SFSergi Ferrer

Sergi Ferrer

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Sergi Ferrer has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Winners’ Restraint or Affective Majoritarianism? Elections, Polarization and Political Support

    by Damjan Tomic, Sergi Ferrer, Enrique Prada, Enrique Hernández

    Research on the impact of elections on attitudes toward democracy has focused primarily on satisfaction with democracy. Building on this, we analyze how winning and losing elections, along with affective polarization, shapes citizens’ support for norms of democratic restraint and consent. We propose that partisan animus weakens the “reservoir of goodwill” that helps citizens accept democratic norms that may go against their self interest. Using a comparative study of 35 elections and two quasi-experimental case studies, we find that while differences between winners and losers in their support for norms of restraint and consent can be statistically significant, they are substantively small compared to several benchmarks, even in highly polarized contexts. Thus, while satisfaction with democracy is notably shaped by winner-loser dynamics, especially when polarization is high, the impact of those dynamics on support for core democratic principles is limited. These findings improve our understanding of the role of citizens in democratic processes.


  • Open Access

    The value of liberal democracy: Assessing citizens' commitment to democratic principles

    by Sergi Ferrer, Enrique Hernández, Enrique Prada, Damjan Tomic

    Recent studies suggest that citizens are unlikely to trade off free elections for other desirable outcomes, such as economic growth. However, while free elections are central to democracies, today democracy is not often undermined by abolishing elections. Our study shifts the focus to citizens' willingness to trade off the more granular democratic principles frequently eroded in backsliding processes – such as judicial independence, media freedom or horizontal accountability – for higher incomes. Through a seven‐country conjoint experiment, we analyse how citizens prioritize among these principles and estimate their ‘willingness to pay’ – or the additional income needed to persuade citizens to give these principles up. We find that while citizens do not relinquish free elections easily, they are more open to forgo liberal principles undermined in backsliding processes, especially when these principles are eroded gradually, one at a time. These findings help explain why democratic backsliding may be often tolerated by citizens.


  • Open Access

    The political consequences of polarization: Quasi-experimental evidence from runoff elections

    by Sergi Ferrer

    Polarization among parties has been increasing in many advanced democracies. While literature on the consequences of polarization is burgeoning, these studies typically face two concerns that are of crucial importance: endogeneity and omitted variables. In this paper I contribute to this literature and argue that polarization among candidates can affect the functioning of democracy by fostering voters’ coordination around incumbents thus decreasing turnover. I test the hypotheses by applying a Regression Discontinuity Design to data from legislative and cantonal elections in France. These elections use a two-round system in which the two most voted candidates in the first round automatically qualify for the second round. Following the logic of ‘close race elections’, I compare cases in which the runner-up candidate that barely qualifies for the second round polarizes the election, with cases in which that candidate did not qualify, decreasing the degree of polarization. This strategy allows me to treat polarization as a truly exogenous variable and overcome issues such as those mentioned above. Overall, results show that polarization clearly decreases incumbent turnover by fostering voters' coordination around them. This effect is particularly strong when polarization comes from the presence of candidates from extreme parties in the second round. When that is the case every single incumbent is able to secure reelection. These results have clear implications for our understanding of the political consequences of polarization.

  • Opposition fragmentation facilitates electoral accountability: Evidence from a survey experiment

    by Sergi Ferrer

    Which is better for electoral accountability: a fragmented opposition that gives plenty of alternatives or an opposition with fewer stronger parties? While oppositions play a key role in democracies, the effect of opposition fragmentation on accountability remains unclear. On the one hand, fragmentation may enhance accountability by providing voters with ideologically close alternatives. On the other hand, increased fragmentation could make coordination over strong viable alternatives more difficult. In this study, I present an original survey experiment designed to test whether fragmentation of the opposition enhances accountability. Moreover, to assess the specific conditions under which fragmentation may enhance accountability, I distinguish between ideologues and pragmatic voters, and differentiate between ideological and valence issues. Results show that opposition fragmentation enhances accountability, particularly for ideologues. Lastly, I present a direct test of the mechanisms that demonstrates that fragmentation improves accountability because marginal gains in ideological proximity outweigh losses in viability.


  • Responsibility attribution for corruption scandals

    by Sergi Ferrer

    This paper studies the effect of the type of government on responsibility attribution for corruption scandals. Most studies on corruption voting have assumed that voters punish all kinds of governments. This article challenges this assumption by distinguishing between two types of governments: single-party majority governments and minority/coalition governments. This hypothesis is tested using data from the 2011 Spanish local elections. Our findings reveal that the effect of coalition governments on corruption voting is not statistically different than majority ones. However, when we differentiate between welfare-enhancing and welfare decreasing corruption, we find that welfare-decreasing corruption has a clear negative effect on the electoral performance of the mayor’s party when it impacts single-party majority governments, but not when the mayor needs the support of other parties (minority or coalition governments).


  • Reviews

    by Sergi Ferrer, Susana Domingo Amestoy, Lindsey Reuben Muñoz

    Why Minority Governments Work. Multilevel Territorial Politics in Spain, Bonnie N. Field (2016) New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 261 pp., ISBN: 978 1 137 55979 1, h/bk, 978 1 137 55980 7, e-pdf, $119.99, $89 The Ghost in the Constitution: Historical Memory and Denial in Spanish Society, Contemporary Hispanic and Lusophone Cultures, vol. 15, Joan Ramon Resina (2017) Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 322 pp., ISBN: 9781786940223, h/bk, £85.00 Literature of Crisis: Spain’s Engagement with Liquid Capital, Olga Bezhanova (2017) Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 175 pp., ISBN: 978-1611488364, hbk, $90.00