K. Virgil English
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
K. Virgil English has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Seaver Thorn
North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, USA
3 shared publications - William Enck
North Carolina State University
3 shared publications - Kevin Butler
University of Florida, Gainesville, USA
2 shared publications - Adam Oest
Arizona State University, United States of America
1 shared publication - Muhammad Saad
Department of Computer Science, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL, USA
1 shared publication - Nathaniel Bennett
University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 19 June 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 43-54
Examining Cryptography and Randomness Failures in Open-Source Cellular Cores
Industry is increasingly adopting private 5G networks to securely manage their wireless devices in retail, manufacturing, natural resources, and healthcare. As with most technology sectors, open-source software is well poised to form the foundation of deployments, whether it is deployed directly or as part of well-maintained proprietary offerings. This paper seeks to examine the use of cryptography and secure randomness in open-source cellular cores. We design a set of 13 CodeQL static program analysis rules for cores written in both C/C++ and Go and apply them to 7 open-source cellular cores implementing 4G and 5G functionality. We identify two significant security vulnerabilities, including predictable generation of TMSIs and improper verification of TLS certificates, with each vulnerability affecting multiple cores. In identifying these flaws, we hope to correct implementations to fix downstream deployments and derivative proprietary projects.
- 19 June 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 43-54
Open AccessExamining Cryptography and Randomness Failures in Open-Source Cellular Cores
Industry is increasingly adopting private 5G networks to securely manage their wireless devices in retail, manufacturing, natural resources, and healthcare. As with most technology sectors, open-source software is well poised to form the foundation of deployments, whether it is deployed directly or as part of well-maintained proprietary offerings. This paper seeks to examine the use of cryptography and secure randomness in open-source cellular cores. We design a set of 13 CodeQL static program analysis rules for cores written in both C/C++ and Go and apply them to 7 open-source cellular cores implementing 4G and 5G functionality. We identify two significant security vulnerabilities, including predictable generation of TMSIs and improper verification of TLS certificates, with each vulnerability affecting multiple cores. In identifying these flaws, we hope to correct implementations to fix downstream deployments and derivative proprietary projects.
- Open Access
- 27 May 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 66-77
5GAC-Analyzer: Identifying Over-Privilege Between 5G Core Network Functions
- 27 May 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 66-77
Open Access5GAC-Analyzer: Identifying Over-Privilege Between 5G Core Network Functions
- Open Access
- 5 December 2022
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 576-590
Analysis of Payment Service Provider SDKs in Android
Payment Service Providers (PSPs) provide software development toolkits (SDKs) for integrating complex payment processing code into applications. Security weaknesses in payment SDKs can impact thousands of applications. In this work, we propose AARDroid for statically assessing payment SDKs against OWASP’s MASVS industry standard for mobile application security. In creating AARDroid, we adapted application-level requirements and program analysis tools for SDK-specific analysis, tailoring dataflow analysis for SDKs using domain-specific ontologies to infer the security semantics of application programming interfaces (APIs). We apply AARDroid to 50 payment SDKs and discover security weaknesses including saving unencrypted credit card information to files, use of insecure cryptographic primitives, insecure input methods for credit card information, and insecure use of WebViews. These results demonstrate the value of applying security analysis at the SDK granularity to prevent the widespread deployment of insecure code.
- 5 December 2022
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 576-590
Open AccessAnalysis of Payment Service Provider SDKs in Android
Payment Service Providers (PSPs) provide software development toolkits (SDKs) for integrating complex payment processing code into applications. Security weaknesses in payment SDKs can impact thousands of applications. In this work, we propose AARDroid for statically assessing payment SDKs against OWASP’s MASVS industry standard for mobile application security. In creating AARDroid, we adapted application-level requirements and program analysis tools for SDK-specific analysis, tailoring dataflow analysis for SDKs using domain-specific ontologies to infer the security semantics of application programming interfaces (APIs). We apply AARDroid to 50 payment SDKs and discover security weaknesses including saving unencrypted credit card information to files, use of insecure cryptographic primitives, insecure input methods for credit card information, and insecure use of WebViews. These results demonstrate the value of applying security analysis at the SDK granularity to prevent the widespread deployment of insecure code.