Pascal Lafourcade
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Pascal Lafourcade has a total of 227 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Léo Robert
University of Picardie Jules Verne, MIS
18 shared publications - Daiki Miyahara
The University of Electro-Communications
14 shared publications Jannik Dreier
Université de Lorraine, CNRS, Inria, LORIA
14 shared publicationsYassine Lakhnech
Université Grenoble Alpes
12 shared publications- Takaaki Mizuki
Tohoku University
11 shared publications Xavier Bultel
CNRS, UMR 6158, LIMOS
11 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 12 October 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in New Political Economy
- p. 1-26
Stack disruption: Worldcoin’s standards for the world
- 12 October 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in New Political Economy
- p. 1-26
Open AccessStack disruption: Worldcoin’s standards for the world
- Open Access
- 4 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 294-310
Sanitizable Signatures with Different Admissibility Policies for Multiple Sanitizers
Sanitizable signatures authorize semi-trusted sanitizers to modify admissible blocks of a signed message. Most works consider only one sanitizer while those considering multiple sanitizers are limited by their capacity to manage admissible blocks which must be the same for all of them. We study the case where different sanitizers with different roles can be trusted to modify different blocks of the message. We define a model for multi-sanitizer sanitizable signatures which allow managing authorization for each sanitizer independently. We also provide formal definitions of its security properties. We propose two secure generic constructions FSV-k-SAN and IUT-k-SAN with different security properties. We implement both constructions and evaluate their performance on a server and a smartphone.
- 4 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 294-310
Open AccessSanitizable Signatures with Different Admissibility Policies for Multiple Sanitizers
Sanitizable signatures authorize semi-trusted sanitizers to modify admissible blocks of a signed message. Most works consider only one sanitizer while those considering multiple sanitizers are limited by their capacity to manage admissible blocks which must be the same for all of them. We study the case where different sanitizers with different roles can be trusted to modify different blocks of the message. We define a model for multi-sanitizer sanitizable signatures which allow managing authorization for each sanitizer independently. We also provide formal definitions of its security properties. We propose two secure generic constructions FSV-k-SAN and IUT-k-SAN with different security properties. We implement both constructions and evaluate their performance on a server and a smartphone.
- Open Access
- 4 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1584-1597
Formal Verification of EDHOC-PSK: A Symbolic Approach with SAPIC+
- 4 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1584-1597
Open AccessFormal Verification of EDHOC-PSK: A Symbolic Approach with SAPIC+
- Open Access
- 4 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Computer Science
- Vol. 1082
Optimal asynchronous perpetual finite grid exploration
- 4 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Computer Science
- Vol. 1082
Open AccessOptimal asynchronous perpetual finite grid exploration
- 1 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 103-117
Tilepaint and Aquarium Puzzles in Periodic Grids
- 1 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 103-117
Tilepaint and Aquarium Puzzles in Periodic Grids
- Open Access
- 24 August 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1476-1489
Formal Analysis of SDNsec: Attacks and Corrections for Payload, Route Integrity and Accountability
- 24 August 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1476-1489
Open AccessFormal Analysis of SDNsec: Attacks and Corrections for Payload, Route Integrity and Accountability
- Open Access
- 24 August 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 231-247
Post-Compromise Security with Application-Level Key-Controls – with a comprehensive study of the 5G AKMA protocol
- 24 August 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 231-247
Open AccessPost-Compromise Security with Application-Level Key-Controls – with a comprehensive study of the 5G AKMA protocol
- Open Access
- 17 June 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Discrete Applied Mathematics
- Vol. 375, 193-214
Infinite grid exploration with synchronous myopic robots without chirality
- 17 June 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Discrete Applied Mathematics
- Vol. 375, 193-214
Open AccessInfinite grid exploration with synchronous myopic robots without chirality
- Open Access
Accuracy Limits as a Barrier to Biometric System Security
Biometric systems are widely used for identity verification and identification, including authentication (i.e., one-to-one matching to verify a claimed identity) and identification (i.e., one-to-many matching to find a subject in a database). The matching process relies on measuring similarities or dissimilarities between a fresh biometric template and enrolled templates. The False Match Rate FMR is a key metric for assessing the accuracy and reliability of such systems. This paper analyzes biometric systems based on their FMR, with two main contributions. First, we explore untargeted attacks, where an adversary aims to impersonate any user within a database. We determine the number of trials required for an attacker to successfully impersonate a user and derive the critical population size (i.e., the maximum number of users in the database) required to maintain a given level of security. Furthermore, we compute the critical FMR value needed to ensure resistance against untargeted attacks as the database size increases. Second, we revisit the biometric birthday problem to evaluate the approximate and exact probabilities that two users in a database collide (i.e., can impersonate each other). Based on this analysis, we derive both the approximate critical population size and the critical FMR value needed to bound the likelihood of such collisions occurring with a given probability. These thresholds offer insights for designing systems that mitigate the risk of impersonation and collisions, particularly in large-scale biometric databases. Our findings indicate that current biometric systems fail to deliver sufficient accuracy to achieve an adequate security level against untargeted attacks, even in small-scale databases. Moreover, state-of-the-art systems face significant challenges in addressing the biometric birthday problem, especially as database sizes grow.
Open AccessAccuracy Limits as a Barrier to Biometric System Security
Biometric systems are widely used for identity verification and identification, including authentication (i.e., one-to-one matching to verify a claimed identity) and identification (i.e., one-to-many matching to find a subject in a database). The matching process relies on measuring similarities or dissimilarities between a fresh biometric template and enrolled templates. The False Match Rate FMR is a key metric for assessing the accuracy and reliability of such systems. This paper analyzes biometric systems based on their FMR, with two main contributions. First, we explore untargeted attacks, where an adversary aims to impersonate any user within a database. We determine the number of trials required for an attacker to successfully impersonate a user and derive the critical population size (i.e., the maximum number of users in the database) required to maintain a given level of security. Furthermore, we compute the critical FMR value needed to ensure resistance against untargeted attacks as the database size increases. Second, we revisit the biometric birthday problem to evaluate the approximate and exact probabilities that two users in a database collide (i.e., can impersonate each other). Based on this analysis, we derive both the approximate critical population size and the critical FMR value needed to bound the likelihood of such collisions occurring with a given probability. These thresholds offer insights for designing systems that mitigate the risk of impersonation and collisions, particularly in large-scale biometric databases. Our findings indicate that current biometric systems fail to deliver sufficient accuracy to achieve an adequate security level against untargeted attacks, even in small-scale databases. Moreover, state-of-the-art systems face significant challenges in addressing the biometric birthday problem, especially as database sizes grow.