Brian R. Cheffins
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Brian R. Cheffins has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Bernard Black
University of Texas
1 shared publication Bobby V. Reddy
Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
1 shared publication- Bobby Vijay Reddy
University of Cambridge
1 shared publication - Carsten Burhop
9374 University of Bonn , Konviktstrasse 11 , Bonn 53113 , Germany
1 shared publication David Chambers
Judge Business School, University of Cambridge , UK
1 shared publication- David Chambers
Is the academic director of the Centre for Endowment Asset Management in the Judge Business School at the University of Cambridge in Cambridge, UK
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 11 August 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
- Vol. 43 (4) , 725-752
Law and Stock Market Development in the UK over Time: An Uneasy Match
Britain has a reputation for having a stock market-oriented corporate economy and there is an extensive literature maintaining that laws affording substantial protection to outside investors are needed for a thriving stock market. Historically, however, UK equity markets have not always flourished and, when they have, law’s contribution has been open to question. This article considers the uneasy match between law and Britain’s stock market development from when shares first began to trade publicly through to the present day, offering in so doing insights into the relationship between law and equity markets and current reforms intended to revive a flagging UK stock exchange.
- 11 August 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
- Vol. 43 (4) , 725-752
Open AccessLaw and Stock Market Development in the UK over Time: An Uneasy Match
Britain has a reputation for having a stock market-oriented corporate economy and there is an extensive literature maintaining that laws affording substantial protection to outside investors are needed for a thriving stock market. Historically, however, UK equity markets have not always flourished and, when they have, law’s contribution has been open to question. This article considers the uneasy match between law and Britain’s stock market development from when shares first began to trade publicly through to the present day, offering in so doing insights into the relationship between law and equity markets and current reforms intended to revive a flagging UK stock exchange.
- Open Access
- 3 July 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Corporate Law Studies
- Vol. 22 (2) , 709-748
Thirty years and done – time to abolish the UK Corporate Governance Code
A 1992 Code of Best Practice developed by a committee Sir Adrian Cadbury chaired revolutionised UK corporate governance. The Code, which introduced non-statutory best practice provisions with which listed companies could choose not to comply so long as they explained why, has evolved into the more expansive UK Corporate Governance Code of today. This article argues that after 3 decades it is time to do away with the code approach and ‘comply-or-explain’. Much of the current Code’s content is now irrelevant, and disclosure and compliance expectations have escalated to levels that create substantial net costs for companies. Additionally, the Code is now being used to address ‘stakeholder’ issues for which the Code’s shareholder enforcement dependent comply-or-explain mechanism is poorly suited. The Code correspondingly should be abolished, with some key points it addresses being dealt with instead by new disclosure requirements under the Financial Conduct Authority’s Listing Rules.
- 3 July 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Corporate Law Studies
- Vol. 22 (2) , 709-748
Open AccessThirty years and done – time to abolish the UK Corporate Governance Code
A 1992 Code of Best Practice developed by a committee Sir Adrian Cadbury chaired revolutionised UK corporate governance. The Code, which introduced non-statutory best practice provisions with which listed companies could choose not to comply so long as they explained why, has evolved into the more expansive UK Corporate Governance Code of today. This article argues that after 3 decades it is time to do away with the code approach and ‘comply-or-explain’. Much of the current Code’s content is now irrelevant, and disclosure and compliance expectations have escalated to levels that create substantial net costs for companies. Additionally, the Code is now being used to address ‘stakeholder’ issues for which the Code’s shareholder enforcement dependent comply-or-explain mechanism is poorly suited. The Code correspondingly should be abolished, with some key points it addresses being dealt with instead by new disclosure requirements under the Financial Conduct Authority’s Listing Rules.
- 9 November 2021
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium
- Vol. 14 (1) , 67-131
Getting Antitrust and History in Tune
Antitrust is high on the reform agenda at present, associated with calls to “break up big tech.” Proponents of reform have invoked history with regularity in making their case. They say reform is essential to reverse the baleful influence of the Chicago School of antitrust, which, in their telling, disastrously and abruptly ended in the 1980s a “golden” era of beneficially lively antitrust enforcement. In fact, antitrust enforcement was, at best, uneven, from the early 20th century through to the end of the 1970s. As for the antitrust “counter-revolution” of the late 20th century, this was fostered as much by fears of foreign competition and skepticism of government regulation as Chicago School theorizing. The pattern helped to ensure that the counter-revolution was largely sustained through the opening decades of the 21st century. This article, in addition to getting antitrust and history in tune by drawing attention to the foregoing points, provides insights regarding antitrust’s future direction.
- 9 November 2021
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium
- Vol. 14 (1) , 67-131
Getting Antitrust and History in Tune
Antitrust is high on the reform agenda at present, associated with calls to “break up big tech.” Proponents of reform have invoked history with regularity in making their case. They say reform is essential to reverse the baleful influence of the Chicago School of antitrust, which, in their telling, disastrously and abruptly ended in the 1980s a “golden” era of beneficially lively antitrust enforcement. In fact, antitrust enforcement was, at best, uneven, from the early 20th century through to the end of the 1970s. As for the antitrust “counter-revolution” of the late 20th century, this was fostered as much by fears of foreign competition and skepticism of government regulation as Chicago School theorizing. The pattern helped to ensure that the counter-revolution was largely sustained through the opening decades of the 21st century. This article, in addition to getting antitrust and history in tune by drawing attention to the foregoing points, provides insights regarding antitrust’s future direction.
- 1 May 2018
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte / Economic History Yearbook
- Vol. 59 (1) , 9-37
The Rise and Fall of the German IPO Market, 1870-1938
This study of over 1,000 initial public offerings (IPOs) on the Berlin stock exchange from German unification to the eve of World War II draws attention to the importance of regulation and deepens our understanding of German stock market development. An increasingly exacting regulatory environment from the early 1880s to 1914 made a vital contribution to the higher likelihood of firms going public surviving. In the inhospitable regulatory setting of the 1930s, IPO activity drew to a halt and the development in the German stock market over the preceding decades reversed. As a complement to our analysis of the impact of regulation, we document the increased involvement of leading universal banks (D-banks) in the IPO market over the whole period.
- 1 May 2018
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte / Economic History Yearbook
- Vol. 59 (1) , 9-37
The Rise and Fall of the German IPO Market, 1870-1938
This study of over 1,000 initial public offerings (IPOs) on the Berlin stock exchange from German unification to the eve of World War II draws attention to the importance of regulation and deepens our understanding of German stock market development. An increasingly exacting regulatory environment from the early 1880s to 1914 made a vital contribution to the higher likelihood of firms going public surviving. In the inhospitable regulatory setting of the 1930s, IPO activity drew to a halt and the development in the German stock market over the preceding decades reversed. As a complement to our analysis of the impact of regulation, we document the increased involvement of leading universal banks (D-banks) in the IPO market over the whole period.
- 24 April 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
- Vol. 33 (3) , 503-533
The Undermining of UK Corporate Governance(?)
Over the past dozen years numerous overseas based businesses with dominant shareholders have become quoted on the London Stock Exchange, prominent examples of which have joined the ‘blue chip’ FTSE 100 stock market index. While this trend has generated concerns about the ‘undermining’ of UK corporate governance and has fostered reform proposals by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) it has thus far escaped academic attention. This article explains why companies with dominant shareholders have been migrating to London and discusses the policy implications. In so doing it shows that the FSA’s proposals mostly cover familiar ground rather than being innovative but maintains that the case for radical reform has in fact not yet been made out.
- 24 April 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
- Vol. 33 (3) , 503-533
The Undermining of UK Corporate Governance(?)
Over the past dozen years numerous overseas based businesses with dominant shareholders have become quoted on the London Stock Exchange, prominent examples of which have joined the ‘blue chip’ FTSE 100 stock market index. While this trend has generated concerns about the ‘undermining’ of UK corporate governance and has fostered reform proposals by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) it has thus far escaped academic attention. This article explains why companies with dominant shareholders have been migrating to London and discusses the policy implications. In so doing it shows that the FSA’s proposals mostly cover familiar ground rather than being innovative but maintains that the case for radical reform has in fact not yet been made out.
- 28 January 2013
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Business History
- Vol. 55 (4) , 670-693
Ownership dispersion and the London Stock Exchange's ‘two-thirds rule’: an empirical test
In the UK, in contrast to most other countries, a hallmark of corporate governance is a separation of ownership and control. There is evidence suggesting that this pattern may have been the norm in Britain as far back as the late nineteenth century. This paper investigates the extent to which law, in the form of a London Stock Exchange listing rule that prohibited the quotation of a class of securities unless two-thirds of the securities quoted had been subscribed for by and allotted to the public, contributed to this outcome. This paper tests the impact of the two-thirds rule by analysing for domestically based companies that carried out initial public offerings between 1900 and 1911 data compiled from prospectuses, a UK investors' guide and documents filed in accordance with UK companies legislation. The results indicate that the two-thirds rule did not influence ownership and control to the extent that might have been anticipated.
- 28 January 2013
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Business History
- Vol. 55 (4) , 670-693
Ownership dispersion and the London Stock Exchange's ‘two-thirds rule’: an empirical test
In the UK, in contrast to most other countries, a hallmark of corporate governance is a separation of ownership and control. There is evidence suggesting that this pattern may have been the norm in Britain as far back as the late nineteenth century. This paper investigates the extent to which law, in the form of a London Stock Exchange listing rule that prohibited the quotation of a class of securities unless two-thirds of the securities quoted had been subscribed for by and allotted to the public, contributed to this outcome. This paper tests the impact of the two-thirds rule by analysing for domestically based companies that carried out initial public offerings between 1900 and 1911 data compiled from prospectuses, a UK investors' guide and documents filed in accordance with UK companies legislation. The results indicate that the two-thirds rule did not influence ownership and control to the extent that might have been anticipated.
- 15 January 2013
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Business History
- Vol. 55 (4) , 601-619
Questioning ‘law and finance’: US stock market development, 1930–70
An important tenet of a burgeoning ‘law and finance’ literature is that stock market development is contingent upon corporate law offering ample protection to shareholders. This paper addresses this claim, using as its departure point developments occurring in the United States between 1930 and 1970. It shows that, contrary to what the law and finance literature would predict, during this period and throughout the twentieth century generally the US lacked corporate law that provided extensive protection to shareholders. It also points out that while federal securities legislation introduced in the mid-1930s bolstered investor protection, this reform effort did not energise the stock market in the manner implied by law and finance analysis.
- 15 January 2013
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Business History
- Vol. 55 (4) , 601-619
Questioning ‘law and finance’: US stock market development, 1930–70
An important tenet of a burgeoning ‘law and finance’ literature is that stock market development is contingent upon corporate law offering ample protection to shareholders. This paper addresses this claim, using as its departure point developments occurring in the United States between 1930 and 1970. It shows that, contrary to what the law and finance literature would predict, during this period and throughout the twentieth century generally the US lacked corporate law that provided extensive protection to shareholders. It also points out that while federal securities legislation introduced in the mid-1930s bolstered investor protection, this reform effort did not energise the stock market in the manner implied by law and finance analysis.
- 18 March 2005
- Published by Wiley in European Financial Management
- Vol. 11 (2) , 153-171
Liability Risk for Outside Directors: a Cross‐Border Analysis
Much has been said recently about the risky legal environment in which outside directors of public companies operate, especially in the USA, but increasingly elsewhere as well. Our research on outside director liability suggests, however, that directors’ fears are largely unjustified. We examine the law and lawsuit outcomes in four common law countries (Australia, Canada, Britain, and the USA) and three civil law countries (France, Germany, and Japan). The legal terrain and the risk of ‘nominal liability’(a court finds liability or the defendants agree to a settlement) differ greatly depending on the jurisdiction. But nominal liability rarely turns into ‘out‐of‐pocket liability,’ in which the directors pay personally damages or legal fees. Instead, damages and legal fees are paid by the company, directors’ and officers’(D&O) insurance, or both. The bottom line: outside directors of public companies face a very low risk of out‐of‐pocket liability. We sketch the political and market forces that produce functional convergence in outcomes across countries, despite large differences in law, and suggest reasons to think that this outcome might reflect sensible policy.
- 18 March 2005
- Published by Wiley in European Financial Management
- Vol. 11 (2) , 153-171
Liability Risk for Outside Directors: a Cross‐Border Analysis
Much has been said recently about the risky legal environment in which outside directors of public companies operate, especially in the USA, but increasingly elsewhere as well. Our research on outside director liability suggests, however, that directors’ fears are largely unjustified. We examine the law and lawsuit outcomes in four common law countries (Australia, Canada, Britain, and the USA) and three civil law countries (France, Germany, and Japan). The legal terrain and the risk of ‘nominal liability’(a court finds liability or the defendants agree to a settlement) differ greatly depending on the jurisdiction. But nominal liability rarely turns into ‘out‐of‐pocket liability,’ in which the directors pay personally damages or legal fees. Instead, damages and legal fees are paid by the company, directors’ and officers’(D&O) insurance, or both. The bottom line: outside directors of public companies face a very low risk of out‐of‐pocket liability. We sketch the political and market forces that produce functional convergence in outcomes across countries, despite large differences in law, and suggest reasons to think that this outcome might reflect sensible policy.
- 1 January 2003
- Published by Wiley in Corporate Governance: An International Review
- Vol. 11 (1) , 8-24
Will Executive Pay Globalise Along American Lines?
In the United States, the remuneration packages of top executives are characterised by a strong emphasis on pay–for–performance and by a highly lucrative “upside”. There is much discussion of the possibility that executive pay practices will globalise in accordance with this pattern. This paper assesses whether such convergence is likely to occur. It does so by considering market–oriented dynamics that could constitute a “global compensation imperative”. It also takes into account possible obstacles to the Americanisation of executive pay, such as legal regulation, “soft law” and “culture”. The paper concludes with a brief series of normative observations.
- 1 January 2003
- Published by Wiley in Corporate Governance: An International Review
- Vol. 11 (1) , 8-24
Will Executive Pay Globalise Along American Lines?
In the United States, the remuneration packages of top executives are characterised by a strong emphasis on pay–for–performance and by a highly lucrative “upside”. There is much discussion of the possibility that executive pay practices will globalise in accordance with this pattern. This paper assesses whether such convergence is likely to occur. It does so by considering market–oriented dynamics that could constitute a “global compensation imperative”. It also takes into account possible obstacles to the Americanisation of executive pay, such as legal regulation, “soft law” and “culture”. The paper concludes with a brief series of normative observations.