Bryan Carter
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Bryan Carter has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Cody Fleming
Iowa State University Ames 50014 Iowa USA
4 shared publications - Barry M. Horowitz
Systems and Information Engineering, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904
2 shared publications Carl R. Elks
Virginia Commonwealth University Richmond Virginia USA
2 shared publicationsGeorgios Bakirtzis
LTCI, Télécom Paris Institut Polytechnique de Paris Palaiseau France
2 shared publications- Georgios Bakirtzis
LTCI, Tlcom Paris, Institut Polytechnique de Paris, Palaiseau, France
2 shared publications - Peter A. Beling
Grado Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA, USA
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 10 December 2025
- Published by Wiley in Systems Engineering
- Vol. 29 (2) , 354-367
Mission Aware Cyber‐Physical Security
Perimeter cybersecurity, while essential, has proven insufficient against sophisticated, coordinated, and cyber‐physical attacks. In contrast, mission‐centric cybersecurity emphasizes finding evidence of attack impact on mission success, allowing for targeted resource allocation to mitigate vulnerabilities and protect critical assets. Mission Aware is a systems‐theoretic cybersecurity analysis that identifies components that, if compromised, destabilize the overall mission. It generates evidence by finding potential attack vectors relevant to mission‐linked elements and traces this evidence to mission requirements, prioritizing high‐impact vulnerabilities relative to mission objectives. Mission Aware is an informational tool for system resilience by unifying cybersecurity analysis with core systems engineering goals.
- 10 December 2025
- Published by Wiley in Systems Engineering
- Vol. 29 (2) , 354-367
Open AccessMission Aware Cyber‐Physical Security
Perimeter cybersecurity, while essential, has proven insufficient against sophisticated, coordinated, and cyber‐physical attacks. In contrast, mission‐centric cybersecurity emphasizes finding evidence of attack impact on mission success, allowing for targeted resource allocation to mitigate vulnerabilities and protect critical assets. Mission Aware is a systems‐theoretic cybersecurity analysis that identifies components that, if compromised, destabilize the overall mission. It generates evidence by finding potential attack vectors relevant to mission‐linked elements and traces this evidence to mission requirements, prioritizing high‐impact vulnerabilities relative to mission objectives. Mission Aware is an informational tool for system resilience by unifying cybersecurity analysis with core systems engineering goals.
- 3 October 2022
- Published by SPIE-Intl Soc Optical Eng
- Vol. 12215, 1221502-2
Impact of higher order surface irregularity on system-level wavefront variation across the field
The influence of surface irregularity on optical system wavefront performance is well established, but typically irregularity analysis and specifications are limited to peak-to-valley or 3rd-order Seidel terms. As optical assembly wavefront specifications become tighter, higher order irregularity may need to be considered, particularly for surfaces away from the system pupil. This work presents a case study of an optical system with tightly controlled wavefront Zernike terms across the field. Using as-built diagnostic testing and optical modeling incorporating Fringe Zernike surface irregularity, higher order rotationally symmetric irregularities are determined to be the root-cause of specific wavefront Zernike failure modes. Sensitivity and tolerancing analysis are used to determine the required surface specification and provide feedback to the fabrication process, improving system first-pass yield.
- 3 October 2022
- Published by SPIE-Intl Soc Optical Eng
- Vol. 12215, 1221502-2
Impact of higher order surface irregularity on system-level wavefront variation across the field
The influence of surface irregularity on optical system wavefront performance is well established, but typically irregularity analysis and specifications are limited to peak-to-valley or 3rd-order Seidel terms. As optical assembly wavefront specifications become tighter, higher order irregularity may need to be considered, particularly for surfaces away from the system pupil. This work presents a case study of an optical system with tightly controlled wavefront Zernike terms across the field. Using as-built diagnostic testing and optical modeling incorporating Fringe Zernike surface irregularity, higher order rotationally symmetric irregularities are determined to be the root-cause of specific wavefront Zernike failure modes. Sensitivity and tolerancing analysis are used to determine the required surface specification and provide feedback to the fabrication process, improving system first-pass yield.
- Open Access
- 7 June 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in Computer
- Vol. 54 (6) , 36-45
Cyberphysical Security Through Resiliency: A Systems-Centric Approach
Cyberphysical systems require resiliency techniques for defense, and multicriteria resiliency problems need an approach that evaluates systems for current threats and potential design solutions. A systems-oriented view of cyberphysical security, termed Mission Aware, is proposed based on a holistic understanding of mission goals, system dynamics, and risk.
- 7 June 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in Computer
- Vol. 54 (6) , 36-45
Open AccessCyberphysical Security Through Resiliency: A Systems-Centric Approach
Cyberphysical systems require resiliency techniques for defense, and multicriteria resiliency problems need an approach that evaluates systems for current threats and potential design solutions. A systems-oriented view of cyberphysical security, termed Mission Aware, is proposed based on a holistic understanding of mission goals, system dynamics, and risk.
- 8 August 2019
- Published by Wiley in Systems Engineering
- Vol. 22 (5) , 411-421
Systems‐theoretic security requirements modeling for cyber‐physical systems
Cyber‐physical systems (CPS) present a unique modeling challenge due to their numerous heterogeneous components, complex physical interactions, and disjoint communication networks. Modeling CPS to aid security analysis further adds to these challenges, because securing CPS requires not only understanding of the system architecture, but also the system's role within its broader expected service. This is due to the infeasibility of completely securing every single component, network, and part within a CPS. As such it is necessary to be cognizant of the system's expected service, or mission, so that the effects of an exploit can be mitigated and the system can perform its mission at least in a partially degraded manner—in other words, a mission‐aware approach to security. As such, a security analysis methodology based on this philosophy is greatly aided by the creation of a model that combines system architecture information, its admissible behaviors, and its mission context. This paper presents a technique for creating such a model using the Systems Modeling Language.
- 8 August 2019
- Published by Wiley in Systems Engineering
- Vol. 22 (5) , 411-421
Systems‐theoretic security requirements modeling for cyber‐physical systems
Cyber‐physical systems (CPS) present a unique modeling challenge due to their numerous heterogeneous components, complex physical interactions, and disjoint communication networks. Modeling CPS to aid security analysis further adds to these challenges, because securing CPS requires not only understanding of the system architecture, but also the system's role within its broader expected service. This is due to the infeasibility of completely securing every single component, network, and part within a CPS. As such it is necessary to be cognizant of the system's expected service, or mission, so that the effects of an exploit can be mitigated and the system can perform its mission at least in a partially degraded manner—in other words, a mission‐aware approach to security. As such, a security analysis methodology based on this philosophy is greatly aided by the creation of a model that combines system architecture information, its admissible behaviors, and its mission context. This paper presents a technique for creating such a model using the Systems Modeling Language.
- Open Access
A Preliminary Design-Phase Security Methodology for Cyber–Physical Systems
Despite “cyber” being in the name, cyber–physical systems possess unique characteristics that limit the applicability and suitability of traditional cybersecurity techniques and strategies. Furthermore, vulnerabilities to cyber–physical systems can have significant safety implications. The physical and cyber interactions inherent in these systems require that cyber vulnerabilities not only be defended against or prevented, but that the system also be resilient in the face of successful attacks. Given the complex nature of cyber–physical systems, the identification and evaluation of appropriate defense and resiliency strategies must be handled in a targeted and systematic manner. Specifically, what resiliency strategies are appropriate for a given system, where, and which should be implemented given time and/or budget constraints? This paper presents two methodologies: (1) the cyber security requirements methodology and (2) a systems-theoretic, model-based methodology for identifying and prioritizing appropriate resiliency strategies for implementation in a given system and mission. This methodology is demonstrated using a case study based on a hypothetical weapon system. An assessment and comparison of the results from the two methodologies suggest that the techniques presented in this paper can augment and enhance existing systems engineering approaches with model-based evidence.
Open AccessA Preliminary Design-Phase Security Methodology for Cyber–Physical Systems
Despite “cyber” being in the name, cyber–physical systems possess unique characteristics that limit the applicability and suitability of traditional cybersecurity techniques and strategies. Furthermore, vulnerabilities to cyber–physical systems can have significant safety implications. The physical and cyber interactions inherent in these systems require that cyber vulnerabilities not only be defended against or prevented, but that the system also be resilient in the face of successful attacks. Given the complex nature of cyber–physical systems, the identification and evaluation of appropriate defense and resiliency strategies must be handled in a targeted and systematic manner. Specifically, what resiliency strategies are appropriate for a given system, where, and which should be implemented given time and/or budget constraints? This paper presents two methodologies: (1) the cyber security requirements methodology and (2) a systems-theoretic, model-based methodology for identifying and prioritizing appropriate resiliency strategies for implementation in a given system and mission. This methodology is demonstrated using a case study based on a hypothetical weapon system. An assessment and comparison of the results from the two methodologies suggest that the techniques presented in this paper can augment and enhance existing systems engineering approaches with model-based evidence.