William Enck
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
William Enck has a total of 98 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Kevin Butler
University of Florida, Gainesville, USA
4 shared publications - Seaver Thorn
North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, USA
4 shared publications - K. Virgil English
North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, USA
3 shared publications - Nathaniel Bennett
University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA
3 shared publications - Patrick Traynor
University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, USA
3 shared publications - Alexandros Kapravelos
North Carolina State University, Raleigh, North Carolina, USA
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 30 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 44-56
ASN1spect: Uncovering ASN.1 Compiler-Generated Vulnerabilities in Critical Infrastructure
- 30 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 44-56
Open AccessASN1spect: Uncovering ASN.1 Compiler-Generated Vulnerabilities in Critical Infrastructure
- Open Access
Multi-Agent Taint Specification Extraction for Vulnerability Detection
Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tools using taint analysis are widely viewed as providing higher-quality vulnerability detection results compared to traditional pattern-based approaches. However, performing static taint analysis for JavaScript poses two major challenges. First, JavaScript's dynamic features complicate data flow extraction required for taint tracking. Second, npm's large library ecosystem makes it difficult to identify relevant sources/sinks and establish taint propagation across dependencies. In this paper, we present SemTaint, a multi-agent system that strategically combines the semantic understanding of Large Language Models (LLMs) with traditional static program analysis to extract taint specifications, including sources, sinks, call edges, and library flow summaries tailored to each package. Conceptually, SemTaint uses static program analysis to calculate a call graph and defers to an LLM to resolve call edges that cannot be resolved statically. Further, it uses the LLM to classify sources and sinks for a given CWE. The resulting taint specification is then provided to a SAST tool, which performs vulnerability analysis. We integrate SemTaint with CodeQL, a state-of-the-art SAST tool, and demonstrate its effectiveness by detecting 106 of 162 vulnerabilities previously undetectable by CodeQL. Furthermore, we find 4 novel vulnerabilities in 4 popular npm packages. In doing so, we demonstrate that LLMs can practically enhance existing static program analysis algorithms, combining the strengths of both symbolic reasoning and semantic understanding for improved vulnerability detection.
Open AccessMulti-Agent Taint Specification Extraction for Vulnerability Detection
Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tools using taint analysis are widely viewed as providing higher-quality vulnerability detection results compared to traditional pattern-based approaches. However, performing static taint analysis for JavaScript poses two major challenges. First, JavaScript's dynamic features complicate data flow extraction required for taint tracking. Second, npm's large library ecosystem makes it difficult to identify relevant sources/sinks and establish taint propagation across dependencies. In this paper, we present SemTaint, a multi-agent system that strategically combines the semantic understanding of Large Language Models (LLMs) with traditional static program analysis to extract taint specifications, including sources, sinks, call edges, and library flow summaries tailored to each package. Conceptually, SemTaint uses static program analysis to calculate a call graph and defers to an LLM to resolve call edges that cannot be resolved statically. Further, it uses the LLM to classify sources and sinks for a given CWE. The resulting taint specification is then provided to a SAST tool, which performs vulnerability analysis. We integrate SemTaint with CodeQL, a state-of-the-art SAST tool, and demonstrate its effectiveness by detecting 106 of 162 vulnerabilities previously undetectable by CodeQL. Furthermore, we find 4 novel vulnerabilities in 4 popular npm packages. In doing so, we demonstrate that LLMs can practically enhance existing static program analysis algorithms, combining the strengths of both symbolic reasoning and semantic understanding for improved vulnerability detection.
- Open Access
- 7 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 99-110
ProfessorX: Detecting Silent Vulnerabilities in Policy Engine Implementations
- 7 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 99-110
Open AccessProfessorX: Detecting Silent Vulnerabilities in Policy Engine Implementations
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 26 May 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology
- Vol. 34 (5) , 1-38
Research Directions in Software Supply Chain Security
Reusable software libraries, frameworks, and components, such as those provided by open source ecosystems and third-party suppliers, accelerate digital innovation. However, recent years have shown almost exponential growth in attackers leveraging these software artifacts to launch software supply chain attacks. Past well-known software supply chain attacks include the SolarWinds, log4j, and xz utils incidents. Supply chain attacks are considered to have three major attack vectors: through vulnerabilities and malware accidentally or intentionally injected into open source and third-party dependencies/components/containers ; by infiltrating the build infrastructure during the build and deployment processes; and through targeted techniques aimed at the humans involved in software development, such as through social engineering. Plummeting trust in the software supply chain could decelerate digital innovation if the software industry reduces its use of open source and third-party artifacts to reduce risks. This article contains perspectives and knowledge obtained from intentional outreach with practitioners to understand their practical challenges and from extensive research efforts. We then provide an overview of current research efforts to secure the software supply chain. Finally, we propose a future research agenda to close software supply chain attack vectors and support the software industry.
- 26 May 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology
- Vol. 34 (5) , 1-38
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessResearch Directions in Software Supply Chain Security
Reusable software libraries, frameworks, and components, such as those provided by open source ecosystems and third-party suppliers, accelerate digital innovation. However, recent years have shown almost exponential growth in attackers leveraging these software artifacts to launch software supply chain attacks. Past well-known software supply chain attacks include the SolarWinds, log4j, and xz utils incidents. Supply chain attacks are considered to have three major attack vectors: through vulnerabilities and malware accidentally or intentionally injected into open source and third-party dependencies/components/containers ; by infiltrating the build infrastructure during the build and deployment processes; and through targeted techniques aimed at the humans involved in software development, such as through social engineering. Plummeting trust in the software supply chain could decelerate digital innovation if the software industry reduces its use of open source and third-party artifacts to reduce risks. This article contains perspectives and knowledge obtained from intentional outreach with practitioners to understand their practical challenges and from extensive research efforts. We then provide an overview of current research efforts to secure the software supply chain. Finally, we propose a future research agenda to close software supply chain attack vectors and support the software industry.
- 10 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1290-1294
iOS Security Framework: Understanding the Security of Mobile Phone Platforms
- 10 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1290-1294
iOS Security Framework: Understanding the Security of Mobile Phone Platforms
- Open Access
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2027-2041
RANsacked: A Domain-Informed Approach for Fuzzing LTE and 5G RAN-Core Interfaces
Cellular network infrastructure serves as the backbone of modern mobile wireless communication. As such, cellular cores must be proactively secured against external threats to ensure reliable service. Compromised base station attacks against the core are a rising threat to cellular networks, while user device inputs have long been considered as an attack vector; despite this, few techniques exist to comprehensively test RAN-Core interfaces against malicious input. In this work, we devise a fuzzing framework that performantly fuzzes cellular interfaces accessible from a base station or user device, overcoming several challenges in fuzzing specific to LTE/5G network components. We also introduce ASNFuzzGen, a tool that compiles ASN.1 specifications into structure-aware fuzzing modules, thereby facilitating effective fuzzing exploration of complex cellular protocols. We run fuzzing campaigns against seven open-source and commercial cores and discover 119 vulnerabilities, with 93 CVEs assigned. Our results reveal common implementation mistakes across several cores that lead to vulnerabilities, and the successful coordination of patches for these vulnerabilities across several vendors demonstrates the practical impact ASNFuzzGen has on hardening user-exposed cellular systems.
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2027-2041
Open AccessRANsacked: A Domain-Informed Approach for Fuzzing LTE and 5G RAN-Core Interfaces
Cellular network infrastructure serves as the backbone of modern mobile wireless communication. As such, cellular cores must be proactively secured against external threats to ensure reliable service. Compromised base station attacks against the core are a rising threat to cellular networks, while user device inputs have long been considered as an attack vector; despite this, few techniques exist to comprehensively test RAN-Core interfaces against malicious input. In this work, we devise a fuzzing framework that performantly fuzzes cellular interfaces accessible from a base station or user device, overcoming several challenges in fuzzing specific to LTE/5G network components. We also introduce ASNFuzzGen, a tool that compiles ASN.1 specifications into structure-aware fuzzing modules, thereby facilitating effective fuzzing exploration of complex cellular protocols. We run fuzzing campaigns against seven open-source and commercial cores and discover 119 vulnerabilities, with 93 CVEs assigned. Our results reveal common implementation mistakes across several cores that lead to vulnerabilities, and the successful coordination of patches for these vulnerabilities across several vendors demonstrates the practical impact ASNFuzzGen has on hardening user-exposed cellular systems.
- 9 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 350-369
Pairing Security Advisories with Vulnerable Functions Using Open-Source LLMs
- 9 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 350-369
Pairing Security Advisories with Vulnerable Functions Using Open-Source LLMs
- Open Access
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1128-1142
VFCFinder: Pairing Security Advisories and Patches
Security advisories are the primary channel of communication for discovered vulnerabilities in open-source software, but they often lack crucial information. Specifically, 63% of vulnerability database reports are missing their patch links, also referred to as vulnerability fixing commits (VFCs). This paper introduces VFCFinder, a tool that generates the top-five ranked set of VFCs for a given security advisory using Natural Language Programming Language (NL-PL) models. VFCFinder achieves a 96.6% recall for finding the correct VFC within the Top-5 commits, and an 80.0% recall for the Top-1 ranked commit. VFCFinder generalizes to nine different programming languages and outperforms state-of-the-art approaches by 36 percentage points in terms of Top-1 recall. As a practical contribution, we used VFCFinder to backfill over 300 missing VFCs in the GitHub Security Advisory (GHSA) database. All of the VFCs were accepted and merged into the GHSA database. In addition to demonstrating a practical pairing of security advisories to VFCs, our general open-source implementation will allow vulnerability database maintainers to drastically improve data quality, supporting efforts to secure the software supply chain.
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1128-1142
Open AccessVFCFinder: Pairing Security Advisories and Patches
Security advisories are the primary channel of communication for discovered vulnerabilities in open-source software, but they often lack crucial information. Specifically, 63% of vulnerability database reports are missing their patch links, also referred to as vulnerability fixing commits (VFCs). This paper introduces VFCFinder, a tool that generates the top-five ranked set of VFCs for a given security advisory using Natural Language Programming Language (NL-PL) models. VFCFinder achieves a 96.6% recall for finding the correct VFC within the Top-5 commits, and an 80.0% recall for the Top-1 ranked commit. VFCFinder generalizes to nine different programming languages and outperforms state-of-the-art approaches by 36 percentage points in terms of Top-1 recall. As a practical contribution, we used VFCFinder to backfill over 300 missing VFCs in the GitHub Security Advisory (GHSA) database. All of the VFCs were accepted and merged into the GHSA database. In addition to demonstrating a practical pairing of security advisories to VFCs, our general open-source implementation will allow vulnerability database maintainers to drastically improve data quality, supporting efforts to secure the software supply chain.
- Open Access
- 19 June 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 43-54
Examining Cryptography and Randomness Failures in Open-Source Cellular Cores
Industry is increasingly adopting private 5G networks to securely manage their wireless devices in retail, manufacturing, natural resources, and healthcare. As with most technology sectors, open-source software is well poised to form the foundation of deployments, whether it is deployed directly or as part of well-maintained proprietary offerings. This paper seeks to examine the use of cryptography and secure randomness in open-source cellular cores. We design a set of 13 CodeQL static program analysis rules for cores written in both C/C++ and Go and apply them to 7 open-source cellular cores implementing 4G and 5G functionality. We identify two significant security vulnerabilities, including predictable generation of TMSIs and improper verification of TLS certificates, with each vulnerability affecting multiple cores. In identifying these flaws, we hope to correct implementations to fix downstream deployments and derivative proprietary projects.
- 19 June 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 43-54
Open AccessExamining Cryptography and Randomness Failures in Open-Source Cellular Cores
Industry is increasingly adopting private 5G networks to securely manage their wireless devices in retail, manufacturing, natural resources, and healthcare. As with most technology sectors, open-source software is well poised to form the foundation of deployments, whether it is deployed directly or as part of well-maintained proprietary offerings. This paper seeks to examine the use of cryptography and secure randomness in open-source cellular cores. We design a set of 13 CodeQL static program analysis rules for cores written in both C/C++ and Go and apply them to 7 open-source cellular cores implementing 4G and 5G functionality. We identify two significant security vulnerabilities, including predictable generation of TMSIs and improper verification of TLS certificates, with each vulnerability affecting multiple cores. In identifying these flaws, we hope to correct implementations to fix downstream deployments and derivative proprietary projects.
- Open Access
- 27 May 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 66-77
5GAC-Analyzer: Identifying Over-Privilege Between 5G Core Network Functions
- 27 May 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 66-77
Open Access5GAC-Analyzer: Identifying Over-Privilege Between 5G Core Network Functions