Chris Ranalli
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Chris Ranalli has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- René van Woudenberg
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
2 shared publications Thirza Lagewaard
Department of Philosophy Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam Amsterdam The Netherlands
2 shared publications- Concha Martínez-Vidal
Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, Santiago, Spain
1 shared publication Daniel Bracker
Department of Philosophy, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, Netherlands
1 shared publication- Finlay Malcolm
University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
1 shared publication - Mark Walker
New Mexico State University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 7 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Acta Analytica
- Vol. 41 (2) , 453-473
Naturalism: Deep Disagreement or Metalinguistic Negotiation?
Drawing on the notions of deep disagreement and metalinguistic negotiation, we develop a new interpretation of the debate between scientific naturalism and liberal naturalism over the idea of naturalism. We argue that recent revisions of the debate suggest that the common perception of this as a case of metalinguistic negotiation is misleading. We trace this misperception back to the different ways in which scientific naturalism and liberal naturalism use the term ‘naturalism.’ Once this difference is considered, their seemingly contradictory claims on this issue can apparently be reconciled. It turns out to be a remarkably consequential metalinguistic negotiation over whether the term ‘naturalism’ should be reinterpreted or replaced for the purposes of positive philosophical theorizing. This interpretation explains the genuine disagreement that led scientific naturalism and liberal naturalism to engage in this debate and illuminates the broader meta-philosophical convictions that underlie each of their positions. Finally, we analyze how the development of the principle of charity acts as a mediating argumentative tool in disagreements.
- 7 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Acta Analytica
- Vol. 41 (2) , 453-473
Open AccessNaturalism: Deep Disagreement or Metalinguistic Negotiation?
Drawing on the notions of deep disagreement and metalinguistic negotiation, we develop a new interpretation of the debate between scientific naturalism and liberal naturalism over the idea of naturalism. We argue that recent revisions of the debate suggest that the common perception of this as a case of metalinguistic negotiation is misleading. We trace this misperception back to the different ways in which scientific naturalism and liberal naturalism use the term ‘naturalism.’ Once this difference is considered, their seemingly contradictory claims on this issue can apparently be reconciled. It turns out to be a remarkably consequential metalinguistic negotiation over whether the term ‘naturalism’ should be reinterpreted or replaced for the purposes of positive philosophical theorizing. This interpretation explains the genuine disagreement that led scientific naturalism and liberal naturalism to engage in this debate and illuminates the broader meta-philosophical convictions that underlie each of their positions. Finally, we analyze how the development of the principle of charity acts as a mediating argumentative tool in disagreements.
- Open Access
- 29 October 2025
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
- Vol. 16 (1) , 53-71
Skepticism and Political Conservatism
In his excellent new book Epistemic Courage , Jonathan Ichikawa argues that epistemology evinces a bias towards the skeptical. In its most extreme forms (i.e., radical skepticism), this leads to complete suspension of judgment and inaction. Less extreme forms manifest themselves in a reluctance to believe what the evidence supports, and to act accordingly. Ichikawa thinks that this is a political as well as an epistemological mistake: skepticism tends to support the status quo and is allied with some of the animating ideas of political conservatism. We reconstruct Ichikawa’s argument that skepticism is allied with political conservatism and explain why we are not convinced. We also sketch a form of skepticism that is explicitly anti-political, and so cannot be closely identified with any political ideology, conservatism included.
- 29 October 2025
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
- Vol. 16 (1) , 53-71
Open AccessSkepticism and Political Conservatism
In his excellent new book Epistemic Courage , Jonathan Ichikawa argues that epistemology evinces a bias towards the skeptical. In its most extreme forms (i.e., radical skepticism), this leads to complete suspension of judgment and inaction. Less extreme forms manifest themselves in a reluctance to believe what the evidence supports, and to act accordingly. Ichikawa thinks that this is a political as well as an epistemological mistake: skepticism tends to support the status quo and is allied with some of the animating ideas of political conservatism. We reconstruct Ichikawa’s argument that skepticism is allied with political conservatism and explain why we are not convinced. We also sketch a form of skepticism that is explicitly anti-political, and so cannot be closely identified with any political ideology, conservatism included.
- 3 March 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 181-203
Suspensive Wronging
According to the thesis of doxastic wronging, we can wrong people in virtue of bearing certain beliefs toward them. In this chapter, I motivate and defend a similar view, the thesis of suspensive wronging, that we can wrong people in virtue of bearing an indecision attitude toward certain questions that bear on particular certain people. I explore the extent to which the thesis of suspensive wronging fits with certain prominent conceptions of suspension of judgment, including the sui generis attitude view, the higher-order attitude view, and the credence view, and argue that it aligns with each of them. I then argue that reflection on cases of suspensive wronging reveals that the common characterization of suspension of judgment as a kind of “neutrality” is nevertheless problematic, arguing that we should distinguish between attitudinal neutrality and property neutrality—i.e., neutrality on the truth of an answer to a question vs. the neutrality of the normative properties of the attitude that responds to a question. Finally, I consider whether widespread views about the involuntariness of belief and the right kind of reasons for belief refute the suspensive wronging thesis, argue that they do not, and conclude with some reflections on the relationship between the suspensive wronging thesis and moral encroachment on suspension of judgment.
- 3 March 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 181-203
Suspensive Wronging
According to the thesis of doxastic wronging, we can wrong people in virtue of bearing certain beliefs toward them. In this chapter, I motivate and defend a similar view, the thesis of suspensive wronging, that we can wrong people in virtue of bearing an indecision attitude toward certain questions that bear on particular certain people. I explore the extent to which the thesis of suspensive wronging fits with certain prominent conceptions of suspension of judgment, including the sui generis attitude view, the higher-order attitude view, and the credence view, and argue that it aligns with each of them. I then argue that reflection on cases of suspensive wronging reveals that the common characterization of suspension of judgment as a kind of “neutrality” is nevertheless problematic, arguing that we should distinguish between attitudinal neutrality and property neutrality—i.e., neutrality on the truth of an answer to a question vs. the neutrality of the normative properties of the attitude that responds to a question. Finally, I consider whether widespread views about the involuntariness of belief and the right kind of reasons for belief refute the suspensive wronging thesis, argue that they do not, and conclude with some reflections on the relationship between the suspensive wronging thesis and moral encroachment on suspension of judgment.
- Open Access
- 22 January 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Episteme
- Vol. 22 (4) , 971-991
Metaphysical ecumenicalism and Moore’s proof
You have hands, but does it follow that there’s an external material world? Moore thought so. However, we argue that this is a mistake. We defend the Ecumenical View, on which ordinary object terms like “hands” are metaphysically ecumenical, akin to the way that terms like “table” are physically ecumenical: just as there are wooden, metal, or plastic tables, so too there can be material, virtual, or immaterial hands. Moore’s position, however, is metaphysically sectarian: the semantics of “hands” requires a materialist metaphysics. Moore’s proof fails not because it displays bad epistemology but because of its problematic commitment to sectarian metaphysics. We conclude with some explorative thoughts on how the Ecumenical View bears on common sense epistemology and a possible equivocation in our understanding of the premises of Moore’s argument.
- 22 January 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Episteme
- Vol. 22 (4) , 971-991
Open AccessMetaphysical ecumenicalism and Moore’s proof
You have hands, but does it follow that there’s an external material world? Moore thought so. However, we argue that this is a mistake. We defend the Ecumenical View, on which ordinary object terms like “hands” are metaphysically ecumenical, akin to the way that terms like “table” are physically ecumenical: just as there are wooden, metal, or plastic tables, so too there can be material, virtual, or immaterial hands. Moore’s position, however, is metaphysically sectarian: the semantics of “hands” requires a materialist metaphysics. Moore’s proof fails not because it displays bad epistemology but because of its problematic commitment to sectarian metaphysics. We conclude with some explorative thoughts on how the Ecumenical View bears on common sense epistemology and a possible equivocation in our understanding of the premises of Moore’s argument.
- Open Access
- 1 May 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 90 (6) , 2353-2388
Is Radical Doubt Morally Wrong?
Is radical skepticism ethically problematic? This paper argues that it is. Radical skepticism’s strong regulation of our doxastic economy results in us having to forego doxastic commitments that we owe to others. Whatever skepticism’s epistemic defects, it is ethically defective. In turn, I defend Moralism, the view that the kind of extreme doubt characteristic of radical skepticism is a serious moral and eudaimonic weakness of radical skeptical epistemology. Whether this means that skepticism is false or incorrect, however, is a further claim that Moralists may or may not accept. I distinguish between an encroachment and abrogation version of the view, and show how each one bears on radical skepticism. In either case, Moralism makes our beliefs less vulnerable to radical revision. The paper concludes with some exploratory reflections on whether the argument can be extended to show that radical skepticism is politically problematic, even risking injustice.
- 1 May 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 90 (6) , 2353-2388
Open AccessIs Radical Doubt Morally Wrong?
Is radical skepticism ethically problematic? This paper argues that it is. Radical skepticism’s strong regulation of our doxastic economy results in us having to forego doxastic commitments that we owe to others. Whatever skepticism’s epistemic defects, it is ethically defective. In turn, I defend Moralism, the view that the kind of extreme doubt characteristic of radical skepticism is a serious moral and eudaimonic weakness of radical skeptical epistemology. Whether this means that skepticism is false or incorrect, however, is a further claim that Moralists may or may not accept. I distinguish between an encroachment and abrogation version of the view, and show how each one bears on radical skepticism. In either case, Moralism makes our beliefs less vulnerable to radical revision. The paper concludes with some exploratory reflections on whether the argument can be extended to show that radical skepticism is politically problematic, even risking injustice.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 26 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy & Technology
- Vol. 37 (1) , 1-26
Authorship and ChatGPT: a Conservative View
Is ChatGPT an author? Given its capacity to generate something that reads like human-written text in response to prompts, it might seem natural to ascribe authorship to ChatGPT. However, we argue that ChatGPT is not an author. ChatGPT fails to meet the criteria of authorship because it lacks the ability to perform illocutionary speech acts such as promising or asserting, lacks the fitting mental states like knowledge, belief, or intention, and cannot take responsibility for the texts it produces. Three perspectives are compared: liberalism (which ascribes authorship to ChatGPT), conservatism (which denies ChatGPT's authorship for normative and metaphysical reasons), and moderatism (which treats ChatGPT as if it possesses authorship without committing to the existence of mental states like knowledge, belief, or intention). We conclude that conservatism provides a more nuanced understanding of authorship in AI than liberalism and moderatism, without denying the significant potential, influence, or utility of AI technologies such as ChatGPT.
- 26 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy & Technology
- Vol. 37 (1) , 1-26
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessAuthorship and ChatGPT: a Conservative View
Is ChatGPT an author? Given its capacity to generate something that reads like human-written text in response to prompts, it might seem natural to ascribe authorship to ChatGPT. However, we argue that ChatGPT is not an author. ChatGPT fails to meet the criteria of authorship because it lacks the ability to perform illocutionary speech acts such as promising or asserting, lacks the fitting mental states like knowledge, belief, or intention, and cannot take responsibility for the texts it produces. Three perspectives are compared: liberalism (which ascribes authorship to ChatGPT), conservatism (which denies ChatGPT's authorship for normative and metaphysical reasons), and moderatism (which treats ChatGPT as if it possesses authorship without committing to the existence of mental states like knowledge, belief, or intention). We conclude that conservatism provides a more nuanced understanding of authorship in AI than liberalism and moderatism, without denying the significant potential, influence, or utility of AI technologies such as ChatGPT.
- 1 July 2023
- Published by University of Illinois Press in American Philosophical Quarterly
- Vol. 60 (3) , 257-273
Recent Work on Skepticism in Epistemology
This paper critically surveys 20 years of recent work on radical skepticism. It focuses on three key issues. First, it starts by exploring how philosophers have recently challenged our understanding of radical skeptical arguments. It then unpacks and critically evaluates some influential reactions to radical skepticism: structuralism, knowledge-first epistemology, epistemological disjunctivism, and hinge epistemology. Third, it explores some novel developments of pragmatism, like pragmatic skepticism, gauges its anti-skeptical import, and reflects on the ways in which radical skeptical epistemology and ethics might meet.
- 1 July 2023
- Published by University of Illinois Press in American Philosophical Quarterly
- Vol. 60 (3) , 257-273
Recent Work on Skepticism in Epistemology
This paper critically surveys 20 years of recent work on radical skepticism. It focuses on three key issues. First, it starts by exploring how philosophers have recently challenged our understanding of radical skeptical arguments. It then unpacks and critically evaluates some influential reactions to radical skepticism: structuralism, knowledge-first epistemology, epistemological disjunctivism, and hinge epistemology. Third, it explores some novel developments of pragmatism, like pragmatic skepticism, gauges its anti-skeptical import, and reflects on the ways in which radical skeptical epistemology and ethics might meet.
- Open Access
- 31 March 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 68 (10) , 3984-4026
What’s so bad about echo chambers?
Echo chambers have received widespread attention in recent years, but there is no agreement over whether they are always epistemically bad for us. Some argue they’re inherently epistemically bad, whilst others claim they can be epistemically good. This paper has three aims. First, to bring together recent studies in this debate, taxonomizing different ways of thinking about the epistemic status of echo chambers. Second, to consider and reject several accounts of what makes echo chambers epistemically harmful or not, and then offer an alternative account which builds on some features of existing accounts. In our view, echo chambers – even those that are truth-conducive – are always epistemically harmful because of their reasons-undermining features, e.g. the way that they impede the development of epistemic reasons which can answer and withstand challenges. This account captures important ideas behind several theories in the epistemology of echo chambers, but offers a richer explanation that does not suffer from their limitations.
- 31 March 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 68 (10) , 3984-4026
Open AccessWhat’s so bad about echo chambers?
Echo chambers have received widespread attention in recent years, but there is no agreement over whether they are always epistemically bad for us. Some argue they’re inherently epistemically bad, whilst others claim they can be epistemically good. This paper has three aims. First, to bring together recent studies in this debate, taxonomizing different ways of thinking about the epistemic status of echo chambers. Second, to consider and reject several accounts of what makes echo chambers epistemically harmful or not, and then offer an alternative account which builds on some features of existing accounts. In our view, echo chambers – even those that are truth-conducive – are always epistemically harmful because of their reasons-undermining features, e.g. the way that they impede the development of epistemic reasons which can answer and withstand challenges. This account captures important ideas behind several theories in the epistemology of echo chambers, but offers a richer explanation that does not suffer from their limitations.
- Open Access
- 22 March 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 36 (6) , 1125-1159
Normativity in studying conspiracy theory belief: Seven guidelines
This paper aims to provide clear guidelines for researchers studying conspiracy theory belief. It examines the meta-linguistic question about how we should conceptaulize 'conspiracy theory' and its relationship to the evaluative question of how we should evaluate beliefs in conspiracy theories, addressing normative issues surrounding the meaning, use, and conceptualization of ‘conspiracy theory’, as well as how these issues might impact how researchers study conspiracy theories or beliefs in them It argues that four norms, the Empirical Accuracy Norm, the Linguistic Norm, the Social Norm, and the Academic Fecundity Norm, underlie debates about how we should conceptualize or define ‘conspiracy theory’. We zoom in on the linguistic norm, as it has been treated as more fundamental than the other norms. We then scrutinize the argument that normative conceptualizations prematurely settle the question of how conspiracy theories and belief in them should be evaluated, and argue that it fails. Subsequently, we turn to the risks normative conceptualizations pose when it comes to certain assumptions and biases in the study of conspiracy theory belief. Finally, we explore where this leaves us regarding the meta-linguistic and evaluative questions, and formulate seven guidelines for studying conspiracy theory belief, whether it be theoretical, historical, or empirical.
- 22 March 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 36 (6) , 1125-1159
Open AccessNormativity in studying conspiracy theory belief: Seven guidelines
This paper aims to provide clear guidelines for researchers studying conspiracy theory belief. It examines the meta-linguistic question about how we should conceptaulize 'conspiracy theory' and its relationship to the evaluative question of how we should evaluate beliefs in conspiracy theories, addressing normative issues surrounding the meaning, use, and conceptualization of ‘conspiracy theory’, as well as how these issues might impact how researchers study conspiracy theories or beliefs in them It argues that four norms, the Empirical Accuracy Norm, the Linguistic Norm, the Social Norm, and the Academic Fecundity Norm, underlie debates about how we should conceptualize or define ‘conspiracy theory’. We zoom in on the linguistic norm, as it has been treated as more fundamental than the other norms. We then scrutinize the argument that normative conceptualizations prematurely settle the question of how conspiracy theories and belief in them should be evaluated, and argue that it fails. Subsequently, we turn to the risks normative conceptualizations pose when it comes to certain assumptions and biases in the study of conspiracy theory belief. Finally, we explore where this leaves us regarding the meta-linguistic and evaluative questions, and formulate seven guidelines for studying conspiracy theory belief, whether it be theoretical, historical, or empirical.
- Open Access
- 2 March 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- p. 1-37
Knowledge of things and aesthetic testimony
Many philosophers believe that aesthetic testimony can provide aesthetic knowledge. This leaves us with the question: why does getting aesthetic knowledge by experience – by seeing a painting up close, or witnessing a performance first-hand – nevertheless seem superior to aesthetic testimony? I argue that it is due to differences in their epistemic value; in the diversity of epistemic goods each one provides. Aesthetic experience, or the experience of art or other aesthetic objects, affords multiple, distinctive epistemic goods whereas aesthetic testimony affords less. In particular, it provides aesthetic knowledge of truths, a kind of propositional knowledge, as well as aesthetic knowledge of things, a kind of non-propositional knowledge. Although aesthetic experience is superior because it has more epistemic value, this doesn’t mean that aesthetic testimony provides weaker justification for aesthetic belief than aesthetic experience; the difference is evaluative, not normative. In this way, we can explain a key pessimistic intuition about aesthetic testimony – that it is inferior to aesthetic experience – whilst preserving the optimistic view that aesthetic testimony makes aesthetic knowledge available to others. The superior epistemic value of first-hand aesthetic experience is compatible with a number of important observations about aesthetic testimony, including the importance of aesthetic trust.
- 2 March 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- p. 1-37
Open AccessKnowledge of things and aesthetic testimony
Many philosophers believe that aesthetic testimony can provide aesthetic knowledge. This leaves us with the question: why does getting aesthetic knowledge by experience – by seeing a painting up close, or witnessing a performance first-hand – nevertheless seem superior to aesthetic testimony? I argue that it is due to differences in their epistemic value; in the diversity of epistemic goods each one provides. Aesthetic experience, or the experience of art or other aesthetic objects, affords multiple, distinctive epistemic goods whereas aesthetic testimony affords less. In particular, it provides aesthetic knowledge of truths, a kind of propositional knowledge, as well as aesthetic knowledge of things, a kind of non-propositional knowledge. Although aesthetic experience is superior because it has more epistemic value, this doesn’t mean that aesthetic testimony provides weaker justification for aesthetic belief than aesthetic experience; the difference is evaluative, not normative. In this way, we can explain a key pessimistic intuition about aesthetic testimony – that it is inferior to aesthetic experience – whilst preserving the optimistic view that aesthetic testimony makes aesthetic knowledge available to others. The superior epistemic value of first-hand aesthetic experience is compatible with a number of important observations about aesthetic testimony, including the importance of aesthetic trust.