Davide Battisti
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Davide Battisti has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Federico Bina
University of Genova
2 shared publications - Alessandra Gasparetto
Center for Clinical Ethics, Department of Biotechnologies and Life Sciences, Insubria University, Varese, Italy
1 shared publication - Andrea Lavazza
Pegaso University, Naples, Italy
1 shared publication - Andreas Komninos
University of Patras, Patras, Greece
1 shared publication - Beatrice Marchegiani
University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
1 shared publication - Carlo Martini
UniSR, Vita-Salute San Raffaele University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 16 November 2026
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
Beyond parental responsibility: physicians’ duties to future patients in reproductive genome editing
- 16 November 2026
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
Open AccessBeyond parental responsibility: physicians’ duties to future patients in reproductive genome editing
- Open Access
- 9 November 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in AI and Ethics
- Vol. 6 (6) , 648
Who am I really talking to? Authenticity, transparency, and the case for “AI ticks” in AI-mediated communication
The growing integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into everyday messaging systems is transforming the conditions under which interpersonal communication takes place. As AI-mediated communication (AI-MC) becomes increasingly seamless and context-sensitive, it blurs the boundary between human expression and algorithmic assistance. This development raises fundamental questions about potential challenges to authenticity in personal relationships and possible strategies to address them. In this regard, we make three main contributions. First, we offer a technically grounded analysis of emerging AI-MC architectures, distinguishing between external prompting, keyboard-level assistance, and fully integrated in-app co-authoring systems. Second, we develop a normative account of authenticity in AI-MC, understood as a second-person, relationship-sensitive notion, drawing on analytic theories of endorsement, relational normativity, and socially situated self-expression. On this basis, we argue that authenticity cannot be directly engineered by design, since it depends on reflective agency and context-dependent interpersonal obligations. Third, we advance a design-oriented proposal aimed at mitigating authenticity-related concerns without resorting to paternalistic restrictions: the introduction of optional and granular disclosure mechanisms (“AI ticks”) that allow users to signal the presence and degree of AI assistance in a context-sensitive manner. We argue that such forms of transparency function not as a substitute for authenticity, but as a pro-ethical condition that enables agents to negotiate authenticity-based obligations within their relationships. The analysis contributes to current debates on the ethics of AI-mediated communication and the conditions of responsible human–AI interaction.
- 9 November 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in AI and Ethics
- Vol. 6 (6) , 648
Open AccessWho am I really talking to? Authenticity, transparency, and the case for “AI ticks” in AI-mediated communication
The growing integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into everyday messaging systems is transforming the conditions under which interpersonal communication takes place. As AI-mediated communication (AI-MC) becomes increasingly seamless and context-sensitive, it blurs the boundary between human expression and algorithmic assistance. This development raises fundamental questions about potential challenges to authenticity in personal relationships and possible strategies to address them. In this regard, we make three main contributions. First, we offer a technically grounded analysis of emerging AI-MC architectures, distinguishing between external prompting, keyboard-level assistance, and fully integrated in-app co-authoring systems. Second, we develop a normative account of authenticity in AI-MC, understood as a second-person, relationship-sensitive notion, drawing on analytic theories of endorsement, relational normativity, and socially situated self-expression. On this basis, we argue that authenticity cannot be directly engineered by design, since it depends on reflective agency and context-dependent interpersonal obligations. Third, we advance a design-oriented proposal aimed at mitigating authenticity-related concerns without resorting to paternalistic restrictions: the introduction of optional and granular disclosure mechanisms (“AI ticks”) that allow users to signal the presence and degree of AI assistance in a context-sensitive manner. We argue that such forms of transparency function not as a substitute for authenticity, but as a pro-ethical condition that enables agents to negotiate authenticity-based obligations within their relationships. The analysis contributes to current debates on the ethics of AI-mediated communication and the conditions of responsible human–AI interaction.
- Open Access
- 1 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy
- p. 1-13
No appeal to moral status required: rethinking the argument for the moral advantage of stem cell-based embryo models in research
Stem Cell-Based Embryo Models (SCBEMs) have been welcomed enthusiastically because they would allow the study of specific phases of human embryonic development without resorting to embryos produced in vitro. This enthusiasm is based on the idea that research on such models is morally less problematic than research on human embryos. However, this position has recently been challenged, as some authors argue that there are no good reasons to attribute a different moral status to SCBEMs compared to embryos, and the focus on such models risks obscuring an appropriate evaluation of embryonic experimentation rather than representing a genuine moral advancement. In light of this disagreement, I discuss what I call the Argument for the Moral Advantage of SCBEMs and aim to defend it against recent criticisms. I first present the standard version of the argument and argue that it assumes embryos possess direct moral status based on their potential to become persons. Then, after discussing criticisms of the standard version, I explore revising the argument. I first consider relying on the embryos’ symbolic moral value; after dismissing this move, I introduce a revised version of the argument based on the pro tanto minimization of moral conflicts, rather than on embryos’ moral status or value. After defending the revised argument against several objections, I finally discuss regulatory issues concerning SCBEMs research.
- 1 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy
- p. 1-13
Open AccessNo appeal to moral status required: rethinking the argument for the moral advantage of stem cell-based embryo models in research
Stem Cell-Based Embryo Models (SCBEMs) have been welcomed enthusiastically because they would allow the study of specific phases of human embryonic development without resorting to embryos produced in vitro. This enthusiasm is based on the idea that research on such models is morally less problematic than research on human embryos. However, this position has recently been challenged, as some authors argue that there are no good reasons to attribute a different moral status to SCBEMs compared to embryos, and the focus on such models risks obscuring an appropriate evaluation of embryonic experimentation rather than representing a genuine moral advancement. In light of this disagreement, I discuss what I call the Argument for the Moral Advantage of SCBEMs and aim to defend it against recent criticisms. I first present the standard version of the argument and argue that it assumes embryos possess direct moral status based on their potential to become persons. Then, after discussing criticisms of the standard version, I explore revising the argument. I first consider relying on the embryos’ symbolic moral value; after dismissing this move, I introduce a revised version of the argument based on the pro tanto minimization of moral conflicts, rather than on embryos’ moral status or value. After defending the revised argument against several objections, I finally discuss regulatory issues concerning SCBEMs research.
- Open Access
- 29 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in AI & SOCIETY
- Vol. 41 (5) , 5177-5189
Personalised LLMs and the risks of the digital twin metaphor
Can an AI truly be your digital twin? Technology companies, startups, and even academic researchers increasingly claim so. From grief-bots that promise to let you talk with deceased loved ones to clinical tools designed to predict patients' treatment preferences, personalized Large Language Models are being marketed as faithful replications of individual identity, personality, and values. The digital twin label—borrowed from industrial engineering, where it describes computational models precisely mirroring physical systems—lends these claims an aura of scientific credibility. But is this metaphor appropriate, or is it dangerously misleading? This paper argues that applying the digital twin metaphor to personalized LLMs constitutes a systematic mischaracterization with serious ethical consequences. To this end, we first outline three plausible interpretations of the PDT metaphor—behaviorist, representational, and phenomenal. We then show that current AI systems do not satisfy the conditions of any of these interpretations, rendering the PDT metaphor ultimately inappropriate. The consequences of this metaphorical overreach are far from When vulnerable individuals—grieving families, patients facing incapacity, people seeking psychological support—interact with systems marketed as preserving human essence, they risk forming attachments to sophisticated illusions. The metaphor fosters misplaced trust, distorts public understanding of AI capabilities, and shapes policy debates on false premises. As these technologies proliferate into healthcare, legal proceedings, and intimate relationships, metaphorical precision becomes an ethical imperative. We conclude by proposing alternative frameworks that honestly represent what these systems can and cannot do.
- 29 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in AI & SOCIETY
- Vol. 41 (5) , 5177-5189
Open AccessPersonalised LLMs and the risks of the digital twin metaphor
Can an AI truly be your digital twin? Technology companies, startups, and even academic researchers increasingly claim so. From grief-bots that promise to let you talk with deceased loved ones to clinical tools designed to predict patients' treatment preferences, personalized Large Language Models are being marketed as faithful replications of individual identity, personality, and values. The digital twin label—borrowed from industrial engineering, where it describes computational models precisely mirroring physical systems—lends these claims an aura of scientific credibility. But is this metaphor appropriate, or is it dangerously misleading? This paper argues that applying the digital twin metaphor to personalized LLMs constitutes a systematic mischaracterization with serious ethical consequences. To this end, we first outline three plausible interpretations of the PDT metaphor—behaviorist, representational, and phenomenal. We then show that current AI systems do not satisfy the conditions of any of these interpretations, rendering the PDT metaphor ultimately inappropriate. The consequences of this metaphorical overreach are far from When vulnerable individuals—grieving families, patients facing incapacity, people seeking psychological support—interact with systems marketed as preserving human essence, they risk forming attachments to sophisticated illusions. The metaphor fosters misplaced trust, distorts public understanding of AI capabilities, and shapes policy debates on false premises. As these technologies proliferate into healthcare, legal proceedings, and intimate relationships, metaphorical precision becomes an ethical imperative. We conclude by proposing alternative frameworks that honestly represent what these systems can and cannot do.
- Open Access
Exploring Repro‐Timing Harm and Benefit
It is plausible that time of birth affects one's prospects for wellbeing. Being born during a war or recession might have a negative impact on early life and lifetime wellbeing. In natural reproduction, delaying conception does not result in the same child being born later, but rather a different child altogether; therefore, prospective parents cannot harm/benefit their children by choosing their time of birth. However, we argue that for prospective parents undergoing the IVF process, things are different. Since it is possible to freeze and store embryos indefinitely before implantation, parents can choose their child's time of birth. Because certain birth timings may better support wellbeing, this introduces the possibility of repro‐timing harms and benefits . This paper explores this new concept by outlining its theoretical assumptions and examining the moral reasons prospective parents in IVF might have for delaying implantation in the short, medium, and long term.
Open AccessExploring Repro‐Timing Harm and Benefit
It is plausible that time of birth affects one's prospects for wellbeing. Being born during a war or recession might have a negative impact on early life and lifetime wellbeing. In natural reproduction, delaying conception does not result in the same child being born later, but rather a different child altogether; therefore, prospective parents cannot harm/benefit their children by choosing their time of birth. However, we argue that for prospective parents undergoing the IVF process, things are different. Since it is possible to freeze and store embryos indefinitely before implantation, parents can choose their child's time of birth. Because certain birth timings may better support wellbeing, this introduces the possibility of repro‐timing harms and benefits . This paper explores this new concept by outlining its theoretical assumptions and examining the moral reasons prospective parents in IVF might have for delaying implantation in the short, medium, and long term.
- 25 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy & Technology
- Vol. 38 (3) , 1-6
Yes, a Clunky Love Letter Written by Your Partner Is Better than an Eloquent One Written by AI: A Reply to Fröding and Peterson
- 25 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy & Technology
- Vol. 38 (3) , 1-6
Yes, a Clunky Love Letter Written by Your Partner Is Better than an Eloquent One Written by AI: A Reply to Fröding and Peterson
- Open Access
- 20 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy & Technology
- Vol. 38 (2) , 1-6
Co-authoring Apologies with ChatGPT Can Support Relationships but not Second-Person Authenticity: A Reply to Lavazza
In this paper, I offer a reply to Lavazza (2025), who states that using an LLM as a co-author to apologize to a partner – far from compromising second-person authenticity – can improve relational morality. I agree that some valuable aspects of the relationship may be enhanced in the co-authorship context; however, the second-person authenticity standard cannot still be adequately met. At best, using ChatGPT as a co-author might be compatible with a scenario in which the second-person authenticity assessment is suspended and postponed to a later point in time; this allows us to capture a potential diachronic dimension in such an assessment that has not yet been explored. In the remainder of the article, I criticize Lavazza’s Kantian argument and offer some clarifications on the analogy between using ChatGPT and friend-suggested communication, as well as on the terminology used.
- 20 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy & Technology
- Vol. 38 (2) , 1-6
Open AccessCo-authoring Apologies with ChatGPT Can Support Relationships but not Second-Person Authenticity: A Reply to Lavazza
In this paper, I offer a reply to Lavazza (2025), who states that using an LLM as a co-author to apologize to a partner – far from compromising second-person authenticity – can improve relational morality. I agree that some valuable aspects of the relationship may be enhanced in the co-authorship context; however, the second-person authenticity standard cannot still be adequately met. At best, using ChatGPT as a co-author might be compatible with a scenario in which the second-person authenticity assessment is suspended and postponed to a later point in time; this allows us to capture a potential diachronic dimension in such an assessment that has not yet been explored. In the remainder of the article, I criticize Lavazza’s Kantian argument and offer some clarifications on the analogy between using ChatGPT and friend-suggested communication, as well as on the terminology used.
- Open Access
- 15 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy
- Vol. 28 (2) , 327-337
Who decides who goes first? Taking democracy seriously in micro-allocative healthcare decisions
The structural scarcity of healthcare resources has deeply challenged their fair distribution, prompting the need for allocation criteria. Long under the spotlight of the bioethical debate with an extraordinary peak during the recent COVID-19 pandemic, micro-allocation of healthcare has been extensively discussed in the literature with regard to issues of substantive and formal justice. This paper addresses a relatively underdiscussed question within the field of formal justice: who should define micro-allocation criteria in healthcare? To explore this issue, we first establish formal requirements that must be met for allocation criteria to be considered fair and legitimate. Then, we introduce three possible answers to the research question: the attending physician, the team of physicians, and the team of experts. We discuss and then reject all of them, arguing that the task of defining allocation criteria should be assigned to a political representative, supported by a cross-disciplinary team of experts. This proposal is based on the need to take democracy seriously as a tool for making substantive allocative decisions in light of the inevitable disagreement on such matters within a community. To support this claim, we present two key arguments—the democracy argument and the consistency argument. We also pre-emptively respond to two significant critiques: the too-specificity of the decision critique and the catastrophic outcomes critique. In conclusion, we argue that our proposal offers the fairest and most legitimate decision-making process for healthcare micro-allocation.
- 15 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy
- Vol. 28 (2) , 327-337
Open AccessWho decides who goes first? Taking democracy seriously in micro-allocative healthcare decisions
The structural scarcity of healthcare resources has deeply challenged their fair distribution, prompting the need for allocation criteria. Long under the spotlight of the bioethical debate with an extraordinary peak during the recent COVID-19 pandemic, micro-allocation of healthcare has been extensively discussed in the literature with regard to issues of substantive and formal justice. This paper addresses a relatively underdiscussed question within the field of formal justice: who should define micro-allocation criteria in healthcare? To explore this issue, we first establish formal requirements that must be met for allocation criteria to be considered fair and legitimate. Then, we introduce three possible answers to the research question: the attending physician, the team of physicians, and the team of experts. We discuss and then reject all of them, arguing that the task of defining allocation criteria should be assigned to a political representative, supported by a cross-disciplinary team of experts. This proposal is based on the need to take democracy seriously as a tool for making substantive allocative decisions in light of the inevitable disagreement on such matters within a community. To support this claim, we present two key arguments—the democracy argument and the consistency argument. We also pre-emptively respond to two significant critiques: the too-specificity of the decision critique and the catastrophic outcomes critique. In conclusion, we argue that our proposal offers the fairest and most legitimate decision-making process for healthcare micro-allocation.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy & Technology
- Vol. 38 (1) , 1-19
Second-Person Authenticity and the Mediating Role of AI: A Moral Challenge for Human-to-Human Relationships?
The development of AI tools, such as large language models and speech emotion and facial expression recognition systems, has raised new ethical concerns about AI’s impact on human relationships. While much of the debate has focused on human-AI relationships, less attention has been devoted to another class of ethical issues, which arise when AI mediates human-to-human relationships. This paper opens the debate on these issues by analyzing the case of romantic relationships, particularly those in which one partner uses AI tools, such as ChatGPT, to resolve a conflict and apologize. After reviewing some possible, non-exhaustive, explanations for the moral wrongness of using AI tools in such cases, I introduce the notion of second-person authenticity: a form of authenticity that is assessed by the other person in the relationship (e.g., a partner). I then argue that at least some actions within romantic relationships should respect a standard of authentic conduct since the value of such actions depends on who actually performs them and not only on the quality of the outcome produced. Therefore, using AI tools in such circumstances may prevent agents from meeting this standard. I conclude by suggesting that the proposed theoretical framework could also apply to other human-to-human relationships, such as the doctor-patient relationship, when these are mediated by AI; I offer some preliminary reflections on such applications.
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy & Technology
- Vol. 38 (1) , 1-19
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessSecond-Person Authenticity and the Mediating Role of AI: A Moral Challenge for Human-to-Human Relationships?
The development of AI tools, such as large language models and speech emotion and facial expression recognition systems, has raised new ethical concerns about AI’s impact on human relationships. While much of the debate has focused on human-AI relationships, less attention has been devoted to another class of ethical issues, which arise when AI mediates human-to-human relationships. This paper opens the debate on these issues by analyzing the case of romantic relationships, particularly those in which one partner uses AI tools, such as ChatGPT, to resolve a conflict and apologize. After reviewing some possible, non-exhaustive, explanations for the moral wrongness of using AI tools in such cases, I introduce the notion of second-person authenticity: a form of authenticity that is assessed by the other person in the relationship (e.g., a partner). I then argue that at least some actions within romantic relationships should respect a standard of authentic conduct since the value of such actions depends on who actually performs them and not only on the quality of the outcome produced. Therefore, using AI tools in such circumstances may prevent agents from meeting this standard. I conclude by suggesting that the proposed theoretical framework could also apply to other human-to-human relationships, such as the doctor-patient relationship, when these are mediated by AI; I offer some preliminary reflections on such applications.
- 29 January 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 25 (2) , 120-123
The Authenticity Requirement: Why Using Digital Twins for Achieving Person-Span Extension Goods Can Be Self-Defeating
- 29 January 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 25 (2) , 120-123
The Authenticity Requirement: Why Using Digital Twins for Achieving Person-Span Extension Goods Can Be Self-Defeating