WEWilliam Enck

William Enck

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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William Enck has a total of 98 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    ASN1spect: Uncovering ASN.1 Compiler-Generated Vulnerabilities in Critical Infrastructure

    by Seaver Thorn, Nathaniel Bennett, Kevin Butler, Patrick Traynor, William Enck

  • Open Access

    Multi-Agent Taint Specification Extraction for Vulnerability Detection

    by Jonah Ghebremichael, Saastha Vasan, Saad Ullah, Greg Tystahl, David Adei, Christopher Kruegel, Giovanni Vigna, William Enck, Alexandros Kapravelos

    Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tools using taint analysis are widely viewed as providing higher-quality vulnerability detection results compared to traditional pattern-based approaches. However, performing static taint analysis for JavaScript poses two major challenges. First, JavaScript's dynamic features complicate data flow extraction required for taint tracking. Second, npm's large library ecosystem makes it difficult to identify relevant sources/sinks and establish taint propagation across dependencies. In this paper, we present SemTaint, a multi-agent system that strategically combines the semantic understanding of Large Language Models (LLMs) with traditional static program analysis to extract taint specifications, including sources, sinks, call edges, and library flow summaries tailored to each package. Conceptually, SemTaint uses static program analysis to calculate a call graph and defers to an LLM to resolve call edges that cannot be resolved statically. Further, it uses the LLM to classify sources and sinks for a given CWE. The resulting taint specification is then provided to a SAST tool, which performs vulnerability analysis. We integrate SemTaint with CodeQL, a state-of-the-art SAST tool, and demonstrate its effectiveness by detecting 106 of 162 vulnerabilities previously undetectable by CodeQL. Furthermore, we find 4 novel vulnerabilities in 4 popular npm packages. In doing so, we demonstrate that LLMs can practically enhance existing static program analysis algorithms, combining the strengths of both symbolic reasoning and semantic understanding for improved vulnerability detection.


  • Open Access

    ProfessorX: Detecting Silent Vulnerabilities in Policy Engine Implementations

    by Ben Weintraub, Chanyuan Liu, William Enck, Cristina Nita-Rotaru

  • Top Cited Papers
    Open Access

    Research Directions in Software Supply Chain Security

    by Laurie Williams, Giacomo Benedetti, Sivana Hamer, Ranindya Paramitha, Imranur Rahman, Mahzabin Tamanna, Greg Tystahl, Nusrat Zahan, Patrick Morrison, Yasemin Acar, et al.

    Reusable software libraries, frameworks, and components, such as those provided by open source ecosystems and third-party suppliers, accelerate digital innovation. However, recent years have shown almost exponential growth in attackers leveraging these software artifacts to launch software supply chain attacks. Past well-known software supply chain attacks include the SolarWinds, log4j, and xz utils incidents. Supply chain attacks are considered to have three major attack vectors: through vulnerabilities and malware accidentally or intentionally injected into open source and third-party dependencies/components/containers ; by infiltrating the build infrastructure during the build and deployment processes; and through targeted techniques aimed at the humans involved in software development, such as through social engineering. Plummeting trust in the software supply chain could decelerate digital innovation if the software industry reduces its use of open source and third-party artifacts to reduce risks. This article contains perspectives and knowledge obtained from intentional outreach with practitioners to understand their practical challenges and from extensive research efforts. We then provide an overview of current research efforts to secure the software supply chain. Finally, we propose a future research agenda to close software supply chain attack vectors and support the software industry.


  • iOS Security Framework: Understanding the Security of Mobile Phone Platforms

    by Răzvan Deaconescu, William Enck, Mihai Chiroiu, Luke Deshotels

  • Open Access

    RANsacked: A Domain-Informed Approach for Fuzzing LTE and 5G RAN-Core Interfaces

    by Nathaniel Bennett, Weidong Zhu, Benjamin Simon, Ryon Kennedy, William Enck, Patrick Traynor, Kevin R. B. Butler

    Cellular network infrastructure serves as the backbone of modern mobile wireless communication. As such, cellular cores must be proactively secured against external threats to ensure reliable service. Compromised base station attacks against the core are a rising threat to cellular networks, while user device inputs have long been considered as an attack vector; despite this, few techniques exist to comprehensively test RAN-Core interfaces against malicious input. In this work, we devise a fuzzing framework that performantly fuzzes cellular interfaces accessible from a base station or user device, overcoming several challenges in fuzzing specific to LTE/5G network components. We also introduce ASNFuzzGen, a tool that compiles ASN.1 specifications into structure-aware fuzzing modules, thereby facilitating effective fuzzing exploration of complex cellular protocols. We run fuzzing campaigns against seven open-source and commercial cores and discover 119 vulnerabilities, with 93 CVEs assigned. Our results reveal common implementation mistakes across several cores that lead to vulnerabilities, and the successful coordination of patches for these vulnerabilities across several vendors demonstrates the practical impact ASNFuzzGen has on hardening user-exposed cellular systems.


  • Pairing Security Advisories with Vulnerable Functions Using Open-Source LLMs

    by Trevor Dunlap, John Speed Meyers, Bradley Reaves, William Enck


  • Open Access

    VFCFinder: Pairing Security Advisories and Patches

    by Trevor Dunlap, Elizabeth Lin, William Enck, Bradley Reaves

    Security advisories are the primary channel of communication for discovered vulnerabilities in open-source software, but they often lack crucial information. Specifically, 63% of vulnerability database reports are missing their patch links, also referred to as vulnerability fixing commits (VFCs). This paper introduces VFCFinder, a tool that generates the top-five ranked set of VFCs for a given security advisory using Natural Language Programming Language (NL-PL) models. VFCFinder achieves a 96.6% recall for finding the correct VFC within the Top-5 commits, and an 80.0% recall for the Top-1 ranked commit. VFCFinder generalizes to nine different programming languages and outperforms state-of-the-art approaches by 36 percentage points in terms of Top-1 recall. As a practical contribution, we used VFCFinder to backfill over 300 missing VFCs in the GitHub Security Advisory (GHSA) database. All of the VFCs were accepted and merged into the GHSA database. In addition to demonstrating a practical pairing of security advisories to VFCs, our general open-source implementation will allow vulnerability database maintainers to drastically improve data quality, supporting efforts to secure the software supply chain.


  • Open Access

    Examining Cryptography and Randomness Failures in Open-Source Cellular Cores

    by K. Virgil English, Nathaniel Bennett, Seaver Thorn, Kevin R. B. Butler, William Enck, Patrick Traynor

    Industry is increasingly adopting private 5G networks to securely manage their wireless devices in retail, manufacturing, natural resources, and healthcare. As with most technology sectors, open-source software is well poised to form the foundation of deployments, whether it is deployed directly or as part of well-maintained proprietary offerings. This paper seeks to examine the use of cryptography and secure randomness in open-source cellular cores. We design a set of 13 CodeQL static program analysis rules for cores written in both C/C++ and Go and apply them to 7 open-source cellular cores implementing 4G and 5G functionality. We identify two significant security vulnerabilities, including predictable generation of TMSIs and improper verification of TLS certificates, with each vulnerability affecting multiple cores. In identifying these flaws, we hope to correct implementations to fix downstream deployments and derivative proprietary projects.


  • Open Access

    5GAC-Analyzer: Identifying Over-Privilege Between 5G Core Network Functions

    by Seaver Thorn, K. Virgil English, Kevin R. B. Butler, William Enck