Yiwei Li
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Yiwei Li has a total of 23 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Yeqin Zeng
Durham University Durham UK
5 shared publications - Zhe Shen
School of Management Xiamen University Xiamen China
3 shared publications - Houjian Li
College of Economics, Sichuan Agricultural University, Chengdu 611130, China
2 shared publications - Wei Shen
Arizona State U
2 shared publications Zhiliang Zhu
2 shared publicationsBo Xu
International School of Finance Fudan University Shanghai China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 19 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Executive Work Experience and Strategic Financing: How Generalist CEOs Shape Debt Structure
This study investigates whether the breadth of CEOs' work experience influences the concentration of firms' debt structure. CEOs with a greater variety of work experience are often referred to as generalist CEOs because they are likely to possess greater general managerial skills. We predict and document a negative relation between generalist CEOs and corporate debt concentration using a sample of S&P 1500 firms from 2001 to 2022. To address endogeneity, we employ propensity score matching, entropy balancing, and a difference-indifferences approach based on CEOs' sudden deaths as plausibly exogenous shocks. We further identify information disclosure as a key mechanism that mediates the negative relation between generalist CEOs and corporate debt concentration. Generalist CEOs, owing to greater career confidence, exhibit a stronger willingness to disclose information, which facilitates a more diversified debt structure by reducing information asymmetry with creditors. The negative relation between general managerial skills and debt concentration is more pronounced for firms with greater CEO power, tighter financial constraints, lower credit ratings, higher default risks, weaker management team ability, and when CFOs are also generalists. Overall, the evidence highlights how CEOs' work experience affect information disclosure and, in turn, firms' financing structure.
- 19 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessExecutive Work Experience and Strategic Financing: How Generalist CEOs Shape Debt Structure
This study investigates whether the breadth of CEOs' work experience influences the concentration of firms' debt structure. CEOs with a greater variety of work experience are often referred to as generalist CEOs because they are likely to possess greater general managerial skills. We predict and document a negative relation between generalist CEOs and corporate debt concentration using a sample of S&P 1500 firms from 2001 to 2022. To address endogeneity, we employ propensity score matching, entropy balancing, and a difference-indifferences approach based on CEOs' sudden deaths as plausibly exogenous shocks. We further identify information disclosure as a key mechanism that mediates the negative relation between generalist CEOs and corporate debt concentration. Generalist CEOs, owing to greater career confidence, exhibit a stronger willingness to disclose information, which facilitates a more diversified debt structure by reducing information asymmetry with creditors. The negative relation between general managerial skills and debt concentration is more pronounced for firms with greater CEO power, tighter financial constraints, lower credit ratings, higher default risks, weaker management team ability, and when CFOs are also generalists. Overall, the evidence highlights how CEOs' work experience affect information disclosure and, in turn, firms' financing structure.
- Open Access
- 18 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Executive Work Experience and Strategic Financing: How Generalist CEOs Shape Debt Structure
This study investigates whether the breadth of CEOs’ work experience influences the concentration of firms’ debt structure. CEOs with a greater variety of work experience are often referred to as generalist CEOs because they are likely to possess greater general managerial skills. We predict and document a negative relation between generalist CEOs and corporate debt concentration using a sample of S&P 1500 firms from 2001 to 2022. To address endogeneity, we employ propensity score matching, entropy balancing, and a difference-in-differences approach based on CEOs’ sudden deaths as plausibly exogenous shocks. We further identify information disclosure as a key mechanism that mediates the negative relation between generalist CEOs and corporate debt concentration. Generalist CEOs, owing to greater career confidence, exhibit a stronger willingness to disclose information, which facilitates a more diversified debt structure by reducing information asymmetry with creditors. The negative relation between general managerial skills and debt concentration is more pronounced for firms with greater CEO power, tighter financial constraints, lower credit ratings, higher default risks, weaker management team ability, and when CFOs are also generalists. Overall, the evidence highlights how CEOs’ work experience affects information disclosure and, in turn, firms’ financing structure.
- 18 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessExecutive Work Experience and Strategic Financing: How Generalist CEOs Shape Debt Structure
This study investigates whether the breadth of CEOs’ work experience influences the concentration of firms’ debt structure. CEOs with a greater variety of work experience are often referred to as generalist CEOs because they are likely to possess greater general managerial skills. We predict and document a negative relation between generalist CEOs and corporate debt concentration using a sample of S&P 1500 firms from 2001 to 2022. To address endogeneity, we employ propensity score matching, entropy balancing, and a difference-in-differences approach based on CEOs’ sudden deaths as plausibly exogenous shocks. We further identify information disclosure as a key mechanism that mediates the negative relation between generalist CEOs and corporate debt concentration. Generalist CEOs, owing to greater career confidence, exhibit a stronger willingness to disclose information, which facilitates a more diversified debt structure by reducing information asymmetry with creditors. The negative relation between general managerial skills and debt concentration is more pronounced for firms with greater CEO power, tighter financial constraints, lower credit ratings, higher default risks, weaker management team ability, and when CFOs are also generalists. Overall, the evidence highlights how CEOs’ work experience affects information disclosure and, in turn, firms’ financing structure.
- 10 July 2026
- Published by Wiley in Financial Review
- Vol. 61 (4) , 1483-1508
CEOs’ Capital Gains Taxes and Corporate Environmental Performance
We examine the association between CEOs’ unrealized long‐term capital gains tax liabilities (tax burdens) and corporate environmental performance. Prior research suggests that managers facing higher tax burdens are less likely to sell stock and therefore become more exposed to firm‐specific risk. This greater undiversified exposure reduces their willingness to undertake risky corporate actions and increases their focus on long‐term firm stability. We therefore hypothesize that higher tax burdens make CEOs more attentive to corporate environmental misconduct. We find that toxic waste generation declines as CEOs’ tax burdens increase. This negative association is stronger among firms with weaker internal governance, less stringent environmental regulatory scrutiny, and CEOs facing stronger career‐related pressure to prioritize near‐term results or having fewer opportunities to diversify risk. Channel tests suggest that higher CEO tax burdens reduce toxic waste generation by improving corporate productive efficiency and increasing green innovation. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of CEOs’ personal tax burdens in shaping corporate environmental policy.
- 10 July 2026
- Published by Wiley in Financial Review
- Vol. 61 (4) , 1483-1508
CEOs’ Capital Gains Taxes and Corporate Environmental Performance
We examine the association between CEOs’ unrealized long‐term capital gains tax liabilities (tax burdens) and corporate environmental performance. Prior research suggests that managers facing higher tax burdens are less likely to sell stock and therefore become more exposed to firm‐specific risk. This greater undiversified exposure reduces their willingness to undertake risky corporate actions and increases their focus on long‐term firm stability. We therefore hypothesize that higher tax burdens make CEOs more attentive to corporate environmental misconduct. We find that toxic waste generation declines as CEOs’ tax burdens increase. This negative association is stronger among firms with weaker internal governance, less stringent environmental regulatory scrutiny, and CEOs facing stronger career‐related pressure to prioritize near‐term results or having fewer opportunities to diversify risk. Channel tests suggest that higher CEO tax burdens reduce toxic waste generation by improving corporate productive efficiency and increasing green innovation. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of CEOs’ personal tax burdens in shaping corporate environmental policy.
- 10 June 2026
- Published by Wiley in Financial Review
- Vol. 61 (4) , 1433-1459
Executive Team Incentive Heterogeneity and Information Suppression
We examine whether the equity incentive heterogeneity of the executive team engenders a positive externality by curtailing stock price crash risk. Supporting this prediction, we find a negative relation between the equity incentive heterogeneity of the executive team and stock price crash risk. Our strong, robust evidence implies that this equity incentive heterogeneity plays a major internal governance role in preempting corporate bad news hoarding activities. In additional analysis, we show that the relation between equity incentive heterogeneity and crash risk is stronger for firms experiencing severe agency conflicts and poor governance. Collectively, our results lend empirical support for the importance of developing a heterogeneous equity incentive structure to deter corporate misbehavior, which, in turn, constrains stock price crash risk.
- 10 June 2026
- Published by Wiley in Financial Review
- Vol. 61 (4) , 1433-1459
Executive Team Incentive Heterogeneity and Information Suppression
We examine whether the equity incentive heterogeneity of the executive team engenders a positive externality by curtailing stock price crash risk. Supporting this prediction, we find a negative relation between the equity incentive heterogeneity of the executive team and stock price crash risk. Our strong, robust evidence implies that this equity incentive heterogeneity plays a major internal governance role in preempting corporate bad news hoarding activities. In additional analysis, we show that the relation between equity incentive heterogeneity and crash risk is stronger for firms experiencing severe agency conflicts and poor governance. Collectively, our results lend empirical support for the importance of developing a heterogeneous equity incentive structure to deter corporate misbehavior, which, in turn, constrains stock price crash risk.
- Open Access
- 30 June 2025
- Published by Wiley in Financial Review
- Vol. 61 (1) , 39-58
How Early Trauma Shapes CEO Risk Appetite for Public Debt Versus Bank Debt
This study examines the impact of CEOs’ early disaster experiences on the choice of debt structure. We find that firms led by CEOs who have endured disasters are more inclined to shift from bank debt to public debt. This evidence remains robust across various alternative measures, empirical specifications, and identification tests aimed at mitigating endogeneity. The effect of CEOs’ early disaster experiences is more pronounced under specific institutional conditions. The effect strengthens with stricter regulatory oversight and lower unemployment risk, suggesting that institutional environments shape how personal experiences manifest in financial decisions. Overall, these findings suggest that the CEOs' inclination, shaped by early disasters, to take additional risk and seek greater autonomy, can have significant effects on corporate debt structure.
- 30 June 2025
- Published by Wiley in Financial Review
- Vol. 61 (1) , 39-58
Open AccessHow Early Trauma Shapes CEO Risk Appetite for Public Debt Versus Bank Debt
This study examines the impact of CEOs’ early disaster experiences on the choice of debt structure. We find that firms led by CEOs who have endured disasters are more inclined to shift from bank debt to public debt. This evidence remains robust across various alternative measures, empirical specifications, and identification tests aimed at mitigating endogeneity. The effect of CEOs’ early disaster experiences is more pronounced under specific institutional conditions. The effect strengthens with stricter regulatory oversight and lower unemployment risk, suggesting that institutional environments shape how personal experiences manifest in financial decisions. Overall, these findings suggest that the CEOs' inclination, shaped by early disasters, to take additional risk and seek greater autonomy, can have significant effects on corporate debt structure.
- 17 September 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Finance Research Letters
- Vol. 69
Revolutionizing Bitcoin price forecasts: A comparative study of advanced hybrid deep learning architectures
- 17 September 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Finance Research Letters
- Vol. 69
Revolutionizing Bitcoin price forecasts: A comparative study of advanced hybrid deep learning architectures
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Corporate Integrity Culture and Bad News Hoarding: An Empirical Analysis of Stock Price Crash Risk
Based on corporate culture measured by analysing earnings call transcripts for 62,664 firm-year observations over the period 2001-2018, we find that corporate integrity culture engenders a positive externality in firms by curtailing stock price crash risk. Possible channels include an enhanced information environment, better employee treatment, and a stronger stakeholder orientation. The causal relation between corporate integrity culture and stock price crash risk is confirmed using three identification tests: matching analyses, change analysis, and exogenous shock of CEO sudden death. Overall, our empirical evidence highlights the important role of corporate integrity culture in deterring corporate misconduct and enhancing market stability.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCorporate Integrity Culture and Bad News Hoarding: An Empirical Analysis of Stock Price Crash Risk
Based on corporate culture measured by analysing earnings call transcripts for 62,664 firm-year observations over the period 2001-2018, we find that corporate integrity culture engenders a positive externality in firms by curtailing stock price crash risk. Possible channels include an enhanced information environment, better employee treatment, and a stronger stakeholder orientation. The causal relation between corporate integrity culture and stock price crash risk is confirmed using three identification tests: matching analyses, change analysis, and exogenous shock of CEO sudden death. Overall, our empirical evidence highlights the important role of corporate integrity culture in deterring corporate misconduct and enhancing market stability.
- Open Access
- 2 October 2023
- Published by Wiley in Corporate Governance: An International Review
- Vol. 32 (4) , 600-624
Does the age of compensation committee members matter for CEO compensation?
Research Question/Issue: We examine the impact of the age of compensation committee (CC) members on CEO compensation. Sociological theory suggests that age is a significant demographic factor influencing behavior. We argue that monitoring intensity increases with age because older directors are more likely to commit to their fiduciary duties.Research Findings/Insights: Using FTSE 350 firms for the period 2002 to 2017, we find that CC members' age is negatively associated with the level of CEO pay but positively associated with pay–performance sensitivity after controlling for risk aversion attitude, experience in board monitoring, knowledge of the firm, and other firm and CEO characteristics. The relationships remain robust to alternative measures for age and compensation, using two‐stage least squares and high‐dimensional fixed effects models. Consistent with the view that older individuals tend to hold higher ethical standards and concomitant closer monitoring, we find that age effects are sensitive to the influence of ethical factors and are strongest for those firms for which intense monitoring is most needed. This suggests that age operates via older directors carrying out their roles more assiduously. We further show that our findings are less likely to be driven by director reputational effects, and the relationship between CC member age and CEO compensation persists even when we control for multiple dimensions of culturally inherited attributes of the CC members.Theoretical/Academic Implications: Despite the large literature on the influence of demographic characteristics on corporate governance, this study is the first on the monitoring effect of CC members' age. It contributes to the literature on the influence of demographic characteristic. It also contributes to the literature on CEO compensation by identifying a demographic factor—age—as a determinant of CEO pay, after controlling for the economic and corporate governance variables of the firm.Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study highlights the role of demographic factors in explaining the monitoring of the CEO compensation contracting process and provides timely evidence on the recent regulatory changes.
- 2 October 2023
- Published by Wiley in Corporate Governance: An International Review
- Vol. 32 (4) , 600-624
Open AccessDoes the age of compensation committee members matter for CEO compensation?
Research Question/Issue: We examine the impact of the age of compensation committee (CC) members on CEO compensation. Sociological theory suggests that age is a significant demographic factor influencing behavior. We argue that monitoring intensity increases with age because older directors are more likely to commit to their fiduciary duties.Research Findings/Insights: Using FTSE 350 firms for the period 2002 to 2017, we find that CC members' age is negatively associated with the level of CEO pay but positively associated with pay–performance sensitivity after controlling for risk aversion attitude, experience in board monitoring, knowledge of the firm, and other firm and CEO characteristics. The relationships remain robust to alternative measures for age and compensation, using two‐stage least squares and high‐dimensional fixed effects models. Consistent with the view that older individuals tend to hold higher ethical standards and concomitant closer monitoring, we find that age effects are sensitive to the influence of ethical factors and are strongest for those firms for which intense monitoring is most needed. This suggests that age operates via older directors carrying out their roles more assiduously. We further show that our findings are less likely to be driven by director reputational effects, and the relationship between CC member age and CEO compensation persists even when we control for multiple dimensions of culturally inherited attributes of the CC members.Theoretical/Academic Implications: Despite the large literature on the influence of demographic characteristics on corporate governance, this study is the first on the monitoring effect of CC members' age. It contributes to the literature on the influence of demographic characteristic. It also contributes to the literature on CEO compensation by identifying a demographic factor—age—as a determinant of CEO pay, after controlling for the economic and corporate governance variables of the firm.Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study highlights the role of demographic factors in explaining the monitoring of the CEO compensation contracting process and provides timely evidence on the recent regulatory changes.
- Open Access
- 11 September 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
- Vol. 61 (4) , 1379-1413
The impact of shareholder litigation risk on income smoothing
This paper investigates whether and how shareholder litigation influences income smoothing. Using the ruling of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1999 as an exogenous shock to the threat of litigation, we find that the increasing difficulty of class action lawsuits decreases income smoothing. This finding is robust to different model specifications. We also show that such an effect is stronger for firms that are more likely to face greater pressure from the threat of shareholder litigation risk. Overall, our findings extend the literature on investigating how class action lawsuits can affect the motivation of income smoothing.
- 11 September 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
- Vol. 61 (4) , 1379-1413
Open AccessThe impact of shareholder litigation risk on income smoothing
This paper investigates whether and how shareholder litigation influences income smoothing. Using the ruling of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1999 as an exogenous shock to the threat of litigation, we find that the increasing difficulty of class action lawsuits decreases income smoothing. This finding is robust to different model specifications. We also show that such an effect is stronger for firms that are more likely to face greater pressure from the threat of shareholder litigation risk. Overall, our findings extend the literature on investigating how class action lawsuits can affect the motivation of income smoothing.
- Open Access
- 13 February 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Generalist CEOs and Stock Price Crash Risk
We investigate whether generalist chief executive officers (CEOs) who gain transferable skills across firms and industries have less incentive to hoard bad news. To address endogeneity concerns stemming from firm-CEO matching, we deploy a difference-in-differences method utilizing exogenous CEO turnovers, a propensity score matching model, and Oster's (2019) coefficient stability test. Supporting our conjecture, we find a negative relation between CEOs' general ability index (GAI) and future stock price crash risk. The effect of GAI on crash risk is stronger when CEOs have more career concerns or firms have more operational complexity. Our analysis further suggests that generalist CEOs attenuate crash risk by reducing real earnings management and increasing conditional accounting conservatism. Taken together, our findings highlight the role of CEOs' general human capital in increasing their tolerance for failure and mitigating the agency problem.
- 13 February 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessGeneralist CEOs and Stock Price Crash Risk
We investigate whether generalist chief executive officers (CEOs) who gain transferable skills across firms and industries have less incentive to hoard bad news. To address endogeneity concerns stemming from firm-CEO matching, we deploy a difference-in-differences method utilizing exogenous CEO turnovers, a propensity score matching model, and Oster's (2019) coefficient stability test. Supporting our conjecture, we find a negative relation between CEOs' general ability index (GAI) and future stock price crash risk. The effect of GAI on crash risk is stronger when CEOs have more career concerns or firms have more operational complexity. Our analysis further suggests that generalist CEOs attenuate crash risk by reducing real earnings management and increasing conditional accounting conservatism. Taken together, our findings highlight the role of CEOs' general human capital in increasing their tolerance for failure and mitigating the agency problem.