Yeqin Zeng
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Yeqin Zeng has a total of 38 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Yiwei Li
Essex Business School University of Essex Colchester Essex UK
5 shared publications Chao Yin
Durham University Business School Durham University Durham DH1 3LB UK
4 shared publicationsWenyi Sun
4 shared publications- Haifeng Guo
School of Finance, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu, China
3 shared publications - Zhe Shen
School of Management Xiamen University Xiamen China
3 shared publications - Chao Yin
University of Edinburgh
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 26 August 2026
- Published by Wiley in International Journal of Finance & Economics
The Impact of Monetary Policy Shocks on Stock Price Crash Risk
This study examines the impact of monetary policy shocks (MPS) on future stock price crash risk (SPCR), using a sample of US firms from 1995 to 2019. We find that expansionary MPS significantly reduce the likelihood of SPCR, while contractionary MPS show no statistically significant effect on SPCR. These results remain robust after controlling for omitted variable bias, reverse causality concern, selection bias, varying forecasting windows, and incorporating different industry definitions. Furthermore, we find that expansionary MPS prevent the accumulation of bad news by curbing aggressive accrual and real earnings management (REM). We also provide evidence for two non–earnings–management‐based channels, where expansionary shocks alleviate external financing constraints and improve investment efficiency. The relation between expansionary MPS and SPCR is more pronounced among firms with better governance monitoring, lower ex‐ante risk, less information asymmetry, greater financial constraints, higher product market competition, and greater stock return sensitivity to MPS. Overall, our findings highlight the important role of macroeconomic policy uncertainty in shaping corporate financial disclosure.
- 26 August 2026
- Published by Wiley in International Journal of Finance & Economics
Open AccessThe Impact of Monetary Policy Shocks on Stock Price Crash Risk
This study examines the impact of monetary policy shocks (MPS) on future stock price crash risk (SPCR), using a sample of US firms from 1995 to 2019. We find that expansionary MPS significantly reduce the likelihood of SPCR, while contractionary MPS show no statistically significant effect on SPCR. These results remain robust after controlling for omitted variable bias, reverse causality concern, selection bias, varying forecasting windows, and incorporating different industry definitions. Furthermore, we find that expansionary MPS prevent the accumulation of bad news by curbing aggressive accrual and real earnings management (REM). We also provide evidence for two non–earnings–management‐based channels, where expansionary shocks alleviate external financing constraints and improve investment efficiency. The relation between expansionary MPS and SPCR is more pronounced among firms with better governance monitoring, lower ex‐ante risk, less information asymmetry, greater financial constraints, higher product market competition, and greater stock return sensitivity to MPS. Overall, our findings highlight the important role of macroeconomic policy uncertainty in shaping corporate financial disclosure.
- Open Access
- 26 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Production Network Position and Inventory Management Efficiency
This paper examines whether a firm’s sectoral position in the production network affects its inventory management efficiency. Using China’s input–output tables, we construct an inter-sector network and measure sector centrality using closeness centrality. We find that firms operating in more central sectors exhibit significantly higher inventory turnover, with a stronger effect among non-state-owned and more diversified firms, as well as under higher demand uncertainty, greater supply chain disruption risks, and more intense market competition. Our findings identify production network centrality as an important determinant of inventory efficiency and highlight the role of information embedded in production networks in shaping firms’ operational outcomes.
- 26 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessProduction Network Position and Inventory Management Efficiency
This paper examines whether a firm’s sectoral position in the production network affects its inventory management efficiency. Using China’s input–output tables, we construct an inter-sector network and measure sector centrality using closeness centrality. We find that firms operating in more central sectors exhibit significantly higher inventory turnover, with a stronger effect among non-state-owned and more diversified firms, as well as under higher demand uncertainty, greater supply chain disruption risks, and more intense market competition. Our findings identify production network centrality as an important determinant of inventory efficiency and highlight the role of information embedded in production networks in shaping firms’ operational outcomes.
- Open Access
- 19 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Executive Work Experience and Strategic Financing: How Generalist CEOs Shape Debt Structure
This study investigates whether the breadth of CEOs' work experience influences the concentration of firms' debt structure. CEOs with a greater variety of work experience are often referred to as generalist CEOs because they are likely to possess greater general managerial skills. We predict and document a negative relation between generalist CEOs and corporate debt concentration using a sample of S&P 1500 firms from 2001 to 2022. To address endogeneity, we employ propensity score matching, entropy balancing, and a difference-indifferences approach based on CEOs' sudden deaths as plausibly exogenous shocks. We further identify information disclosure as a key mechanism that mediates the negative relation between generalist CEOs and corporate debt concentration. Generalist CEOs, owing to greater career confidence, exhibit a stronger willingness to disclose information, which facilitates a more diversified debt structure by reducing information asymmetry with creditors. The negative relation between general managerial skills and debt concentration is more pronounced for firms with greater CEO power, tighter financial constraints, lower credit ratings, higher default risks, weaker management team ability, and when CFOs are also generalists. Overall, the evidence highlights how CEOs' work experience affect information disclosure and, in turn, firms' financing structure.
- 19 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessExecutive Work Experience and Strategic Financing: How Generalist CEOs Shape Debt Structure
This study investigates whether the breadth of CEOs' work experience influences the concentration of firms' debt structure. CEOs with a greater variety of work experience are often referred to as generalist CEOs because they are likely to possess greater general managerial skills. We predict and document a negative relation between generalist CEOs and corporate debt concentration using a sample of S&P 1500 firms from 2001 to 2022. To address endogeneity, we employ propensity score matching, entropy balancing, and a difference-indifferences approach based on CEOs' sudden deaths as plausibly exogenous shocks. We further identify information disclosure as a key mechanism that mediates the negative relation between generalist CEOs and corporate debt concentration. Generalist CEOs, owing to greater career confidence, exhibit a stronger willingness to disclose information, which facilitates a more diversified debt structure by reducing information asymmetry with creditors. The negative relation between general managerial skills and debt concentration is more pronounced for firms with greater CEO power, tighter financial constraints, lower credit ratings, higher default risks, weaker management team ability, and when CFOs are also generalists. Overall, the evidence highlights how CEOs' work experience affect information disclosure and, in turn, firms' financing structure.
- Open Access
- 18 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Executive Work Experience and Strategic Financing: How Generalist CEOs Shape Debt Structure
This study investigates whether the breadth of CEOs’ work experience influences the concentration of firms’ debt structure. CEOs with a greater variety of work experience are often referred to as generalist CEOs because they are likely to possess greater general managerial skills. We predict and document a negative relation between generalist CEOs and corporate debt concentration using a sample of S&P 1500 firms from 2001 to 2022. To address endogeneity, we employ propensity score matching, entropy balancing, and a difference-in-differences approach based on CEOs’ sudden deaths as plausibly exogenous shocks. We further identify information disclosure as a key mechanism that mediates the negative relation between generalist CEOs and corporate debt concentration. Generalist CEOs, owing to greater career confidence, exhibit a stronger willingness to disclose information, which facilitates a more diversified debt structure by reducing information asymmetry with creditors. The negative relation between general managerial skills and debt concentration is more pronounced for firms with greater CEO power, tighter financial constraints, lower credit ratings, higher default risks, weaker management team ability, and when CFOs are also generalists. Overall, the evidence highlights how CEOs’ work experience affects information disclosure and, in turn, firms’ financing structure.
- 18 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessExecutive Work Experience and Strategic Financing: How Generalist CEOs Shape Debt Structure
This study investigates whether the breadth of CEOs’ work experience influences the concentration of firms’ debt structure. CEOs with a greater variety of work experience are often referred to as generalist CEOs because they are likely to possess greater general managerial skills. We predict and document a negative relation between generalist CEOs and corporate debt concentration using a sample of S&P 1500 firms from 2001 to 2022. To address endogeneity, we employ propensity score matching, entropy balancing, and a difference-in-differences approach based on CEOs’ sudden deaths as plausibly exogenous shocks. We further identify information disclosure as a key mechanism that mediates the negative relation between generalist CEOs and corporate debt concentration. Generalist CEOs, owing to greater career confidence, exhibit a stronger willingness to disclose information, which facilitates a more diversified debt structure by reducing information asymmetry with creditors. The negative relation between general managerial skills and debt concentration is more pronounced for firms with greater CEO power, tighter financial constraints, lower credit ratings, higher default risks, weaker management team ability, and when CFOs are also generalists. Overall, the evidence highlights how CEOs’ work experience affects information disclosure and, in turn, firms’ financing structure.
- Open Access
- 4 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Production Network Position and Inventory Management Efficiency
This paper examines whether a firm’s sectoral position in the production network affects its inventory management efficiency. Using China’s input–output tables, we construct an inter-sector network and measure sector centrality using closeness centrality. We find that firms operating in more central sectors exhibit significantly higher inventory turnover, with a stronger effect among non-state-owned and more diversified firms, as well as under higher demand uncertainty, greater supply chain disruption risks, and more intense market competition. Our findings identify production network centrality as an important determinant of inventory efficiency and highlight the role of information embedded in production networks in shaping firms’ operational outcomes.
- 4 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessProduction Network Position and Inventory Management Efficiency
This paper examines whether a firm’s sectoral position in the production network affects its inventory management efficiency. Using China’s input–output tables, we construct an inter-sector network and measure sector centrality using closeness centrality. We find that firms operating in more central sectors exhibit significantly higher inventory turnover, with a stronger effect among non-state-owned and more diversified firms, as well as under higher demand uncertainty, greater supply chain disruption risks, and more intense market competition. Our findings identify production network centrality as an important determinant of inventory efficiency and highlight the role of information embedded in production networks in shaping firms’ operational outcomes.
- 10 June 2026
- Published by Wiley in Financial Review
- Vol. 61 (4) , 1433-1459
Executive Team Incentive Heterogeneity and Information Suppression
We examine whether the equity incentive heterogeneity of the executive team engenders a positive externality by curtailing stock price crash risk. Supporting this prediction, we find a negative relation between the equity incentive heterogeneity of the executive team and stock price crash risk. Our strong, robust evidence implies that this equity incentive heterogeneity plays a major internal governance role in preempting corporate bad news hoarding activities. In additional analysis, we show that the relation between equity incentive heterogeneity and crash risk is stronger for firms experiencing severe agency conflicts and poor governance. Collectively, our results lend empirical support for the importance of developing a heterogeneous equity incentive structure to deter corporate misbehavior, which, in turn, constrains stock price crash risk.
- 10 June 2026
- Published by Wiley in Financial Review
- Vol. 61 (4) , 1433-1459
Executive Team Incentive Heterogeneity and Information Suppression
We examine whether the equity incentive heterogeneity of the executive team engenders a positive externality by curtailing stock price crash risk. Supporting this prediction, we find a negative relation between the equity incentive heterogeneity of the executive team and stock price crash risk. Our strong, robust evidence implies that this equity incentive heterogeneity plays a major internal governance role in preempting corporate bad news hoarding activities. In additional analysis, we show that the relation between equity incentive heterogeneity and crash risk is stronger for firms experiencing severe agency conflicts and poor governance. Collectively, our results lend empirical support for the importance of developing a heterogeneous equity incentive structure to deter corporate misbehavior, which, in turn, constrains stock price crash risk.
- 25 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Financial Analysis
- Vol. 113
CEOs’ early-life disaster experiences and corporate hedging activities
- 25 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Financial Analysis
- Vol. 113
CEOs’ early-life disaster experiences and corporate hedging activities
- Open Access
- 6 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Automation Exposure and Investment Sensitivity
This paper investigates the effect of automation exposure on firms’ investment sensitivity. Using a sample of U.S. public firms spanning the period 1980–2020, we document a negative effect of automation exposure on both investment–cash flow sensitivity and investment–price sensitivity. Our main finding remains robust after accounting for a range of potential endogeneity concerns. The negative effect on investment–cash flow sensitivity is more pronounced among firms with financial constraints, while the negative effect on investment–price sensitivity is stronger for firms with higher stock price informativeness and more managerial incentives to learn from the market. Overall, our study highlights the important role of automation technologies in shaping corporate activities.
- 6 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessAutomation Exposure and Investment Sensitivity
This paper investigates the effect of automation exposure on firms’ investment sensitivity. Using a sample of U.S. public firms spanning the period 1980–2020, we document a negative effect of automation exposure on both investment–cash flow sensitivity and investment–price sensitivity. Our main finding remains robust after accounting for a range of potential endogeneity concerns. The negative effect on investment–cash flow sensitivity is more pronounced among firms with financial constraints, while the negative effect on investment–price sensitivity is stronger for firms with higher stock price informativeness and more managerial incentives to learn from the market. Overall, our study highlights the important role of automation technologies in shaping corporate activities.
- Open Access
- 3 May 2024
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
- Vol. 52 (1) , 182-221
Generalist CEOs and stock price crash risk
We investigate whether generalist chief executive officers (CEOs), that is, CEOs who gain transferable skills across firms and industries, have less incentive to hoard bad news. To address endogeneity concerns stemming from firm–CEO matching, we deploy a difference‐in‐differences method utilizing exogenous CEO turnovers, propensity score matching and entropy balancing matching methods, and Oster's coefficient stability test. Supporting our conjecture, we find a negative relation between CEOs’ general ability index (GAI) and future stock price crash risk. The effect of CEOs’ GAI on crash risk is stronger when labor demand is stronger and when firms have more agency conflicts. Our analysis further suggests that generalist CEOs attenuate crash risk by increasing conditional accounting conservatism and reducing real earnings management. Taken together, our findings highlight the role of CEOs’ general human capital in increasing their tolerance for failure and mitigating the agency problem.
- 3 May 2024
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
- Vol. 52 (1) , 182-221
Open AccessGeneralist CEOs and stock price crash risk
We investigate whether generalist chief executive officers (CEOs), that is, CEOs who gain transferable skills across firms and industries, have less incentive to hoard bad news. To address endogeneity concerns stemming from firm–CEO matching, we deploy a difference‐in‐differences method utilizing exogenous CEO turnovers, propensity score matching and entropy balancing matching methods, and Oster's coefficient stability test. Supporting our conjecture, we find a negative relation between CEOs’ general ability index (GAI) and future stock price crash risk. The effect of CEOs’ GAI on crash risk is stronger when labor demand is stronger and when firms have more agency conflicts. Our analysis further suggests that generalist CEOs attenuate crash risk by increasing conditional accounting conservatism and reducing real earnings management. Taken together, our findings highlight the role of CEOs’ general human capital in increasing their tolerance for failure and mitigating the agency problem.
- 7 March 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 237
Do young CEOs matter for corporate digital transformation?
- 7 March 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 237
Do young CEOs matter for corporate digital transformation?