Karl Hagen Bjurstrøm
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Karl Hagen Bjurstrøm has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jonas Kjærvik
University of Oslo
1 shared publication - Jostein Askim
Department of Political Science University of Oslo Oslo Norway
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 10 November 2021
- Published by OsloMet - Oslo Metropolitan University in Nordisk Administrativt Tidsskrift
- Vol. 98 (2)
Mål- og resultatstyring og tillitsbasert styring: Ulike alternativer eller kunstige motsetninger?
Forvaltningspolitikk har i økende grad kommet på dagsorden. Særlig diskuteres behovet for å erstatte mål- og resultatstyring med tillitsbasert styring. I denne artikkelen argumenteres det for at motsetningen mellom mål- og resultatstyring og tillitsbasert styring er kunstig og at tillitsbasert styring er fullt forenelig med mål- og resultatstyring. Heller enn å diskutere mål- og resultatstyring og tillitsbasert styring som ulike dikotomier bør vi studere hvordan behovet for politisk kontroll og faglig autonomi og handlingsrom kan og bør balanseres i utøvelsen av mål- og resultatstyring. Artikkelen viser hvordan ulike teoretiske tilnærminger til styring, samt forskning på etatsstyring i Norge, kan brukes for å forstå ulik praktisering av mål- og resultatstyring. Slik får en et mer nyansert bilde av, og økt bevissthet om, hvordan offentlig styring gjennom mål- og resultatstyring kan utøves.
- 10 November 2021
- Published by OsloMet - Oslo Metropolitan University in Nordisk Administrativt Tidsskrift
- Vol. 98 (2)
Open AccessMål- og resultatstyring og tillitsbasert styring: Ulike alternativer eller kunstige motsetninger?
Forvaltningspolitikk har i økende grad kommet på dagsorden. Særlig diskuteres behovet for å erstatte mål- og resultatstyring med tillitsbasert styring. I denne artikkelen argumenteres det for at motsetningen mellom mål- og resultatstyring og tillitsbasert styring er kunstig og at tillitsbasert styring er fullt forenelig med mål- og resultatstyring. Heller enn å diskutere mål- og resultatstyring og tillitsbasert styring som ulike dikotomier bør vi studere hvordan behovet for politisk kontroll og faglig autonomi og handlingsrom kan og bør balanseres i utøvelsen av mål- og resultatstyring. Artikkelen viser hvordan ulike teoretiske tilnærminger til styring, samt forskning på etatsstyring i Norge, kan brukes for å forstå ulik praktisering av mål- og resultatstyring. Slik får en et mer nyansert bilde av, og økt bevissthet om, hvordan offentlig styring gjennom mål- og resultatstyring kan utøves.
- Open Access
- 24 March 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Public Performance & Management Review
- Vol. 43 (5) , 1053-1077
Principal–Agent or Principal–Steward: How Ministry–Agency Relations Condition the Impact of Performance Management in the Steering of Government Agencies
Using agency and stewardship theories, this article investigates conditions that affect the impact of performance management in the ministerial steering of agencies. Agency theory assumes that agencies act opportunistically, leading to low trust between the ministry and the agency. Conversely, stewardship theory assumes that agencies act trustworthily. Arguably, however, in the steering of agencies, the impact of performance management depends on performance management practices and the type of ministry–agency relation. The effect of performance contract design and a top-down or bottom-up approach to performance management on the impact of performance management is analyzed in the context of whether the ministry–agency relation tends toward the principal–agent or principal–steward type. The data were obtained from a survey of bureaucrats employed in government agencies in Norway and a systematic analysis of official policy documents. The results show that a bottom-up approach increases the impact of performance management in principal–steward relations but not in principal–agent relations. Performance contract design has no effect on the impact of performance management, irrespective of relationship characteristics.
- 24 March 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Public Performance & Management Review
- Vol. 43 (5) , 1053-1077
Open AccessPrincipal–Agent or Principal–Steward: How Ministry–Agency Relations Condition the Impact of Performance Management in the Steering of Government Agencies
Using agency and stewardship theories, this article investigates conditions that affect the impact of performance management in the ministerial steering of agencies. Agency theory assumes that agencies act opportunistically, leading to low trust between the ministry and the agency. Conversely, stewardship theory assumes that agencies act trustworthily. Arguably, however, in the steering of agencies, the impact of performance management depends on performance management practices and the type of ministry–agency relation. The effect of performance contract design and a top-down or bottom-up approach to performance management on the impact of performance management is analyzed in the context of whether the ministry–agency relation tends toward the principal–agent or principal–steward type. The data were obtained from a survey of bureaucrats employed in government agencies in Norway and a systematic analysis of official policy documents. The results show that a bottom-up approach increases the impact of performance management in principal–steward relations but not in principal–agent relations. Performance contract design has no effect on the impact of performance management, irrespective of relationship characteristics.
- 29 October 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Public Management Review
- Vol. 23 (3) , 397-421
How interagency coordination is affected by agency policy autonomy
This article analyses how variances in inter-agency coordination are affected by agencies’ policy autonomy. Performance management has increased the focus on agency autonomy, but knowledge of how different levels of agency autonomy affect coordination amongst government agencies is limited. Theoretically, this article uses agency and stewardship theory to discuss why agencies might regard coordination as either desirable or undesirable. Empirically, this article analyses performance contracts between and annual reports of ministries and government agencies. Findings support the expectation derived from agency theory. Agencies with high autonomy coordinate less with other agencies than agencies with low autonomy do.
- 29 October 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Public Management Review
- Vol. 23 (3) , 397-421
How interagency coordination is affected by agency policy autonomy
This article analyses how variances in inter-agency coordination are affected by agencies’ policy autonomy. Performance management has increased the focus on agency autonomy, but knowledge of how different levels of agency autonomy affect coordination amongst government agencies is limited. Theoretically, this article uses agency and stewardship theory to discuss why agencies might regard coordination as either desirable or undesirable. Empirically, this article analyses performance contracts between and annual reports of ministries and government agencies. Findings support the expectation derived from agency theory. Agencies with high autonomy coordinate less with other agencies than agencies with low autonomy do.
- 3 January 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Public Management Journal
- Vol. 22 (3) , 470-498
Quasi-Contractual Ministerial Steering of State Agencies: Its Intensity, Modes, and How Agency Characteristics Matter
This article demonstrates the value of conceptualizing four ideal types when studying ministries’ contract steering of state agencies—relational, double-whammy, performance, and behavioral steering—each defined by its combination of input- and output-oriented steering. In the system under study—Norway—about half of all agencies are subjected to steering with a clear profile; the other half are not. The two profiles often dismissed or overlooked in existing research—relational and double-whammy steering—are most common. Thus, introducing a contract regime has not meant a clear shift from input to output control, as posited by some. Most agency characteristics under study—size, age, political salience, and tasks—have significant effects on the likelihood that an agency is subjected to one type of steering or another. Still, the analysis suggests that agency-level characteristics constrain ministerial choice about which steering to practice only to a limited extent.
- 3 January 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Public Management Journal
- Vol. 22 (3) , 470-498
Quasi-Contractual Ministerial Steering of State Agencies: Its Intensity, Modes, and How Agency Characteristics Matter
This article demonstrates the value of conceptualizing four ideal types when studying ministries’ contract steering of state agencies—relational, double-whammy, performance, and behavioral steering—each defined by its combination of input- and output-oriented steering. In the system under study—Norway—about half of all agencies are subjected to steering with a clear profile; the other half are not. The two profiles often dismissed or overlooked in existing research—relational and double-whammy steering—are most common. Thus, introducing a contract regime has not meant a clear shift from input to output control, as posited by some. Most agency characteristics under study—size, age, political salience, and tasks—have significant effects on the likelihood that an agency is subjected to one type of steering or another. Still, the analysis suggests that agency-level characteristics constrain ministerial choice about which steering to practice only to a limited extent.