Ingela Alger
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Ingela Alger has a total of 38 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jörgen Weibull
Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm, Sweden
4 shared publications - Jonathan Stieglitz
Toulouse School of Economics, Toulouse, France
3 shared publications Donald Cox
Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse Toulouse School of Economics CNRS University of Toulouse Capitole France
2 shared publications- Josepa Miquel-Florensa
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse Capitole , Toulouse, France
2 shared publications - Laura Juarez
Centro de Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Mexico City, Mexico
2 shared publications - Laurent Lehmann
Department of Ecology and Evolution, University of Lausanne, Switzerland
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Proximate and ultimate drivers of norms and norm change
We describe a formal model of norm psychology that can be applied to better un-derstand norm change. The model integrates several proximate drivers of normative behavior: beliefs and preferences about a) material payoffs, b) personal norms, c) peer disapproval, d) conformity, and e) authority compliance. Additionally, we review inter-disciplinary research on ultimate foundations of these proximate drivers of normative behavior. Finally, we discuss opportunities for integration between the proposed formal framework and several psychological sub-fields.
Open AccessProximate and ultimate drivers of norms and norm change
We describe a formal model of norm psychology that can be applied to better un-derstand norm change. The model integrates several proximate drivers of normative behavior: beliefs and preferences about a) material payoffs, b) personal norms, c) peer disapproval, d) conformity, and e) authority compliance. Additionally, we review inter-disciplinary research on ultimate foundations of these proximate drivers of normative behavior. Finally, we discuss opportunities for integration between the proposed formal framework and several psychological sub-fields.
- Open Access
- 28 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- Vol. 13 (4) , 1288-1319
Evolution of Semi-Kantian Preferences in Two-Player Assortative Interactions with Complete and Incomplete Information and Plasticity
We model the evolution of preferences guiding behavior in pairwise interactions in group-structured populations. The model uses long-term evolution theory to examine different interaction scenarios, including conditional preference expression upon recognition of the partner’s type. We apply the model to the evolution of semi-Kantian preferences at the fitness level, which combine self-interest and a Kantian interest evaluating own behavior in terms of consequences for own fitness if the partner also adopted this behavior. We seek the convergence stable and uninvadable value of the Kantian coefficient, i.e., the weight attached to the Kantian interest, a quantitative trait varying between zero and one. We consider three scenarios: (a) incomplete information; (b) complete information and incomplete plasticity; and (c) complete information and complete plasticity, where individuals not only recognize the type of their interaction partner (complete information), but also conditionally express the Kantian coefficient upon it (complete plasticity). For (a), the Kantian coefficient generally evolves to equal the coefficient of neutral relatedness between interacting individuals; for (b), it evolves to a value that depends on demographic and interaction assumptions, while for (c) there are generally multiple uninvadable types, including the type whereby an individual is a pure Kantian when interacting with individuals of the same type and applies the Kantian coefficient that is uninvadable under complete information with zero relatedness when interacting with a different typed individual. Overall, our model connects several concepts for analysing the evolution of behavior rules for strategic interactions that have been emphasized in different and sometimes isolated studies.
- 28 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- Vol. 13 (4) , 1288-1319
Open AccessEvolution of Semi-Kantian Preferences in Two-Player Assortative Interactions with Complete and Incomplete Information and Plasticity
We model the evolution of preferences guiding behavior in pairwise interactions in group-structured populations. The model uses long-term evolution theory to examine different interaction scenarios, including conditional preference expression upon recognition of the partner’s type. We apply the model to the evolution of semi-Kantian preferences at the fitness level, which combine self-interest and a Kantian interest evaluating own behavior in terms of consequences for own fitness if the partner also adopted this behavior. We seek the convergence stable and uninvadable value of the Kantian coefficient, i.e., the weight attached to the Kantian interest, a quantitative trait varying between zero and one. We consider three scenarios: (a) incomplete information; (b) complete information and incomplete plasticity; and (c) complete information and complete plasticity, where individuals not only recognize the type of their interaction partner (complete information), but also conditionally express the Kantian coefficient upon it (complete plasticity). For (a), the Kantian coefficient generally evolves to equal the coefficient of neutral relatedness between interacting individuals; for (b), it evolves to a value that depends on demographic and interaction assumptions, while for (c) there are generally multiple uninvadable types, including the type whereby an individual is a pure Kantian when interacting with individuals of the same type and applies the Kantian coefficient that is uninvadable under complete information with zero relatedness when interacting with a different typed individual. Overall, our model connects several concepts for analysing the evolution of behavior rules for strategic interactions that have been emphasized in different and sometimes isolated studies.
- Open Access
- 13 June 2023
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 120 (25)
The evolution of early hominin food production and sharing
How did humans evolve from individualistic to collective foraging with sex differences in production and widespread sharing of plant and animal foods? While current evolutionary scenarios focus on meat, cooking, or grandparental subsidies, considerations of the economics of foraging for extracted plant foods (e.g., roots, tubers), inferred to be important for early hominins (∼6 to 2.5 mya), suggest that early hominins shared such foods with offspring and others. Here, we present a conceptual and mathematical model of early hominin food production and sharing, prior to the emergence of frequent hunting, cooking, and increased lifespan. We hypothesize that extracted plant foods were vulnerable to theft, and that male mate guarding protected females from food theft. We identify conditions favoring extractive foraging and food sharing across mating systems (i.e., monogamy, polygyny, promiscuity), and we assess which system maximizes female fitness with changes in the profitability of extractive foraging. Females extract foods and share them with males only when: i) extracting rather than collecting plant foods pays off energetically; and ii) males guard females. Males extract foods when they are sufficiently high in value, but share with females only under promiscuous mating and/or no mate guarding. These results suggest that if early hominins had mating systems with pair-bonds (monogamous or polygynous), then food sharing by adult females with unrelated adult males occurred before hunting, cooking, and extensive grandparenting. Such cooperation may have enabled early hominins to expand into more open, seasonal habitats, and provided a foundation for the subsequent evolution of human life histories.
- 13 June 2023
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 120 (25)
Open AccessThe evolution of early hominin food production and sharing
How did humans evolve from individualistic to collective foraging with sex differences in production and widespread sharing of plant and animal foods? While current evolutionary scenarios focus on meat, cooking, or grandparental subsidies, considerations of the economics of foraging for extracted plant foods (e.g., roots, tubers), inferred to be important for early hominins (∼6 to 2.5 mya), suggest that early hominins shared such foods with offspring and others. Here, we present a conceptual and mathematical model of early hominin food production and sharing, prior to the emergence of frequent hunting, cooking, and increased lifespan. We hypothesize that extracted plant foods were vulnerable to theft, and that male mate guarding protected females from food theft. We identify conditions favoring extractive foraging and food sharing across mating systems (i.e., monogamy, polygyny, promiscuity), and we assess which system maximizes female fitness with changes in the profitability of extractive foraging. Females extract foods and share them with males only when: i) extracting rather than collecting plant foods pays off energetically; and ii) males guard females. Males extract foods when they are sufficiently high in value, but share with females only under promiscuous mating and/or no mate guarding. These results suggest that if early hominins had mating systems with pair-bonds (monogamous or polygynous), then food sharing by adult females with unrelated adult males occurred before hunting, cooking, and extensive grandparenting. Such cooperation may have enabled early hominins to expand into more open, seasonal habitats, and provided a foundation for the subsequent evolution of human life histories.
- 24 May 2023
- Published by Cassyni
Half a century of evolutionary games
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) is an indispensable part of modern evolutionary theory. 2023 marks the 50th anniversary of the article by John Maynard Smith and George Price that defined central concepts and became a focal point in the field. EGT can address biological questions where there is no obvious “best thing” that an individual can do, because their payoff depends not only on what they do but also on what their ‘opponents’ do. In the last 50 years, EGT has expanded and become integrated with a range of other theoretical methods. A recent theme issue reviewed the history and methodology of the field and presented novel research. In this seminar, some of the authors from the issue will talk about the topic and their papers. Evolutionarily stable preferences The 50-year old concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy provided a key tool for theorists to model ultimate drivers of behaviour in social interactions. For decades, economists ignored ultimate drivers and used models in which individuals choose strategies based on their preferences—a proximate mechanism for behaviour—and the distribution of preferences in the population was taken to be fixed and given. This article summarizes some key findings in the literature on evolutionarily stable preferences, which in the past three decades has proposed models that combine the two approaches: individuals inherit their preferences, the preferences determine their strategy choices, which in turn determine evolutionary success. One objective is to highlight complementarities and potential avenues for future collaboration between biologists and economists. Cooperation and coordination in heterogeneous populations One landmark application of evolutionary game theory is the study of social dilemmas. This literature explores why people cooperate even when there are strong incentives to defect. Much of this literature, however, assumes that interactions are symmetric. Individuals are assumed to have the same strategic options and the same potential pay-offs. Yet many interesting questions arise once individuals are allowed to differ. Here, we study asymmetry in simple coordination games. In our set-up, human participants need to decide how much of their endowment to contribute to a public good. If a group’s collective contribution reaches a pre-defined threshold, all group members receive a reward. To account for possible asymmetries, individuals either differ in their endowments or their productivities. According to a theoretical equilibrium analysis, such games tend to have many possible solutions. In equilibrium, group members may contribute the same amount, different amounts or nothing at all. According to our behavioural experiment, however, humans favour the equilibrium in which everyone contributes the same proportion of their endowment. We use these experimental results to highlight the non-trivial effects of inequality on cooperation, and we discuss to which extent models of evolutionary game theory can account for these effects. The rarer-sex effect The study of sex allocation—that is, the investment of resources into male versus female reproductive effort—yields among the best quantitative evidence for Darwinian adaptation, and has long enjoyed a tight and productive interplay of theoretical and empirical research. The fitness consequences of an individual's sex allocation decisions depend crucially upon the sex allocation behaviour of others and, accordingly, sex allocation is readily conceptualized in terms of an evolutionary game. Here, I investigate the historical development of understanding of a fundamental driver of the evolution of sex allocation—the rarer-sex effect—from its inception in the writing of Charles Darwin in 1871 through to its explicit framing in terms of consanguinity and reproductive value by William D. Hamilton in 1972. I show that step-wise development of theory proceeded through refinements in the conceptualization of the strategy set, the payoff function and the unbeatable strategy. The future of theoretical evolutionary game theory volutionary game theory is a truly interdisciplinary subject that goes well beyond the limits of biology. Mathematical minds get hooked up in simple models for evolution and often gradually move into other parts of evolutionary biology or ecology. Social scientists realize how much they can learn from evolutionary thinking and gradually transfer insight that was originally generated in biology. Computer scientists can use their algorithms to explore a new field where machines not only learn from the environment, but also from each other. The breadth of the field and the focus on a few very popular issues, such as cooperation, comes at a price: several insights are re-discovered in different fields under different labels with different heroes and modelling traditions. For example, reciprocity or spatial structure are treated differently. Will we continue to develop things in parallel? Or can we converge to a single set of ideas, a single tradition and eventually a single software repository? Or will these fields continue to cross-fertilize each other, learning from each other and engaging in a constructive exchange between fields? Ultimately, the popularity of evolutionary game theory rests not only on its explanatory power, but also on the intuitive character of its models. Evolutionarily stable strategy analysis and its links to demography and genetics through invasion fitness Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) analysis pioneered by Maynard Smith and Price took off in part because it often does not require explicit assumptions about the genetics and demography of a population in contrast to population genetic models. Though this simplicity is useful, it obscures the degree to which ESS analysis applies to populations with more realistic genetics and demography: for example, how does ESS analysis handle complexities such as kin selection, group selection and variable environments when phenotypes are affected by multiple genes? In this paper, I review the history of the ESS concept and show how early uncertainty about the method lead to important mathematical theory linking ESS analysis to general population genetic models. I use this theory to emphasize the link between ESS analysis and the concept of invasion fitness. I give examples of how invasion fitness can measure kin selection, group selection and the evolution of linked modifier genes in response to variable environments. The ESSs in these examples depend crucially on demographic and genetic parameters, which highlights how ESS analysis will continue to be an important tool in understanding evolutionary patterns as new models address the increasing abundance of genetic and long-term demographic data in natural populations. Stackelberg evolutionary game theory: how to manage evolving systems Stackelberg evolutionary game (SEG) theory combines classical and evolutionary game theory to frame interactions between a rational leader and evolving followers. In some of these interactions, the leader wants to preserve the evolving system (e.g. fisheries management), while in others, they try to drive the system to extinction (e.g. pest control). Often the worst strategy for the leader is to adopt a constant aggressive strategy (e.g. overfishing in fisheries management or maximum tolerable dose in cancer treatment). Taking into account the ecological dynamics typically leads to better outcomes for the leader and corresponds to the Nash equilibria in game-theoretic terms. However, the leader’s most profitable strategy is to anticipate and steer the eco-evolutionary dynamics, leading to the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game. We show how our results have the potential to help in fields where humans try to bring an evolutionary system into the desired outcome, such as, among others, fisheries management, pest management and cancer treatment. Finally, we discuss limitations and opportunities for applying SEGs to improve the management of evolving biological systems. Game theory in biology: 50 years and onwards Game theory in biology gained prominence 50 years ago, when Maynard Smith Price formulated the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Their aim was to explain why conflicts between animals of the same species usually are of a ‘limited war’ type, not causing serious injury. They emphasized that game theory is an alternative to previous ideas about group selection, which were used by ethologists to explain limited aggression. Subsequently, the ESS concept was applied to many phenomena with frequency dependence in the evolutionary success of strategies, including sex allocation, alternative mating types, contest behaviour and signalling, cooperation, and parental care. Both the analyses of signalling and cooperation were inspired by similar problems in economics and attracted much attention in biology. Here we give a perspective on which of the ambitions in the field have been achieved, with a focus on contest behaviour and cooperation. We evaluate whether the game-theoretical study of the evolution of cooperation has measured up to expectations in explaining the behaviour of non-human animals. We also point to potentially fruitful directions for the field, and emphasize the importance of incorporating realistic behavioural mechanisms into models.
- 24 May 2023
- Published by Cassyni
Half a century of evolutionary games
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) is an indispensable part of modern evolutionary theory. 2023 marks the 50th anniversary of the article by John Maynard Smith and George Price that defined central concepts and became a focal point in the field. EGT can address biological questions where there is no obvious “best thing” that an individual can do, because their payoff depends not only on what they do but also on what their ‘opponents’ do. In the last 50 years, EGT has expanded and become integrated with a range of other theoretical methods. A recent theme issue reviewed the history and methodology of the field and presented novel research. In this seminar, some of the authors from the issue will talk about the topic and their papers. Evolutionarily stable preferences The 50-year old concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy provided a key tool for theorists to model ultimate drivers of behaviour in social interactions. For decades, economists ignored ultimate drivers and used models in which individuals choose strategies based on their preferences—a proximate mechanism for behaviour—and the distribution of preferences in the population was taken to be fixed and given. This article summarizes some key findings in the literature on evolutionarily stable preferences, which in the past three decades has proposed models that combine the two approaches: individuals inherit their preferences, the preferences determine their strategy choices, which in turn determine evolutionary success. One objective is to highlight complementarities and potential avenues for future collaboration between biologists and economists. Cooperation and coordination in heterogeneous populations One landmark application of evolutionary game theory is the study of social dilemmas. This literature explores why people cooperate even when there are strong incentives to defect. Much of this literature, however, assumes that interactions are symmetric. Individuals are assumed to have the same strategic options and the same potential pay-offs. Yet many interesting questions arise once individuals are allowed to differ. Here, we study asymmetry in simple coordination games. In our set-up, human participants need to decide how much of their endowment to contribute to a public good. If a group’s collective contribution reaches a pre-defined threshold, all group members receive a reward. To account for possible asymmetries, individuals either differ in their endowments or their productivities. According to a theoretical equilibrium analysis, such games tend to have many possible solutions. In equilibrium, group members may contribute the same amount, different amounts or nothing at all. According to our behavioural experiment, however, humans favour the equilibrium in which everyone contributes the same proportion of their endowment. We use these experimental results to highlight the non-trivial effects of inequality on cooperation, and we discuss to which extent models of evolutionary game theory can account for these effects. The rarer-sex effect The study of sex allocation—that is, the investment of resources into male versus female reproductive effort—yields among the best quantitative evidence for Darwinian adaptation, and has long enjoyed a tight and productive interplay of theoretical and empirical research. The fitness consequences of an individual's sex allocation decisions depend crucially upon the sex allocation behaviour of others and, accordingly, sex allocation is readily conceptualized in terms of an evolutionary game. Here, I investigate the historical development of understanding of a fundamental driver of the evolution of sex allocation—the rarer-sex effect—from its inception in the writing of Charles Darwin in 1871 through to its explicit framing in terms of consanguinity and reproductive value by William D. Hamilton in 1972. I show that step-wise development of theory proceeded through refinements in the conceptualization of the strategy set, the payoff function and the unbeatable strategy. The future of theoretical evolutionary game theory volutionary game theory is a truly interdisciplinary subject that goes well beyond the limits of biology. Mathematical minds get hooked up in simple models for evolution and often gradually move into other parts of evolutionary biology or ecology. Social scientists realize how much they can learn from evolutionary thinking and gradually transfer insight that was originally generated in biology. Computer scientists can use their algorithms to explore a new field where machines not only learn from the environment, but also from each other. The breadth of the field and the focus on a few very popular issues, such as cooperation, comes at a price: several insights are re-discovered in different fields under different labels with different heroes and modelling traditions. For example, reciprocity or spatial structure are treated differently. Will we continue to develop things in parallel? Or can we converge to a single set of ideas, a single tradition and eventually a single software repository? Or will these fields continue to cross-fertilize each other, learning from each other and engaging in a constructive exchange between fields? Ultimately, the popularity of evolutionary game theory rests not only on its explanatory power, but also on the intuitive character of its models. Evolutionarily stable strategy analysis and its links to demography and genetics through invasion fitness Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) analysis pioneered by Maynard Smith and Price took off in part because it often does not require explicit assumptions about the genetics and demography of a population in contrast to population genetic models. Though this simplicity is useful, it obscures the degree to which ESS analysis applies to populations with more realistic genetics and demography: for example, how does ESS analysis handle complexities such as kin selection, group selection and variable environments when phenotypes are affected by multiple genes? In this paper, I review the history of the ESS concept and show how early uncertainty about the method lead to important mathematical theory linking ESS analysis to general population genetic models. I use this theory to emphasize the link between ESS analysis and the concept of invasion fitness. I give examples of how invasion fitness can measure kin selection, group selection and the evolution of linked modifier genes in response to variable environments. The ESSs in these examples depend crucially on demographic and genetic parameters, which highlights how ESS analysis will continue to be an important tool in understanding evolutionary patterns as new models address the increasing abundance of genetic and long-term demographic data in natural populations. Stackelberg evolutionary game theory: how to manage evolving systems Stackelberg evolutionary game (SEG) theory combines classical and evolutionary game theory to frame interactions between a rational leader and evolving followers. In some of these interactions, the leader wants to preserve the evolving system (e.g. fisheries management), while in others, they try to drive the system to extinction (e.g. pest control). Often the worst strategy for the leader is to adopt a constant aggressive strategy (e.g. overfishing in fisheries management or maximum tolerable dose in cancer treatment). Taking into account the ecological dynamics typically leads to better outcomes for the leader and corresponds to the Nash equilibria in game-theoretic terms. However, the leader’s most profitable strategy is to anticipate and steer the eco-evolutionary dynamics, leading to the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game. We show how our results have the potential to help in fields where humans try to bring an evolutionary system into the desired outcome, such as, among others, fisheries management, pest management and cancer treatment. Finally, we discuss limitations and opportunities for applying SEGs to improve the management of evolving biological systems. Game theory in biology: 50 years and onwards Game theory in biology gained prominence 50 years ago, when Maynard Smith Price formulated the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Their aim was to explain why conflicts between animals of the same species usually are of a ‘limited war’ type, not causing serious injury. They emphasized that game theory is an alternative to previous ideas about group selection, which were used by ethologists to explain limited aggression. Subsequently, the ESS concept was applied to many phenomena with frequency dependence in the evolutionary success of strategies, including sex allocation, alternative mating types, contest behaviour and signalling, cooperation, and parental care. Both the analyses of signalling and cooperation were inspired by similar problems in economics and attracted much attention in biology. Here we give a perspective on which of the ambitions in the field have been achieved, with a focus on contest behaviour and cooperation. We evaluate whether the game-theoretical study of the evolution of cooperation has measured up to expectations in explaining the behaviour of non-human animals. We also point to potentially fruitful directions for the field, and emphasize the importance of incorporating realistic behavioural mechanisms into models.
- Open Access
- 20 March 2023
- Published by The Royal Society in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Vol. 378 (1876) , 20210505
Evolutionarily stable preferences
The 50-year old concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy provided a key tool for theorists to model ultimate drivers of behaviour in social interactions. For decades, economists ignored ultimate drivers and used models in which individuals choose strategies based on their preferences—a proximate mechanism for behaviour—and the distribution of preferences in the population was taken to be fixed and given. This article summarizes some key findings in the literature on evolutionarily stable preferences, which in the past three decades has proposed models that combine the two approaches: individuals inherit their preferences, the preferences determine their strategy choices, which in turn determine evolutionary success. One objective is to highlight complementarities and potential avenues for future collaboration between biologists and economists. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Half a century of evolutionary games: a synthesis of theory, application and future directions’.
- 20 March 2023
- Published by The Royal Society in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Vol. 378 (1876) , 20210505
Open AccessEvolutionarily stable preferences
The 50-year old concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy provided a key tool for theorists to model ultimate drivers of behaviour in social interactions. For decades, economists ignored ultimate drivers and used models in which individuals choose strategies based on their preferences—a proximate mechanism for behaviour—and the distribution of preferences in the population was taken to be fixed and given. This article summarizes some key findings in the literature on evolutionarily stable preferences, which in the past three decades has proposed models that combine the two approaches: individuals inherit their preferences, the preferences determine their strategy choices, which in turn determine evolutionary success. One objective is to highlight complementarities and potential avenues for future collaboration between biologists and economists. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Half a century of evolutionary games: a synthesis of theory, application and future directions’.
- 23 January 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The World Bank Economic Review
- Vol. 37 (2) , 205-220
Do Women Contribute More Effort than Men to a Real Public Good?
This study presents evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment, conducted in eight small, rural villages in Mexico, in which subjects choose to exert real effort to fund real health centers in their own and other localities. The results show that women are more willing than men to exert effort to fund the health center in another locality, relative to the one in their locality. This gender gap is mostly due to women who have some trust in the way the government spends taxes, and to those who benefit from a government program that targets women and fosters healthcare use. These results also suggest that women might be aware of their higher willingness to exert effort for a public good that does not benefit them directly, compared to men, because they seem to reduce their individual effort the more female their environment is.
- 23 January 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The World Bank Economic Review
- Vol. 37 (2) , 205-220
Do Women Contribute More Effort than Men to a Real Public Good?
This study presents evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment, conducted in eight small, rural villages in Mexico, in which subjects choose to exert real effort to fund real health centers in their own and other localities. The results show that women are more willing than men to exert effort to fund the health center in another locality, relative to the one in their locality. This gender gap is mostly due to women who have some trust in the way the government spends taxes, and to those who benefit from a government program that targets women and fosters healthcare use. These results also suggest that women might be aware of their higher willingness to exert effort for a public good that does not benefit them directly, compared to men, because they seem to reduce their individual effort the more female their environment is.
- Open Access
Evolutionarily stable preferences
The 50-year old concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) provided a key tool for theorists to model ultimate drivers of behavior in social interactions. For decades economists ignored ultimate drivers and used models in which individuals choose strategies based on their preferences-a proximate mechanism for behavior-and the distribution of preferences in the population was taken to be fixed and given. This article summarizes some key findings in the literature on evolutionarily stable preferences, which in the past three decades has proposed models that combine the two approaches: individuals inherit their preferences, the preferences determine their strategy choices, which in turn determines evolutionary success. One objective is to highlight complementarities and potential avenues for future collaboration between biologists and economists.
Open AccessEvolutionarily stable preferences
The 50-year old concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) provided a key tool for theorists to model ultimate drivers of behavior in social interactions. For decades economists ignored ultimate drivers and used models in which individuals choose strategies based on their preferences-a proximate mechanism for behavior-and the distribution of preferences in the population was taken to be fixed and given. This article summarizes some key findings in the literature on evolutionarily stable preferences, which in the past three decades has proposed models that combine the two approaches: individuals inherit their preferences, the preferences determine their strategy choices, which in turn determines evolutionary success. One objective is to highlight complementarities and potential avenues for future collaboration between biologists and economists.
- Open Access
The evolution of early hominin food production and sharing
How did humans evolve from individualistic foraging to collective foraging with sex differences in food production and widespread sharing of plant and animal foods? While current models of food sharing focus on meat or cooking, considerations of the economics of foraging for extracted plant foods (e.g., roots, tubers), inferred to be important for earlier hominins (∼ 6–2.5 mya), suggest that hominins shared such foods. Here we present a conceptual and mathematical model of early hominin food production and sharing, prior to the emergence of frequent scavenging, hunting and cooking. We hypothesize that extracted plant foods were vulnerable to theft, and that male mate-guarding protected females from food theft. We identify conditions favoring plant food production and sharing across mating systems (i.e., monogamy, polygyny, promiscuity), and we assess which mating system maximizes female fitness with changes in the energetic profitability of extractive foraging. Females extract foods and share them with males only when: i) extracting rather than collecting plant foods pays off energetically; and ii) males guard females.
Open AccessThe evolution of early hominin food production and sharing
How did humans evolve from individualistic foraging to collective foraging with sex differences in food production and widespread sharing of plant and animal foods? While current models of food sharing focus on meat or cooking, considerations of the economics of foraging for extracted plant foods (e.g., roots, tubers), inferred to be important for earlier hominins (∼ 6–2.5 mya), suggest that hominins shared such foods. Here we present a conceptual and mathematical model of early hominin food production and sharing, prior to the emergence of frequent scavenging, hunting and cooking. We hypothesize that extracted plant foods were vulnerable to theft, and that male mate-guarding protected females from food theft. We identify conditions favoring plant food production and sharing across mating systems (i.e., monogamy, polygyny, promiscuity), and we assess which mating system maximizes female fitness with changes in the energetic profitability of extractive foraging. Females extract foods and share them with males only when: i) extracting rather than collecting plant foods pays off energetically; and ii) males guard females.
- 1 October 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 190, 228-254
On the evolution of male competitiveness
- 1 October 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 190, 228-254
On the evolution of male competitiveness
- Open Access
Estimating Social Preferences and Kantian Morality in Strategic Interactions
Recent theoretical work suggests that a form of Kantian morality has evolutionary foundations. To investigate the relative importance of Kantian morality and social preferences, we run laboratory experiments on strategic interaction in social dilemmas. Using a structural model, we estimate social preferences and morality concerns both at the individual level and the aggregate level. We observe considerable heterogeneity in social preferences and Kantian morality. A finite mixture analysis shows that the subject pool is well described as consisting of two types. One exhibits a combination of inequity aversion and Kantian morality, while the other combines spite and Kantian morality.
Open AccessEstimating Social Preferences and Kantian Morality in Strategic Interactions
Recent theoretical work suggests that a form of Kantian morality has evolutionary foundations. To investigate the relative importance of Kantian morality and social preferences, we run laboratory experiments on strategic interaction in social dilemmas. Using a structural model, we estimate social preferences and morality concerns both at the individual level and the aggregate level. We observe considerable heterogeneity in social preferences and Kantian morality. A finite mixture analysis shows that the subject pool is well described as consisting of two types. One exhibits a combination of inequity aversion and Kantian morality, while the other combines spite and Kantian morality.