Umberto Grandi
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Umberto Grandi has a total of 51 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Emiliano Lorini
IRIT, CNRS, Toulouse University
3 shared publications - Paolo Turrini
University of Warwick
3 shared publications - Andreas Herzig
IRIT
2 shared publications - Arianna Novaro
Université Paris
2 shared publications - Carlos Navarrete
Université de Toulouse
2 shared publications - Cesar Augusto Hidalgo
Center for Collective Learning CIAS Corvinus University of Budapest Közraktár u. 4-6 1093 Budapest Hungary
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 31 August 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-5
Social Choice with Text: Collective Decision Making in the LLM Era
- 31 August 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-5
Open AccessSocial Choice with Text: Collective Decision Making in the LLM Era
- 5 August 2025
- Published by AI Access Foundation in Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
- Vol. 83
A Complexity-Theoretic Analysis of Majority Illusion in Social Networks
Majority illusion occurs in a social network when the majority of the network vertices belong to a certain type but the majority of each vertex's neighbours belong to a different type, therefore creating the wrong perception, i.e., the illusion, that the majority type is different from the actual one. From a system engineering point of view, this motivates the search for algorithms to detect and, where possible, correct this often undesirable phenomenon. In this we provide a computational study of majority illusion in social networks, paying particular attention to the problem of its verification, i.e., whether majority illusion can occur on social networks, and elimination, i.e., how can we eliminate majority illusion by social network rewiring. While we show that the problems we consider are generally NP-complete, we also provide a parameterised complexity analysis, showing FPT-algorithms for the detection problem and W[1]-hardness for the elimination problem, using natural graph-theoretic parameters.
- 5 August 2025
- Published by AI Access Foundation in Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
- Vol. 83
A Complexity-Theoretic Analysis of Majority Illusion in Social Networks
Majority illusion occurs in a social network when the majority of the network vertices belong to a certain type but the majority of each vertex's neighbours belong to a different type, therefore creating the wrong perception, i.e., the illusion, that the majority type is different from the actual one. From a system engineering point of view, this motivates the search for algorithms to detect and, where possible, correct this often undesirable phenomenon. In this we provide a computational study of majority illusion in social networks, paying particular attention to the problem of its verification, i.e., whether majority illusion can occur on social networks, and elimination, i.e., how can we eliminate majority illusion by social network rewiring. While we show that the problems we consider are generally NP-complete, we also provide a parameterised complexity analysis, showing FPT-algorithms for the detection problem and W[1]-hardness for the elimination problem, using natural graph-theoretic parameters.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 13 November 2024
- Published by The Royal Society in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences
- Vol. 382 (2285) , 20240100
Large language models (LLMs) as agents for augmented democracy
We explore an augmented democracy system built on off-the-shelf large language models (LLMs) fine-tuned to augment data on citizens’ preferences elicited over policies extracted from the government programmes of the two main candidates of Brazil’s 2022 presidential election. We use a train-test cross-validation set-up to estimate the accuracy with which the LLMs predict both: a subject’s individual political choices and the aggregate preferences of the full sample of participants. At the individual level, we find that LLMs predict out of sample preferences more accurately than a ‘bundle rule’, which would assume that citizens always vote for the proposals of the candidate aligned with their self-reported political orientation. At the population level, we show that a probabilistic sample augmented by an LLM provides a more accurate estimate of the aggregate preferences of a population than the non-augmented probabilistic sample alone. Together, these results indicate that policy preference data augmented using LLMs can capture nuances that transcend party lines and represents a promising avenue of research for data augmentation. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Co-creating the future: participatory cities and digital governance’.
- 13 November 2024
- Published by The Royal Society in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences
- Vol. 382 (2285) , 20240100
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessLarge language models (LLMs) as agents for augmented democracy
We explore an augmented democracy system built on off-the-shelf large language models (LLMs) fine-tuned to augment data on citizens’ preferences elicited over policies extracted from the government programmes of the two main candidates of Brazil’s 2022 presidential election. We use a train-test cross-validation set-up to estimate the accuracy with which the LLMs predict both: a subject’s individual political choices and the aggregate preferences of the full sample of participants. At the individual level, we find that LLMs predict out of sample preferences more accurately than a ‘bundle rule’, which would assume that citizens always vote for the proposals of the candidate aligned with their self-reported political orientation. At the population level, we show that a probabilistic sample augmented by an LLM provides a more accurate estimate of the aggregate preferences of a population than the non-augmented probabilistic sample alone. Together, these results indicate that policy preference data augmented using LLMs can capture nuances that transcend party lines and represents a promising avenue of research for data augmentation. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Co-creating the future: participatory cities and digital governance’.
- Open Access
- 16 October 2024
- Published by IOS Press
- p. 3565-3572
Abductive and Contrastive Explanations for Scoring Rules in Voting
We view voting rules as classifiers that assign a winner (a class) to a profile of voters’ preferences (an instance). We propose to apply techniques from formal explainability, most notably abductive and contrastive explanations, to identify minimal subsets of a preference profile that either imply the current winner or explain why a different candidate was not elected. Formal explanations turn out to have strong connections with classical problems studied in computational social choice such as bribery, possible and necessary winner identification, and preference learning. We design algorithms for computing abductive and contrastive explanations for scoring rules. For the Borda rule, we find a lower bound on the size of the smallest abductive explanations, and we conduct simulations to identify correlations between properties of preference profiles and the size of their smallest abductive explanations.
- 16 October 2024
- Published by IOS Press
- p. 3565-3572
Open AccessAbductive and Contrastive Explanations for Scoring Rules in Voting
We view voting rules as classifiers that assign a winner (a class) to a profile of voters’ preferences (an instance). We propose to apply techniques from formal explainability, most notably abductive and contrastive explanations, to identify minimal subsets of a preference profile that either imply the current winner or explain why a different candidate was not elected. Formal explanations turn out to have strong connections with classical problems studied in computational social choice such as bribery, possible and necessary winner identification, and preference learning. We design algorithms for computing abductive and contrastive explanations for scoring rules. For the Borda rule, we find a lower bound on the size of the smallest abductive explanations, and we conduct simulations to identify correlations between properties of preference profiles and the size of their smallest abductive explanations.
- Open Access
Abductive and Contrastive Explanations for Scoring Rules in Voting
We view voting rules as classifiers that assign a winner (a class) to a profile of voters' preferences (an instance). We propose to apply techniques from formal explainability, most notably abductive and contrastive explanations, to identify minimal subsets of a preference profile that either imply the current winner or explain why a different candidate was not elected. Formal explanations turn out to have strong connections with classical problems studied in computational social choice such as bribery, possible and necessary winner identification, and preference learning. We design algorithms for computing abductive and contrastive explanations for scoring rules. For the Borda rule, we find a lower bound on the size of the smallest abductive explanations, and we conduct simulations to identify correlations between properties of preference profiles and the size of their smallest abductive explanations.
Open AccessAbductive and Contrastive Explanations for Scoring Rules in Voting
We view voting rules as classifiers that assign a winner (a class) to a profile of voters' preferences (an instance). We propose to apply techniques from formal explainability, most notably abductive and contrastive explanations, to identify minimal subsets of a preference profile that either imply the current winner or explain why a different candidate was not elected. Formal explanations turn out to have strong connections with classical problems studied in computational social choice such as bribery, possible and necessary winner identification, and preference learning. We design algorithms for computing abductive and contrastive explanations for scoring rules. For the Borda rule, we find a lower bound on the size of the smallest abductive explanations, and we conduct simulations to identify correlations between properties of preference profiles and the size of their smallest abductive explanations.
- Open Access
- 15 December 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 92 (6) , 1437-1465
Collective combinatorial optimisation as judgment aggregation
In many settings, a collective decision has to be made over a set of alternatives that has a combinatorial structure: important examples are multi-winner elections, participatory budgeting, collective scheduling, and collective network design. A further common point of these settings is that agents generally submit preferences over issues (e.g., projects to be funded), each having a cost, and the goal is to find a feasible solution maximising the agents’ satisfaction under problem-specific constraints. We propose the use of judgment aggregation as a unifying framework to model these situations, which we refer to as collective combinatorial optimisation problems. Despite their shared underlying structure, collective combinatorial optimisation problems have so far been studied independently. Our formulation into judgment aggregation connects them, and we identify their shared structure via five case studies of well-known collective combinatorial optimisation problems, proving how popular rules independently defined for each problem actually coincide. We also chart the computational complexity gap that may arise when using a general judgment aggregation framework instead of a specific problem-dependent model.
- 15 December 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 92 (6) , 1437-1465
Open AccessCollective combinatorial optimisation as judgment aggregation
In many settings, a collective decision has to be made over a set of alternatives that has a combinatorial structure: important examples are multi-winner elections, participatory budgeting, collective scheduling, and collective network design. A further common point of these settings is that agents generally submit preferences over issues (e.g., projects to be funded), each having a cost, and the goal is to find a feasible solution maximising the agents’ satisfaction under problem-specific constraints. We propose the use of judgment aggregation as a unifying framework to model these situations, which we refer to as collective combinatorial optimisation problems. Despite their shared underlying structure, collective combinatorial optimisation problems have so far been studied independently. Our formulation into judgment aggregation connects them, and we identify their shared structure via five case studies of well-known collective combinatorial optimisation problems, proving how popular rules independently defined for each problem actually coincide. We also chart the computational complexity gap that may arise when using a general judgment aggregation framework instead of a specific problem-dependent model.
- 16 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Human Behaviour
- Vol. 8 (1) , 137-148
Understanding political divisiveness using online participation data from the 2022 French and Brazilian presidential elections
Digital technologies can augment civic participation by facilitating the expression of detailed political preferences. Yet, digital participation efforts often rely on methods optimized for elections involving a few candidates. Here we present data collected in an online experiment where participants built personalized government programmes by combining policies proposed by the candidates of the 2022 French and Brazilian presidential elections. We use this data to explore aggregates complementing those used in social choice theory, finding that a metric of divisiveness, which is uncorrelated with traditional aggregation functions, can identify polarizing proposals. These metrics provide a score for the divisiveness of each proposal that can be estimated in the absence of data on the demographic characteristics of participants and that explains the issues that divide a population. These findings suggest that divisiveness metrics can be useful complements to traditional aggregation functions in direct forms of digital participation.
- 16 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Human Behaviour
- Vol. 8 (1) , 137-148
Understanding political divisiveness using online participation data from the 2022 French and Brazilian presidential elections
Digital technologies can augment civic participation by facilitating the expression of detailed political preferences. Yet, digital participation efforts often rely on methods optimized for elections involving a few candidates. Here we present data collected in an online experiment where participants built personalized government programmes by combining policies proposed by the candidates of the 2022 French and Brazilian presidential elections. We use this data to explore aggregates complementing those used in social choice theory, finding that a metric of divisiveness, which is uncorrelated with traditional aggregation functions, can identify polarizing proposals. These metrics provide a score for the divisiveness of each proposal that can be estimated in the absence of data on the demographic characteristics of participants and that explains the issues that divide a population. These findings suggest that divisiveness metrics can be useful complements to traditional aggregation functions in direct forms of digital participation.
- Open Access
- 1 August 2023
- Published by International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 1, 418-426
Moral Planning Agents with LTL Values
A moral planning agent (MPA) seeks to compare two plans or compute an optimal plan in an interactive setting with other agents, where relative ideality and optimality of plans are defined with respect to a prioritized value base. We model MPAs whose values are expressed by formulas of linear temporal logic (LTL) and define comparison for both joint plans and individual plans. We introduce different evaluation criteria for individual plans including an optimistic (risk-seeking) criterion, a pessimistic (risk-averse) one, and two criteria based on the use of anticipated responsibility. We provide complexity results for a variety of MPA problems.
- 1 August 2023
- Published by International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 1, 418-426
Open AccessMoral Planning Agents with LTL Values
A moral planning agent (MPA) seeks to compare two plans or compute an optimal plan in an interactive setting with other agents, where relative ideality and optimality of plans are defined with respect to a prioritized value base. We model MPAs whose values are expressed by formulas of linear temporal logic (LTL) and define comparison for both joint plans and individual plans. We introduce different evaluation criteria for individual plans including an optimistic (risk-seeking) criterion, a pessimistic (risk-averse) one, and two criteria based on the use of anticipated responsibility. We provide complexity results for a variety of MPA problems.
- Open Access
- 1 August 2023
- Published by International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 3, 2616-2623
Measuring and Controlling Divisiveness in Rank Aggregation
In rank aggregation, members of a population rank issues to decide which are collectively preferred. We focus instead on identifying divisive issues that express disagreements among the preferences of individuals. We analyse the properties of our divisiveness measures and their relation to existing notions of polarisation. We also study their robustness under incomplete preferences and algorithms for control and manipulation of divisiveness. Our results advance our understanding of how to quantify disagreements in collective decision-making.
- 1 August 2023
- Published by International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 3, 2616-2623
Open AccessMeasuring and Controlling Divisiveness in Rank Aggregation
In rank aggregation, members of a population rank issues to decide which are collectively preferred. We focus instead on identifying divisive issues that express disagreements among the preferences of individuals. We analyse the properties of our divisiveness measures and their relation to existing notions of polarisation. We also study their robustness under incomplete preferences and algorithms for control and manipulation of divisiveness. Our results advance our understanding of how to quantify disagreements in collective decision-making.