Bobby Vijay Reddy
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Bobby Vijay Reddy has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Brian R. Cheffins
University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
6 shared publications - Brian R. Cheffins
SJ Berwin Professor of Corporate Law, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge
1 shared publication - Pedro Schilling de Carvalho
Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 27 July 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Cambridge Law Journal
- Vol. 85 (2) , 380-409
THE STEWARDSHIP CODE AND SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT: THE END OF THE ROAD
Since the Financial Reporting Council (“FRC”) issued the initial version of the Stewardship Code in 2010, fostering shareholder engagement in publicly traded companies has been a core element of the Code. When the FRC promulgated the 2020 Stewardship Code the FRC was responding to evidence that prior versions had fallen short on the shareholder activism front by emphasising disclosure of engagement outcomes by Code signatories. This article indicates that the 2026 Stewardship Code reverts substantially to the ineffective pre-2020 approach, explains why the change occurred, and argues that this is the end of the road with respect to shareholder engagement and the Stewardship Code.
- 27 July 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Cambridge Law Journal
- Vol. 85 (2) , 380-409
Open AccessTHE STEWARDSHIP CODE AND SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT: THE END OF THE ROAD
Since the Financial Reporting Council (“FRC”) issued the initial version of the Stewardship Code in 2010, fostering shareholder engagement in publicly traded companies has been a core element of the Code. When the FRC promulgated the 2020 Stewardship Code the FRC was responding to evidence that prior versions had fallen short on the shareholder activism front by emphasising disclosure of engagement outcomes by Code signatories. This article indicates that the 2026 Stewardship Code reverts substantially to the ineffective pre-2020 approach, explains why the change occurred, and argues that this is the end of the road with respect to shareholder engagement and the Stewardship Code.
- 11 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 960-965
Private Equity Valuation
- Open Access
- 12 October 2024
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Private Equity and Net Asset Value Loans -Ticking Time Bomb or Ticking All the Right Boxes?
The private equity leveraged buyout (LBO) industry has been on the ropes in recent years, with high interest rates making acquisitions more costly, severely depressing exit values, and hampering fund-raisings. Accordingly, the industry has sought to adapt, and net asset value loans (NAV Debt) have come to the fore extolled in some quarters as being the savior of the industry. NAV Debt is borrowing by a fund backed-up by the net asset value of all the portfolio companies that it owns. NAV Debt cuts against the grain of conventional LBO mechanics by creating liabilities at the fund-level rather than at the level of individual portfolio companies. In this article, the traditional LBO model and the governance advantages that emerge therefrom are described, before discussing the way in which NAV Debt challenges the customary form. The article argues that although NAV Debt is versatile in its uses and conceptually can provide benefits for a private equity fund, it also has a darker side that undermines the carefully curated dynamics of the LBO archetype and could in certain circumstances be detrimental to LBO investors. Lenders and fund sponsors may claim that NAV Debt ticks all the right boxes, especially during a period of economic turmoil, but, in fact, its use bakes-in significant risks that could pummel final returns. Although NAV Debt is perhaps not quite a ticking time bomb, it could represent a gamble that tarnishes the returns of a generation of funds.
- 12 October 2024
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Open AccessPrivate Equity and Net Asset Value Loans -Ticking Time Bomb or Ticking All the Right Boxes?
The private equity leveraged buyout (LBO) industry has been on the ropes in recent years, with high interest rates making acquisitions more costly, severely depressing exit values, and hampering fund-raisings. Accordingly, the industry has sought to adapt, and net asset value loans (NAV Debt) have come to the fore extolled in some quarters as being the savior of the industry. NAV Debt is borrowing by a fund backed-up by the net asset value of all the portfolio companies that it owns. NAV Debt cuts against the grain of conventional LBO mechanics by creating liabilities at the fund-level rather than at the level of individual portfolio companies. In this article, the traditional LBO model and the governance advantages that emerge therefrom are described, before discussing the way in which NAV Debt challenges the customary form. The article argues that although NAV Debt is versatile in its uses and conceptually can provide benefits for a private equity fund, it also has a darker side that undermines the carefully curated dynamics of the LBO archetype and could in certain circumstances be detrimental to LBO investors. Lenders and fund sponsors may claim that NAV Debt ticks all the right boxes, especially during a period of economic turmoil, but, in fact, its use bakes-in significant risks that could pummel final returns. Although NAV Debt is perhaps not quite a ticking time bomb, it could represent a gamble that tarnishes the returns of a generation of funds.
- Open Access
- 8 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in European Business Organization Law Review
- Vol. 25 (4) , 721-764
Going Dutch? Comparing Regulatory and Contracting Policy Paradigms via Amsterdam and London SPAC Experiences
The special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) is a cash shell listed with the sole purpose of acquiring an operating business. Although SPACs, in a high interest rate environment, may have recently fallen out of favor, it was not long ago when they dominated the US markets. SPACs did not, though, come without controversy. Arguably, the incentives ingrained in typical SPACs make them poor investments for long-term shareholders, while lucrative for their sponsors and shareholders seeking to exit prior to an acquisition. Europe was not immune to the SPAC craze, but London and Amsterdam took differing approaches. While London employs a regulatory paradigm pursuant to which SPACs (to avoid a trading suspension upon announcement of an acquisition) must adopt specific terms, Amsterdam follows a contracting paradigm, giving market participants broad scope to implement any SPAC terms that they see fit. In this article, the terms of the cohort of London- and Amsterdam-listed SPACs from 2021 and 2022 are comprehensively scrutinized in the context of the terms that are embedded in the typical US SPAC. This article finds that many of the terms mandated by London’s regulatory rules are also found in Amsterdam-listed SPACs. However, many of those London- and Amsterdam-listed SPACs also display many of the qualities seen in the US which have caused so much consternation. Taking inspiration from the phrase ‘going Dutch’, it is argued that an optimal SPAC policy that assuages concerns levied at US SPACs should take contributions from both the regulatory and contracting paradigms.
- 8 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in European Business Organization Law Review
- Vol. 25 (4) , 721-764
Open AccessGoing Dutch? Comparing Regulatory and Contracting Policy Paradigms via Amsterdam and London SPAC Experiences
The special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) is a cash shell listed with the sole purpose of acquiring an operating business. Although SPACs, in a high interest rate environment, may have recently fallen out of favor, it was not long ago when they dominated the US markets. SPACs did not, though, come without controversy. Arguably, the incentives ingrained in typical SPACs make them poor investments for long-term shareholders, while lucrative for their sponsors and shareholders seeking to exit prior to an acquisition. Europe was not immune to the SPAC craze, but London and Amsterdam took differing approaches. While London employs a regulatory paradigm pursuant to which SPACs (to avoid a trading suspension upon announcement of an acquisition) must adopt specific terms, Amsterdam follows a contracting paradigm, giving market participants broad scope to implement any SPAC terms that they see fit. In this article, the terms of the cohort of London- and Amsterdam-listed SPACs from 2021 and 2022 are comprehensively scrutinized in the context of the terms that are embedded in the typical US SPAC. This article finds that many of the terms mandated by London’s regulatory rules are also found in Amsterdam-listed SPACs. However, many of those London- and Amsterdam-listed SPACs also display many of the qualities seen in the US which have caused so much consternation. Taking inspiration from the phrase ‘going Dutch’, it is argued that an optimal SPAC policy that assuages concerns levied at US SPACs should take contributions from both the regulatory and contracting paradigms.
- Open Access
- 11 August 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
- Vol. 43 (4) , 725-752
Law and Stock Market Development in the UK over Time: An Uneasy Match
Britain has a reputation for having a stock market-oriented corporate economy and there is an extensive literature maintaining that laws affording substantial protection to outside investors are needed for a thriving stock market. Historically, however, UK equity markets have not always flourished and, when they have, law’s contribution has been open to question. This article considers the uneasy match between law and Britain’s stock market development from when shares first began to trade publicly through to the present day, offering in so doing insights into the relationship between law and equity markets and current reforms intended to revive a flagging UK stock exchange.
- 11 August 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
- Vol. 43 (4) , 725-752
Open AccessLaw and Stock Market Development in the UK over Time: An Uneasy Match
Britain has a reputation for having a stock market-oriented corporate economy and there is an extensive literature maintaining that laws affording substantial protection to outside investors are needed for a thriving stock market. Historically, however, UK equity markets have not always flourished and, when they have, law’s contribution has been open to question. This article considers the uneasy match between law and Britain’s stock market development from when shares first began to trade publicly through to the present day, offering in so doing insights into the relationship between law and equity markets and current reforms intended to revive a flagging UK stock exchange.
- 22 July 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-5
Private Equity Valuation
- Open Access
- 18 July 2023
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Law and Stock Market Development in the UK Over Time: An Uneasy Match
Britain has a reputation for having a stock market-oriented corporate economy and there is an extensive literature maintaining that laws affording substantial protection to outside investors are needed for a thriving stock market. Historically, however, UK equity markets have not always flourished and, when they have, law’s contribution has been open to question. This paper considers the uneasy match between law and Britain’s stock market development from when shares first began to trade publicly through to the present day, offering in so doing insights on the relationship between law and equity markets and current reforms intended to revive a flagging UK stock exchange.
- 18 July 2023
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Open AccessLaw and Stock Market Development in the UK Over Time: An Uneasy Match
Britain has a reputation for having a stock market-oriented corporate economy and there is an extensive literature maintaining that laws affording substantial protection to outside investors are needed for a thriving stock market. Historically, however, UK equity markets have not always flourished and, when they have, law’s contribution has been open to question. This paper considers the uneasy match between law and Britain’s stock market development from when shares first began to trade publicly through to the present day, offering in so doing insights on the relationship between law and equity markets and current reforms intended to revive a flagging UK stock exchange.
- Open Access
- 20 June 2023
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Murder on the City Express - Who is Killing the London Stock Exchange's Equity Market?
In Agatha Christie’s Murder on the Orient Express, Poirot deduced that no single culprit was responsible for a murder on the eponymous train. In this article, which is intended to serve as an aide memoire to assess anticipated reforms, we similarly reason that there is no single suspect responsible for a recent decline in fortunes of the London Stock Exchange’s equity market. We note that globally-relevant factors, such as the rise of private capital, may have impacted the health of the U.K.’s primary stock market. However, sufficiently material differences in various stock market metrics exist between the London Stock Exchange and stock markets elsewhere to suggest that U.K.-specific factors are also significant. We canvass several of those factors: Britain’s listing requirements and corporate governance regime, a paucity of public company investment research, the withdrawal of U.K. pension and insurance firms as public company investors, a U.K. investment culture that prioritises dividends over growth, a lack of world-leading British corporations, and managerial shortcomings. We suggest that all of these factors likely have contributed to the U.K.’s equity market travails, a finding which implies that generating effective reforms will require coherent and expansive policymaking.
- 20 June 2023
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Open AccessMurder on the City Express - Who is Killing the London Stock Exchange's Equity Market?
In Agatha Christie’s Murder on the Orient Express, Poirot deduced that no single culprit was responsible for a murder on the eponymous train. In this article, which is intended to serve as an aide memoire to assess anticipated reforms, we similarly reason that there is no single suspect responsible for a recent decline in fortunes of the London Stock Exchange’s equity market. We note that globally-relevant factors, such as the rise of private capital, may have impacted the health of the U.K.’s primary stock market. However, sufficiently material differences in various stock market metrics exist between the London Stock Exchange and stock markets elsewhere to suggest that U.K.-specific factors are also significant. We canvass several of those factors: Britain’s listing requirements and corporate governance regime, a paucity of public company investment research, the withdrawal of U.K. pension and insurance firms as public company investors, a U.K. investment culture that prioritises dividends over growth, a lack of world-leading British corporations, and managerial shortcomings. We suggest that all of these factors likely have contributed to the U.K.’s equity market travails, a finding which implies that generating effective reforms will require coherent and expansive policymaking.
- Open Access
- 1 March 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Cambridge Law Journal
- Vol. 82 (1) , 17-20
CREDIT WHERE CREDIT'S DUE: THE SUPREME COURT TAKE ON DIRECTORS’ DUTIES AND CREDITORS’ INTERESTS
- 1 March 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Cambridge Law Journal
- Vol. 82 (1) , 17-20
Open AccessCREDIT WHERE CREDIT'S DUE: THE SUPREME COURT TAKE ON DIRECTORS’ DUTIES AND CREDITORS’ INTERESTS
- Open Access
- 27 July 2022
- Published by Wiley in The Modern Law Review
- Vol. 86 (1) , 176-213
Will Listing Rule Reform Deliver Strong Public Markets for the UK?
There is a general consensus that the UK needs strong public equity markets. To help to ensure Britain is well‐positioned on this front, the Financial Conduct Authority reformed the London Stock Exchange's listing regime in 2021 to foster initial public offerings (IPOs). This article outlines and evaluates these IPO‐related reforms, assessing their potential to resuscitate the UK's public equity markets. The article puts the IPO‐related reforms into context by considering whether the fostering of strong equity markets is a sensible policy goal and by assessing what laws governing publicly traded companies can contribute to this endeavour. The article acknowledges that the specific IPO reforms may increase IPO activity but concludes that concerns about strong public markets will continue to exist. This is because the reforms do not address stock market exits or the ‘over’‐regulation of public companies which discourages reliance on equity markets.
- 27 July 2022
- Published by Wiley in The Modern Law Review
- Vol. 86 (1) , 176-213
Open AccessWill Listing Rule Reform Deliver Strong Public Markets for the UK?
There is a general consensus that the UK needs strong public equity markets. To help to ensure Britain is well‐positioned on this front, the Financial Conduct Authority reformed the London Stock Exchange's listing regime in 2021 to foster initial public offerings (IPOs). This article outlines and evaluates these IPO‐related reforms, assessing their potential to resuscitate the UK's public equity markets. The article puts the IPO‐related reforms into context by considering whether the fostering of strong equity markets is a sensible policy goal and by assessing what laws governing publicly traded companies can contribute to this endeavour. The article acknowledges that the specific IPO reforms may increase IPO activity but concludes that concerns about strong public markets will continue to exist. This is because the reforms do not address stock market exits or the ‘over’‐regulation of public companies which discourages reliance on equity markets.