Jelle Bruineberg
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Jelle Bruineberg has a total of 30 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Erik Rietveld
Department of Psychiatry, Amsterdam UMC Location AMC, Amsterdam, Netherlands
6 shared publications - Ludger van Dijk
Philosophy Group, Department of Communication, Philosophy, Technology and Education, Wageningen University & Research
3 shared publications - Manuel Baltieri
Lab for Neural Computation and Adaptation, RIKEN Center for Brain Science, Japan
3 shared publications - Joe Dewhurst
LMU Munich, Munich, Germany
2 shared publications - Julian Kiverstein
Department of Psychiatry, Amsterdam UMC Location AMC, Amsterdam, Netherlands
2 shared publications - Krzysztof Dołęga
Ruhr-Universität Bochum
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 10 November 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Ecological Psychology
- p. 1-8
Attuning to the World’s Needs
- 10 November 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Ecological Psychology
- p. 1-8
Attuning to the World’s Needs
- Open Access
- 7 October 2026
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Attention and the Relevance Problem
The relevance problem is the problem of how cognitive systems can be sensitive to what is relevant despite relevance being holistic, open‐ended, and context‐sensitive. The problem has typically been applied to higher‐order cognitive processes. In this paper, I argue that there is a hitherto unrecognized relevance problem for perceptual attention. This problem becomes apparent when considering the functions of attention: attention must not only support ongoing task performance but also remain sensitive to opportunities for task switching, latent learning, and context checking. Existing treatments of the relevance problem have largely focused on its task‐relative form: given a task, what is relevant? I argue that attention faces a more general problem that includes sensitivity to factors relevant to other interests and to cues indicating that another activity may be worth pursuing. For such features of the environment to stand out as salient, salience cannot be determined solely by bottom‐up factors and a limited set of occurrent top‐down factors, such as current goals and intentions. Rather, it must reflect the wider (if not the entire) range of an agent's latent interests in a context‐sensitive way. This motivational unencapsulation of attention poses a challenge for both contemporary accounts of attention and suggests that passive attention is much more intelligent than commonly thought.
- 7 October 2026
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Open AccessAttention and the Relevance Problem
The relevance problem is the problem of how cognitive systems can be sensitive to what is relevant despite relevance being holistic, open‐ended, and context‐sensitive. The problem has typically been applied to higher‐order cognitive processes. In this paper, I argue that there is a hitherto unrecognized relevance problem for perceptual attention. This problem becomes apparent when considering the functions of attention: attention must not only support ongoing task performance but also remain sensitive to opportunities for task switching, latent learning, and context checking. Existing treatments of the relevance problem have largely focused on its task‐relative form: given a task, what is relevant? I argue that attention faces a more general problem that includes sensitivity to factors relevant to other interests and to cues indicating that another activity may be worth pursuing. For such features of the environment to stand out as salient, salience cannot be determined solely by bottom‐up factors and a limited set of occurrent top‐down factors, such as current goals and intentions. Rather, it must reflect the wider (if not the entire) range of an agent's latent interests in a context‐sensitive way. This motivational unencapsulation of attention poses a challenge for both contemporary accounts of attention and suggests that passive attention is much more intelligent than commonly thought.
- Open Access
- 5 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Perceptual attention and indeterminacy: Merleau-Pontyian challenges to naïve realism and representationalism
In Phenomenology of Perception , Merleau-Ponty criticizes what he calls “Empiricist” and “Intellectualist” accounts of perception. One of his central criticisms is that both misconstrue the relationship between perception and attention. As a result, neither can tell a coherent story about the role of attention in perceptual knowledge. In this paper, we extract the core lessons of Merleau-Ponty’s discussion and apply them to some prominent contemporary accounts of the relation between attention and perception, namely Sebastian Watzl’s (2017) and Bill Brewer’s (2013). Although operating within very different frameworks—Watzl is a representationalist, whereas Brewer is a naïve realist—we show that they encounter a similar set of problems, which are highlighted in Merleau-Ponty’s discussion. We end by providing a set of constraints that any adequate account of the relation between attention and perception must meet, and sketch how the naïve realist and representationalist, each in their own way, might satisfy these constraints.
- 5 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Open AccessPerceptual attention and indeterminacy: Merleau-Pontyian challenges to naïve realism and representationalism
In Phenomenology of Perception , Merleau-Ponty criticizes what he calls “Empiricist” and “Intellectualist” accounts of perception. One of his central criticisms is that both misconstrue the relationship between perception and attention. As a result, neither can tell a coherent story about the role of attention in perceptual knowledge. In this paper, we extract the core lessons of Merleau-Ponty’s discussion and apply them to some prominent contemporary accounts of the relation between attention and perception, namely Sebastian Watzl’s (2017) and Bill Brewer’s (2013). Although operating within very different frameworks—Watzl is a representationalist, whereas Brewer is a naïve realist—we show that they encounter a similar set of problems, which are highlighted in Merleau-Ponty’s discussion. We end by providing a set of constraints that any adequate account of the relation between attention and perception must meet, and sketch how the naïve realist and representationalist, each in their own way, might satisfy these constraints.
- 3 November 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 48, e94
Giving body to the multitrait framework
Given its assumption that cognition is embodied, the multitrait framework could benefit from engaging with recent work in embodied cognitive science. Here, we introduce three lines of contemporary research—from ecological psychology, basal cognition, and embodied cognitive neuroscience—which help contextualize the article’s “trait-linkage” findings and further support the authors’ arguments for evolutionary continuity between simple and complex cognitive traits.
- 3 November 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 48, e94
Giving body to the multitrait framework
Given its assumption that cognition is embodied, the multitrait framework could benefit from engaging with recent work in embodied cognitive science. Here, we introduce three lines of contemporary research—from ecological psychology, basal cognition, and embodied cognitive neuroscience—which help contextualize the article’s “trait-linkage” findings and further support the authors’ arguments for evolutionary continuity between simple and complex cognitive traits.
- Open Access
- 10 May 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 39 (6) , 1-23
Rethinking the cognitive foundations of the attention economy
- 10 May 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 39 (6) , 1-23
Open AccessRethinking the cognitive foundations of the attention economy
- 1 July 2024
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Psychological Review
- Vol. 131 (4) , 993-1006
Productive pluralism: The coming of age of ecological psychology.
The ecological approach to psychology has been a main antecedent of embodied and situated approaches to cognition. The concept of affordances in particular has gained currency throughout psychological science. Yet, contemporary ecological psychology has seemed inaccessible to outsiders and protective of its legacy. Indeed, some prominent ecological psychologists have presented their approach as a "package deal"-a principled and unified perspective on perception and action. Looking at the history of the field, however, we argue that ecological psychology has developed in rich and pluriform ways. Aiming to open the field to critical engagement and productive exchange, we identify three major strands of thought within ecological psychology, each of which emerged in the 20 years after Gibson's death: physical, biological, and social ecological psychology. Each of these strands develop ecological ideas in quite different directions, making different use of some of its central concepts, adopting different explanatory principles, and embodying different philosophical worldviews. Proponents of the ecological approach have been arguing for pluralism within cognitive science to make room for ecological psychology. Given the diversity of the strands, we extend this plea to within ecological psychology itself; the field is better off aiming for a productive pluralism in which the different strands are in dialogue with each other. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 July 2024
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Psychological Review
- Vol. 131 (4) , 993-1006
Productive pluralism: The coming of age of ecological psychology.
The ecological approach to psychology has been a main antecedent of embodied and situated approaches to cognition. The concept of affordances in particular has gained currency throughout psychological science. Yet, contemporary ecological psychology has seemed inaccessible to outsiders and protective of its legacy. Indeed, some prominent ecological psychologists have presented their approach as a "package deal"-a principled and unified perspective on perception and action. Looking at the history of the field, however, we argue that ecological psychology has developed in rich and pluriform ways. Aiming to open the field to critical engagement and productive exchange, we identify three major strands of thought within ecological psychology, each of which emerged in the 20 years after Gibson's death: physical, biological, and social ecological psychology. Each of these strands develop ecological ideas in quite different directions, making different use of some of its central concepts, adopting different explanatory principles, and embodying different philosophical worldviews. Proponents of the ecological approach have been arguing for pluralism within cognitive science to make room for ecological psychology. Given the diversity of the strands, we extend this plea to within ecological psychology itself; the field is better off aiming for a productive pluralism in which the different strands are in dialogue with each other. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).
- Open Access
- 5 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 181 (2-3) , 461-484
Structuring embodied minds: attention and perceptual agency
Perception is, at least sometimes, something we do. This paper is concerned with how to account for perceptual agency (i.e., the active aspect of perception). Eilan divides accounts of perceptual agency up into two camps: enactivist theories hold that perceptual agency is accounted for by the involvement of bodily action, while mental theories hold that perceptual agency is accounted for by the involvement of mental action in perception. In Structuring Mind (2017), Sebastian Watzl aligns his ‘activity view’ with the mental action route and develops the view that the mental activity of attending infuses perceptual experience with agency. Moreover, Watzl claims that his view can accommodate enactivist intuitions, while rejecting their claims about embodiment.In this paper, we scrutinize the relevant notion of mental action involved in the mental action route. We analyze the involvement of the body in overt acts of attention (like sniffing and smelling) and argue that a constitutively embodied account of mental action provides a better analysis of overt attention than a conjunctive account in which overt attention involves a bodily and a (separate) mental action. Furthermore, we argue that the standard cases of covert attention (such as the Posner paradigm) involve the body in multiple ways.In closing, we discuss the relevance of our analysis for the debate on perceptual agency and the embodied mind thesis. We conclude that the embodied mental action route to theorizing perceptual agency provides the best analysis of perceptual agency but comes with significant commitments about the embodiment of attention.
- 5 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 181 (2-3) , 461-484
Open AccessStructuring embodied minds: attention and perceptual agency
Perception is, at least sometimes, something we do. This paper is concerned with how to account for perceptual agency (i.e., the active aspect of perception). Eilan divides accounts of perceptual agency up into two camps: enactivist theories hold that perceptual agency is accounted for by the involvement of bodily action, while mental theories hold that perceptual agency is accounted for by the involvement of mental action in perception. In Structuring Mind (2017), Sebastian Watzl aligns his ‘activity view’ with the mental action route and develops the view that the mental activity of attending infuses perceptual experience with agency. Moreover, Watzl claims that his view can accommodate enactivist intuitions, while rejecting their claims about embodiment.In this paper, we scrutinize the relevant notion of mental action involved in the mental action route. We analyze the involvement of the body in overt acts of attention (like sniffing and smelling) and argue that a constitutively embodied account of mental action provides a better analysis of overt attention than a conjunctive account in which overt attention involves a bodily and a (separate) mental action. Furthermore, we argue that the standard cases of covert attention (such as the Posner paradigm) involve the body in multiple ways.In closing, we discuss the relevance of our analysis for the debate on perceptual agency and the embodied mind thesis. We conclude that the embodied mental action route to theorizing perceptual agency provides the best analysis of perceptual agency but comes with significant commitments about the embodiment of attention.
- Open Access
- 20 November 2023
- Published by TU Delft OPEN Publishing in Journal of Human-Technology Relations
- Vol. 1
Sketching theory
The Journal of Human-Technology Relations is committed to investigating human-technology relations from a wide range of academic disciplines and subdisciplines in the humanities and social sciences, from design to philosophy and everything in between. To provide a space for productive correspondence with these practices the journal offers authors the possibility to submit pictorials. Pictorials take seriously the mutually constitutive relation between material process and product. They are papers in which visual components (e.g. diagrams, sketches, illustrations, renderings, photographs, annotated photographs, gifs) play an important role. At a minimum, these visuals do more than support the text. At their best, they work together with the text in a way that makes meaning irreducible to either medium alone. In this pictorial we demonstrate this scope by example, making a philosophical argument with more than textual means.
- 20 November 2023
- Published by TU Delft OPEN Publishing in Journal of Human-Technology Relations
- Vol. 1
Open AccessSketching theory
The Journal of Human-Technology Relations is committed to investigating human-technology relations from a wide range of academic disciplines and subdisciplines in the humanities and social sciences, from design to philosophy and everything in between. To provide a space for productive correspondence with these practices the journal offers authors the possibility to submit pictorials. Pictorials take seriously the mutually constitutive relation between material process and product. They are papers in which visual components (e.g. diagrams, sketches, illustrations, renderings, photographs, annotated photographs, gifs) play an important role. At a minimum, these visuals do more than support the text. At their best, they work together with the text in a way that makes meaning irreducible to either medium alone. In this pictorial we demonstrate this scope by example, making a philosophical argument with more than textual means.
- Open Access
- 21 July 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Productive pluralism: the coming of age of ecological psychology
The ecological approach to psychology has been a main antecedent of embodied and situated approaches to cognition and the concept of affordances in particular has gained currency throughout psychological science. Yet contemporary ecological psychology has seemed inaccessible to outsiders and protective of its legacy. Indeed, some prominent ecological psychologists have presented their approach as a “package deal”—a principled and unified perspective on perception and action. Looking at the history of the field, however, we argue that ecological psychology has developed in rich and pluriform ways. Aiming to open the field to critical engagement and productive exchange, we identify three major strands of thought within ecological psychology, each of which emerged in the 20 years after Gibson’s death: physical, biological and social ecological psychology. Each of these strands develop ecological ideas in quite different directions, making different use of some of its central concepts, and adopting different explanatory principles, embodying different philosophical worldviews. Proponents of the ecological approach have been arguing for pluralism within cognitive science to make room for ecological psychology. Given the diversity of the strands, we extend this plea to within ecological psychology itself; the field is better off aiming for a productive pluralism in which the different strands are in dialogue with each other.
- 21 July 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessProductive pluralism: the coming of age of ecological psychology
The ecological approach to psychology has been a main antecedent of embodied and situated approaches to cognition and the concept of affordances in particular has gained currency throughout psychological science. Yet contemporary ecological psychology has seemed inaccessible to outsiders and protective of its legacy. Indeed, some prominent ecological psychologists have presented their approach as a “package deal”—a principled and unified perspective on perception and action. Looking at the history of the field, however, we argue that ecological psychology has developed in rich and pluriform ways. Aiming to open the field to critical engagement and productive exchange, we identify three major strands of thought within ecological psychology, each of which emerged in the 20 years after Gibson’s death: physical, biological and social ecological psychology. Each of these strands develop ecological ideas in quite different directions, making different use of some of its central concepts, and adopting different explanatory principles, embodying different philosophical worldviews. Proponents of the ecological approach have been arguing for pluralism within cognitive science to make room for ecological psychology. Given the diversity of the strands, we extend this plea to within ecological psychology itself; the field is better off aiming for a productive pluralism in which the different strands are in dialogue with each other.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Vol. 2023 (1) , niad019
Adversarial inference: predictive minds in the attention economy
What is it about our current digital technologies that seemingly makes it difficult for users to attend to what matters to them? According to the dominant narrative in the literature on the “attention economy,” a user’s lack of attention is due to the large amounts of information available in their everyday environments. I will argue that information-abundance fails to account for some of the central manifestations of distraction, such as sudden urges to check a particular information-source in the absence of perceptual information. I will use active inference, and in particular models of action selection based on the minimization of expected free energy, to develop an alternative answer to the question about what makes it difficult to attend. Besides obvious adversarial forms of inference, in which algorithms build up models of users in order to keep them scrolling, I will show that active inference provides the tools to identify a number of problematic structural features of current digital technologies: they contain limitless sources of novelty, they can be navigated by very simple and effortless motor movements, and they offer their action possibilities everywhere and anytime independent of place or context. Moreover, recent models of motivated control show an intricate interplay between motivation and control that can explain sudden transitions in motivational state and the consequent alteration of the salience of actions. I conclude, therefore, that the challenges users encounter when engaging with digital technologies are less about information overload or inviting content, but more about the continuous availability of easily available possibilities for action.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Vol. 2023 (1) , niad019
Open AccessAdversarial inference: predictive minds in the attention economy
What is it about our current digital technologies that seemingly makes it difficult for users to attend to what matters to them? According to the dominant narrative in the literature on the “attention economy,” a user’s lack of attention is due to the large amounts of information available in their everyday environments. I will argue that information-abundance fails to account for some of the central manifestations of distraction, such as sudden urges to check a particular information-source in the absence of perceptual information. I will use active inference, and in particular models of action selection based on the minimization of expected free energy, to develop an alternative answer to the question about what makes it difficult to attend. Besides obvious adversarial forms of inference, in which algorithms build up models of users in order to keep them scrolling, I will show that active inference provides the tools to identify a number of problematic structural features of current digital technologies: they contain limitless sources of novelty, they can be navigated by very simple and effortless motor movements, and they offer their action possibilities everywhere and anytime independent of place or context. Moreover, recent models of motivated control show an intricate interplay between motivation and control that can explain sudden transitions in motivational state and the consequent alteration of the salience of actions. I conclude, therefore, that the challenges users encounter when engaging with digital technologies are less about information overload or inviting content, but more about the continuous availability of easily available possibilities for action.