BHBarry M. Horowitz

Barry M. Horowitz

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Barry M. Horowitz has a total of 27 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Cyberphysical Security Through Resiliency: A Systems-Centric Approach

    by Cody H Fleming, Carl Elks, Georgios Bakirtzis, Stephen Adams, Bryan Carter, Peter Beling, Barry Horowitz

    Cyberphysical systems require resiliency techniques for defense, and multicriteria resiliency problems need an approach that evaluates systems for current threats and potential design solutions. A systems-oriented view of cyberphysical security, termed Mission Aware, is proposed based on a holistic understanding of mission goals, system dynamics, and risk.


  • Open Access

    A Preliminary Design-Phase Security Methodology for Cyber–Physical Systems

    by Bryan Carter, Stephen Adams, Georgios Bakirtzis, Tim Sherburne, Peter Beling, Barry Horowitz, Cody Fleming

    Despite “cyber” being in the name, cyber–physical systems possess unique characteristics that limit the applicability and suitability of traditional cybersecurity techniques and strategies. Furthermore, vulnerabilities to cyber–physical systems can have significant safety implications. The physical and cyber interactions inherent in these systems require that cyber vulnerabilities not only be defended against or prevented, but that the system also be resilient in the face of successful attacks. Given the complex nature of cyber–physical systems, the identification and evaluation of appropriate defense and resiliency strategies must be handled in a targeted and systematic manner. Specifically, what resiliency strategies are appropriate for a given system, where, and which should be implemented given time and/or budget constraints? This paper presents two methodologies: (1) the cyber security requirements methodology and (2) a systems-theoretic, model-based methodology for identifying and prioritizing appropriate resiliency strategies for implementation in a given system and mission. This methodology is demonstrated using a case study based on a hypothetical weapon system. An assessment and comparison of the results from the two methodologies suggest that the techniques presented in this paper can augment and enhance existing systems engineering approaches with model-based evidence.


  • The integration of diversely redundant designs, dynamic system models, and state estimation technology to the cyber security of physical systems

    by Barry M. Horowitz, Katherine M. Pierce

    As exemplified in the 2010 Stuxnet attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, cyber attackers have capabilities to embed disruptive infections into equipment that is employed within physical systems. This paper presents a cyber security design approach that addresses cyber attacks that include modification of operator displays used for support in managing software controlled automated systems. This class of problems is especially important because our nation's critical infrastructures include such systems. In addition, many other systems, such as surveillance systems, navigation systems, and communications systems, are candidates for such solutions as they continue to become more and more automated. The suggested design approach builds upon fault–tolerant and automatic control system techniques that, with important and necessary modifications, are the basis for providing improved cyber security. In particular, the appropriate combination of diversely redundant security designs coupled with system dynamics models and state estimation techniques provide a potential means for detecting purposeful adjustments to operator displays. This paper provides a theoretical approach for designing such solutions and a corresponding set of examples with simulation–based results. In addition, the paper includes a discussion of important implementation requirements for greater assurance of such physical system security solutions. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Syst Eng 16


  • A System‐Aware Cyber Security architecture

    by Rick A. Jones, Barry Horowitz

    As exemplified in the 2010 Stuxnet attack on an Iranian nuclear facility, attackers have the capabilities to embed infections in equipment that is employed in nuclear power systems. In this paper, a new systems engineering focused approach for mitigating such risks is described. This approach involves the development of a security architectural formulation that integrates a set of reusable security services as an architectural solution that is an embedded component of the system to be protected. The System‐Aware architectural approach embeds security components into the system to be protected. The architecture includes services that (1) collect and assess real‐time security relevant measurements from the system being protected, (2) perform security analysis on those measurements, and (3) execute system security control actions as required. This architectural formulation results in a defense that is referred to as System‐Aware Cyber Security. This includes (1) the integration of a diverse set of dynamically interchangeable redundant subsystems involving hardware and software components provided from multiple vendors to significantly increase the difficulty for adversaries by avoiding a monoculture environment, (2) the development of subsystems that are capable of rapidly changing their attack surface through hardware and software reconfiguration (configuration hopping) in response to perceived threats, (3) data consistency checking services (e.g., intelligent voting mechanisms) for isolating faults and permitting moving surface control actions to avoid operations in a compromised configuration, and (4) forensic analysis techniques for rapid post‐attack categorization of whether a given fault is more likely the result of an infected embedded hardware or software component (i.e., cyber attack) or a natural failure. In this paper we present these key elements of the System‐Aware Cyber Security architecture and show, including an application example, how they can be integrated to mitigate the risks of insider and supply chain attacks. In addition, this paper outlines an initial vision for a security analysis framework to compare alternative System‐Aware security architectures. Finally, we summarize future research that is necessary to facilitate implementation across additional domains critical to the nation's interest. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Syst Eng


  • An architectural systems engineering methodology for addressing cyber security

    by Jennifer L. Bayuk, Barry M. Horowitz

    This paper discusses important shortcomings of current approaches to systems security engineering. The value and limitations of perimeter security designs are examined. An architectural approach to systems security engineering is introduced as a complementary means for strengthening current approaches. Accordingly, this paper outlines a methodology to identify classes of new reusable system security solutions and an architectural framework based on reuse of the patterns of solutions. It also introduces a new methodology for security metrics intended to stimulate critical solution design tradeoff analyses as part of security design reuse considerations. Examples of problems, potential architectural solutions, and corresponding security metrics are provided. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Syst Eng


  • A Framework for the Evaluation of State Breach Reporting Laws

    by Benjamin J. Brooker, Jonathan Crawford, Barry M. Horowitz

    This paper develops a framework for evaluating the effectiveness of cyber security breach reporting laws across states. In doing so, trends and correlations in state reporting along with other relevant factors are identified using readily available data. This paper addresses two critical questions in the assessment of breach reporting legislation: 1) How does the rate of reporting security breaches across states compare with the rate of reporting of security threats to computer operating systems?, and 2) What factors other than the implementation of breach reporting legislation effect the rate of reporting security breaches across states? The framework developed in this paper can be applied in future analyses to evaluate the effectiveness of breach reporting legislation and can assist in pinpointing legislative weaknesses across states. Limitations in the availability of data inspired the generation of a number of recommendations for the improvement of breach reporting law evaluation. First, more time is needed to collect data, as most laws have been in place for two or fewer years. Second, each state should have a central database that records all reported cyber security breaches. This will allow for greater visibility to the public and would make for greater accessibility of data for both consumers and researchers. Finally, further research efforts should be conducted on the topic of OS security vulnerability patch rates and their relevance to the actual, realized cyber threat level of operating systems.