Natasha McKeever
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Natasha McKeever has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Joe Saunders
Durham University
3 shared publications Luke Brunning
University of Birmingham
1 shared publication- Luke Brunning
University of Leeds
1 shared publication Philosophy Documentation Center
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 13 January 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Hypatia
- Vol. 40 (3) , 633-652
Is Sex Work Inherently Gendered?
Sex work is highly gendered, with 80 percent of sex workers being female, and the vast majority of buyers of sex being male. It is often taken for granted that this is how it is, and implicit in much of the debate around sex work is the assumption that it is inherently gendered. In this paper, I question this assumption, drawing on sociological research to challenge arguments which purport that it is inconceivable that women would ever want to pay for sex, or that sex work would exist under conditions of gender equality. I argue that gendered sexual norms likely are a significant reason for why sex work is so gendered, but sex work would probably continue to exist under conditions of gender equality, due to the diversity in motivations people have for buying and selling sex. Acknowledging that sex work is not inherently gendered is important for (at least) two reasons. First, it is probable that the gendered nature of sex work contributes to the stigma and bad treatment that sex workers, particularly female ones, face. Secondly, if sex work is not inherently gendered, this will have implications for how we should think about it, morally, practically, and legally.
- 13 January 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Hypatia
- Vol. 40 (3) , 633-652
Open AccessIs Sex Work Inherently Gendered?
Sex work is highly gendered, with 80 percent of sex workers being female, and the vast majority of buyers of sex being male. It is often taken for granted that this is how it is, and implicit in much of the debate around sex work is the assumption that it is inherently gendered. In this paper, I question this assumption, drawing on sociological research to challenge arguments which purport that it is inconceivable that women would ever want to pay for sex, or that sex work would exist under conditions of gender equality. I argue that gendered sexual norms likely are a significant reason for why sex work is so gendered, but sex work would probably continue to exist under conditions of gender equality, due to the diversity in motivations people have for buying and selling sex. Acknowledging that sex work is not inherently gendered is important for (at least) two reasons. First, it is probable that the gendered nature of sex work contributes to the stigma and bad treatment that sex workers, particularly female ones, face. Secondly, if sex work is not inherently gendered, this will have implications for how we should think about it, morally, practically, and legally.
- 16 December 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 2204-2208
Love
- 4 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-5
Love
- Open Access
- 27 May 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 30 (3) , 254-275
Irrational Love: Taking Romeo and Juliet Seriously
This paper argues that there are important irrational elements to love. In the philosophical literature, we typically find that love is either thought of as rational or arational and that any irrational elements are thought to be defective, or extraneous to love itself. We argue, on the contrary, that irrationality is in part connected to what we find valuable about love. We focus on 3 basic elements of love: 1) Whom you love 2) How much you love them 3) How much of a role love plays in your life And in each case, we argue that love can be irrational and valuable.
- 27 May 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 30 (3) , 254-275
Open AccessIrrational Love: Taking Romeo and Juliet Seriously
This paper argues that there are important irrational elements to love. In the philosophical literature, we typically find that love is either thought of as rational or arational and that any irrational elements are thought to be defective, or extraneous to love itself. We argue, on the contrary, that irrationality is in part connected to what we find valuable about love. We focus on 3 basic elements of love: 1) Whom you love 2) How much you love them 3) How much of a role love plays in your life And in each case, we argue that love can be irrational and valuable.
- Open Access
- 13 October 2020
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Applied Philosophy
- Vol. 38 (3) , 497-517
Asexuality
Asexuality is overlooked in the philosophical literature and in wider society. Such neglect produces incomplete or inaccurate accounts of romantic life and harms asexual people. We develop an account of asexuality to redress this neglect and enrich discussion of romantic life. Asexual experiences are diverse. Some asexual people have sex; some have romantic relationships in the absence of sex. We accept the common definition of asexuality as the absence of sexual attraction and explain how sexual attraction and sexual desire differ by giving an affordance‐like account of sexual attraction. Armed with that distinction, we show that asexuality is clearly different from celibacy or disorders of desire and that some existing philosophical theories of sexual desire struggle to accommodate asexual sexuality. We then build on asexual testimony about the diversity of non‐sexual attractions to answer two common objections levelled at asexual romance: that romantic relationships require sexual attraction or that sex in the absence of sexual attraction is insufficiently focused on someone as an individual. Finally, we describe some of the ways asexuality has been erased or denigrated in society, and the specific injustices and harms that result.
- 13 October 2020
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Applied Philosophy
- Vol. 38 (3) , 497-517
Open AccessAsexuality
Asexuality is overlooked in the philosophical literature and in wider society. Such neglect produces incomplete or inaccurate accounts of romantic life and harms asexual people. We develop an account of asexuality to redress this neglect and enrich discussion of romantic life. Asexual experiences are diverse. Some asexual people have sex; some have romantic relationships in the absence of sex. We accept the common definition of asexuality as the absence of sexual attraction and explain how sexual attraction and sexual desire differ by giving an affordance‐like account of sexual attraction. Armed with that distinction, we show that asexuality is clearly different from celibacy or disorders of desire and that some existing philosophical theories of sexual desire struggle to accommodate asexual sexuality. We then build on asexual testimony about the diversity of non‐sexual attractions to answer two common objections levelled at asexual romance: that romantic relationships require sexual attraction or that sex in the absence of sexual attraction is insufficiently focused on someone as an individual. Finally, we describe some of the ways asexuality has been erased or denigrated in society, and the specific injustices and harms that result.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Philosophy Documentation Center in Social Theory and Practice
- Vol. 46 (4) , 765-784
Prostitution and the Good of Sex in advance
In Sascha Settegast’s recently published article, “Prostitution and the Good of Sex” in Social Theory and Practice, he argues that prostitution is intrinsically harmful. In this article, I object to his argument, making the following three responses to his account: 1) bad sex is not “detrimental to the good life”; 2) bad sex is not necessarily unvirtuous; 3) sex work is work as well as sex, and so must be evaluated as work in addition to as sex.
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Philosophy Documentation Center in Social Theory and Practice
- Vol. 46 (4) , 765-784
Open AccessProstitution and the Good of Sex in advance
In Sascha Settegast’s recently published article, “Prostitution and the Good of Sex” in Social Theory and Practice, he argues that prostitution is intrinsically harmful. In this article, I object to his argument, making the following three responses to his account: 1) bad sex is not “detrimental to the good life”; 2) bad sex is not necessarily unvirtuous; 3) sex work is work as well as sex, and so must be evaluated as work in addition to as sex.
- Open Access
- 1 February 2019
- Published by Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy in Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
- Vol. 14 (3) , 204-226
What Can We Learn About Romantic Love from Harry Frankfurt’s Account of Love?
Harry Frankfurt has a comprehensive and, at times, compelling, account of love, which are outlined in several of his works. However, he does not think that romantic love fits the ideal of love as it "includes a number of vividly distracting elements, which do not belong to the essential nature of love as a mode of disinterested concern." In this paper, I argue that we can, nonetheless, learn some important things about romantic love from his account. Furthermore, I will suggest, conversely, that there is distinct value in romantic love, which derives from the nature of the relationship on which it is based. Frankfurt tries to take agape and reformulate it so that it can also account for love of particular people. While he succeeds, to some extent, in describing parental love, he fails to accurately describe romantic love and friendship, and, moreover, overlooks what is distinctly valuable about them. Although it was not his intention to describe romantic love, by failing to include features such as reciprocity in his account of love, Frankfurt leaves no room for a kind of love that is important and valuable to many people.
- 1 February 2019
- Published by Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy in Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
- Vol. 14 (3) , 204-226
Open AccessWhat Can We Learn About Romantic Love from Harry Frankfurt’s Account of Love?
Harry Frankfurt has a comprehensive and, at times, compelling, account of love, which are outlined in several of his works. However, he does not think that romantic love fits the ideal of love as it "includes a number of vividly distracting elements, which do not belong to the essential nature of love as a mode of disinterested concern." In this paper, I argue that we can, nonetheless, learn some important things about romantic love from his account. Furthermore, I will suggest, conversely, that there is distinct value in romantic love, which derives from the nature of the relationship on which it is based. Frankfurt tries to take agape and reformulate it so that it can also account for love of particular people. While he succeeds, to some extent, in describing parental love, he fails to accurately describe romantic love and friendship, and, moreover, overlooks what is distinctly valuable about them. Although it was not his intention to describe romantic love, by failing to include features such as reciprocity in his account of love, Frankfurt leaves no room for a kind of love that is important and valuable to many people.
- Open Access
- 8 November 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Criminal Law and Philosophy
- Vol. 13 (4) , 599-619
Can a Woman Rape a Man and Why Does It Matter?
- 8 November 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Criminal Law and Philosophy
- Vol. 13 (4) , 599-619
Open AccessCan a Woman Rape a Man and Why Does It Matter?
- 1 January 2016
- Published by Philosophy Documentation Center in International Journal of Applied Philosophy
- Vol. 30 (2) , 201-218
Love
- 1 January 2016
- Published by Philosophy Documentation Center in International Journal of Applied Philosophy
- Vol. 30 (2) , 201-218
Love