ANArianna Novaro

Arianna Novaro

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Arianna Novaro has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Computational Social Choice: Research & Development

    by Dorothea Baumeister, Ratip Emin Berker, Niclas Boehmer, Sylvain Bouveret, Andreas Darmann, Piotr Faliszewski, Martin Lackner, Jérôme Lang, Nicholas Mattei, Arianna Novaro

    Computational social choice (COMSOC) studies principled ways to aggregate conflicting individual preferences into collective decisions. In this paper, we call for an increased effort towards Computational Social Choice: Research & Development (COMSOC-R&D), a problem-driven research agenda that explicitly aims to design, implement, and test collective decision-making systems in the real world. We articulate the defining features of COMSOC-R&D, argue for its value, and discuss various roadblocks and possible solutions.

  • Open Access

    Repeated Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items

    by Ayumi Igarashi, Martin Lackner, Oliviero Nardi, Arianna Novaro

    The problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items is a well-known challenge in the field of (computational) social choice. In this scenario, there is a fundamental incompatibility between notions of fairness (such as envy-freeness and proportionality) and economic efficiency (such as Pareto-optimality). However, in the real world, items are not always allocated once and for all, but often repeatedly. For example, the items may be recurring chores to distribute in a household. Motivated by this, we initiate the study of the repeated fair division of indivisible goods and chores, and propose a formal model for this scenario. In this paper, we show that, if the number of repetitions is a multiple of the number of agents, there always exists a sequence of allocations that is proportional and Pareto-optimal. On the other hand, irrespective of the number of repetitions, an envy-free and Pareto-optimal sequence of allocations may not exist. For the case of two agents, we show that if the number of repetitions is even, it is always possible to find a sequence of allocations that is overall envy-free and Pareto-optimal. We then prove even stronger fairness guarantees, showing that every allocation in such a sequence satisfies some relaxation of envy-freeness. Finally, in case that the number of repetitions can be chosen freely, we show that envy-free and Pareto-optimal allocations are achievable for any number of agents.


  • Open Access

    Repeated Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items

    by Ayumi Igarashi, Martin Lackner, Oliviero Nardi, Arianna Novaro

    The problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items is a well-known challenge in the field of (computational) social choice. In this scenario, there is a fundamental incompatibility between notions of fairness (such as envy-freeness and proportionality) and economic efficiency (such as Pareto-optimality). However, in the real world, items are not always allocated once and for all, but often repeatedly. For example, the items may be recurring chores to distribute in a household. Motivated by this, we initiate the study of the repeated fair division of indivisible goods and chores, and propose a formal model for this scenario. In this paper, we show that, if the number of repetitions is a multiple of the number of agents, there always exists a sequence of allocations that is proportional and Pareto-optimal. On the other hand, irrespective of the number of repetitions, an envy-free and Pareto-optimal sequence of allocations may not exist. For the case of two agents, we show that if the number of repetitions is even, it is always possible to find a sequence of allocations that is overall envy-free and Pareto-optimal. We then prove even stronger fairness guarantees, showing that every allocation in such a sequence satisfies some relaxation of envy-freeness. Finally, in case that the number of repetitions can be chosen freely, we show that envy-free and Pareto-optimal allocations are achievable for any number of agents.

  • Open Access

    Collective combinatorial optimisation as judgment aggregation

    by Linus Boes, Rachael Colley, Umberto Grandi, Jérôme Lang, Arianna Novaro

    In many settings, a collective decision has to be made over a set of alternatives that has a combinatorial structure: important examples are multi-winner elections, participatory budgeting, collective scheduling, and collective network design. A further common point of these settings is that agents generally submit preferences over issues (e.g., projects to be funded), each having a cost, and the goal is to find a feasible solution maximising the agents’ satisfaction under problem-specific constraints. We propose the use of judgment aggregation as a unifying framework to model these situations, which we refer to as collective combinatorial optimisation problems. Despite their shared underlying structure, collective combinatorial optimisation problems have so far been studied independently. Our formulation into judgment aggregation connects them, and we identify their shared structure via five case studies of well-known collective combinatorial optimisation problems, proving how popular rules independently defined for each problem actually coincide. We also chart the computational complexity gap that may arise when using a general judgment aggregation framework instead of a specific problem-dependent model.


  • Unravelling multi-agent ranked delegations

    by Rachael Colley, Umberto Grandi, Arianna Novaro