Elias L. Khalil
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Elias L. Khalil has a total of 27 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alain Marciano
University of Turin
2 shared publications - Daniel Houser
Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, USA
2 shared publications - Michael T. Ewing
Southern Cross University
2 shared publications - Siyu Wang
Department of Economics and Institute for the Study of Economic Growth, Wichita State University, Wichita, USA
2 shared publications Alain Marciano
1 shared publication- Alain Marciano
Université de Reims Champagne Ardenne
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 12 October 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Utilitas
- Vol. 38 (4) , 303-325
Two Moments of Impartial Spectators, Four Genera of Satisfactions: Making Sense of The Theory of Moral Sentiments
This paper reconstructs Adam Smith’s theory of human behavior à la rational choice theory. The reconstruction shows how the emotions and morality are different phases of rationality. The reconstruction is based on two sets of distinctions. The first distinguishes between two moments of rationality : (i) the rationality of making the best decisions; and (ii) the rationality of commanding those decisions. The second set includes four genera of satisfaction : (1) substantive satisfaction arises upon consuming pecuniary goods, e.g., food and clothes; (2) transcendent satisfaction takes place when the decision maker bonds with loved ones and aspires great goals; (3) self-possession satisfaction is the “warm glow” that emerges as a by-product of keeping promises, which occasions integrity, and avoiding excessive bonding and attachments, which occasion dignity; and (4) worthiness satisfaction emerges as a by-product of choosing worthy acts, i.e., acts free of toxic preferences (self-aggrandizement and malevolence).
- 12 October 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Utilitas
- Vol. 38 (4) , 303-325
Open AccessTwo Moments of Impartial Spectators, Four Genera of Satisfactions: Making Sense of The Theory of Moral Sentiments
This paper reconstructs Adam Smith’s theory of human behavior à la rational choice theory. The reconstruction shows how the emotions and morality are different phases of rationality. The reconstruction is based on two sets of distinctions. The first distinguishes between two moments of rationality : (i) the rationality of making the best decisions; and (ii) the rationality of commanding those decisions. The second set includes four genera of satisfaction : (1) substantive satisfaction arises upon consuming pecuniary goods, e.g., food and clothes; (2) transcendent satisfaction takes place when the decision maker bonds with loved ones and aspires great goals; (3) self-possession satisfaction is the “warm glow” that emerges as a by-product of keeping promises, which occasions integrity, and avoiding excessive bonding and attachments, which occasion dignity; and (4) worthiness satisfaction emerges as a by-product of choosing worthy acts, i.e., acts free of toxic preferences (self-aggrandizement and malevolence).
- 2 October 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 49, e435
A problem facing process-egalitarianism: Why do individuals surrender autonomy to political community?
This comment accepts the distinction that Duncan Stibbard-Hawkes and Chris von Rueden make: the difference between process-egalitarianism and outcome-egalitarianism. It also accepts that most historical societies care more about process- than outcome-egalitarianism. However, a question remains. If people care about process-egalitarianism, how come they are ready to surrender autonomy – i.e., ability to make decisions of their own – to a political community?
- 2 October 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 49, e435
A problem facing process-egalitarianism: Why do individuals surrender autonomy to political community?
This comment accepts the distinction that Duncan Stibbard-Hawkes and Chris von Rueden make: the difference between process-egalitarianism and outcome-egalitarianism. It also accepts that most historical societies care more about process- than outcome-egalitarianism. However, a question remains. If people care about process-egalitarianism, how come they are ready to surrender autonomy – i.e., ability to make decisions of their own – to a political community?
- Open Access
Real and Apparent Deviations From Rational Choice
This paper offers a taxonomy of real and apparent deviations from rationality. The taxonomy is based on three axes of divides—whereas the axes are successive refinements. The outermost‐axis divide delineates “anxiety‐based choices” from “anxiety‐free choices.” Anxiety‐based choices are real deviations such as the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes and superstitions. The intermediate‐axis divide focuses on anxiety‐free choices, distinguishing “reference‐independent choices” from “reference‐dependent choices.” Reference‐dependent choices are only apparent deviations from rationality. The innermost‐axis divide focuses on reference‐dependent choices, identifying three families of reference‐dependent choices. The first family is the set of norms—rules and heuristics—that act as institutions to ensure optimal decisions. Rules include precommitments adopted to avert temptations. Heuristics include generalizations adopted to economize cognitive cost (bounded rationality). The second family is the set of principles of justice and propriety. The ultimatum game illustrates justice. Loss aversion can be argued to arise from scolding oneself for failing to be proper and doing the right thing. The third family is the set of contexts that signal the relevant attachments—such as bonding with loved ones or persevering with an aspirational goal. Examples include the endowment effect and assessments related to happiness.
Open AccessReal and Apparent Deviations From Rational Choice
This paper offers a taxonomy of real and apparent deviations from rationality. The taxonomy is based on three axes of divides—whereas the axes are successive refinements. The outermost‐axis divide delineates “anxiety‐based choices” from “anxiety‐free choices.” Anxiety‐based choices are real deviations such as the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes and superstitions. The intermediate‐axis divide focuses on anxiety‐free choices, distinguishing “reference‐independent choices” from “reference‐dependent choices.” Reference‐dependent choices are only apparent deviations from rationality. The innermost‐axis divide focuses on reference‐dependent choices, identifying three families of reference‐dependent choices. The first family is the set of norms—rules and heuristics—that act as institutions to ensure optimal decisions. Rules include precommitments adopted to avert temptations. Heuristics include generalizations adopted to economize cognitive cost (bounded rationality). The second family is the set of principles of justice and propriety. The ultimatum game illustrates justice. Loss aversion can be argued to arise from scolding oneself for failing to be proper and doing the right thing. The third family is the set of contexts that signal the relevant attachments—such as bonding with loved ones or persevering with an aspirational goal. Examples include the endowment effect and assessments related to happiness.
- Open Access
- 13 June 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Human Arenas
- Vol. 9 (S3) , 2286-2307
Aspiration and Tranquility: Two Types of Happiness
This paper advances two distinctions concerning satisfaction. First, happiness differs from well-being. Happiness is the by-product satisfaction experienced by the decision maker (DM) when reflecting on her well-being through contextual comparison. Second, there are two forms of contextual comparison and, consequently, two types of happiness. The distinction follows the temporal orientation of the context: the DM may evaluate current well-being either retrospectively (backward-looking), by reference to past well-being, or prospectively (forward-looking), by reference to aspired well-being. Retrospective (backward-looking) comparison gives rise to what this paper calls “happiness-as-tranquility” (or its absence), whereas prospective (forward-looking) comparison gives rise to “happiness-as-aspiration” (or its absence). One implication of these distinctions is a resolution of the income–happiness paradox, also known as the “Easterlin paradox.”
- 13 June 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Human Arenas
- Vol. 9 (S3) , 2286-2307
Open AccessAspiration and Tranquility: Two Types of Happiness
This paper advances two distinctions concerning satisfaction. First, happiness differs from well-being. Happiness is the by-product satisfaction experienced by the decision maker (DM) when reflecting on her well-being through contextual comparison. Second, there are two forms of contextual comparison and, consequently, two types of happiness. The distinction follows the temporal orientation of the context: the DM may evaluate current well-being either retrospectively (backward-looking), by reference to past well-being, or prospectively (forward-looking), by reference to aspired well-being. Retrospective (backward-looking) comparison gives rise to what this paper calls “happiness-as-tranquility” (or its absence), whereas prospective (forward-looking) comparison gives rise to “happiness-as-aspiration” (or its absence). One implication of these distinctions is a resolution of the income–happiness paradox, also known as the “Easterlin paradox.”
- 1 June 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 49, e107
Why do romantic relationships matter more to men than to women? The commitment problem and market competition for useful men
While this commentary concurs with Wahring et al., their explanation of the asymmetry begs the question: Why are men less successful in forming brotherhood social networks than women? This commentary offers an answer: Given their difference in investment/child, men are incentivized to renege on commitment more than women. Hence, women choose, ceteris paribus , to marry the most romantic man available.
- 1 June 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 49, e107
Why do romantic relationships matter more to men than to women? The commitment problem and market competition for useful men
While this commentary concurs with Wahring et al., their explanation of the asymmetry begs the question: Why are men less successful in forming brotherhood social networks than women? This commentary offers an answer: Given their difference in investment/child, men are incentivized to renege on commitment more than women. Hence, women choose, ceteris paribus , to marry the most romantic man available.
- Open Access
- 27 March 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Institutional Economics
- Vol. 22
Rules and temptations: which came first? – ERRATUM
- 27 March 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Institutional Economics
- Vol. 22
Open AccessRules and temptations: which came first? – ERRATUM
- Open Access
- 19 February 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Institutional Economics
- Vol. 22, e9
Rules and temptations: which came first?
For received theories, (suboptimal) temptations arise first, and, consequently, people set up rules or institutions to control them. Hence, any deviation from institutions is suboptimal. However, these received theories face an anomaly, coined here the ‘Holiday License Paradox’: Why would people who adopt optimal institutions turn around and designate ‘holidays’ (cheat days) that allow them to indulge in suboptimal consumption? To solve this paradox, this paper reverses the entry point: people first set up rules – whereas temptations are identifiable only with respect to those rules. This solution raises a new question: what is the origin of rules? People adopt rules to control ‘temerity’, i.e., overconfidence. This raises a further question: what is the origin of temerity? Temerity is a default heuristic expressing the optimal response in life-and-death decisions. Thus, temerity-as-heuristics is rather efficient on average. However, temerity can become excessive, and, at second approximation, people adopt rules to control temerity. Once we regard rules or institutions to come first, i.e., prior to temptations, it becomes possible to solve the Holiday License Paradox.
- 19 February 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Institutional Economics
- Vol. 22, e9
Open AccessRules and temptations: which came first?
For received theories, (suboptimal) temptations arise first, and, consequently, people set up rules or institutions to control them. Hence, any deviation from institutions is suboptimal. However, these received theories face an anomaly, coined here the ‘Holiday License Paradox’: Why would people who adopt optimal institutions turn around and designate ‘holidays’ (cheat days) that allow them to indulge in suboptimal consumption? To solve this paradox, this paper reverses the entry point: people first set up rules – whereas temptations are identifiable only with respect to those rules. This solution raises a new question: what is the origin of rules? People adopt rules to control ‘temerity’, i.e., overconfidence. This raises a further question: what is the origin of temerity? Temerity is a default heuristic expressing the optimal response in life-and-death decisions. Thus, temerity-as-heuristics is rather efficient on average. However, temerity can become excessive, and, at second approximation, people adopt rules to control temerity. Once we regard rules or institutions to come first, i.e., prior to temptations, it becomes possible to solve the Holiday License Paradox.
- Open Access
- 13 November 2025
- Published by F1000 Research Ltd in F1000Research
- Vol. 12, 83
Is rationality a cognitive faculty?
Rationality in the standard (economics) sense cannot be a form of intelligence or any other cognitive faculty, such as memory, language, or mathematical skills. To establish this thesis, this paper uses a distinction from set theory, namely, the distinction between “binary relators” and “binary operators”. Rationality, in the standard sense, acts as a binary relator in the sense that it is an optimization method, whereas cognitive ability acts as a binary operator in the sense that it is a transformational function. Rationality as an optimization method (binary relator) does not differ from the neo-Darwinian notion of natural selection: either method seeks to find the best choice or fit trait given the constraints. A cognitive faculty as a transformational function (binary operator) simply translates inputs into outputs. The distinction between standard rationality and cognitive functions has wide-ranging implications for the theory of evolution.
- 13 November 2025
- Published by F1000 Research Ltd in F1000Research
- Vol. 12, 83
Open AccessIs rationality a cognitive faculty?
Rationality in the standard (economics) sense cannot be a form of intelligence or any other cognitive faculty, such as memory, language, or mathematical skills. To establish this thesis, this paper uses a distinction from set theory, namely, the distinction between “binary relators” and “binary operators”. Rationality, in the standard sense, acts as a binary relator in the sense that it is an optimization method, whereas cognitive ability acts as a binary operator in the sense that it is a transformational function. Rationality as an optimization method (binary relator) does not differ from the neo-Darwinian notion of natural selection: either method seeks to find the best choice or fit trait given the constraints. A cognitive faculty as a transformational function (binary operator) simply translates inputs into outputs. The distinction between standard rationality and cognitive functions has wide-ranging implications for the theory of evolution.
- Open Access
- 31 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Humanities and Social Sciences Communications
- Vol. 12 (1) , 1-12
Anxiety and rationality: Allais paradox, procrastination, Keynesian expectations, and other anxiety-based deviations from rationality
This paper proposes that there is a set of behavioral deviations from standard rational choices that differs from the rest of the deviations. This set is characterized by anxiety-based choices that are truly non-rational, whereas the rest consists of deviations that are actually rational once we take into consideration the role of reference points. This paper registers that the behavioral sciences literature conflates anxiety-based deviations with anxiety-free deviations. This conflation is probably the outcome of this literature’s cognitivist framework, which ignores the upheavals of the self. Anxiety is rather a manifestation of the upheavals of the self, where the self is inflicted by conflicting passions, apprehensions, and everyday difficulties in making decisions. Such upheavals undermine the formation of coherent preferences, which is guaranteed by the completeness axiom. This paper identifies a few anxiety-based deviations: the Allais paradox, procrastination, addictions, Keynesian expectations, the hot hand fallacy, the gambler’s fallacy, leadership awe, the Ellsberg paradox, and deliberate ignorance. Nevertheless, this set of anxiety-based deviations leaves out a heap of anxiety-free deviations—such as succumbing to temptations, the demand for equity that informs the ultimatum game, heuristics that sometimes lead to biases, the endowment effect, etc. The contribution of this paper lies in proposing a criterion, namely, the role of reference points, that can help us delineate anxiety-based from anxiety-free deviations from rationality.
- 31 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Humanities and Social Sciences Communications
- Vol. 12 (1) , 1-12
Open AccessAnxiety and rationality: Allais paradox, procrastination, Keynesian expectations, and other anxiety-based deviations from rationality
This paper proposes that there is a set of behavioral deviations from standard rational choices that differs from the rest of the deviations. This set is characterized by anxiety-based choices that are truly non-rational, whereas the rest consists of deviations that are actually rational once we take into consideration the role of reference points. This paper registers that the behavioral sciences literature conflates anxiety-based deviations with anxiety-free deviations. This conflation is probably the outcome of this literature’s cognitivist framework, which ignores the upheavals of the self. Anxiety is rather a manifestation of the upheavals of the self, where the self is inflicted by conflicting passions, apprehensions, and everyday difficulties in making decisions. Such upheavals undermine the formation of coherent preferences, which is guaranteed by the completeness axiom. This paper identifies a few anxiety-based deviations: the Allais paradox, procrastination, addictions, Keynesian expectations, the hot hand fallacy, the gambler’s fallacy, leadership awe, the Ellsberg paradox, and deliberate ignorance. Nevertheless, this set of anxiety-based deviations leaves out a heap of anxiety-free deviations—such as succumbing to temptations, the demand for equity that informs the ultimatum game, heuristics that sometimes lead to biases, the endowment effect, etc. The contribution of this paper lies in proposing a criterion, namely, the role of reference points, that can help us delineate anxiety-based from anxiety-free deviations from rationality.
- Open Access
- 3 July 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Economic Issues
- Vol. 59 (3) , 760-779
Why are Some Transactions Repugnant? Superseding the Utilitarian and the Deontological Explanations
- 3 July 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Economic Issues
- Vol. 59 (3) , 760-779
Open AccessWhy are Some Transactions Repugnant? Superseding the Utilitarian and the Deontological Explanations