Erik Rietveld
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Erik Rietveld has a total of 49 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Julian Kiverstein
Department of Psychiatry, Amsterdam UMC Location AMC, Amsterdam, Netherlands
20 shared publications Damiaan Denys
Department of Psychiatry, Amsterdam UMC Location AMC, Amsterdam, Netherlands
7 shared publications- Jelle Bruineberg
Center for Subjectivity Research, Department of Communication, Faculty of Humanities, University of Copenhagen
6 shared publications - Damiaan Denys
Department of Psychiatry, Academic Medical Center, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands; The Netherlands Institute for Neuroscience, An Institute of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
3 shared publications - Ludger van Dijk
Philosophy Group, Department of Communication, Philosophy, Technology and Education, Wageningen University & Research
3 shared publications Sanneke de Haan
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 4 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
- Vol. 44 (2) , 529-543
Disabling Scaffolds: The Lived Embodiment of Disability in an Oppressive Sociomaterial Environment
The influential social model understands disability in terms of oppression instantiated in a material environment that disables bodily impaired people. Many of the demands of disability activists for what we might call equal material access have since been satisfied. Yet oppression of subtler psychological and emotional forms persists for many disabled people. We will argue that the results of these psychosocial forms of oppression is that scaffolding which was set up to provide access to disabled people may become disabling. We introduce the concept of “disabling scaffolding” to refer to environmental structures that inhibit the disabled person’s abilities because of social structures of intersubjective and material oppression. We borrow Iris Marion Young’s concept of “inhibited intentionality” to describe the effects of oppression, which come to operate “from within” the disabled person, deeply affecting the person’s experience of the body as an “I-can”. Disabling scaffolding is a consequence of material and intersubjective oppression that leads to inhibited intentionality, gradually leading to a pathologization of the disabled person’s embodiment.
- 4 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
- Vol. 44 (2) , 529-543
Open AccessDisabling Scaffolds: The Lived Embodiment of Disability in an Oppressive Sociomaterial Environment
The influential social model understands disability in terms of oppression instantiated in a material environment that disables bodily impaired people. Many of the demands of disability activists for what we might call equal material access have since been satisfied. Yet oppression of subtler psychological and emotional forms persists for many disabled people. We will argue that the results of these psychosocial forms of oppression is that scaffolding which was set up to provide access to disabled people may become disabling. We introduce the concept of “disabling scaffolding” to refer to environmental structures that inhibit the disabled person’s abilities because of social structures of intersubjective and material oppression. We borrow Iris Marion Young’s concept of “inhibited intentionality” to describe the effects of oppression, which come to operate “from within” the disabled person, deeply affecting the person’s experience of the body as an “I-can”. Disabling scaffolding is a consequence of material and intersubjective oppression that leads to inhibited intentionality, gradually leading to a pathologization of the disabled person’s embodiment.
- Open Access
- 13 December 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 16 (3) , 1-21
Desire and Motivation in Predictive Processing: An Ecological-Enactive Perspective
The predictive processing theory refers to a family of theories that take the brain and body of an organism to implement a hierarchically organized predictive model of its environment that works in the service of prediction-error minimization. Several philosophers have wondered how belief-like states of prediction account for the conative role desire plays in motivating a person to act. A compelling response to this challenge has begun to take shape that starts from the idea that certain predictions are prioritized in the predictive processing hierarchy. We use the term “first priors” to refer to such predictions. We will argue that agents use first priors to engage in affective sense-making. What has been missing in the literature that seeks to understand desire in terms of predictive processing is a recognition of the role of affective sense-making in motivating action. We go on to describe how affective sense-making can play a role in the context-sensitive shifting assignments of precision to predictions. Precision expectations refer to estimates of the reliability of predictions of the sensory states that are the consequences of acting. Given the role of affect in modulating precision-estimation, we argue that agents will tend to experience their environment through the lens of their desires as a field of inviting affordances. We will show how PP provides a neurocomputational framework that can bridge between first-person phenomenological descriptions of what it is to be a desiring creature, and a third-person, ecological-enactive analysis of desire.
- 13 December 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 16 (3) , 1-21
Open AccessDesire and Motivation in Predictive Processing: An Ecological-Enactive Perspective
The predictive processing theory refers to a family of theories that take the brain and body of an organism to implement a hierarchically organized predictive model of its environment that works in the service of prediction-error minimization. Several philosophers have wondered how belief-like states of prediction account for the conative role desire plays in motivating a person to act. A compelling response to this challenge has begun to take shape that starts from the idea that certain predictions are prioritized in the predictive processing hierarchy. We use the term “first priors” to refer to such predictions. We will argue that agents use first priors to engage in affective sense-making. What has been missing in the literature that seeks to understand desire in terms of predictive processing is a recognition of the role of affective sense-making in motivating action. We go on to describe how affective sense-making can play a role in the context-sensitive shifting assignments of precision to predictions. Precision expectations refer to estimates of the reliability of predictions of the sensory states that are the consequences of acting. Given the role of affect in modulating precision-estimation, we argue that agents will tend to experience their environment through the lens of their desires as a field of inviting affordances. We will show how PP provides a neurocomputational framework that can bridge between first-person phenomenological descriptions of what it is to be a desiring creature, and a third-person, ecological-enactive analysis of desire.
- 22 July 2024
- Published by The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration in Sociology of power
- Vol. 36 (2)
A Rich Landscape of Affordances
- 22 July 2024
- Published by The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration in Sociology of power
- Vol. 36 (2)
A Rich Landscape of Affordances
- Open Access
- 15 July 2024
- Published by Tankebanen forlag in Inscriptions
- Vol. 7 (2)
Intimate places
Our essay starts from our first-person experience of visiting El Eco Experimental Museum in Mexico City. Over the course of our visit, El Eco became, what we will call an ‘intimate place’ in which we were able to explore personal thoughts, memories, and feelings. We go on to compare El Eco to Black Water (2021), a site-specific art installation by RAAAF. We draw on Donald Winnicott’s work on play to show how intimate places like the El Eco museum have commonalities with the therapeutic setting of psychotherapy. They are places that enable people to freely associate by enabling a visitor to be in a state of relaxation, and by affording a rich array of disruptive possibilities for self-exploration. We understand such intimate places as playgrounds that can (temporarily) disrupt rigid patterns of resistance or avoidance, enabling a person to confront difficult emotions and experiences that might otherwise go unnoticed.
- 15 July 2024
- Published by Tankebanen forlag in Inscriptions
- Vol. 7 (2)
Open AccessIntimate places
Our essay starts from our first-person experience of visiting El Eco Experimental Museum in Mexico City. Over the course of our visit, El Eco became, what we will call an ‘intimate place’ in which we were able to explore personal thoughts, memories, and feelings. We go on to compare El Eco to Black Water (2021), a site-specific art installation by RAAAF. We draw on Donald Winnicott’s work on play to show how intimate places like the El Eco museum have commonalities with the therapeutic setting of psychotherapy. They are places that enable people to freely associate by enabling a visitor to be in a state of relaxation, and by affording a rich array of disruptive possibilities for self-exploration. We understand such intimate places as playgrounds that can (temporarily) disrupt rigid patterns of resistance or avoidance, enabling a person to confront difficult emotions and experiences that might otherwise go unnoticed.
- Open Access
- 22 April 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Adaptive Behavior
- Vol. 32 (5) , 421-438
Trusted Urban Places
We draw on insights from ecological psychology, explorative architecture, and psychiatry to provide an analysis of basic trust in relation to urban places. We use the term basic trust to refer to the attitude of certainty we express when we act in skilled, often unreflective, habitual ways in the living environment. We will argue that the basic trust of people living in cities should be understood in relation to what we will call trusted urban places. Trusted urban places can be understood similarly as what Giovanna Colombetti and Joel Krueger have called “affective niches” that provide affordances for amplifying, dampening, and sustaining affective states. The basic trust of people living in cities, we will argue, depends upon people moving through and engaging with trusted urban places. In urbanism and architecture, it is barely recognized how the city affords places of affective significance that the person incorporates into their bodily way of existing. Persistent exposure to urban stressors can disturb basic trust in one’s living environment, resulting in a person no longer being at home in the world. We provide examples in which people, as a consequence of the repeated exposure to stressors, no longer move through and engage with trusted urban places, and the impact this has on their basic trust. Our aim is to understand how the urban environment can contribute to the path from stress to anxiety and mood disorders, and how a person can regain their openness to possibilities for regulating their emotions skilfully.
- 22 April 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Adaptive Behavior
- Vol. 32 (5) , 421-438
Open AccessTrusted Urban Places
We draw on insights from ecological psychology, explorative architecture, and psychiatry to provide an analysis of basic trust in relation to urban places. We use the term basic trust to refer to the attitude of certainty we express when we act in skilled, often unreflective, habitual ways in the living environment. We will argue that the basic trust of people living in cities should be understood in relation to what we will call trusted urban places. Trusted urban places can be understood similarly as what Giovanna Colombetti and Joel Krueger have called “affective niches” that provide affordances for amplifying, dampening, and sustaining affective states. The basic trust of people living in cities, we will argue, depends upon people moving through and engaging with trusted urban places. In urbanism and architecture, it is barely recognized how the city affords places of affective significance that the person incorporates into their bodily way of existing. Persistent exposure to urban stressors can disturb basic trust in one’s living environment, resulting in a person no longer being at home in the world. We provide examples in which people, as a consequence of the repeated exposure to stressors, no longer move through and engage with trusted urban places, and the impact this has on their basic trust. Our aim is to understand how the urban environment can contribute to the path from stress to anxiety and mood disorders, and how a person can regain their openness to possibilities for regulating their emotions skilfully.
- Open Access
- 6 June 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Adaptive Behavior
- Vol. 32 (3) , 207-224
The causal mind: An affordance-based account of causal engagement
Causal cognition is a core aspect of how we deal with the world; however, existing psychological theories tend not to target intuitive causal engagement that is done in daily life. To fill this gap, we propose an Ecological-Enactive (E-E) affordance-based account of situated causal engagement, that is, causal judgments and perceptions. We develop this account to improve our understanding of this way of dealing with the world, which includes making progress on the causal selection problem, and to extend the scope of embodied cognitive science to causal cognition. We characterize identifying causes as selectively attending to the relevant ecological information to engage with relevant affordances, where these affordances are dependent on individual abilities. Based on this we construe causal engagement as based on a learned skill. Moreover, we argue that to understand judgments of causation as we make them in our daily lives, we need to see them as situated in sociocultural practices. Practices are about doing, and so this view helps us understand why people make these judgments so ubiquitously: to get things done, to provide an effective path to intervening in the world. Ultimately this view on causal engagement allows us to account for individual differences in causal perceptions, judgments, and selections by appealing to differences in learned skills and sociocultural practices.
- 6 June 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Adaptive Behavior
- Vol. 32 (3) , 207-224
Open AccessThe causal mind: An affordance-based account of causal engagement
Causal cognition is a core aspect of how we deal with the world; however, existing psychological theories tend not to target intuitive causal engagement that is done in daily life. To fill this gap, we propose an Ecological-Enactive (E-E) affordance-based account of situated causal engagement, that is, causal judgments and perceptions. We develop this account to improve our understanding of this way of dealing with the world, which includes making progress on the causal selection problem, and to extend the scope of embodied cognitive science to causal cognition. We characterize identifying causes as selectively attending to the relevant ecological information to engage with relevant affordances, where these affordances are dependent on individual abilities. Based on this we construe causal engagement as based on a learned skill. Moreover, we argue that to understand judgments of causation as we make them in our daily lives, we need to see them as situated in sociocultural practices. Practices are about doing, and so this view helps us understand why people make these judgments so ubiquitously: to get things done, to provide an effective path to intervening in the world. Ultimately this view on causal engagement allows us to account for individual differences in causal perceptions, judgments, and selections by appealing to differences in learned skills and sociocultural practices.
- Open Access
- 19 October 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Adaptive Behavior
- Vol. 30 (6) , 603-611
Engaging with art skillfully. First steps towards an ecological-enactive account of the experience of art
Ecological-enactive cognitive science is an increasingly influential paradigm that has proved its heuristic value in various fields of the human sciences. This text, in the form of a conversation, explores possibilities for an ecological-enactive account of how people experientially engage with works of art on the basis of their embodied skills.
- 19 October 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Adaptive Behavior
- Vol. 30 (6) , 603-611
Open AccessEngaging with art skillfully. First steps towards an ecological-enactive account of the experience of art
Ecological-enactive cognitive science is an increasingly influential paradigm that has proved its heuristic value in various fields of the human sciences. This text, in the form of a conversation, explores possibilities for an ecological-enactive account of how people experientially engage with works of art on the basis of their embodied skills.
- Open Access
- 18 October 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Adaptive Behavior
- Vol. 30 (6) , 489-503
The affordances of art for making technologies
With this inaugural lecture as Socrates Professor on the topic of Making Humane Technologies, I aim to show that artistic practices afford embedding technologies better in society. Analyzing artworks made at RAAAF, an art collective that makes visual art and experimental architecture, I will describe three aspects of making practices that may contribute to improving the embedding of technology in society: (1) the skill of working with layers of meaning; (2) the skill of creating material playgrounds that afford free exploration of the potential of new technologies and artistic experiments; and (3) the skill of openness to the possibility of having radically different socio-material practices. I will use images of several RAAAF projects to make these skills involved in making more tangible. It is artistic skills like these that can contribute to a better societal embedding of technologies.
- 18 October 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Adaptive Behavior
- Vol. 30 (6) , 489-503
Open AccessThe affordances of art for making technologies
With this inaugural lecture as Socrates Professor on the topic of Making Humane Technologies, I aim to show that artistic practices afford embedding technologies better in society. Analyzing artworks made at RAAAF, an art collective that makes visual art and experimental architecture, I will describe three aspects of making practices that may contribute to improving the embedding of technology in society: (1) the skill of working with layers of meaning; (2) the skill of creating material playgrounds that afford free exploration of the potential of new technologies and artistic experiments; and (3) the skill of openness to the possibility of having radically different socio-material practices. I will use images of several RAAAF projects to make these skills involved in making more tangible. It is artistic skills like these that can contribute to a better societal embedding of technologies.
- Open Access
- 17 October 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Adaptive Behavior
- Vol. 30 (6) , 613-623
Change-Ability for a World in Flux
This article aims to sketch a new integrative perspective on what I call change-ability. I define change-ability as skilled ways of coordinating with a rapidly changing world. Many urgent societal challenges – from climate change to obesity, from the mass extinction of species to fraying social cohesion – require people to collectively change everyday patterns of behaviour they take for granted. The key insight I start from is that to durably change undesirable patterns of behaviour, we could start by changing the affordances the environment offers – the possibilities for action offered to us by the living environment. The aim of this article is to sketch an integrative conceptual framework for understanding change-ability in terms in terms of a dynamical ‘brain ↔ body ↔ community ↔ landscape of affordances’ system. This Change-Ability Conceptual Framework starts from the idea that individuals and communities are situated in the same rich landscape of affordances and suggests that making communities more change-able entails transforming the material ‘grooves’ that have formed in this landscape of affordances.
- 17 October 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Adaptive Behavior
- Vol. 30 (6) , 613-623
Open AccessChange-Ability for a World in Flux
This article aims to sketch a new integrative perspective on what I call change-ability. I define change-ability as skilled ways of coordinating with a rapidly changing world. Many urgent societal challenges – from climate change to obesity, from the mass extinction of species to fraying social cohesion – require people to collectively change everyday patterns of behaviour they take for granted. The key insight I start from is that to durably change undesirable patterns of behaviour, we could start by changing the affordances the environment offers – the possibilities for action offered to us by the living environment. The aim of this article is to sketch an integrative conceptual framework for understanding change-ability in terms in terms of a dynamical ‘brain ↔ body ↔ community ↔ landscape of affordances’ system. This Change-Ability Conceptual Framework starts from the idea that individuals and communities are situated in the same rich landscape of affordances and suggests that making communities more change-able entails transforming the material ‘grooves’ that have formed in this landscape of affordances.