KEK. Virgil English

K. Virgil English

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


K. Virgil English has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Examining Cryptography and Randomness Failures in Open-Source Cellular Cores

    by K. Virgil English, Nathaniel Bennett, Seaver Thorn, Kevin R. B. Butler, William Enck, Patrick Traynor

    Industry is increasingly adopting private 5G networks to securely manage their wireless devices in retail, manufacturing, natural resources, and healthcare. As with most technology sectors, open-source software is well poised to form the foundation of deployments, whether it is deployed directly or as part of well-maintained proprietary offerings. This paper seeks to examine the use of cryptography and secure randomness in open-source cellular cores. We design a set of 13 CodeQL static program analysis rules for cores written in both C/C++ and Go and apply them to 7 open-source cellular cores implementing 4G and 5G functionality. We identify two significant security vulnerabilities, including predictable generation of TMSIs and improper verification of TLS certificates, with each vulnerability affecting multiple cores. In identifying these flaws, we hope to correct implementations to fix downstream deployments and derivative proprietary projects.


  • Open Access

    5GAC-Analyzer: Identifying Over-Privilege Between 5G Core Network Functions

    by Seaver Thorn, K. Virgil English, Kevin R. B. Butler, William Enck


  • Open Access

    Analysis of Payment Service Provider SDKs in Android

    by Samin Yaseer Mahmud, K. Virgil English, Seaver Thorn, William Enck, Adam Oest, Muhammad Saad

    Payment Service Providers (PSPs) provide software development toolkits (SDKs) for integrating complex payment processing code into applications. Security weaknesses in payment SDKs can impact thousands of applications. In this work, we propose AARDroid for statically assessing payment SDKs against OWASP’s MASVS industry standard for mobile application security. In creating AARDroid, we adapted application-level requirements and program analysis tools for SDK-specific analysis, tailoring dataflow analysis for SDKs using domain-specific ontologies to infer the security semantics of application programming interfaces (APIs). We apply AARDroid to 50 payment SDKs and discover security weaknesses including saving unencrypted credit card information to files, use of insecure cryptographic primitives, insecure input methods for credit card information, and insecure use of WebViews. These results demonstrate the value of applying security analysis at the SDK granularity to prevent the widespread deployment of insecure code.