Daiki Miyahara
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Daiki Miyahara has a total of 58 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Takaaki Mizuki
Tohoku University
37 shared publications - Pascal Lafourcade
Université Clermont Auvergne
14 shared publications - Kazuo Sakiyama
Department of Informatics, The University of Electro-Communications
13 shared publications Hideaki Sone
12 shared publications- Kazumasa Shinagawa
University of Tsukuba
9 shared publications - Léo Robert
University of Picardie Jules Verne, MIS
9 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 27-36
Masked NTT-Multiplication with Fresh Randomness on ML-KEM Decapsulation to Hinder Profiling-based Attacks for Cortex-M4
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 27-36
Open AccessMasked NTT-Multiplication with Fresh Randomness on ML-KEM Decapsulation to Hinder Profiling-based Attacks for Cortex-M4
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 23-39
Counterfeit Coin Problem Can be Extended to Secure Multiparty Computation
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 23-39
Counterfeit Coin Problem Can be Extended to Secure Multiparty Computation
- Open Access
- 1 March 2026
- Published by Institute of Electronics, Information and Communications Engineers (IEICE) in IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
- Vol. E109.A (3) , 280-289
Advancing DFA on Ascon: A Practical Key-Recovery Attack Using Bit-Flip Faults
With the rapid expansion of the Internet of Things (IoT), ensuring robust security for resource-constrained devices has become essential. Many IoT devices operate in environments with significant security threats, necessitating lightweight yet effective cryptographic solutions. To address this need, the National Institute of Standards and Technology has selected Ascon as the standard for lightweight cryptography due to its efficient round-based processing. Since its introduction, extensive cryptanalysis and security evaluations have been conducted, including assessments of resistance to side-channel and fault attacks. Differential Fault Analysis has been applied to Ascon, with previous research introducing a two-step fault model that combines bit-flip and bit-set faults for key recovery. The previous study introduced a two-step fault model: the attacker first retrieves the lower 64 bits of the secret key with bit-flip faults and then uses bit-set/bit-reset faults to obtain the upper 64 bits of the key. However, in practice, we would not choose the bit-set or bit-reset fault depending on the target devices with a low precision in controlling the fault. In this regard, fault analysis based on bit-flip faults is preferable because it enables key-recovery attacks regardless of the bit-set or bit-reset fault. This paper proposes a new key-recovery fault attack that relies solely on bit-flip faults, eliminating the bit-set/reset fault assumptions. Additionally, we evaluate the theoretical relationship between the number of random bit-flips injected and the reduced keyspace using a probabilistic model based on the coupon collector problem. Through this approach, we assess the feasibility and complexity of our proposed attack, demonstrating its effectiveness against Ascon in a realistic adversarial setting.
- 1 March 2026
- Published by Institute of Electronics, Information and Communications Engineers (IEICE) in IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
- Vol. E109.A (3) , 280-289
Open AccessAdvancing DFA on Ascon: A Practical Key-Recovery Attack Using Bit-Flip Faults
With the rapid expansion of the Internet of Things (IoT), ensuring robust security for resource-constrained devices has become essential. Many IoT devices operate in environments with significant security threats, necessitating lightweight yet effective cryptographic solutions. To address this need, the National Institute of Standards and Technology has selected Ascon as the standard for lightweight cryptography due to its efficient round-based processing. Since its introduction, extensive cryptanalysis and security evaluations have been conducted, including assessments of resistance to side-channel and fault attacks. Differential Fault Analysis has been applied to Ascon, with previous research introducing a two-step fault model that combines bit-flip and bit-set faults for key recovery. The previous study introduced a two-step fault model: the attacker first retrieves the lower 64 bits of the secret key with bit-flip faults and then uses bit-set/bit-reset faults to obtain the upper 64 bits of the key. However, in practice, we would not choose the bit-set or bit-reset fault depending on the target devices with a low precision in controlling the fault. In this regard, fault analysis based on bit-flip faults is preferable because it enables key-recovery attacks regardless of the bit-set or bit-reset fault. This paper proposes a new key-recovery fault attack that relies solely on bit-flip faults, eliminating the bit-set/reset fault assumptions. Additionally, we evaluate the theoretical relationship between the number of random bit-flips injected and the reduced keyspace using a probabilistic model based on the coupon collector problem. Through this approach, we assess the feasibility and complexity of our proposed attack, demonstrating its effectiveness against Ascon in a realistic adversarial setting.
- 13 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 213-229
Impossibility of Four-Card AND Protocols with a Single Closed Shuffle
- 13 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 213-229
Impossibility of Four-Card AND Protocols with a Single Closed Shuffle
- 23 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 144-160
Let’s Share a Secret: Share-Reduced Design of M&M for the AES S-Box
- 23 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 144-160
Let’s Share a Secret: Share-Reduced Design of M&M for the AES S-Box
- 15 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 24-39
PRNG-Oriented Side-Channel Security Evaluation for TI-AES
- 15 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 24-39
PRNG-Oriented Side-Channel Security Evaluation for TI-AES
- 30 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 53-64
Key-Recovery Attack Against Ascon Using 1-Bit Random Fault Model
- 30 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 53-64
Key-Recovery Attack Against Ascon Using 1-Bit Random Fault Model
- Open Access
- 2 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory of Computing Systems
- Vol. 69 (2) , 1
Correction to: How to Play Old Maid with Virtual Players
- 2 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory of Computing Systems
- Vol. 69 (2) , 1
Open AccessCorrection to: How to Play Old Maid with Virtual Players
- Open Access
- 1 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory of Computing Systems
- Vol. 69 (1) , 1-18
How to Play Old Maid with Virtual Players
Old Maid is a popular card game. While typically played with three or more players, it is less enjoyable with only two people. To address this, we propose a protocol to create a virtual player, Carol, by making use of card-based cryptography when only two people, Alice and Bob, are available to play Old Maid. Specifically, we design a card-based protocol to remove any pair of cards having the same number in Carol’s hand (namely, the virtual player’s hand) without leaking any information about Carol’s hand (more than necessary); our protocol uses additional cards aside from playing cards that are used in Old Maid. Using our protocol, without any third human player, Alice and Bob can have fun with Old Maid!
- 1 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory of Computing Systems
- Vol. 69 (1) , 1-18
Open AccessHow to Play Old Maid with Virtual Players
Old Maid is a popular card game. While typically played with three or more players, it is less enjoyable with only two people. To address this, we propose a protocol to create a virtual player, Carol, by making use of card-based cryptography when only two people, Alice and Bob, are available to play Old Maid. Specifically, we design a card-based protocol to remove any pair of cards having the same number in Carol’s hand (namely, the virtual player’s hand) without leaking any information about Carol’s hand (more than necessary); our protocol uses additional cards aside from playing cards that are used in Old Maid. Using our protocol, without any third human player, Alice and Bob can have fun with Old Maid!