples originally obtained for a parasite-based discrimination study were used to provide complementary insights through otolith shape and geochemical signatures. Methodology: A subset of 150 individuals (30 per location) collected across five Portuguese locations (Portugal mainland: Matosinhos, Figueira da Foz, and Sagres; and Archipelagos: Azores and Madeira) was selected for otolith analyses. Otolith contour phenotypic variation was quantified through Elliptical Fourier Descriptors (EFDs) and Shape Indices (SIs), while elemental signatures (element: Ca) were analyzed using solution-based inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (SB-ICP-MS). Statistical analyses involved both univariate (one-way ANOVA, followed by Tukey tests, if needed) and multivariate approaches (MANOVA and LDFA), considering both individual and combined datasets. Results: EFDs + SIs yielded the lowest discriminatory power, with an overall reclassification accuracy of 38%. In contrast, Ca signatures provided the highest discrimination at 79%. The combination of both markers resulted in a slightly lower overall accuracy of 75%, likely due to the higher variance associated with the morphological data. Conclusions: In agreement with the previous parasite assessment, these otolith-based approaches confirm that the Macaronesian archipelagos consist of distinct stocks, separate from the Portuguese continental shelf. Furthermore, significant differences in otolith geochemical signatures between Sagres and Figueira da Foz point to a further subdivision of stocks. These findings are consistent with recent genetic data identifying three distinct stocks along the western and southern Iberian Peninsula, reinforcing the need for localized management of P. bogaraveo populations to ensure long-term fishery sustainability.
- 16 June 2026
- Published by MDPI AG in Proceedings
- Vol. 146 (1) , 8
Open AccessIntegrating Otolith Shape and Chemistry for Stock Discrimination of Pagellus bogaraveo in the Northeast Atlantic
Introduction: Fish stock identification and delineation are fundamental requirements for preventing local depletion and promoting the sustainable exploitation of marine resources. The blackspot seabream, Pagellus bogaraveo, is the most commercially valuable sparid species across the Northeast Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea. To effectively discriminate fish stocks, researchers increasingly rely on the use of natural tags, which reflect both environmental and genetic influences, providing critical information regarding fish movements and population structure. Objective: To broaden the understanding of P. bogaraveo stock structure, samples originally obtained for a parasite-based discrimination study were used to provide complementary insights through otolith shape and geochemical signatures. Methodology: A subset of 150 individuals (30 per location) collected across five Portuguese locations (Portugal mainland: Matosinhos, Figueira da Foz, and Sagres; and Archipelagos: Azores and Madeira) was selected for otolith analyses. Otolith contour phenotypic variation was quantified through Elliptical Fourier Descriptors (EFDs) and Shape Indices (SIs), while elemental signatures (element: Ca) were analyzed using solution-based inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (SB-ICP-MS). Statistical analyses involved both univariate (one-way ANOVA, followed by Tukey tests, if needed) and multivariate approaches (MANOVA and LDFA), considering both individual and combined datasets. Results: EFDs + SIs yielded the lowest discriminatory power, with an overall reclassification accuracy of 38%. In contrast, Ca signatures provided the highest discrimination at 79%. The combination of both markers resulted in a slightly lower overall accuracy of 75%, likely due to the higher variance associated with the morphological data. Conclusions: In agreement with the previous parasite assessment, these otolith-based approaches confirm that the Macaronesian archipelagos consist of distinct stocks, separate from the Portuguese continental shelf. Furthermore, significant differences in otolith geochemical signatures between Sagres and Figueira da Foz point to a further subdivision of stocks. These findings are consistent with recent genetic data identifying three distinct stocks along the western and southern Iberian Peninsula, reinforcing the need for localized management of P. bogaraveo populations to ensure long-term fishery sustainability.
- Open Access
- 28 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences
- Vol. 47 (4) , 54
Physical explanations in evolutionary biology
The consensus in philosophy of biology seems to be that although nothing in biological systems is strictly incompatible with physical laws, biology is to a very great extent autonomous from physics. The main thesis of this paper is that, although biology is autonomous from the physical sciences in several ways, it is not explanatorily independent from physics. Physical explanations are pervasive and important in biology, including in evolutionary biology. The paper presents three case studies of physical explanations in evolutionary biology: a case of adaptation to pressure in deep-sea invertebrates, which illustrates how a physical parameter imposes selective pressures that organisms adapt to by changing their own physical properties; the case of water viscosity and the evolution of multicellularity, which shows how a global change in a physical parameter is thought to have triggered a macroevolutionary event; and the case of quantum tunnelling in respiration, which shows how quantum physics is relevant to the evolution of sex in eukaryotes.
- 28 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences
- Vol. 47 (4) , 54
Open AccessPhysical explanations in evolutionary biology
The consensus in philosophy of biology seems to be that although nothing in biological systems is strictly incompatible with physical laws, biology is to a very great extent autonomous from physics. The main thesis of this paper is that, although biology is autonomous from the physical sciences in several ways, it is not explanatorily independent from physics. Physical explanations are pervasive and important in biology, including in evolutionary biology. The paper presents three case studies of physical explanations in evolutionary biology: a case of adaptation to pressure in deep-sea invertebrates, which illustrates how a physical parameter imposes selective pressures that organisms adapt to by changing their own physical properties; the case of water viscosity and the evolution of multicellularity, which shows how a global change in a physical parameter is thought to have triggered a macroevolutionary event; and the case of quantum tunnelling in respiration, which shows how quantum physics is relevant to the evolution of sex in eukaryotes.
- Open Access
- 4 September 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 92 (5) , 1128-1139
Physical Explanation and the Autonomy of Biology
It is often claimed that biology is autonomous from the physical sciences, but this is seldom made precise. This article makes explicit, for the first time, five distinct “autonomy of biology” theses. Three moderate theses concerning scientific status, methodological distinctness, and nonreducibility of biology to physics are correct and are nearly universally accepted. Two stronger theses, concerning the exclusivity of biological explanation and irrelevance of physical laws, are shown to be false on the basis of two case studies of physical explanations of biological phenomena. Which scales and laws are explanatorily relevant for a particular phenomenon must be decided empirically.
- 4 September 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 92 (5) , 1128-1139
Open AccessPhysical Explanation and the Autonomy of Biology
It is often claimed that biology is autonomous from the physical sciences, but this is seldom made precise. This article makes explicit, for the first time, five distinct “autonomy of biology” theses. Three moderate theses concerning scientific status, methodological distinctness, and nonreducibility of biology to physics are correct and are nearly universally accepted. Two stronger theses, concerning the exclusivity of biological explanation and irrelevance of physical laws, are shown to be false on the basis of two case studies of physical explanations of biological phenomena. Which scales and laws are explanatorily relevant for a particular phenomenon must be decided empirically.
- Open Access
- 7 August 2025
- Published by The Royal Society in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Vol. 380 (1931) , 20240099
Function, chance and purpose in the biosphere: a critical examination of the Darwinized Gaia hypothesis
The original Gaia hypothesis purports to explain the long-term maintenance of the Earth’s habitability by proposing that the biosphere has evolved homeostatic control of environmental parameters crucial to its survival. This idea was criticized for being incompatible with core Darwinian requirements for evolution by natural selection, since the biosphere is not part of a population of entities with variation, reproduction and heredity. Recently, however, some authors have defended a ‘Darwinized’ version of the Gaia hypothesis. Proponents of Darwinized Gaia argue that there can be natural selection for persistence alone, with no need for reproduction or competition, and that a single lineage can undergo a process of sequential selection over time. This article examines these ideas in the light of two important distinctions in evolutionary biology: adaptation versus by-product, and transformational versus variational explanation. Despite these new interesting ideas, however, the Darwinized Gaia hypothesis still cannot overcome the main objections from evolutionary biology. This article is part of the discussion meeting issue ‘Chance and purpose in the evolution of biospheres’.
- 7 August 2025
- Published by The Royal Society in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Vol. 380 (1931) , 20240099
Open AccessFunction, chance and purpose in the biosphere: a critical examination of the Darwinized Gaia hypothesis
The original Gaia hypothesis purports to explain the long-term maintenance of the Earth’s habitability by proposing that the biosphere has evolved homeostatic control of environmental parameters crucial to its survival. This idea was criticized for being incompatible with core Darwinian requirements for evolution by natural selection, since the biosphere is not part of a population of entities with variation, reproduction and heredity. Recently, however, some authors have defended a ‘Darwinized’ version of the Gaia hypothesis. Proponents of Darwinized Gaia argue that there can be natural selection for persistence alone, with no need for reproduction or competition, and that a single lineage can undergo a process of sequential selection over time. This article examines these ideas in the light of two important distinctions in evolutionary biology: adaptation versus by-product, and transformational versus variational explanation. Despite these new interesting ideas, however, the Darwinized Gaia hypothesis still cannot overcome the main objections from evolutionary biology. This article is part of the discussion meeting issue ‘Chance and purpose in the evolution of biospheres’.
- 16 July 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in BioScience
- Vol. 75 (11) , 998-1001
Legitimizing Gaia: can biosphere evolution fit the Darwinian framework?
- 16 July 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in BioScience
- Vol. 75 (11) , 998-1001
Legitimizing Gaia: can biosphere evolution fit the Darwinian framework?
- Open Access
- 2 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 90 (7) , 2971-2994
Biological Antecedents Essentialism
An essentialist claim often made about organisms is that they could not have originated in different gametes. The thesis of gametic essentialism (GE) is usually understood either as a particular case of material origin essentialism, or as genetic essentialism. This paper argues that it should instead be understood in terms of the numerical identity of the gametes. Since gametes are living cells, their identity conditions should be the same as those of other living beings, and therefore involve neither specific material composition, nor specific genes, but continuity of the same life. Understood in this way, GE is a particular case of biological antecedents essentialism (BAE), a kind of origin essentialism that is better justified in the light of the metaphysical nature of organisms as objects that inherit life from previously existing living organisms. BAE overcomes many objections facing other origin essentialist accounts, and it recognises the importance of the gametes in transmitting not just genes, but actively functioning physical structures necessary for life. If we wish to maintain an origin essentialism principle for organisms, we should prefer BAE.
- 2 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 90 (7) , 2971-2994
Open AccessBiological Antecedents Essentialism
An essentialist claim often made about organisms is that they could not have originated in different gametes. The thesis of gametic essentialism (GE) is usually understood either as a particular case of material origin essentialism, or as genetic essentialism. This paper argues that it should instead be understood in terms of the numerical identity of the gametes. Since gametes are living cells, their identity conditions should be the same as those of other living beings, and therefore involve neither specific material composition, nor specific genes, but continuity of the same life. Understood in this way, GE is a particular case of biological antecedents essentialism (BAE), a kind of origin essentialism that is better justified in the light of the metaphysical nature of organisms as objects that inherit life from previously existing living organisms. BAE overcomes many objections facing other origin essentialist accounts, and it recognises the importance of the gametes in transmitting not just genes, but actively functioning physical structures necessary for life. If we wish to maintain an origin essentialism principle for organisms, we should prefer BAE.
- Open Access
- 27 October 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 202 (5) , 1-23
Thought experiments, sentience, and animalism
Animalism is prima facie the most plausible view about what we are; it aligns better with science and common sense, and is metaphysically more parsimonious. Thought experiments involving the brain, however, tend to elicit intuitions contrary to animalism. In this paper, I examine two classical thought experiments from the literature, brain transplant and cerebrum transplant, and a new one, cerebrum regeneration. I argue that they are theoretically possible, but that a scientifically informed account of what would actually happen shows that in none of the cases would the person be separated from the animal. Our intuitions in these cases, when adequately informed by neuroscience, do not conflict with animalism – rather, they suggest a correction of the animalist position: the persisting animal should be at least minimally sentient. Sentience animalism is a new formulation of the animalist account of personal identity that allows us to reconcile facts about our biological persistence conditions with the intuition that human persistence should involve some kind of psychological continuity.
- 27 October 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 202 (5) , 1-23
Open AccessThought experiments, sentience, and animalism
Animalism is prima facie the most plausible view about what we are; it aligns better with science and common sense, and is metaphysically more parsimonious. Thought experiments involving the brain, however, tend to elicit intuitions contrary to animalism. In this paper, I examine two classical thought experiments from the literature, brain transplant and cerebrum transplant, and a new one, cerebrum regeneration. I argue that they are theoretically possible, but that a scientifically informed account of what would actually happen shows that in none of the cases would the person be separated from the animal. Our intuitions in these cases, when adequately informed by neuroscience, do not conflict with animalism – rather, they suggest a correction of the animalist position: the persisting animal should be at least minimally sentient. Sentience animalism is a new formulation of the animalist account of personal identity that allows us to reconcile facts about our biological persistence conditions with the intuition that human persistence should involve some kind of psychological continuity.
- Open Access
- 11 August 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 89 (4) , 1387-1406
Cats are not necessarily animals
Some plausibly necessary a posteriori theoretical claims include ‘water is H2O’, ‘gold is the element with atomic number 79’, and ‘cats are animals’. In this paper I challenge the necessity of the third claim. I argue that there are possible worlds in which cats exist, but are not animals. Under any of the species concepts currently accepted in biology, organisms do not belong essentially to their species. This is equally true of their ancestors. In phylogenetic systematics, monophyletic clades such as the animal kingdom are composed of an ancestral stem species and all of its descendants. If the stem species had not existed, neither would the clade. Thus it could have been the case that all the organisms which actually belong to the animal kingdom might have existed yet not have been animals.
- 11 August 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 89 (4) , 1387-1406
Open AccessCats are not necessarily animals
Some plausibly necessary a posteriori theoretical claims include ‘water is H2O’, ‘gold is the element with atomic number 79’, and ‘cats are animals’. In this paper I challenge the necessity of the third claim. I argue that there are possible worlds in which cats exist, but are not animals. Under any of the species concepts currently accepted in biology, organisms do not belong essentially to their species. This is equally true of their ancestors. In phylogenetic systematics, monophyletic clades such as the animal kingdom are composed of an ancestral stem species and all of its descendants. If the stem species had not existed, neither would the clade. Thus it could have been the case that all the organisms which actually belong to the animal kingdom might have existed yet not have been animals.